Judgement Appeal (No. 25 of 1944) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (July 15, 1942) which allowed in part an appeal from, and modified a judgment and decree of, the Court of the Subordinate Judge of Gurdaspur (March 3, 1941). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee It was common ground that before 1934 the appellant and respondent, who were full brothers, their father Bhodu Shah, and their step brother Wadhawa Mal had formed a joint Hindu family, and that in 1932 Wadhawa Mal instituted a suit for partition. On December 27, 1934, Bhodu Shah having died during the pendency of the suit, Wadhawa Mal on the one hand and the appellant and respondent on the other hand entered into a compromise whereby one-third of the family property was assigned to Wadhawa Mal and two-thirds to the appellant and respondent. The suit in which this appeal arose was instituted by the appellant on December 21, 1939. In his plaint he alleged that after the partition of 1934 he and the respondent remained members of a joint Hindu family, the respondent, as the elder brother, being the Karta. The appellant claimed partition of the joint family property, possession of his share, and the rendering of accounts by the respondent. The respondent in his written statement alleged that partition was effected in 1934 between all the members of the family, and that thereafter he and the appellant were divided in status, but remained joint owners of their share of the family property until December 21, 1939 ; that on that date the bulk of the property was physically divided between the two brothers, though part still remained in joint ownership, and that two memoranda were prepared in duplicate showing the division arrived at and what property continued joint, one memorandum being retained by each brother. The trial judge framed issues of which the first two were — 1. Did the parties of this suit constitute a joint Hindu family even after the separation of their eldest brother Wadhawa Mal? 2. Did the parties of this suit separate in 1939 and therefore the suit in the present form does not lie ? The trial judge answered the first issue in the affirmative, and the finding that the appellant and respondent remained joint after 1934 was not challenged before the Board. 2. Did the parties of this suit separate in 1939 and therefore the suit in the present form does not lie ? The trial judge answered the first issue in the affirmative, and the finding that the appellant and respondent remained joint after 1934 was not challenged before the Board. The second issue, which the learned judge answered in the negative, was the material one on this appeal. The learned judge held in the first place that the memoranda referred to in the written statement, which for purposes of identification were marked " C " and " D," constituted an instrument for partition and could not be given in evidence since they were neither stamped nor registered. He gave the respondent the opportunity of paying the necessary stamp duty and penalty, but the respondent declined to make the payment. The alleged fact that the documents had been stamped since judgment was immaterial. In the absence of written evidence of partition the learned judge considered that the oral evidence called by the respondent to support a partition in February, 1939, was unsatisfactory, and accordingly he held the parties to have been joint at the date of suit and gave the appellant a decree. In appeal the High Court of Lahore (Dalip Singh and Muhammad Munir JJ.) considered only issue 2. They held that the oral evidence proved that partition between the appellant and the respondent took place on or before February 21, 1939, and they expressed the opinion that the documents marked " C " and " D," even if they required to be stamped and registered, could be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purpose of determining the factum of partition as distinct from its terms. Section 35 of the Indian Stamp Act, 1899, provided — "No instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in " evidence for any purpose by any person having by law or " consent of parties authority to receive evidence, or shall " be acted upon, registered or authenticated by any such " person or by any public officer, unless such instrument is " duly stamped." The provisos did not apply in this case. Section 49 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, provided that no document required to be registered under s. 17 should, unless it had been registered, affect any immovable property comprised therein or be received in evidence of any transaction affecting such property. 1945. Nov. 15. Robert Ritson for the appellant. The respondent alleges that there was a partition, which, it is submitted for the appellant, means a division of the property, in February, 1939, and subsequently in March, 1939, and he wants to prove that division and say that the appellant cannot bring his action. The two memoranda, marked " C " and " D," were wholly inadmissible in evidence owing to their not having been stamped and registered, and the court is not at liberty to look at them for any evidential purpose whatever Indian Stamp Act, 1899, s. 35 ; Indian Registration Act, 1908, ss. 17, 49 ; Indian Evidence Act, 1872, s. 91. The factum of partition cannot be proved by oral evidence where the terms of the alleged partition have been reduced to writing. The word “partition” is, it is submitted, used in two ways—change of status, and division of property. Change of status can be proved even if the documents are inadmissible, but the property cannot be dealt with in that way. The allegation of the respondent that there was a partition in February, 1939, only amounts to a statement that there was a division of property ; the documents are those of partition of property, and under the various statutory provisions above mentioned they cannot be looked at for any purpose. There is no reliable evidence of any partition having taken place in February or March, 1939, and the terms of the alleged partition were not in evidence before the court. The respondents defence was that the joint Hindu family of the respondent and the appellant had been disrupted in 1934, and having failed in that defence he cannot now be allowed to claim that it was disrupted in 1939. The documents ought in this case to have been completely expunged from consideration and not used for any purpose whatever Ramayya v. Achamma (( 1944) A. I. R. (Mad.) 550.). The documents ought in this case to have been completely expunged from consideration and not used for any purpose whatever Ramayya v. Achamma (( 1944) A. I. R. (Mad.) 550.). [Reference was also made to Varatha Pillai v. Jeevarathammal (( 1918) L. R. 46 I. A. 285), Rajangam Ayyar v. Rajangam Ayyar (( 1922) L. R. 50 I. A. 134), Kishan Chand v. Dina Nath (( 1933) A. I. R. (Lah.) 574.), and Nilkanth Bhimaji v. Hanmant Eknath (( 1920) I. L. R. 44 B. 881.).] Separation of status is expressly excluded from consideration for the purposes of this appeal; the only point contended for is that the respondent has not proved, and cannot prove, that there has been separation of property. Rewcastle K. C. and J. M. Parikh for the respondent. Looking at the evidence, apart from the documents, it is plain that there was ample evidence before the court below which enabled it to answer issue No. 2 in the respondents favour. Severance of status does not require to be proved by any documentary evidence at all. There is here evidence that there was an actual division of property between the parties early in 1939, and that they went into possession of their respective shares. There is also conduct inconsistent with anything except separation. Taking those things together, and without looking at the documents, they had separated in status and made some partition of the property before these proceedings were started, although the terms of the partition of the property cannot be precisely ascertained. That being the position, the purpose of this action requires the appellant to say that he is joint, and if he was not joint when his suit was instituted this action was bound to fail, except in respect of property which was shown, and admitted by the respondent, to be undivided. As to the admissibility of the documents, I would adopt the statement in Mulla on the Stamp Act, 3rd ed., p. 118. The High Court were right in saying that, once it is found that the parties are separate and that there is some sort of partition of property, it is then for a plaintiff approaching a position of that kind to say what property is held jointly. Robert Ritson replied. Dec. The High Court were right in saying that, once it is found that the parties are separate and that there is some sort of partition of property, it is then for a plaintiff approaching a position of that kind to say what property is held jointly. Robert Ritson replied. Dec. 17 The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts and quoted the statutory provisions set out above and continued It is unnecessary to consider the effect of s. 49 of the Indian Registration Act because the documents in question not being stamped, the wider prohibition contained in the Stamp Act applies, and the learned trial judge rightly excluded the documents. Their Lordships are not in agreement with the opinion of the High Court that the documents marked "C" and " D," even if they required to be stamped and registered, could be used to corroborate the oral evidence for the purpose of determining the factum of partition as distinct from its terms. As already noted, s. 35 of the Indian Stamp Act enacts that no instrument chargeable with duty shall be admitted in evidence for any purpose. Mr. Rewcastle, as part of his argument for the respondent, adopted the note on the words " for any purpose " in s. 35 contained in the 4th edition of Sir Dinshah Mullas book on the Indian Stamp Act, 1899. He pointed out that the words " for any purpose " first appeared in India in the Stamp Act of 1879, and in England in the Stamp Act of 1891, and that under the earlier Acts there were decisions in both countries that an unstamped document might be admitted in evidence for a collateral purpose, that is, to prove some matter other than the transaction recorded in the instrument, and he submitted that these cases applied even under the later Acts. Their Lordships do not take this view. A document admitted in proof of some collateral matter is admitted in evidence for that purpose, and the statute enacts that it shall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose. Their Lordships see no reason why the words " for any " purpose " in the Indian Act of 1879 should not be given their natural meaning and effect. A document admitted in proof of some collateral matter is admitted in evidence for that purpose, and the statute enacts that it shall not be admitted in evidence for any purpose. Their Lordships see no reason why the words " for any " purpose " in the Indian Act of 1879 should not be given their natural meaning and effect. Such words may well have been inserted by the legislature to get rid of the difficulties surrounding the question of what amounted to a collateral purpose. Their Lordships therefore pay no regard to the documents marked "C " and " D," but they are in agreement with the High Court in thinking that the oral evidence proved partition in February, 1939. The respondent no doubt failed to prove the partition in 1934, which was alleged in his written statement, but the important question is whether partition had been affected before the institution of the suit in December, 1939. Two witnesses, Das Mal and Sain Das, gave evidence of a partition of the joint property in February, 1939, at which the witnesses were present, and of the parties taking possession of the property allotted to them. This evidence was supported by evidence that soon after February, 1939, some land revenue was paid separately by the respondent, though previously it had been paid by both parties jointly; by evidence of two witnesses who stated that they had cultivated land belonging jointly to the parties, but that since April, 1939, they had paid the produce separately to each ; and by the evidence of the respondent that for 1939-40 and 1940-41 he had submitted separate returns for income-tax. Their Lordships think it unnecessary to discuss the evidence in further detail, since this was done in both the lower courts. In their Lordships view the evidence establishes a physical division of much of the joint property in February, 1939, and this is only consistent with a severance in the status of the parties having taken place. Their Lordships think it unnecessary to discuss the evidence in further detail, since this was done in both the lower courts. In their Lordships view the evidence establishes a physical division of much of the joint property in February, 1939, and this is only consistent with a severance in the status of the parties having taken place. On that view of the matter, the appellant can get no more than the High Court gave him, namely, a declaration that he is entitled to a half share in the agricultural lands which the respondent admitted to be joint, and a preliminary decree for partition of the properties mentioned in the documents marked " C " and " D " and admitted by the respondent in such documents to be joint. It has been argued for the appellant that the decree of the High Court erred in referring to the documents marked " C " and "D" which were not admissible in evidence. But the documents were not used as evidence ; they were employed merely as a convenient means of identifying the properties admitted by the respondent to be joint, thereby avoiding setting out the properties in a schedule to the order, which would have been the more regular course. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellant must pay the respondents costs of the appeal.