Judgement Appeal (No. 87 of 1944), by special leave, from a judgment and order of the High Court (August 21, 1944) which had dismissed an application by the present appellants to be released on bail pending the decision of His Majesty in Council in their appeal, by special leave, from the judgment and order of that High Court (April 26, 1944) whereby the court upheld their conviction of conspiracy to cheat and of cheating the Government under s. 120B read with s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court (Teja Singh J.), on August 9, 1944, held that the correct view was that taken by Blacker J. in Bawa Faqir Singh v. Emperor (( 1938) A. I. R. (Lah.) 697.), that once a High Court has passed an order in a criminal appeal it becomes functus officio and has no seisin of the case, but that seisin may be revived if His Majesty in Council grants special leave to appeal with a direction to the High Court to entertain an application for bail. The High Court accordingly adjourned the hearing of the applica tion for bail to enable it to be ascertained whether the Judicial Committee was moved for bail and whether any directions were given on such application. After the adjournment a final order was passed by the High Court on August 21, 1944, dismissing the application for bail on the ground that the Judicial Committee was merely moved for special leave to appeal and gave no directions to the High Court to entertain an application for bail. The question raised by this appeal is whether a High Court in India has power to grant bail to a person who has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and to whom His Majesty in Council has given leave to appeal against his conviction or sentence. 1944. Dec. 12, 13. Pritt K.C. and Khambatta for the appellants. There has been a conflict of opinion in India on the question in this appeal. The material provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are ss. 401, 426, 496, 498 and 561A [see the judgment of the Judicial Committee]. Most courts have rested on s. 561 a—the inherent jurisdiction section —in saying that there is power to grant bail to a convicted person in such circumstances as the present. The material provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are ss. 401, 426, 496, 498 and 561A [see the judgment of the Judicial Committee]. Most courts have rested on s. 561 a—the inherent jurisdiction section —in saying that there is power to grant bail to a convicted person in such circumstances as the present. Blacker J. in Bawa Faqir Singh v. Emperor (( 1938) A. I. R. (Lah.) 697.) said that a High Court having become functus officio when it p has passed an order in a criminal appeal, seisin may be revived if His Majesty in Council grants special leave to appeal with a direction to the High Court to entertain an application for bail. That is a strange half-way house. A direction of the Judicial Committee cannot alter the power which the High Court has or has not got. If there is power under s. 498 of the Code to grant bail the High Court does not need your Lordships direction, and if the High Court has not the power the Boards direction would not give it. The question is whether the inherent power of the High Court to make orders to secure the ends of justice, in s. 56IA, extends to the granting of bail. It is submitted that it does. Queen-Empress v. Subrahmania Ayyar (( 1900) I. L. R. 24 M. 161.) is not a very satisfactory decision, the court merely stating that in their opinion they had jurisdiction to give bail. In Emperor v. Ram Sarup (( 1926) I. L. R. 49 A. 247.) it was held that the High Court had inherent jurisdiction under s. 561A to grant bail, but they declined to do so until special leave to appeal had been granted by the Privy Council. Tulsi Telini v. Emperor (( 1923) I. L. R. 50 C. 585.) is earlier in date than s. 56IA of the Code. The legislature in s. 56IA has not created any new inherent power, but has simply said what that power is. It was said in Babu Lal Chokhani v. Emperor (I. L. R. [ 1937] I C. 464.) that after the disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court, it becomes functus officio and has no seisin of the case in any way, and that before leave to appeal has been granted by the Judicial Committee the High Court cannot grant bail. That does not affect the present case, because here the leave has been granted. [Reference was made to Thakur Shah v. The King-Emperor (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 196, 199).] It was recently held in this country that an inherent power to grant bail does not exist in the High Court of Justice Ex parte Blyth ([ 1944] K. B. 532.). It should be remembered, however, that India is quite apart from this country, and no regard should be had here to English law. It would be too narrow a view to say that there cannot be, in the inherent jurisdiction to secure the ends of justice, the power to grant bail because bail is already dealt with in the Code of Criminal Procedure. It is necessary to consider whether it serves the ends of justice to release the appellants or not. Of the cases in India, two High Courts say positively that they have this jurisdiction, and no High Court states that it has not, apart from the curious suggestion that it only arises if the Board says that it does. There is no case which says that after leave to appeal has been given by the Privy Council a High Court cannot grant bail. [Reference was also made to Diwan Chand v. King-Emperor (( 1908) P. R., Cr. Judgmts. No, 15, p. 50).] A High Court in India has power to grant bail to a person who has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment and to whom His Majesty in Council has given special leave to appeal against his conviction or sentence. Khambatta followed. B. MacKenna for the respondent. The High Court has no power to grant bail to a convicted person under s. 498 of the Code. That section is in a chapter on bail, and must be read in its context. It deals only with the granting of bail to accused persons, and not to persons who have been convicted. If the appellants are right in contending that s. 498 gives the power to the High Court in a case where a person has been convicted then s. 426, sub-s. 2, of the Code would have been quite unnecessary. Section 498 gives the same power to Courts of Session as it gives to the High Court. If the appellants are right in contending that s. 498 gives the power to the High Court in a case where a person has been convicted then s. 426, sub-s. 2, of the Code would have been quite unnecessary. Section 498 gives the same power to Courts of Session as it gives to the High Court. If the argument is right that the High Court under s. 498 has the power in any particular case, including cases where a conviction has taken place, to grant bail, then the Court of Session has the like power. The Court of Session must in that case have the power to grant bail pending an appeal from any court to a court subordinate to the High Court. Then, one asks, why did s. 426, sub-s. 2, confine the power to grant bail to the High Court, and did not put in the words "and to the Court of Session." With regard to the inherent jurisdiction, the effect of s. 561A was considered in King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (( 1944) L. R. 71 I. A. 203.). Under the Letters Patent of the Lahore High Court, 1919, there is no room for the inherent power; cl. 28 provides that their powers shall be those conferred by the Code of Criminal Procedure and by any other enactment passed by a competent legislative authority. If that submission is too narrow, and there is room, notwithstanding the way cl. 28 is framed, for other powers outside it, then it is for the appellants to show that this isa necessary power for the High Court to possess, and so necessary that it must be inherent in the very idea of a High Court of Judicature. [Reference was made to Babu Lal Chokhani v. Emperor (I. L. R. [ 1937] 1 C. 464, 467-8.)]. [Reference was made to Babu Lal Chokhani v. Emperor (I. L. R. [ 1937] 1 C. 464, 467-8.)]. The main arguments in reply to the argument for the appellants on the inherent power point are (a) The power is unnecessary, as it is already vested in the executive government; (b) It is not clear that this power would serve the ends of justice, for if the power were merely to grant bail without suspending the sentence, then the consequence pointed out by Hallett J. in Ex parte Blyth ([ 1944] K. B. 532.) might result—that a convicted person might serve no sentence, or a shorter one than was meet for the case; (c) If this power does exist, and is exercised with the result that the sentence is reduced by the period for which the bail lasts, then in effect the judge will be altering the effect of the sentence, and s. 369 of the Code expressly provides that a judgment shall not be altered after it has been passed; (d) There is no inherent power vested in any High Court in relation to a subject-matter which is covered by the provisions of the Code. In Babu Lal Chokhani v. Emperor (I. L. R. [ 1937] 1 C. 470) Henderson J. said "In my opinion" it would be incorrect to interpret s. 56IA of the Code of "Criminal Procedure as having any reference to bail, a matter" which is specifically provided for by the Code itself.” [Reference was also made to Bashiruddin Ahmad v. King-Emperor (I. L. R. [ 1937] Nag.236, 239.), and Sankaralinga Mudaliar v. Narayana Mudaliar (( 1922) I. L.R. 45 M. 913, 918.).] There is a dearth of authority, and the appellants have only been able to refer to Emperor v. Ram Sarup (I. L. R. 49 A. 247.) where the power has been held to exist. Lastly, it is safe to take by analogy the position in this country, and the power of the High Court in India cannot be greater than that of the Kings Bench judges in this country Ryots of Garabandho v. Zemindar of Parlakimedi (( 1943) L. R. 70 I. A. 129, 151.). Pritt K.C., in reply. The point as to the Letters Patent was not taken in the respondents printed Case; cl. 28 is not the right place in which to discover the jurisdiction, inherent or otherwise. Pritt K.C., in reply. The point as to the Letters Patent was not taken in the respondents printed Case; cl. 28 is not the right place in which to discover the jurisdiction, inherent or otherwise. As to the possible effect of granting bail, the authorities have never adverted to the fact that the sentence, or part of it, might be escaped. On the point whether the power is necessary, the last thing which a court should be desirous of saying is that, in a topic which is ordinarily dealt with by it, recourse should be had to the executive government; it would really be entrusting a judicial power to the executive. Lastly, it is not right to say that because bail in some fields has been covered by complete legislation, that means that in some field where it has not been touched by legislation the inherent jurisdiction should be destroyed by something that does not cover it. In re Evans (( 1926) I. L. R. 50 B. 741.) is an instance of the exercise of the inherent power. 1945. Feb. 5. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by LORD RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN. This appeal raises the important question whether a High Court in India has power to grant bail to a person who has been convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, and to whom His Majesty in Council has given special leave to appeal against his conviction or sentence. The questions which arise for consideration in such a case are of such a nature that they can only, their Lordships think, be properly dealt with by some authority in India possessing either knowledge of the relevant facts, or the means of acquiring that knowledge; but whether a High Court in India has power to grant bail in the circumstances indicated is a matter on which divers views have been expressed in the courts in India, and which comes before the Board for the first time, in the following circumstances—The appellants were convicted under s. 120B read with s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced to terms of rigorous imprisonment. On appeal, the High Court of Lahore upheld the convictions but altered the sentences. The appellants, having obtained special leave from His Majesty in Council to appeal from the judgments of the High Court, applied to the High Court of Lahore to be released on bail. On appeal, the High Court of Lahore upheld the convictions but altered the sentences. The appellants, having obtained special leave from His Majesty in Council to appeal from the judgments of the High Court, applied to the High Court of Lahore to be released on bail. Their application was dismissed, on the ground that the Judicial Committee had given no direction that an application for bail should be made to the High Court. From that dismissal they now appeal by special leave to His Majesty in Council. It will be convenient at the outset to review briefly the decisions in India. In the year 1900 the High Court of Madras held (in a case in which special leave to appeal had been granted) that it had power to make an order for release on bail pending the decision of the appeal (see Queen-Empress v. Subrahmania Ayyar (( 1900) I. L. R. 24 M. 161.)). On the petition for special leave, an application for bail had also been made, when the Judicial Committee stated that any such application must be dealt with by the High Court. The case was argued before the High Court on the footing that the High Court could act under s. 498 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (herein referred to as the Code). The judgment simply states—" In our opinion" this court has jurisdiction to make an order, in this case, "releasing the accused on bail, pending the decision of the Privy Council.” (Ibid. 163.). In the year 1908, in Diwan Chand v. King-Emperor (( 1908) P. R., Cr. Judgmts. No. 15, p. 50.) the Chief Court, which had previously dismissed an appeal from their convictions by the accused persons, dismissed an application by them to be released on bail pending the hearing of a petition by them to His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal. The application seems to have been based on s. 498 of the Code, but it was held that s. 498 " does not refer "to a case where the court is functus officio, but refers to " cases where the court has still some power left as regards the " sentence of the accused,” and that the court had no power to release the accused on bail. In February, 1923, the case of Tulsi Telini v. Emperor (( 1923) I. L. R. 50 C. 585) came before the High Court of Calcutta. A convicted person applied under s. 498 of the Code for a stay of execution of the sentence pending the hearing of a proposed application to His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal. It was decided that the High Court had no jurisdiction under s. 498. The Chief Justice indicated that the High Court might have had jurisdiction by reason of cl. 41 of the Courts Letters Patent if the case had come within that clause, which it did not. Richardson J. distinguished the Madras case on the ground that in that case special leave to appeal had already been obtained. He was of opinion that the court had no jurisdiction under s. 498 to grant bail pending an application for special leave to appeal. The court was functus officio, and had no seisin of the case. Nor had the court any inherent jurisdiction. He pointed out, however, that it was open to the Local Government to suspend the sentence under s. 401 of the Code. On April 2, 1923, the Code of Criminal Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1923, came into force, by which there was added to the Code s. 561A which runs thus—" 561A. Nothing in this " Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent power " of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary " to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent " abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the " ends of justice." In 1926, in Emperor v. Ram Sarup (( 1926) I. L. R. 49 A. 247.) the High Court of Allahabad held that "a High Court has certainly inherent" jurisdiction to stay execution of its own order when the ends "of justice require it." (Ibid. 249). It refused to grant bail at that stage because special leave to appeal had not yet been obtained; a petition had been lodged, but had not been heard by the Judicial Committee. The applicant, however, was told to apply again, when leave to appeal had been granted. 249). It refused to grant bail at that stage because special leave to appeal had not yet been obtained; a petition had been lodged, but had not been heard by the Judicial Committee. The applicant, however, was told to apply again, when leave to appeal had been granted. In 1936 another case came before the High Court of Calcutta, namely, Babu Lal Chokhani v. Emperor (I. L. R. [ 1937] 1 C. 464.), in which it was held that after disposal of a criminal appeal the High Court is functus officio and has no seisin of the case, and cannot grant bail to a convicted person before leave to appeal has been granted by His Majesty in Council. The decisions in 24 Madras (I. L. R. 24 M. 163.) and 49 Allahabad (1) were distinguished on the ground that they were decisions given on the footing that leave to appeal had been, or would be, obtained. The application for bail had been refused by the High Court of Calcutta, who gave their reasons at a later date. Cunliffe J. in his judgment mentions the fact that in the interval a suspension order had been made by the Local Government under s. 401. Henderson J. (differing from the view expressed in the Allahabad case (1)) was of opinion that s. 56IA had no reference to bail, which was a matter specifically provided for by the Code itself. It appears (from the judgment of Blacker J. in a later case) that, special leave to appeal having been subsequently obtained, a Single Bench Judge did in fact grant bail to Babu Lal Chokhani. In the same year the matter came under the consideration of the High Court of Nagpur in Bashiruddin Ahmad v. King-Emperor (I. L. R. [ 1937] Nag. 236.). The High Court, on an appeal from an acquittal, had convicted a person charged with an offence under s. 420 of the Indian Penal Code. He applied for bail pending an" application to His Majesty in Council for leave to appeal. It was held that after signing judgment convicting the accused the High Court was functus officio, and had thereafter no power to release him on bail unless special leave to appeal was granted. The application was therefore refused " for the "present,” because no directions had been received from their Lordships of the Privy Council. It was held that after signing judgment convicting the accused the High Court was functus officio, and had thereafter no power to release him on bail unless special leave to appeal was granted. The application was therefore refused " for the "present,” because no directions had been received from their Lordships of the Privy Council. Bose J., who delivered the judgment of the court, repudiated the idea of the High Court possessing any inherent jurisdiction to grant bail. The question of bail had been expressly dealt with by the Code, 94 and although the matter of bail pending an appeal to the "Judicial Committee is not there, its provisions on the subject" must be regarded as exhaustive." (I. L. R. [ 1937] Nag. 239). Finally, in 1937 an application for bail was made to the High Court of Lahore by a convicted person who had obtained special leave to appeal from His Majesty in Council; but no direction had been given as to applying for bail to the High Court. It was decided that once the High Court had passed orders in a criminal appeal it was functus officio and had no seisin of the case, but that the seisin might be revived when the Judicial Committee gave leave to appeal and directed the High Court. Blacker J., in delivering judgment, said that he had no power to grant bail because ingranting leave to appeal the Judicial Committee had given no direction to apply to the High Court for bail. Blacker J., in delivering judgment, said that he had no power to grant bail because ingranting leave to appeal the Judicial Committee had given no direction to apply to the High Court for bail. He dismissed the application, but stated—" it can, "in my opinion, be revived if the petitioner obtains and "produces any direction from their Lordships of the Privy" Council in the matter which would authorize this court to "go into the question of bail." In the present case, the appellants application to be released on bail pending the decision of their appeal to His Majesty in Council was dismissed by the High Court of Lahore (following the last-mentioned case) on the ground that their Lordships had given no "direction to the High Court to entertain an application for bail." From this review of the authorities in India it would appear that the various views which have prevailed may be summarized thus (i.) if leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty in Council and the Judicial Committee has said that an application for bail must be dealt with by the High Court, the High Court will have power under s. 498 of the Code to release a convicted person on bail pending the hearing of the appeal; (2.) the High Court has an inherent power to do so if special leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty in Council; (3.) the High Court possesses no inherent power as regards bail; (4.) after disposal of a criminal appeal by the High Court it is functus officio, has no longer any seisin of the case, and cannot grant bail to a convicted person unless special leave to appeal has been obtained from His Majesty in Council; (5.) in addition, there must also be a direction received from " their " Lordships of the Privy Council M; (6.) the High Courts seisin of a criminal case, and its power to grant bail under s. 498 of the Code, is revived when the Judicial Committee gives leave to appeal and directs the High Court. Their Lordships are unable to recognize any proceeding or conduct on their part in the past which can be properly described as a " direction to a High Court to entertain an " application for bail." When any suggestion of bail has been mooted on behalf of a successful petitioner for special leave to appeal against his conviction, their Lordships have always refused to consider the matter, and have, no doubt, at times said that the question of bail could only be properly and satisfactorily dealt with in India. But they have never given any formal direction to a High Court on the matter, nor has any reference to bail been made in Orders in Council granting leave to appeal. Moreover, their Lordships find it impossible to appreciate how any suggestion or direction by them in regard to an application for bail to the High Court, made or given when they decide to advise His Majesty that special leave to appeal from a sentence or conviction should be granted, can in any way determine or affect the question under consideration on this appeal. The High Court either does possess power to grant bail in the given circumstances or it does not. If it possesses the power, it possesses it independently of any suggestion or direction made or given by their Lordships. If it does not possess it, no suggestion or direction made or given by their Lordships could confer such a power. So far as any decision in India is based on the fact that such a suggestion was made or direction given, or that no such suggestion was made or direction given, it cannot be supported on that ground alone. There remains for consideration the question whether the alleged existence of a power in a High Court to grant bail in the stated circumstances can be established on other grounds. If it exists it must be either because it was conferred on the High Courts by the Code, or because it is one of those inherent powers which are referred to in s. 561A of the Code. So far as the provisions of the Code are concerned, their Lordships can discover nothing therein to justify the view that any such power is thereby conferred on a High Court. So far as the provisions of the Code are concerned, their Lordships can discover nothing therein to justify the view that any such power is thereby conferred on a High Court. The question of bail is dealt with in Part IX of the Code (" Supplementary Provisions") under ch, XXXIX., which is entitled "Of Bail." The only granting of bail which is referred to in that chapter (which consists of ss. 496 to 502 inclusive) is the granting of bail to accused persons. There is no reference therein to the granting of bail to persons who have been tried and convicted. It is true that in the Indian decisions s. 498 seems to have been treated as though it included cases in which persons already convicted were concerned; but any such view seems to their Lordships to be a misapprehension based on a mistaken reading of a few words which occur in that section. The section runs thus—" 498. The amount of every bond " executed under this Chapter shall be fixed with due regard " to the circumstances of the case, and shall not be excessive; " and the High Court or Court of Session may, in any case, " whether there be an appeal on conviction or not, direct that " any person be admitted to bail, or that the bail required by " a police-officer or Magistrate be reduced.” Two things must be observed in relation to this section. The only bonds " executed under this chapter " are executed by persons who are accused (not convicted) persons; and the words " whether there be an appeal on conviction or not " merely qualify or relate to the words " in any case," and only mean that all accused persons are within the section whether their case is appealable on conviction or not. In truth, the scheme of ch. XXXIX is that ss. 496 and 497 provide for the granting of bail to accused persons before trial, and the other sections of the chapter deal with matters ancillary or subsidiary to that provision. The only provision in the Code which refers to the grant of bail to a convicted person is to be found in s. 426. Section 426 forms part of ch. xxxi. of the Code, which is entitled " Of Appeals " and is included in Part VII. The only provision in the Code which refers to the grant of bail to a convicted person is to be found in s. 426. Section 426 forms part of ch. xxxi. of the Code, which is entitled " Of Appeals " and is included in Part VII. of the Code (" Of Appeal, Reference and Revision "). The section is in these terms — "426. (1.) Pending any appeal by a convicted person, the Appellate Court may, for reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended and, also, if he is in confinement, that he be released on bail or on his own bond. (2.) The power conferred by this section on an Appellate Court may be exercised also by the High Court in the case of any appeal by a convicted person to a Court subordinate thereto. (3) When the appellant is ultimately sentenced to imprisonment, penal servitude or transportation, the time during which he is so released shall be excluded in computing the term for which he is so sentenced." A consideration of s. 426 reinforces the view that s. 498 has no reference to convicted persons; for if they were covered by s. 498 it would confer on the Court of Session a power to grant bail to a convicted person appealing to the High Court, a power which under s. 426 is confined to the High Court. Their Lordships feel no doubt that the Code confers no power on a High Court to grant bail in the case of a convicted person, and the fact that he has obtained leave from His Majesty in Council to appeal from his conviction or sentence makes no difference in this regard. If such a power exists in a High Court it can only be as a power inherent in a High Court, because it is a power which is necessary to secure the ends of justice. It must be observed that, as decided by Hallett J., after a careful and exhaustive review of the authorities, that no such inherent power exists in the High Court of Justice in this country (exparte Blyth ([ 1944] K. B. 532.)). It must be observed that, as decided by Hallett J., after a careful and exhaustive review of the authorities, that no such inherent power exists in the High Court of Justice in this country (exparte Blyth ([ 1944] K. B. 532.)). In a case (reported only in the "Weekly Notes ") Branson J. appears to have made an order granting bail to a prisoner (in this country) who had been sentenced to six months imprisonment in Cyprus but had been given leave by His Majesty in Council to appeal (Sutton v. Reg. ([ 1932] W. N. 272.)). The order, however, seems to have been made with the consent of the Secretaries of State for Home Affairs and for the Colonies, and cannot be relied on as any authority for the view that a judge of the High Court has any inherent power to grant bail in the circumstances indicated. When such power exists it is statutory. It is perhaps conceivable that such an inherent power might exist in the High Courts in India, but historically it would seem unlikely in view of the provision found in the early Charters, which confers powers on the judges in India by reference to the powers of the Justices of the Kings Bench in England in terms such as the following—" and to have " such jurisdiction and authority as Our Justices of Our Court " of Kings Bench have and may lawfully exercise within that " part of Great Britain called England, as far as circumstances " will admit.” Section 56IA of the Code confers no powers. It merely safeguards all existing inherent powers possessed by a High Court necessary (among other purposes) to secure the ends of justice. But other difficulties exist in the way of establishing that any such inherent power exists in a High Court. A power to grant bail to convicted persons would, if exercised, interrupt the serving of the sentence; the period of bail might even cover the whole of its term. A power to grant bail would not include a power to exclude the period of bail from the term of the sentence; that this is so is shown by the fact that it was necessary to enact the special provision which is contained in sub-s.3 of s. 426 of the Code. A power to grant bail would not include a power to exclude the period of bail from the term of the sentence; that this is so is shown by the fact that it was necessary to enact the special provision which is contained in sub-s.3 of s. 426 of the Code. Under these conditions, the exercise of a power to grant bail would, in the event of the appeal being unsuccessful, result in defeating the ends of justice. Moreover, in the same event it would result in an alteration by the High Court of its judgment, which is prohitibed by s. 369 of the Code. Finally, their Lordships take the view that ch. XXXIX of the Code together with s. 426 is, and was intended to contain, a complete and exhaustive statement of the powers of a High Court in India to grant bail, and excludes the existence of any additional, inherent power in a High Court relating to the subject of bail. They find themselves in agreement with the views expressed by Richardson J., Henderson J. and Bose J. in the three cases referred to earlier in this judgment. It may well be that the case of an appeal from a High Court to His Majesty in Council was not within the contemplation of the framers of the Code. It may well be that a power to grant bail in such a case would be a proper and useful power to vest in a High Court. Their Lordships fully appreciate the propriety and utility of such a power, exercisable by judges acquainted with the relevant facts of each case, and (if exercised) with power to order that the bail period be excluded from the term of any sentence. But, in their Lordships opinion, this desirable object can only be achieved by legislation. In the meantime there is a section of the Code to which, pending legislation, recourse may be had, and by means of which the ends of justice may be secured, namely, s. 401, which enables the Provincial Government to "suspend” the execution of a sentence. As hereinbefore appears, recourse has been had to this section on previous occasions. For the reasons indicated their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal fails and should be dismissed. As hereinbefore appears, recourse has been had to this section on previous occasions. For the reasons indicated their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal fails and should be dismissed. In view of the general importance of the question which has been raised and decided their Lordships make no order as to the costs of this appeal.