JUDGMENT Misra and Koul, JJ. - This is a second rent appeal. It arises out of a suit instituted by Jang Babadur Singh, a co-sharer of village Natkur, for his share of profits for the years 1341 Fasli to 1344 Fasli against Lala Radha Raman and Mohammad Mustafa Husain, Lambardars, u/s 108, clause 15, Oudh Rent Act. The trial Court passed a decree"against Radha Raman for the sum of Rs. 1,477/11/3 in addition to past interest at 9 per cent and future interest at 4 1/2 per cent per annum on the basis of gross profits for all the four years. In appeal this decree was modified by the learned District Judge inasmuch as nothing was allowed to the plaintiff for kharif 1341 Fasli, and it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to any past interest. Nothing was found due from Nustafa Husain. Radha- Raman has now come up in second appeal. 2. A preliminary objection is taken by the learned Counsel for the respondents on the ground that the appeal has abated. 3. During the pendency of the appeal in this Court Jang Bahadur died on 30th October 1943. On 6th December, 1943, the appellant moved an application for substitution alleging that Anant Singh and Narendra Singh, the two sons of the deceased, were his legal representatives. Narendra Singh was a minor, and the name of Mst. Dewavati, his mother, was pro- posed for guardianship. When the application came on for hearing on 28th February, 1944, the learned Counsel for Anant Singh intimated that he would con- tend at the hearing of the appeal that the whole appeal had abated on account of Mst. Dewavati's name not being brought on re- cord as respondent. This was on the ground that by virtue of Section 3 of the Hindu Woman's Rights to Property Act (Act XVIII of 1937) as amended by Act XI of 1938, the widow succeeded to the interest of her husband and was therefore, his legal representative along with his two sons. By an order passed by our brother Madeley J. Anant Singh and Narendra Singh were substituted in place of the deceased respondent,. Jang Bahadur Singh. on 28th February, 1944 and Mst. Dewavati was appointed a guardian of his minor son. It was thought that the question of abatement did not arise at that stage at all. By an order passed by our brother Madeley J. Anant Singh and Narendra Singh were substituted in place of the deceased respondent,. Jang Bahadur Singh. on 28th February, 1944 and Mst. Dewavati was appointed a guardian of his minor son. It was thought that the question of abatement did not arise at that stage at all. As the question was of some importance and was likely to come up frequently before the Court, our brother Ghulam Hasan, J. by his order, dated 11th December, 1944, referred the whole appeal for decision by a Bench of this Court u/s 14 (2) of the Oudh Courts Act 4. Protracted arguments have been addressed to us by the learned Counsel for the purpose of this preliminary objection, but we have no hesitation in holding that the objection is groundless, and it must fail. 5. The objection is founded on the assumption that Jang Bahadur Singh was a member of a joint family and that the property, in respect of which the profits were claimed, was a joint family property. Sub-Section 2 of Section 3 of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937, as amended in 1938, prescribes that when a Hindu governed by any school of Hindu law other than the Dayabhaga school or by customary law dies having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, his widow shall, subject to the provisions of sub-Section (3), have in the property the same interest as he himself had. Sub-Section 3 then lays down that any interest devolving on a Hindu widow under the provisions of this Section shall be the limited interest known as a Hindu Woman's estate, provided how- ever that she shall have the same right of claiming partition as a male owner. Although thus the law now vests in a Hindu widow the limited interest- of her husband in the joint property, it does not operate to alter the Hindu Law of joint family so as to make her a member of the co-parcenary. It is clear that if the property in respect of which the profits were claimed was joint family property of Jang Bahadur and his sons, the joint family is now represented by Anant Singh and Narendra Singh alone. It is clear that if the property in respect of which the profits were claimed was joint family property of Jang Bahadur and his sons, the joint family is now represented by Anant Singh and Narendra Singh alone. The provision would seem to indicate that a mere devolution of the husband's interest would not otherwise affect the joint family status as such or invest the widow with the rights of a male co-parcener other than those necessary for enforcing the interest expressly conferred on her. The right of co-premiership or a representation of the joint family is not included among the rights so conferred, and it is difficult to regard her as a legal representative of her husband in that sense. 6. There can be no doubt that when the Manager of a joint family dies after the institution of a suit in respect of a joint family funds, his sons, who are the managing members of the family, are competent to represent other members, and if they are brought on the record within time, the suit or the appeal does not abate by lapse of time. This is irrespective of the fact that some other members of the family are sought to be impleaded beyond the period of limitation. A division Bench of the late Court of the Judicial Commissioners in Mst. Sughar Kumvar v. Sitapat Ram AIR 1917 Oudh 34, observed in this connection as follows The; object of bringing all the legal representatives on the record is to protect the interests of the debtor or the person against whom the suit is pending and to provide that all the questions involved in the suit might be finally-adjudicated, so as to bind all the parties interested therein. But where some of the legal representatives are unwilling to join as plaintiffs, an application made to implead them as defendants serves the same purpose, and as pointed out in Bhikaji Ram Chandra v. Purshotam, ( I L R (1886) Bom 220) and Musala Reddi v. Ramayya, ( ILR (1900) Mad 125), the Court is competent to implead them, whenever it finds that their joinder is essential to secure a final adjudication of the matters in issue, though the limitation prescribed by Article 176 of the Indian Limitation Act (IX of 1908) may have expired. The same is the case where some of the persons consent to the managing members of the family carrying on the suit. The decisions in Gajraj Singh v. Gauri Shankar, ( (1915) 18 Oudh Cas 90) and Girish Chander Lahiri v. Sasi Sekhareswar Roy, ( ILR (1906) Cal 329) lay down that a Court is not precluded from adding any party whenever it considers necessary. And as the sons of the late Rai Sri Ram Bahadur, who were the managing members of the family, had duly applied for substitution within the time allowed by law, no question of abatement can possibly arise. 7. In Musatnmat Eadan v. Musammat Ram Dulari (1940) 15 Luck. 463 : OA 337 : A W R (C C) 128, Ziaul Hasan and Yorke, JJ. came to the conclusion that where in a suit on foot of mortgage one of the heirs of the deceased motgagor was inadvertently not impleaded,, the estate was sufficiently represented and the decree in the suit was binding on the heir who was not brought on the record. Reliance for this opinion was placed on a Privy Council case of Khiarajtnal v. Daim (1905) 32 IA 23 and a deceased Mohammadan had been brought on the record but one was inadvertently omitted. Their Lordships did not attach any importance to the omission, and they observed that the estate was nonetheless sufficiently represented for the purposes of the suit In Lala Anant Lala v. Rant Adhar (1942) 17 Luck 720 : 1941 OA 1071 : 1942 AWR (CC.) 15 our brother Ghulam Hasan, J. had to consider the question with reference particularly to the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act (Act XVIII of 377) as amended by Act XI of 1938, and he repelled the contention that the rights of survivorship in a joint Hindu family possessed by the sons were taken away by the provisions of sub-Sections (2) and (3). He, therefore, held that the plaintiff-applicant was perfectly justified in impleading the two sons of Durga deceased as his legal representatives. No doubt he found that it was the duty of the plaintiff to have impleaded the widow also as a co-defendant, but the failure to do so cannot operate as a dismissal of the entire suit. He, therefore, held that the plaintiff-applicant was perfectly justified in impleading the two sons of Durga deceased as his legal representatives. No doubt he found that it was the duty of the plaintiff to have impleaded the widow also as a co-defendant, but the failure to do so cannot operate as a dismissal of the entire suit. In his opinion, it was open to the plaintiff to have the widow impleaded as a defendant and it was equally the duty of the Court, if her presence was necessary, to have impleaded her for an effective determination of the controversy in the case. The judgment went on to say that there is ample authority in support of the proposition that where a suit has been brought after the death of a person, all the legal representatives of the deceased need not be impleaded. It is sufficient that the plaintiff sues those persons whom he considers to be the legal representatives after enquiry, and if such persons are sued, the suit is a good one and the decree will be effective to the extent of the property of the deceased. A number of cases were cited by Ghulam Hasan, J. in support of this view. 8. Assuming, however, for the sake of argument that Mst. Dewavati was the legal representative of her husband, Jang Bahadur Singh by virtue of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, we are unable to hold that the appeal abated in consequence of her name being omitted in the application for substitution moved by the appellant on 6th December, 1943. Order 22, rule 4, C. P. C. read with rule 11 governed the substitution in place of the deceased respondent. This rule necessitates an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the deceased defendant, and where, within the time limited by law, no application in that behalf is made, the suit is to abate as against deceased respondent. An application was made within the period prescribed by article mere fact that the list of legal representatives mentioned in that application was not exhaustive would not in our opinion, operate to abate the appeal against the deceased plaintiff- respondent. In AIR 1927 170 (Oudh) , a Bench of this Court observed as follows Now it is agreed that within the time limited by law an application was made under sub-rule 1. In AIR 1927 170 (Oudh) , a Bench of this Court observed as follows Now it is agreed that within the time limited by law an application was made under sub-rule 1. The suit shall therefore not abate. The argument leads to somewhat absurd results. It may frequently happen that an opposite-party, who is to make an application, is wholly a stranger to the family of the deceased party and has no knowledge as to who are precisely the legal representatives of the deceased party. He would naturally in the circumstances make inquiries. This will take time. After having made an application intimating that death has taken place in the rank of the opposite- party, he would be quite within his rights to give exact information as to the names, addresses and other particulars of the persons supposed to be the legal representatives of the deceased party within a reasonable period of time. There is nothing in the rules of the procedure to compel a party to take such steps within any prescribed limit of time. All that he is required to do is to make a bona fide reasonable application within the time allowed bylaw. Having done that the obligation which law imposes on him is discharged. 9. In Muhammad Zafaryab Khan v. Abdul Razzaq Khan (1928) 50 All 857, a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court pointed out that under Section 2 of the CPC "legal representative" does not necessarily mean all the heirs under the personal law, means some person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of- the deceased. Order XXII, rule 5, requires that when the question of the claimant being the legal representative of a deceased party arises the Court shall deter- mine that question. The provisions in rules 3 and 4 show that after the Court has determined that a particular person is the legal representative, it shall proceed with the suit. It is, therefore, quite obvious that for the purpose of this appeal, it must be taken that Musammat Zubeda Begam is the legal representative of the deceased appellant, and, therefore, it is not open to the respondents to urge that the appeal has abated, because some other heirs have been left out. 10. In Abdulla Sahib v. Vageer Beevi Ammal A I R 1928 Mad. 10. In Abdulla Sahib v. Vageer Beevi Ammal A I R 1928 Mad. 1199, Reilly, J. relying upon a previous decision of the Madras High Court in Kadir Mohideen Maraeaya v. Muthkrishna Ayyar (1903) 26 Mad 230 and of the Patna High Court in Shib Duita Singh v. Karim Bakhsh (1925) 4 Pat 220 held that where only some of the legal representatives of a deceased person are brought on record and with- in time, there is no abatement even though other legal representatives are omitted 11. It was further held that if a deceased person's estate is represented sufficiently for an effective decree to be made against it, that decree, so long as it stands will bind all the deceased's legal representatives in their capacity as such, whether they are on the record of the proceedings or not. 12. The view of the Bombay High Court as shown by Mulchand Hemraj Vs. Jairamdas Chaturbhuj, AIR 1935 Bom 287 , is that it is sufficient to compliance with Order 22, rule 4, C. P. C. if one legal representative is brought on the record. It is not necessary that all of them should be impleaded. 13. We hold therefore that the preliminary objection is without substance. We may mention that on 17th July, 1944 the appellant filed an application for adding Mst. Dewamati as a legal representative for the sake of precaution. In view of what we have said above there can be no valid objection to bring the name of Mst. Dewavati on the record as a respondent and we have accordingly granted -.the appellant's prayer. We will therefore proceed to consider the appeal on merits. The learned lower Court in agreeing with the view of the Assistant Collector decreed the claim on the basis of gross rental, because the circumstance of the case disclosed that the lambardar did not in fact keep any accounts of realisation, and the books which he proposed to file in the case at a belated stage were not genuine. In addition to the failure to keep accounts the Lambardar deliberately dictated wrong siahas. He did not take out distraints nor did he institute suits for realisation of uncollected rents. He also left large areas without settlement of rent. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that mere non-production of account books does not lead to an inference of negligence. In addition to the failure to keep accounts the Lambardar deliberately dictated wrong siahas. He did not take out distraints nor did he institute suits for realisation of uncollected rents. He also left large areas without settlement of rent. The learned Counsel for the appellant contends that mere non-production of account books does not lead to an inference of negligence. A reference is made to U. P. Stay of Proceedings, (Revenue Court) Act IV of 1937 and to Arrears of Rent Remission Act of 1939 whereby,-it is urged, it became impossible for the Lambardar to institute suits for arrears up to 1344 Fasli. It may be noticed that these Acts came into force subsequent to, the period for which the profits were claimed. 14. The disabilities imposed by them were, therefore, subsequent and not contemporaneous. We are of opinion that the failure to maintain accounts, the dictation of incorrect siahas, the failure to takeout distrait and leaving large areas without taking steps to have rents assessed on them cumulatively support the rending of negligence, and we accordingly hold that the plaintiff was entitled to the profits on the basis of gross rental. In assessing the amount the trial Court made an allowance for Lambardari dues and collection charges as well as for the remissions given in rental. There can, therefore, be no further reduction on account of costs of realisation or on account' of economic depression. There remain two further matters in respect of which the arguments advanced by the parties need consideration. It would appear that Mustafa Husain was the Lambardar of the village till the end of kharif 1341 Fasli and was then succeeded by Lala Radha Raman. Mustafa Husain apparently had in his possession in the years in suit certain sir plot, the rental of which amounted to Rs. 17-7-0 per year. The appellant contended in the Court below as well as in this Court that the profits of the sir plot should be excluded from the total rental, as the land was in possession of one of the co-sharers himself. There is nothing to show that Mostaa Husain's share of profits did not exceed Rs. 17-7-0 per year, and if the appellant sought to have this rental excluded, he could have done so only if allowance for the land in possession of Mustafa Husain could not be made in the settlement of accounts with him. There is nothing to show that Mostaa Husain's share of profits did not exceed Rs. 17-7-0 per year, and if the appellant sought to have this rental excluded, he could have done so only if allowance for the land in possession of Mustafa Husain could not be made in the settlement of accounts with him. We, therefore, agree with the learned District Judge in overruling this plea. The next argument relates to some theka lands. The share owned by Thakur Jang Bahadur Singh in village Natkur amounts to 1 anna 10 pies 16 krants 2 7/8 decimals. Out of this appears that the plaintiff, Jang Bahadur Singh, gave a theka for the years in suit to another person for 2 pies 8 krants 3 1/40 decimals. The appellant, therefore, claimed that he was not liable to profits in respect of the entire share of Jang Bahadur Singh but only to that share which remained vested in him after carving out the interest of the Thekadar. This contention did not find favour with the Courts below and the result was that in decreeing the suit of Jang Bahadur the share of profits relating to 2 pies 8 krants 3 1/40 decimals was also decreed to the plaintiff. The basis of decision is that according to Section 3, clause 10 o! the Oudh Rent Act. Thekadar is a mere tenant and as such he could not be entitled to a share of profits" from the Lambardar u/s 108, clause 15, Oudh Rent Act. The right to receive the profits from the Lambardar could therefore be exercised by the plaintiff only. This view is supported by a decision of this Court in Rameshwar v. Achhaibar Singh (1931) 8 O W N 1050. 15. We have carefully considered the conclusions reached in that case in respect of the right of a Thekadar under clause IS of Section 108, but we are of opinion that there is nothing in that clause to debar a Thekedar from claiming his share of pro- fits against a Lambardar. Clause 15 of Section 108, Oudh Rent Act is as follows- "Suit by a sharer, against a Lambardar or co-sharer for a share of the profits of an estate or any part thereof, for the rending and settlement of accounts in respect of those profits." 16. Clause 15 of Section 108, Oudh Rent Act is as follows- "Suit by a sharer, against a Lambardar or co-sharer for a share of the profits of an estate or any part thereof, for the rending and settlement of accounts in respect of those profits." 16. It is significant that the clause nowhere mentions the word "Thekedar" or "Tenant" and we cannot, therefore, import into it the definition of the word "tenant" as contained in Section 3, clause 10. By virtue of that definition the word "tenant" includes for the purposes of a number of sections including Section 108 a thekedar or the person to whom the collection of rents' in village or portion of a village has been leased by the landlord. The word "sharer" is not defined in the Act. There is, no doubt, however, that every person who has a definite separate share in the village whether recorded or unrecorded is entitled to claim his profits, and in order, to enable a person to file a suit under clause 16 a person need-not necessarily be a full proprietor vide Thakur Prasad Singh v. Adhya Prasad Singh (1921) 29 O C 395. In Debt Saran Lal v. Debt Saran Upadhia S D 3 of 1883 (B R), it was held that the lessee of a recorded co-sharer was entitled to sue another recorded co-sharer for his share of profits u/s 93, clause (h) of Act XII of 1881 which now corresponds to Section 108 Clause 16 of Oudh Rent Act. In Muhammad Ahmad Said Khan v. Muhammad Masih-Ullah Khan (1912) 34 All. 250, a Bench of the Allahabad High Court dealing with the cognate provisions contained in Sections 166 and 201 of the Agra Tenancy Act (Act II of 1901) came to the conclusion that the lessee was entitled to the profits of the share . covered by his lease so long as his name was recorded in the revenue papers. According to Section 166 of that Act the word "co-sharer" includes the heirs, legal representatives, executors, administrators, and assigns of a co-sharers, but although there is no such corresponding provision in the Oudh Rent Act ,a co-sharer's assignee must obviously be regarded as entitled to the profits of the share transferred to him. According to Section 166 of that Act the word "co-sharer" includes the heirs, legal representatives, executors, administrators, and assigns of a co-sharers, but although there is no such corresponding provision in the Oudh Rent Act ,a co-sharer's assignee must obviously be regarded as entitled to the profits of the share transferred to him. It is urged for the respondent that the Thekedar being not a proprietor or a person, who is liable to claim partition, could not be regarded as entitled to claim front the Lambardar his separate share of profits. In our opinion these considerations are wholly foreign to the matter under consideration. The view of Mr. Justice Kisch in Rameshwar v. Achhaibar Singh 1931 8 O W N 1050, is based on a single Judge decision of the Allahabad High Court reported in Puran v. Khiali Ram (1925) 9 R D 329. We have tried to discover the reasons which underly the rule there enunciated, but the matter appears to have been disposed of without any discussion. None of the decisions to which we have referred earlier were cited in arguments, and we are unable to agree with the conclusions reached therein. In our opinion Thakur Jang Bahadur Singh was not entitled Io the profits which were legitimately due on the basis of his Theka to the lessee. The parties* Counsel have agreed that the profits of that share namely 2 pies 8 krants 3 1/40 decimals for the period amount to Rs. 129/7/6. 17. We accordingly modify the decree of the Court below and reduce the sum decreed by Rs. 129/7/6. The appeal is allowed to this extent only. The parties will get their costs in proportion to their success and failure.