JUDGMENT Wali Ullah, J. - This is an application in revision by the plaintiff under S. 25, Small Cause Courts Act, against the decree passed by the learned Judge of the Small Cause Court dismissing his suit as barred by limitation. 2. It appears that one Durga Ahir executed a promissory note on 25-12-1930 for Rs. 200 in favour of Radhe Shiam. It was stipulated that interest would be paid on the amount borrowed at the rate of Rs. 2 per cent, per mensem. Subsequently on 24-9-1933, Durga Ahir executed a simple money bond for Rs. 200 in favour of Radhe Shiam. It was recited in the bond that the amount due under the earlier promissory note dated 25-12-1930, together with interest came to a large amount but owing to the poverty of the executant of the bond (Durga Ahir) Radhe Shiam, the creditor, had given up his claims to interest and had agreed to accept the bond for Rs. 200 only in lieu of the earlier promissory note. It was stipulated in the bond that the sum of Rs. 200 would be paid by instalments of Rs. 20 each every year in the month of Jaith. It was further provided in the bond that in case of default in the payment of any instalment the lender aforesaid shall have the right to realise by filing a suit either the entire amount of the instalments in respect of which default be committed and those in respect of which there be no default till then with interest at 1 per cent, per mensem or only the amount in respect of instalment in payment of which default be committed. Further it was stipulated that the said Lala Saheb (the lender) will also have the right to realise by filing a suit in Court the total amount due from the executant on account of principal and interest after the expiry of time for all the instalments, that is at the time when the last instalment fell due. The plaintiff is the son of Radhe Shiam who is dead. The defendants are the sons of Durga who is also dead. The suit was instituted on 22-7-1944. 3. It is common ground that no instalment was ever paid at any time by the executant, so the first default in payment occurred in June 1934. The plaintiff is the son of Radhe Shiam who is dead. The defendants are the sons of Durga who is also dead. The suit was instituted on 22-7-1944. 3. It is common ground that no instalment was ever paid at any time by the executant, so the first default in payment occurred in June 1934. The suit was contested substantially on the grounds that Durga had not exceuted the bond in suit; that it was not for consideration and that in any event the suit was barred by limitation. On a consideration of the evidence on the record the learned Judge of the Court below found that the bond in suit was duly executed by Durga deceased and was for consideration. He also recorded a finding that the suit was governed by Art. 75, Lim. Act, and was consequently barred by time. The suit was accordingly dismissed but there was no order for costs. 4. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant has strongly contended that the Court below took an erroneous view of the law in applying Art. 75, Limitation Act, to the facta of the present case. His contention is that the proper article to apply was Art. 80, Limitation Act, and the suit was consequently within time. It is, however, obvious That Art. 80 would have no application if the suit falls within the purview of Art. 75, of the Act. The crucial question, therefore, is whether on a proper interpretation of the bond in suit the case comes within the four corners of Art. 75. The material portions of the bond in suit have been set out above. It was provided in the bond that payments were to be made by instalments. It was further provided that if default was committed in the payment of any one instalment the creditor could realise the entire amount due under the bond with interest at one per cent per mensem. In view of these stipulations in the bond, it must be held that according to the provisions of the bond the whole amount became due at the time when the first default was committed. In view of these stipulations in the bond, it must be held that according to the provisions of the bond the whole amount became due at the time when the first default was committed. Learned counsel for the applicant, however, contends that it is clear from the provisions of the bond itself that a third option was given to the creditor namely a right to sue for the entire amount due under the bond together with interest at the time fixed for the payment of the last instalment. His contention is that owing to what he characterises as the option 3 given to the creditor' time did not begin to run against the plaintiff applicant from the date of the first default. He argues that according to the special stipulationthe so-called option 3in the bond the plaintiff could institute the suit within three years of the time fixed for payment of the last instalment. If this contention is correct Art. 75 has no application and the case would be governed by Art. 80. This contention was raised on behalf of the plaintiff applicant in the Court below as well but it was repelled by the learned Judge. The learned Judge of the Court below has relied upon the case in [Munshi Lal v. Sagar Mal] (43) 1943 A.L.J. 238 (239), which in its turn is based on a Full Bench ruling of this Court in Jawahar Lal Vs. Mathura Prasad and Another The learned Judge of the Court below has found as a fact that there was no allegation or evidence to show that the creditor ever waived the benefit of the default clause in the bond. In regard to the stipulations contained in the bond, the learned Judge was of opinion that on a proper interpretation of the document as a whole there was no third and distinct option given to the creditor as contended for by the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the plaintiff applicant has also contended that the principle laid down by a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in Lalta Prasad and Others Vs. Gajadhar Shukul and Others really governs the present case. 5. Learned counsel for the defendant opposite parties has strongly relied on the Full Bench decision in Jawahar Lal Vs. Mathura Prasad and Another and the case in (43) 1943 A.L.J. 238 (239) referred to above. Gajadhar Shukul and Others really governs the present case. 5. Learned counsel for the defendant opposite parties has strongly relied on the Full Bench decision in Jawahar Lal Vs. Mathura Prasad and Another and the case in (43) 1943 A.L.J. 238 (239) referred to above. During the course of arguments reference ha& also been made to the case in Sukh Lal Vs. Bhoora, AIR 1934 All 1039 . I have considered these rulings with care and I have also carefully perused the stipulations contained in the bond in suit. It seems to me that the principles laid down by the Full Bench in (1934) A.L.J. 10352 may be summed up as under : In the case of an instalment bond, if it is provided that in the event of a default in payment of one installment the creditor can bring his suit for realising the entire amount of the bond, the whole amount must be considered to become due within the meaning of col. 1, Art. 75, Limitation Act, and Art. 75 would be applicable to a suit based on such a bond. As Art. 75 would cover such a case neither Art. 74 nor Art. 80 can have any application. By virtue of the provisions of col. 3, Art. 75 time will begin to run from the date of the first default which makes the whole money due and if waiver is proved the date of a fresh default. In delivering the judgment of the Full Bench in the case mentioned above at p. 1043 Sir Shah Sulaiman C.J., is reported to have observed: If a case is directly covered by the language of col. 1, Art. 75, namely, it is a case of a suit brought on a bond payable by instalments which bond provides that if default be made the whole shall be due and the suit is brought after the whole has become due, then in my opinion, there is no escape from Art. 75. 6. It follows, therefore, that time will begin to run from the date of default no matter whether the creditor has been given the option of suing only for the instalment in respect of which a default has been committed. 6. It follows, therefore, that time will begin to run from the date of default no matter whether the creditor has been given the option of suing only for the instalment in respect of which a default has been committed. The essential thing, to my mind, therefore is to find, on a proper interpretation of the language of the bond whether the entire amount of the bond becomes due on the occurrence of the default in question. If it be found that the entire amount becomes due the claim for the recovery of the amount would consequently become barred by time after three years or sis years if the deed be a registered one. It may be that it is barred by time even before the date for payments the last instalment arrives. The stipulation in the bond in suit in the present case to the effect that Lala Saheb will also have the right to realise by filing a suit in Court the total amount due from the executant on account of principal and interest after the expiry of time for all the instalments, that is, at the time when the last instalment falls due cannot arrest the running of time when once it has begun to run on account of the fact that Art. 75 governs the case. Such a stipulation is nothing short of a contract or agreement between the parties for altering the statutory period of limitation, namely three years as prescribed by Art. 75. It is, however, quite clear that parties cannot by contract alter the statutory period of limitation nor can they alter the statutory 'starting point' of limitation. Such a covenant must be deemed to be void under S. 23, Contract Act. 7. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-applicant relied upon the observations of the learned Judges in Lalta Prasad and Others Vs. Gajadhar Shukul and Others where it is observed that the covenant in the bond entitling the creditor to sue before the expiry of the stipulated period .... was for the benefit of the creditor, and it was open to him to waive that option and to wait for the full period of lour years before putting the bond into suit. These observations no doubt are in favour of the applicant but this case is clearly distinguishable. was for the benefit of the creditor, and it was open to him to waive that option and to wait for the full period of lour years before putting the bond into suit. These observations no doubt are in favour of the applicant but this case is clearly distinguishable. It was not a case of a bond payable by (instalments inasmuch as a bond is payable by instalments only when the principal amount thereof is payable by instalments and not where the interest is payable on particular dates but the whole of the principal is payable after a fixed date. Article 75 therefore, could not have applied in that case. In view of what has gone before, it seems to me that the suit was clearly barred by time and the Court below has taken a correct view of the law. 8. In my opinion, therefore, there is no force in this application and it is accordingly dismissed. As observed by the learned Judge of the Court below the plaintiff-applicant may have been misled by the language in which the bond was couched. I, therefore, make no orders as to costs of this application.