JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal on behalf of the Plaintiff in a suit on a foreign judgment. That judgment was pronounced on the 6th of September, 1937, by the Siem or Chief of a State in the District of the Khasi and Jaintia Hills in Assam, known as the Khyrim State. The parties are all permanent residents of that State. It appears that one U. Luing Kin borrowed a sum of Rs. 350 from one U. Lur Singh on the 16th of July, 1934, agreeing to repay the amount within three years with interest at 20 per cent. per annum. There was a condition in the agreement (which is Ex. 1 in the case) that upon failure to repay the loan within the stipulated period the borrower would give up to the lender an orchard belonging to the former which was situated at a place in the District of Sylhet within British India. The agreement was admittedly executed at Lakhat Bazar in Khyrim State. U. Luing Kin did not pay the money, and thereupon U. Lur Singh instituted a suit before the Khyrim State Darbar to enforce the above agreement. That suit was brought prematurely before the three years allowed by the agreement for repayment had expired, but no objection appears to have been raised by the Defendant there on that ground. The Khyrim State Darbar passed judgment in that suit on the 6th of September, 1937, by which it made an order on U. Luing Kin for payment of the principal sum with interest from the date of the loan to the 5th of October, 1936, the date of the institution of the suit. There was further a declaration that if U. Luing Kin failed to pay the principal and interest as directed, U. Lur Singh shall obtain absolute possession of the orchard as provided for in the agreement. U. Lur Singh thereafter applied to the Siem of Khyrim for enforcement of this judgment, but as the property was situated in Sylhet, the Siem sent a letter of request to the Munsif's Court at Sylhet for delivery of possession of the orchard to the Plaintiff. The order of the Siem was thereupon put into execution in Title Execution Case No. 324 of 1938 in the Court of the Munsif and possession delivered to the Plaintiff. An objection was then raised under sec. The order of the Siem was thereupon put into execution in Title Execution Case No. 324 of 1938 in the Court of the Munsif and possession delivered to the Plaintiff. An objection was then raised under sec. 47 of the CPC on the ground that the proper remedy of the Plaintiff to enforce the order of the Siem was not by way of execution but by way of suit. That objection prevailed, and the order for delivery of possession was accordingly set aside. The Plaintiff, however, was allowed to retain possession of the orchard. He then instituted the present suit in the Court of the Munsif at Sylhet for a declaration of his rights under the judgment of the Siem of the Khyrim Darbar. In terms the Plaintiff asked that it should be declared that he was entitled to retain the orchard in his absolute possession on the basis of the judgment. Various objections were raised on behalf of the Defendants who are the heirs of the original borrower. They were all overruled, and the Munsif decreed the suit. 2. Upon appeal the learned Subordinate Judge has reversed that decision, and the main ground on which he has done so is that the Khyrim Darbar had no jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment on which the present suit was based. 3. On behalf of the Respondents that view has also been pressed before us. We do not think, however, that it should be given effect to. Under the terms of the Sanad granted to the Chief of the Khyrim State by the British Government, it appears that the Siem is empowered and required to adjudicate and decide all civil cases which may arise within the limits of the State, in which the subjects of the Siem alone are concerned. It is contended that the suit which was instituted by U. Lur Singh, the predecessor--in-interest of the present Plaintiff, before the Khyrim State Darbar was not a suit which the Darbar was competent to entertain, in so far as it related to immovable property situated in British India. We are not quite sure that the suit was one for recovery of immovable property. We are not quite sure that the suit was one for recovery of immovable property. The learned Subordinate Judge has no doubt expressed the view that by the terms of the agreement between the parties the orchard had been offered as collateral security for the loan; and that the suit was in substance a suit for enforcement of the security. It is not necessary, however, to regard the suit in that light. We think, the correct view was taken by the trial Court which held that it was essentially a suit to enforce the agreement for recovery of the loan: in other words, it was more a personal action than an action for recovery of land. The judgment no doubt declared that if the Defendant failed to pay the amount found due, the Plaintiff should obtain absolute possession of the orchard. But this is not quite the same as a decree for possession. It amounted to no more than a declaration that if the Defendant failed to pay the amount in question, he would be entitled to enforce his right to possession under the agreement, it being left to the Plaintiff to take appropriate proceedings for that purpose. Whether a suit for a mere declaration to that effect, without acting for the consequential relief of possession, was competent under the law of the Khyrim State, is another question and is not relevant in the present suit. Even if the above interpretation is not possible on the terms of the judgment, we think it would be wrong to set it aside in its entirety, as if it was a nullity and was of no effect between the parties. We do not see why effect could not be given to it to the extent to which, on the strictest view of the powers of the Siem of the Darbar, that Darbar would be competent to deal with the matter. It is not disputed that so far as the suit was for repayment of the loan the Darbar had jurisdiction to try it. It cannot also be disputed that so far as the Plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under the agreement, it must be taken to have been competent to the Darbar to give him such declaration. It is not disputed that so far as the suit was for repayment of the loan the Darbar had jurisdiction to try it. It cannot also be disputed that so far as the Plaintiff sought a declaration of his rights under the agreement, it must be taken to have been competent to the Darbar to give him such declaration. Regarded, therefore, as a declaration of the Plaintiff's rights to implement the agreement in so far as it entitled him to possession of the orchard, the judgment would be quite within the competence of the Khyrim Darbar. There is no reason why sec. 13 of the CPC should not accordingly apply to the judgment as so read. It would serve the Plaintiff's purpose fully, if effect be given to the judgment only from that point of view. The present suit being a suit based on that judgment, the Plaintiff should accordingly be held entitled to a decree in terms of the agreement as declared by that judgment. That is exactly the decree which the trial Court gave the Plaintiff. The result is, in our opinion, that the appeal must succeed. The judgment and decree of the learned Subordinate Judge are, therefore, set aside and those of the learned Munsif of Sylhet restored. The Appellants are entitled to their costs. We assess the hearing-fee at 2 gold mohurs.