JUDGMENT Allsop, Ag. C.J. 1. These appeals arise out of two proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act. Two applications under S. 4 of the Act were made by two brothers and in each proceeding the question arose whether a share in the village of Deomai was the property of the applicants or was the property of Sri Thakur Bindraban Behari Ji. The share in dispute belonged to the family of which the two applicants were members but it is alleged that it was dedicated, to the idol by a deed executed on 11-11-1864. The representatives of the idol produced a copy of this deed which was executed by Thakur Prasad and Janki Prasad, the two representatives of the family at that time. They have also produced copies of two other documents dealing with partitions in the years 1878 and 1908 in which it was mentioned by the members of the family that this property had been dedicated to the idol. There was some question whether these documents were relevant, but that is a matter which, we think, we need not discuss. 2. On the assumption that an attempt was made to dedicate the property in the year 1864, we still think that the property has not passed to the idol. According to this deed the two men, Thakur Prasad and Janki Prasad, directed that the profits of the village should be paid to the idol. It has been urged before us that this was in effect a dedication of the property itself, but we do not think that it is possible to put that construction upon the deed. The persons who executed the deed certainly said that the whole profits of the village should go to the idol and upon this fact the argument is advanced that a gift of the whole profits amounts to a gift of the share itself. We have been referred to the case in C. Venkatachariar Vs. Bontham Pachayappa Chetti and Others, AIR 1926 Mad 250 This does not seem to us to be more than a decision upon the rules of conveyancing as understood in England and we do not think that such rules could apply to this province where conveyancing is not in the hands of trained conveyancers but of petition writers who cannot be expected to know any technical rules or terms of art. We think that the deed must be construed as a whole. If it went no further than to say that the whole income of the property was dedicated to the idol there might be some force in the appellant's argument, but there are other terms in the deed. It is said quite clearly that the persons who executed the deed and their heirs and successors should remain recorded as proprietors of the property in the register of proprietors and that inheritance should be governed by the ordinary rules. It is also said that the land revenue due on the share shall be paid by those two persons and their heirs and successors out of their own pockets, if possible, and not out of the income of the share. There is a provision that the share may be mortgaged, though not sold in order to pay off arrears of land revenue if the proprietors of the time have not been able to pay the money out of their own pockets. It seems to us quite clear on the construction of this deed that there was no intention that the property itself should vest in the idol. 3. There is an alternative suggestion that the deed at least creates a charge in favour of the idol. That again we think is a suggestion which we cannot accept. The deed is not framed as it would have been framed if there had been an intention to create a charge and we think the provisions for mortgaging the property in order to pay off arrears of land revenue is inconsistent with the creation of a charge. If the property was charged in this way that the whole of the income from it was to go to the idol, then we cannot see how there could be any mortgage executed by the proprietors because the mortgage itself should be subject to the charge and there would be nothing left for the mortgagee to enjoy. We are satisfied that the two men who executed the deed were under the impression that they could transfer the future income of the property to the idol without transferring the property itself or any interest in it and in our judgment they were mistaken upon this point. We may refer to the provisions of S. 124, T.P. Act. We are satisfied that the two men who executed the deed were under the impression that they could transfer the future income of the property to the idol without transferring the property itself or any interest in it and in our judgment they were mistaken upon this point. We may refer to the provisions of S. 124, T.P. Act. We do not see how the owners of the property could transfer the future income by way of gift before it had accrued. In our judgment the decision of the Court below that the property still vests in the applicants under the Encumbered Estates Act is a correct decision. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs.