Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No. 75 of 1944) from a judgment and decree of the High Court (September 3, 1940) which modified a judgment and decree of the District Judge of Aligarh (August 18, 1936) which in turn had modified an award of the land acquisition officer, Aligarh (November 7, 1933). The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The land to which the first appeal relates consisted of twelve bighas and nine biswas, which were held by the appellant as the mutawalli of waqf property. The land to which the second appeal relates consisted of one bigha which was the appellants personal property. These lands were acquired, together with other adjacent lands belonging to other owners, for the Co-operative Housing Society, Ld., Aligarh, under Government Notification dated May 29, 1930, and issued under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. At that time the whole area held by the appellant was occupied by two tenants, Abdul Karim and Karu. During the proceedings before the land acquisition officer it was agreed between all the parties before him first, that in order to ascertain the market value of the land concerned all the sale deeds relating to the sales in respect of an area less than seventy-five yards should be struck off, and secondly, that the exemplars for evolving sales, that was, sale deeds relating to other sales, should be taken into consideration as far back as the year 1923, that was, seven years preceding the year 1930, excluding the transactions which had some special grounds for being too high or too low or which might be inadmissible on any other ground to be decided by the land acquisition officer. The land acquisition officer decided to apply a flat rate in respect of the lands under acquisition, and to fix that flat rate at 5 annas, 1 pie per square yard, and he fixed the compensation payable to the appellant on that basis. The land acquisition officer decided to apply a flat rate in respect of the lands under acquisition, and to fix that flat rate at 5 annas, 1 pie per square yard, and he fixed the compensation payable to the appellant on that basis. It was not shown in the award made by the land acquisition officer how the figure of 5 annas, 1 pie per square yard was arrived at, but from the judgment of the High Court now under appeal it appeared that the land acquisition officer took twenty-eight exemplars, selected from a much larger number, which had taken place within the previous seven years, that he added up the number of square yards sold in such transactions and the prices paid thereon and, by striking an average reached the figure of 5 annas, 1 pie per square yard, and awarded to the appellant in respect of both his personal and waqf property a sum of Rs.14,127, 13 annas 6 pies. On August 27, 1934, the appellant lodged an application to the collector as land acquisition officer under s. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for reference to the civil court regarding the acquisition of the properties on the ground that the compensation awarded was inadequate. In his written statement the collector pleaded that the award of the collector was made on the basis of the statement of parties " that the value " be fixed on the basis of certain sale deeds on the file " and therefore the applicant had no right to question the award. The learned District Judge raised two issues which are material—" (1.) Whether the compensation awarded is “adequate? If not, what is the proper compensation? " (2.) Whether the rate of compensation was fixed with, the " consent of the applicants and the acquiring body ? If so, “how does it affect the case ?” The District Judge, in the result, held that the appellant was entitled to Rs.29,202, 6 annas 10 pies in respect of both properties, and on appeal to the High Court (Collister and Bajpai JJ.) that award was increased by Rs.2,775, 12 annas 3 pies. The appellant now asked that the amount of compensation should be increased. 1945. Nov. 26, 27. Rewcastle K.C. and Dingle Foot for the appellant. The appellant now asked that the amount of compensation should be increased. 1945. Nov. 26, 27. Rewcastle K.C. and Dingle Foot for the appellant. The main question in these appeals is whether, in deciding the amount of compensation to be awarded to the appellant for the compulsory acquisition of his land, the High Court were right in reducing the price per square yard agreed between the parties by reason of the fact that the land was burdened with occupancy tenants. The submission that they were not is put on three grounds (a) As the parties had agreed on the rate at which compensation was to be paid that agreement could not be disturbed, (b) That agreement had been arrived at on the basis of certain exemplars, and the High Court were in error in thinking that the areas covered by those exemplars were all at the time of the sale free of occupancy tenants and in making the adjustment on that basis, (c) If it was proper to make any adjustment at all it was necessary, to make a proper one, to consider the circumstances applicable to each of the plots of land and the position of the tenants by whom the land was occupied ; the adjustment could not be arrived at without such a consideration by fixing a rough flat rate per square yard. “Occupancy tenant" means a tenant in occupation of the land at the time of the sale. Tucker K.C. and Wallach for the respondent. Whenever there is a sale deed of land, if there is an occupancy tenant or a statutory tenant the deed appears to state so. It is reasonably certain, therefore, that unless there is some mention in the sale deed of an existing occupancy or statutory tenant there were none at the date of the sale deed. If, of course, the land in question was burdened with occupancy tenants and the land with which it was compared was, and the court assumed that it was not, that would be a mistake in calculation, and it may be that the Board would send it back. There was no such mistake here. If, of course, the land in question was burdened with occupancy tenants and the land with which it was compared was, and the court assumed that it was not, that would be a mistake in calculation, and it may be that the Board would send it back. There was no such mistake here. The Board have laid down the circumstances in which it will interfere in the matter of calculation, and none of such circumstances is present in this appeal Narsingh Das v. Secretary of State for India (( 1924) L. R. 52 I. A. 133) ; Nowroji Rustomji Wadia v. Bombay Government (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 367.). " Occupancy tenant " is a well-known phrase which has been in existence since at least 1901 Agra Tenancy Act, 1926, s. 10. It is said for the appellant that the High Court were wrong in treating these twenty-eight exemplars as not being burdened with occupancy tenants because there were before the court four deeds in the list which were so burdened. It is submitted that three of those four are not so burdened, and that the other is not an exemplar. The valuation by the High Court of the lands compulsorily acquired in these cases is correct. Rewcastle K.C. replied. 1946. Jan. 14. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts set out above and continued The learned District Judge dealt with the second issue first. He noted that the agreement of the parties excluding sale deeds relating to areas less than seventy-five yards and sales more than seven years before the notification was relied on behalf of the collector to preclude the applicants from questioning the award. The learned judge rejected this contention, holding that the agreement only related to the evidence to be relied on for the purpose of determining the value, and that the parties had not con sented to be bound by the conclusion drawn by the land acquisition officer on the basis of such evidence The learned judge then considered the twenty-eight exemplars which had been relied on by the land acquisition officer and came to the conclusion that the conditions of the sal deed, exh. 84, one of the twenty-eight exemplars, bore a very close resemblance to the conditions relating to the acquisition of the appellants land, and that the rate at which the land in that exhibit was sold, namely, 10 annas, if pies per square yard, afforded the best basis for valuation of the appellants land. Accordingly, he allowed that rate, and, adding fifteen per cent, for compulsory acquisition, increased the amount awarded to the appellant to Rs.29,202.6.10. From the decision of the learned District Judge the appellant appealed to the High Court. There was also an appeal by the collector and by one of the tenants of the appellants property, but as those parties have not appealed to His Majesty in Council their cases need not be considered. The learned judges of the High Court disagreed with the learned District Judge in his answer to issue 2, and stated their opinion in these words —" We are also of the opinion that there was a binding " agreement between the parties that certain exemplars " afforded the basis for determining the market value of the " various properties. The agreement was not only that M transactions involving less than seventy-five square yards " and of a period anterior to 1923 should be excluded, but the " land acquisition officer was further given the power to " reject some transactions on the ground of being too high " or too low/ or by reason of being inadmissible on any " other ground’ and therefore the parties agreed that the " exemplars that might then remain after the exercise of " discretion by the land acquisition officer would constitute " the basis for determining the market price, and we have to " determine the market value of the land at the date of the " publication of the notification under s. 4 of the Act." Their Lordships are not in agreement with this opinion of the High Court, which seems to show some misconception of the functions of the land acquisition officer and the court under the Land Acquisition Act. Even if the agreement arrived at between the parties did cover the basis on which compensation was to be allowed, which their Lordships think it did not, such agreement could not bind the land acquisition officer or the District Judge in the performance of their statutory duties under the Land Acquisition Act, as is clear from an examination of the relevant provisions of the Act. Under s. 4 of the Act it is provided that where it appears to the provincial government that land is needed for any public purpose a notification to that effect is to be published as directed. Under s. 5 (a) persons interested in the land which has been notified may object to its acquisition, and the collector has to hear the objection and make a report thereon to Government. Under s. 6, if Government is satisfied, after considering the collectors report, that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a company (a subject dealt with in later sections of the Act) a declaration to that effect has to be made and published. Under s. 9 notice has to be published by the collector stating that Government intend to take the land, and that claims to compensation for all interest in such land may be made to him. Under s. 11 the collector has to inquire into the value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4 and into the respective interests of persons claiming compensation, and to make an award of (inter alia) the compensation which in his opinion should be allowed for the land. Under s. 12 notice of the award has to be given. Under s. 18 any person interested who has not accepted the award may by written application to the collector require him to refer the matter (which may include the amount of compensation) to the court. Under s. 19, sub-s. 1 (d), the collector in making the reference is required to state for the information of the court, if the objection be to the amount of compensation, the. grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. Under s. 19, sub-s. 1 (d), the collector in making the reference is required to state for the information of the court, if the objection be to the amount of compensation, the. grounds on which the amount of compensation was determined. Under s. 23 the court is required to take into consideration (inter alia) the market value of the land at the date of the publication of the notification under s. 4, and to add fifteen per cent, to the market value for compulsory acquisition. Under, s. 26 the award is to be deemed a decree. " Collector" is defined in the Act as including a deputy commissioner and any officer specially appointed by the provincial government to perform the functions of a collector under the Act. It is clear, therefore, that the land acquisition officer, in awarding the amount of compensation under s. 11, is performing a statutory duty, a duty the exercise of which, in cases where land is to be acquired for a public purpose, concerns the public, since it affects the expenditure of public money. In assessing compensation he is bound to exercise his own judgment as to the correct basis of valuation, and his judgment cannot be controlled by an agreement between the parties interested. On a reference under s. 18 the District Judge must also exercise his own judgment and consider, amongst other things, whether the award of the land acquisition officer was based on a correct principle. If in this case the District Judge considered that the market value of the land to be acquired could be better ascertained by basing it on a sale of neighbouring land in which the conditions closely resembled those affecting the land to be acquired, rather than by taking an average of prices obtained on a large number of sales in which the conditions were less similar, he was entitled and bound to act on his own view. In appeal the judges of the High Court were free to disagree with the District Judge if they thought him wrong, but this they do not appear to have done. They held that the District Judge was not free to act on his own view because it conflicted with the agreement between the parties. In appeal the judges of the High Court were free to disagree with the District Judge if they thought him wrong, but this they do not appear to have done. They held that the District Judge was not free to act on his own view because it conflicted with the agreement between the parties. Their Lordships have thought it right to make these observations lest they should be supposed to countenance a construction of the Act which, in their view, unjustifiably restricts the duties and obligations of the land acquisition officer and the court thereunder. There is, however, no cross-appeal try the collector, and the appellant does not seek the nestoration of the order of the District Judge, and the actual question which arises for decision is confined within a narrow compass. Having decided that the order of the District Judge was wrong, the learned judges of the High Court said that the twenty-eight transactions remained for consideration, and the method of striking the average was the only method by which the market price could be fixed, but they thought that the land acquisition officer had adopted a wrong method of striking the average. They considered that the rate in connexion with each of these transactions ought to be first determined, that the rates so evolved should be added up, and the total divided by twenty-eight, the number of the transactions. On this basis the average rate worked out at R.1, 4 annas per square yard. The learned judges then proceeded in these terms —" It is also agreed before us that in the case of the twenty-eight exemplars the land was not burdened with " occupancy tenants, whereas in the cases before us the land "is so burdened. There is nothing in the order of the land " acquisition officer to show that he paid any regard to this " aspect. It is not always easy to induce occupancy tenants” to surrender their rights and an attempt in that direction " always involves some trouble and some expense. We think " that 8 annas per square yard should be deducted for this " trouble and expense and the zamindars ought to be awarded " compensation at the rate of 12 annas per square yard” Accordingly, the amount awarded to the appellant was increased by Rs.2775-12-3. We think " that 8 annas per square yard should be deducted for this " trouble and expense and the zamindars ought to be awarded " compensation at the rate of 12 annas per square yard” Accordingly, the amount awarded to the appellant was increased by Rs.2775-12-3. In this appeal the appellant accepted the rate of R.1, 4 annas per square yard, but objected to the deduction of 8 annas per square yard in respect of occupancy tenancies, an expression defined in the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The appellant contended that the learned judges of the High Court were under a misapprehension in saying that it had been agreed before them that in the case of the twenty-eight exemplars the land was not burdened with occupancy tenants. The appellant does not seem to have challenged the reference to his alleged agreement in the judgment of the High Court before the decree based thereon became binding, nor are there on the record any notes of the learned judges made at the hearing on this point. The appellant admits that as to most of the twenty-eight exemplars there is no evidence whether the land was subject to occupancy tenancies or not, and he says that the matter was never gone into. It has been argued, however, before their Lordships that there are four cases comprised in the twenty-eight exemplars in which the record shows that there were occupancy tenants. But when examined it appears that in three of those cases the tenants who were on the land were not occupancy tenants. The only case in which it is shown that there was an occupancy tenant is that comprised in exh. 84, the exemplar relied on by the learned District Judge, and no doubt in that case there must have been an occupancy tenant or the exemplar could not have been relied on as affording an accurate comparison with the case of the appellant. The appellant has failed to satisfy their Lordships that the statement in the High Court judgment that it had been agreed that in the case of the twenty-eight exemplars land was not burdened with occupancy tenants was wrong, or that there is any ground on which it would be right to allow further evidence on the point to be taken. This really disposes of the appeal. This really disposes of the appeal. It was objected by the appellant that the High Court was wrong in treating all the twenty-eight exemplars on precisely the same footing in relation to occupancy tenants without making any inquiry into the circumstances of particular cases, and further, that 8 annas per square yard is too heavy a deduction to make merely on account of trouble and expense in getting rid of occupancy tenants. These, however, are mere questions relating to value, with which it is not the practice of their Lordships Board to interfere, recognizing, as they do, that the local knowledge of courts in India on such matters is of the greatest value. Their Lordships will therefore humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the respondent.