JUDGMENT Misra, J. - This is a defendant's second appeal. It arises, out of a suit (or accounts in respect of a possessory mortgage of two groves in village Purah Har, district Unao, instituted by Mst. Hajra Bibi u/s 33, U. P. Agriculturists' Relief Act. Mst. Hsjra Bibi has since died and is now represented by Ashfaq Husain and another. 2. The facts are that on 1st February, 1933, Mst. Hajra Bibi, executed a mortgage with possession in favour of Sahu Ram hypothecating two groves Nos. 59 and 279 in village Purah Har, district Unao, for Rs. 632. she stipulated that the rate of interest chargeable upon the deed was Re. 1/4 per cent per month and that the mortgagee was entitled to sell the produce of the groves and appropriate the money so realised towards interest. The excess was thereafter to be paid to the mortgagor. The period of the mortgage was 10 years and it was provided that in default of payment, the mortgagee had the right to foreclose or sell the property. During the course of the proceedings before the learned Munsif, Unao, u/s 35, the Counsel for the parties agreed that the amount payable to the defendant was Rs. 500 up to 29th August, 1936, and that a declaration be made to that effect. After a joint statement was made to this effect before the Court, Sahu Ram preferred an application praying that a decree in accordance with the terms of his mortgage may be passed in his favour if the Court came to the conclusion that Section 33 contemplated accounting in respect of a mortgage. On 31st August, 1939, the learned Munsif accordingly passed a money decree for a sum of Rs. 50u in favour of the defendant. Sabu Ram then went up in appeal and contended in the first place that Section 33 did not apply to mortgage transactions and in the second place that future interest ought to have been allowed to him. The first contention prevailed with the learned District Judge. He, there- fore, did not go into the second question raised before him. On the view which he took the suit of Mst. Hajra Bibi for accounting was dismissed. The first contention prevailed with the learned District Judge. He, there- fore, did not go into the second question raised before him. On the view which he took the suit of Mst. Hajra Bibi for accounting was dismissed. The opinion of the lower Court was obviously wrong having regard to a Bench decision of this Court in Lata Ram Narain v. Thakur Chandrika Prasad 1938 OA 434 : AWR (CC) 54 : OWN 535 . This Court, therefore, on an appeal filed by the Agriculturist-debtor remained the case to the learned District Judge for decision on the second point. It may be mentioned that in the course of the argument in second appeal, the learned Counsel for Sahu Ram had contended that a decree under Order 34 should have been passed in his favour instead of a mere money decree. In the order of remand therefore the Court below was directed to decide whether a decree u/s 34 was under the circumstances of the case competent. 3. When the case went back to the learned District Judge Unao, two points were argued before him (1) that the defendant-creditor was entitled to obtain a foreclosure and (2) that he was entitled to future interest. On both these points the conclusion of the lower Court was against Sahu Ram as ten years period provided under the deed had not yet expired. The decree of the learned Munsif was, therefore, confirmed, and the appeal was dismissed. 4. The sole point urged by the learned Counsel for the appellant before me is that Sahu Ram was entitled to obtain a foreclosure decree under the provisions of Section 33, clause 2 of the Agriculturists' Relief Act, The argument in this connection is two-fold (a) that for the purposes of clause 2 of Section 33 the maturity or immaturity of the mortgage is immaterial and (b) that assuming that the money was not payable at the time of the decision by the Court below, it became payable by virtue of subsequent events, and a decree for foreclosure should nevertheless be now passed in the creditor's favour. 5. I will take up the above points seriatim. Clause 2 of Section 33 reads as follows- In such suit the Court shall follow the provisions of Chapter IV of this Act and the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act X of 1918. 5. I will take up the above points seriatim. Clause 2 of Section 33 reads as follows- In such suit the Court shall follow the provisions of Chapter IV of this Act and the provisions of the Usurious Loans Act X of 1918. It shall, after taking necessary accounts, declare the amount which is still payable by the plaintiff to the defendant, and shall on the application of the defendant, and if the money is payable, pass a decree in favour of the defendant. 6. The language used contemplates two kinds of orders under this clause. In the first place it contemplates a declaration of the amount "which is stilt payable" by the plaintiff to the defendant. In the second 'place it contemplates a decree in favour of. the defendant "if the money is payable." In my opinion words mentioned above in inverted commas contemplate two different positions. Where merely a declaration is to be made, it is not necessary to see whether under the terms of the contract the money has in fact become due. The Court has only to see as to what is the amount, if any, owed by the debtor to the creditor at the point of time when the application is. made. When, however, an application is made by creditor for a decree, the Court is empowered to grant it only if by the terms of the contract the money is in fact payable at the time. There is nothing in Section 33 which indicates that the legislature intended to accelerate the payments in disregard of the contract. Where the legislature so desired, it clearly mentioned that orders for redemption of mortgages, could be made notwithstanding any contract to the contrary vide for example Section 12. The sanctity of the contract is preserved by Section 33, clause 2, except in so far as the rate of interest is concerned. This is made clear by the provision that the Court has to follow the provisions of Chapter IV of the Act and the provisions of the Usurious" Loans Act of 1918. It is thus only in respect of interest that the/stipulations of the contract have to be overridden under this section. 7. The mortgage deed was for a period of 10 years and the money due thereunder therefore did not become payable till 1st February, 1943. It is thus only in respect of interest that the/stipulations of the contract have to be overridden under this section. 7. The mortgage deed was for a period of 10 years and the money due thereunder therefore did not become payable till 1st February, 1943. On 31st of August, 1939, when the order was passed by the learned Munsif the money which, by virtue of the agreement of 29th August, 1936, was to be declared as being payable, was not in fact realisable by the mortgagee. The learned Munsif nevertheless passed a decree in favour of the defendant for that amount and Mst. Hajra Bibi the debtor acquiesced in it. It has thus become final. This Court, there- fore, need not disturb the decree in appellant's favour and place him in a worse position. The contention of the creditor, however, that the maturity of the mortgage is not a condition precedent to the passing of the decree must be overruled. 8. The second contention raised on behalf of the appellant has been urged from two points of view (1) that Rs. 500 had by virtue of the agreement been held to be payable to Sahu Ram. The debtor acquiesced in this decree. It was there/ore no longer open to her to plead that the loan had not become "payable" within the meaning of Section 33 Clause 2, and (2) that the period of mortgage having expired on 1st February, 1943, the money has not at any rate become payable. It is said that this Court can take cognisance of the change of circumstances during the pendency of the appeal, and a foreclosure decree must therefore now be passed in favour of the defendant. In my opinion none of these arguments can be allowed to prevail.; The decree of the learned Munsif has no doubt been acquiesced in by the debtor; but it does not follow therefrom that she is estopped from saying that the money is not payable under the terms of the mortgage and that Sahu Ram is, there- fore, not entitled to a foreclosure decree under Clause 3 of Section 88. 9. Her acquiescence, in permitting a declaration! or in a simple money decree, could not operate to accelerate the period provided in the deed for foreclosure. 9. Her acquiescence, in permitting a declaration! or in a simple money decree, could not operate to accelerate the period provided in the deed for foreclosure. As regards the contention founded upon the fact that the mortgage has now matured, it is to be remembered that the mortgagee has continued to remain in possession of the property after the date of the application namely the 29th April,- 193": The account' between the parties on agreement was only up to 89th April, 1986. One of the conditions embodied in the mortgage deed was that the mortgagee would sell the produce of the groves and appropriate the price towards the interest due. The excess amount was to be made over to the mortgagor. I cannot assume that from 29th April 1936 up to the present day the mortgagor has realised nothing more than his interest due to him. In fact I am informed by Mr. Ali Mohammad for the respondent that considerable realisations have been made. I twill not therefore be fair to pass a foreclosure decree upon an accounting made on 29th April, 1936. This contention, therefore! must also fail. 10. The result is that the decree passed by the Court below must stand. . This appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.