JUDGMENT Braund, J. - We have before us as a Full Bench a question of law arising out of three second Appeals, Nos. 493, 494 and 1826, all of 1943. In each of these cases the facts are for the present purpose identical. It need only be said that in each case the plaintiff, who was a landlord, obtained a decree for arrears of rent against his tenant. That decree he sought to execute by the usual execution proceedings, and in each of the three cases he has been confronted with S. 3, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Rent (Remission) Act, 1939 (Act 18 [XVIII] of 1939), out of which this reference arises. 2. The actual terms of reference are these: Whether, upon the true construction of S. 3, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Bent (Remission) Act, 1939, (Act 18 [XVIII] of 1939), read with S. 2, U.P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act, 1937 (Act 4 [IV] of 1937) and S. 2, U.P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) (Amendment) Act, 1937, an application made in execution to enforce a decree obtained in respect of arrears of rent is an application for the recovery of arrears of rent which, if made during the period in which the U.P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act, 1937, is in force, would have been stayed under the provisions of that Act. 3. The point is a very short one, being in effect merely whether the words "applications for the recovery of arrears of rent" are wide enough to include applications to execute decrees which have already been obtained in a suit claiming arrears of rent. 4. Section 3, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Rent (Remission) Act, 1939 appears in an Act the preamble of which is as follows: Whereas it is expedient to remit arrears of rent the proceedings for the recovery of which have been stayed by the U. P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act, 1937...... 5. It appears obvious that the main object of this Act was to grant concessions to tenants in the matter of the arrears of rent due from them to their landlords. Although this is not a consideration that can control the actual language which the Act has used, it has nonetheless to be borne in mind in giving a construction to S. 3. Although this is not a consideration that can control the actual language which the Act has used, it has nonetheless to be borne in mind in giving a construction to S. 3. Recently Lord Atkin in the Privy Council in construing certain sections of our Agriculturists' Relief Act was constrained to say that: . . . . the words of a remedial statute must be construed, so far as they reasonably admit, so as to secure that the relief contemplated by the statute shall not be denied to the class, intended to be relieved ....: ('44) AIR 1944 35 (Privy Council) 6. Section 3, United Provinces Stayed Arrears of Rent (Remission) Act, 1939, (which for convenience I shall hereinafter call "the Remission Act") follows an earlier Act of 1937 called the United Provinces Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act, and it has to be considered, I think, in sequence to that Act. The 1937 Act by S. 2 provided that: .... all proceedings in suits and applications of the classes specified in the schedule to this Act . . . shall be stayed .. . . 7. It has to be observed that what were stayed by the 1937 Act were not proceedings for the recovery of arrears of rent, but certain definite classes of proceedings specified in the schedule to the Act which itself refers to the schedules of the Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. When those schedules are examined, it is found that the specified proceedings stayed by the 1937 Act can be classified into five categories. The first of those categories concerned the recovery of arrears of rent; the second related to ejectment; the third to the assessment and recovery of arrears of revenue; the fourth to the fixing of rent; and the fifth to the execution of money decrees. 8. The relevance of it is this. When the United Provinces Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act came to an end, S. 3, Remission Act, was enacted presumably for the purpose of being substituted for it. 8. The relevance of it is this. When the United Provinces Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act came to an end, S. 3, Remission Act, was enacted presumably for the purpose of being substituted for it. The appellants in these cases have rightly pointed out that, when the Remission Act came to be enacted, the framers of it chose by S. 3 to limit its mischief by carefully chosen words, namely, by saying that it is to apply to "all suits or applications for the recovery of arrears of rent....." The argument goes on to point out that since there were many other specified types of proceedings affected by the 1937 Act, it is only what can be strictly brought within the description of "suits or applications for the recovery of arrears of rent" that can be held to be still affected by S. 3, Remission Act. Put shortly, the argument is one of contrast between the breadth of the 1937 Act and what is said to have been the deliberate exclusiveness of the language of S. 3, Remission Act. 9. This argument is certainly attractive. Nevertheless it does not, in my view, relieve us of the necessity of putting our own construction on the words of S. 3, which are the words we have to deal with. There were among those classes of proceedings which were affected by the 1937 Act that class which related to applications for the execution of decrees for arrears of rent, namely the types of application included in Group F-3 (a), 4 (2) and 4 (3) (a) of Sch. 4 to the Agra Tenancy Act. It is clear from this that the earlier Act of 1937 contemplated a stay of that type of application, which is precisely the type of application we have before us. It is possibly true that in strictness it can be said that an application to enforce a decree by execution is not itself an "application for the recovery of arrears of rent"; and again we are reminded that it is those words and none other that we have to consider in S. 3, Remission Act. It is possibly true that in strictness it can be said that an application to enforce a decree by execution is not itself an "application for the recovery of arrears of rent"; and again we are reminded that it is those words and none other that we have to consider in S. 3, Remission Act. Bearing that in mind, nevertheless, it cannot be denied that an application for the execution of a decree, itself obtained in respect of arrears of rent, is in substance an application which has as its object to obtain the money which has been ordered by the decree to be paid, that is to say, the money which represents the arrears of rent originally sued for. The words "recover" and "recovery" are to my mind wide enough, and are appropriate, to cover a case in which a man seeks to obtain for himself the fruits of a decree and in that way to get the arrears of rent which that decree represents. It is not a very long, nor indeed incorrect, step to treat the execution of a decree as a step in the suit itself. I, therefore, see no necessity to apply any particular force to the actual words of S. 3 in order to include within the category of "applications for the recovery of arrears of rent" that process which is the execution of a decree by which a successful plaintiff hopes to reduce to the form of cash the decree which is the fruit of his suit. In plain language it is a means of "recovering" that which he originally sued for. 10. The strictly technical argument is, of course, that, the debt having merged in the judgment, there remain no longer any "arrears of rent" to be recovered. To my mind that is forcing a technicality too far. It is quite true that for many purposes a debt does merge in a judgment or in a decree and in that sense disappears. The strictly technical argument is, of course, that, the debt having merged in the judgment, there remain no longer any "arrears of rent" to be recovered. To my mind that is forcing a technicality too far. It is quite true that for many purposes a debt does merge in a judgment or in a decree and in that sense disappears. But it is by no means for all purposes that this happens, and one instance taken at random can be found in such a case as in (1894) 1 Q.B. 189, In re King and Beasley in which it was held for the purpose of the Bankruptcy Acts, in England that a creditor could still rely on his debt to found a bankruptcy petition, notwithstanding that he had already obtained a judgment on it. 11. Bearing in mind, therefore, that we are construing an Act of a remedial character and having regard to the view of the construction of S. 3 that the words can naturally enough bear a meaning which will permit them to include an application to execute a decree obtained in respect of arrears of rent, I do not feel that we can exclude from that class of application which is prohibited by S. 3 an application by which a man in the position of the plaintiff in each of these suits seeks, by plucking the fruits of his suit, in substance and in fact to "recover" the money (that is to say, the arrears of rent) which constituted the sole cause of action on which that suit was originally brought. 12. I am glad to find that this has been the view which has been accepted by two learned single Judges of this Court and is also the view which seems to have been favoured by the Oudh Chief Court in a Full Bench judgment in the year 1941 ('41) 28 AIR 1941 Oudh 273 : 16 Luck. 443 : 194 I.C. 387 (F.B.), Hari Saran Das v. Dhani Ram. 443 : 194 I.C. 387 (F.B.), Hari Saran Das v. Dhani Ram. For these reasons, in my judgment, this reference falls to be answered by saying that, on the true construction of S. 3, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Bent (Remission) Act, 1939, an application made in execution to enforce a decree obtained in respect of arrears of rent is an "application for the recovery of arrears of rent which, If made during the period in which the United Provinces Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act, 1937, was in force, would have been stayed under the provisions of that Act." Hamilton J. 13. I agree with the view of my learned brother and have nothing to add. Pathak J. 14. I also agree with the view of my learned brother. 15. The three second Appeals in question will be sent back to the Courts whence they came now to be heard in accordance with the declaration we have made above. The costs of this Full Bench (if any) will be costs in the respective second Appeals. 16. As regards the two other revisions which have been before us to-day, Nos. 3 of 1942 and 63 of 1948, we understand that the applicant is now dead. It may be that as a result of the decision of this Full Bench no one may desire to press them any further. We, however, direct that they now be remitted, with copies of this judgment attached, to the original Judges or Benches which were dealing with them. Judgment of the Division Bench Braund J. 17. These three second Appeals Nos. 493, 494 and 1826, all of 1943, have now come back to us after having been dealt with by the Full Bench in January. The effect of that Full Bench has been to dispose of the principal point which was common to all three second appeals. Another secondary point has been dealt with in another Full Bench and we are not now concerned with it. There only remain two small questions outstanding. 18. The first of these affects only the second Appeals Nos. 493 and 494; but it is nevertheless an extremely neat point, the answer to which is not at first sight altogether apparent. What is said by Mr. Govind Das is that, if one looks at S. 5, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Bent (Remission) Act, 1939, one observes a very curious thing. 493 and 494; but it is nevertheless an extremely neat point, the answer to which is not at first sight altogether apparent. What is said by Mr. Govind Das is that, if one looks at S. 5, U.P. Stayed Arrears of Bent (Remission) Act, 1939, one observes a very curious thing. Section 5 is a section which takes certain classes of persons out of the mischief of the Act. It says that: The provisions of S. 3 in this Act shall not apply to a suit or application instituted or made against any person the rent payable by whom in the year 1344 Fasli was more than Ms. 500. ... 19. The words in italics above are relied on by Mr. Govind Das to suggest that it is not merely the current annual rent which is to be treated as the test whether the person comes within S. 3 or not, but it is what in fact was payable in the particular Fasli year 1344, whether it was current rent or whether it was arrears of rent. You have, he says, to take what was due in that particular year and, no matter how it was made up, if it exceeded its. 600, then it sufficed to take the case out of S. 3. 20. This point is an ingenious one which relies on two words, namely the word "payable" and the word "in." It has been pointed out, not without force, that in the U.P. Stay of Proceedings (Revenue Courts) Act, 1937, which may be described as the parent Act, the expression "rent for" a period frequently recurs. In S. 5 of the Act with which we are dealing the expression has been changed to "rent.....in." That is one point. And Mr. Govind Das adds the second point that not only has the Legislature denoted that what is intended is not merely rent "for" a period but is rent "in" a period, but it has also introduced the word "payable," meaning thereby that what you have to look for is what amount of money the tenant was liable to pay in that particular period. 21. This, as I have said, is ingenious and is not, in my opinion, altogether easy to answer. But on the whole I have come to the conclusion that it is more ingenious than sound. 21. This, as I have said, is ingenious and is not, in my opinion, altogether easy to answer. But on the whole I have come to the conclusion that it is more ingenious than sound. We have to construe the Act as we find it, and if it were clear on the face of S. 5 that those tenants who in the year 1344 owed more than five hundred rupees, whether for arrears or current rent, should escape the provisions of S. 3, then we should have to construe the Act in that way. But, in my opinion, there are indications that that is not really what has been expressed by the Legislature in the language it has used. 22. Referring first to S. 3 itself, it is to be noticed that what it deals with is suits or applications for the recovery of arrears of rent. The whole section is dealing, not with current rent, but with arrears of rent and suits or applications to recover those arrears. When, therefore, in S. 5 it refers to a suit or application instituted or made against any person, it means a suit or application instituted in respect of arrears of rent. If that is so, it seems to me a little remarkable that the draftsman should have gone on immediately to use the word "rent" if he had not perfectly well understood that arrears of rent was one thing and rent was another thing. "What Mr. Govind Das's argument amounts to is that the word "rent" in S. 5 means not only current rent but also arrears of rent. In my view, in the context the more natural meaning of the word "rent" is that it refers merely to current rent. 23. But there is, I think, another indication. The words used are "the rent payable.... in the year...." The word "payable", I think, means that "which the tenant was liable to pay in the year". Now, it is not true to say that a tenant was liable to pay arrears of rent accrued in 1342 and 1343 in the year 1344. His primary liability was to pay that rent when it accrued due and that liability has been protracted into 1344 merely because he did not happen to pay it earlier. Now, it is not true to say that a tenant was liable to pay arrears of rent accrued in 1342 and 1343 in the year 1344. His primary liability was to pay that rent when it accrued due and that liability has been protracted into 1344 merely because he did not happen to pay it earlier. I think, therefore, that the words "payable in" are more apt to describe the liability which arises in respect of a particular year than a liability which arose in some earlier year and was merely by accident protracted into the year 1944. 24. But there is another indication still, I [think, in the word "the" Rent in the abstract is one thing. "The" rent payable in the particular year is another thing altogether. The introduction of the word "the" to my mind indicates that the Legislature is referring to some particular rent. And that rent can only be the rent payable in a particular year in the sense that it accrues due in respect of that year. For these reasons, in my opinion, the appeals fail on this point. 25. There is only one other short point which arises out of second Appeal No. 1826 of 1943. It appears in this case that a decree had been obtained for the arrears of rent. That decree had been executed by obtaining from the execution Court an order for ejectment and I think that the execution Court had no more to do with the matter except possibly to see that its officer obtained and gave possession to the decree-holder. It is said, therefore, that because this execution application involved merely an application for ejectment, that is to say, to get the property back, it ceased to be (or possibly never was) an "application... for the recovery of arrears of rent." In my view there is nothing in this point. The execution application, whatever form it took, arose out of the decree for rent and was an application the object of which was to recover that rent. In short, it said to the judgment-debtor that if he did not pay it, he would be ejected. And the actual ejectment was merely the logical sequence of his refusing to pay. The execution application, whatever form it took, arose out of the decree for rent and was an application the object of which was to recover that rent. In short, it said to the judgment-debtor that if he did not pay it, he would be ejected. And the actual ejectment was merely the logical sequence of his refusing to pay. The application, therefore, was in my opinion nonetheless an application for arrears of rent because in the events which happened it turned out that the only course open to the judgment-debtor was in the end to retake possession. For these reasons, I think, that these three second appeals must be dismissed with costs. Hamilton J. 26. I agree with the decision arrived at by my learned brother and have little to add. I would point out that by S. 5 the provisions of S. 3 of this Act shall not apply also to any person who in the year 1937 was assessed to income tax under the income tax Act, 1922, or under the income tax law of any Indian State or to any person whose land was assessed in the year 1344 Fasli to a local rate of more than twenty-five rupees. A person who pays local rate of more than twenty-five rupees is a person who pays a certain amount of land revenue. These two provisions indicate that the object of the Legislature was to take into consideration the financial status of the individual in the year 1344, that status being arrived at by considering what his revenue was or what his income liable to income tax was. In many of these local Acts, persons have been classified similarly taking into consideration the revenue and the income tax and also taking into consideration the rent payable when land revenue was not payable. When two classes of persona out of three are arrived at by considering the financial status in a particular year, it seems to me reasonable to give a similar meaning to the expression which has been dealt with by my learned brother as regards the rent so as to make the same principle apply throughout, that is to say, the rent qualification would be ejusdem generis as the land revenue or income tax assessment qualification. As regards the point involved in Second Appeal No. 1826, the object was that in certain cases the rent that was payable to the zamindar was no longer made payable. If the tenant did not have to pay that rent, it seems to me that it would be anomalous to say that nevertheless he could be ejected for failing to pay a rent which in fact was not payable. I, therefore, agree with the decision arrived at by my learned brother. 27. The three appeals are dismissed with costs.