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1946 DIGILAW 106 (ALL)

Huzur Ara Begam v. Roshan Jahan Begam

1946-04-08

MADELEY, MISRA

body1946
JUDGMENT Misra and Madeley, JJ. - These revisions petitions arise out of proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act and are directed against an order of the Special Judge passed at the instance of the landlord debtor Nawab Roshan Jehan Begam staying further proceedings under Chapter v. of the Act and recalling the creditors' decrees forwarded by him to the Collector in pursuance of Section 19. 2. The proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act were initiated by Nawab Roshan Jehan Begam in July 1935 and at first took their normal course. Notice u/s 11 were published in the gazette on 17th April, 1937 and since there were no claim set up under that section the Court proceeded to determine the debts due to the creditors. A number of decrees were passed against the landlord and were transmitted to the Collector on 26th January 1938, for execution along with the ranking order and the list of properties which were liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debts. During the course of the liquidation proceedings certain house property was auctioned on 22nd June 1942 u/s 24 and was purchased by Rani Huzur Ara Begam for Rs. 76,000. The sale was confirmed on 21st September 1942, but the delivery of possession of two shops comprised in the house property has been stayed by an order of this Court. 3. It will be recalled that Sub-section (2) of Section 11 of the Act as it originally stood prescribed that any person having a claim to the property shown by the landlord in this written statement u/s 8 might present a petition of claim in the Court of the Special Judge within three months of the publication of notice in the gazette. By Sub-section (3) the Special Judge was enjoined to determine all claims to the property before proceeding to determine the amount due to any creditor u/s 14 and the decrees under the latter section were not to be passed until one month had expired from the date of the determination of the claims u/s 11. By Sub-section (3) the Special Judge was enjoined to determine all claims to the property before proceeding to determine the amount due to any creditor u/s 14 and the decrees under the latter section were not to be passed until one month had expired from the date of the determination of the claims u/s 11. The limitation of time within which the application u/s 11 was to be made precluded the Court from entertaining bona fide claims which could not be preferred within the specified period and the legislature, therefore thought fit to amend the provision in 1939 by addition of a proviso to Sub-section (2) which ran thus Provided that if the claimant satisfied the Special Judge that he had sufficient cause for not making his application within the above period, the Special Judge may receive such application, if presented at time before such property is transferred to any person under the provisions of Sections 24, 25, 28 or 31 or a bond is issued by the Collector to a creditor under Sections 30 or 31. 4. Taking advantage of the amendment one Nawab Khurshed Jehan Begam a daughter-in-law of the landlord, filed a claim' on 18th August 1942, on the basis of a registered deed of gift dated 21st July, 1932, in respect of two shops included in the house property purchased by Rani Huzur Ara Begam (It will be noticed that this claim was preferred about a month before the confirmation of sale in favor of the Rani,) A number of grounds for condensation of the delay were put forward, but by his order, dated 18th March 1943, the learned Special Judge refused to entertain the claim holding that there was no sufficient cause and that the amended provision should not be invoked by the lady inasmuch as the property had already been transferred in pursuance of Section 24. Nawab Khurshed Jehan's appeal against the aforesaid order to this Court is still pending decision. 5. During the pendency of her daughter in law's claim in the Court of the Special Judge Nawab Roshan Jehan Begam presented on 14th October 1942, the application which gives rise to these revisions. Nawab Khurshed Jehan's appeal against the aforesaid order to this Court is still pending decision. 5. During the pendency of her daughter in law's claim in the Court of the Special Judge Nawab Roshan Jehan Begam presented on 14th October 1942, the application which gives rise to these revisions. She pointed out that as a result of the claim to Khurshed Jehan Begam u/s 11 she would be entitled within a month of its disposal to the benefit of Section 20 and the proceedings would be liable to be quashed at her instance and that the decrees which had been passed against her u/s 1 were erroneous in various respects and would require correction. She prayed, therefore that the aforesaid decrees should be recalled and further proceedings in the liquidation Court be stayed. This application was disposed of on 14th March, 19 44. and as stated above the Special Judge partly acceded to the request. His view was that Sub-section (3) of Section 11 necessitated a predetermination of debts due to the creditors and since Section 20 afforded to the landlord a fresh opportunity to have the entire proceedings quashed the decrees passed u/s 14 should be recalled from the Court of the Collector and the proceedings under Chapter v. should remain in abeyance. Against this order Rani Huzur Ara Begam has come up to this Court u/s 46 by her revision petition No. 2 of 1944 and a similar petition (No. 3 of 1944) has been filed by two creditors namely Nawab Husain Ali Khan and Mst. Bishun Dei. the other creditors acquiesced in the order and have been impleaded as opposite-parties along with Nawab Roshan Jehan Begam, 6. We have heard the Learned Counsel for the parties and after a careful consideration of the contentions urged at the bar we Lave come to the conclusion that these revisions must be allowed, Sub-section (3) of Section 1 contemplates claims which have been preferred within three months of the notice specified under Sub-section (2) and prescribed that the Special Judge shall not pass any decrees u/s 14 before the expiry of a month from the determination of those claims. The prohibition obviously cannot be applied to cases where decrees in favor of the creditors have already been passed u/s 14 and have become final. The prohibition obviously cannot be applied to cases where decrees in favor of the creditors have already been passed u/s 14 and have become final. If it was intended that such decrees should be rescinded and the debts should be predetermined in the event of a belated claim to the property of the landlord u/s 11 being preferred we have no doubt that the amending Act would have made an express provision to that effect. The object underlying the proviso was to relieve bona-fide claimants whose applications could not be prepared in time. We find it somewhat difficult to imagine that Sub-section (3) which prescribed that determination of debts u/s 14 was to be made after the expiry of one month from the date of disposal of the claim to property carries an implication that decrees which have already been passed must become infractions and fresh adjudications must be made in the event of a belated claim being preferred. It has been held by a Bench of this Court in Thukur Sheomangal Singh v. Jamesh Own 1944 O.A. 210 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 210 : O.W.N. 297 that if a claim under the proviso to Section 11(2) was not entertained by the Special Judge by reason of the fact that it was not preferred within the time allowed by law its rejection could not provide an opportunity to the landlord to apply u/s 20. In coming to this conclusion the learned Judges constituting the Bench analyzed the provisions of Section 20 and Section 11(3) and they came to the conclusion that reading the two sections together it followed that Section 20 could not be invoked after decrees had been passed u/s 14. They observed in this connection that to concede such a right to him (landlord) would be to defeat the intention of the legislature. They observed in this connection that to concede such a right to him (landlord) would be to defeat the intention of the legislature. There is no doubt that by the insertion of the proviso in Sub-section (2) of Section II in 1939 the period for filing a claim has been extended upon sufficient cause being shown to the satisfaction of the Special Judge but we do not think that in expending this indulgence to a claimant the legislature could have intended that although the claims u/s 11 had been determined and subsequent there to the decrees had been passed u/s 11, it was open to any person waning to put forward a claim whether real or shadowy, to enlarge the time in favor of the landlord so as to enable him to get the proceedings quashed merely upon the ground that a claim had been put forward and dismissed. We are unable to impute an intention to the legislature to render the decrees passed u/s 14 ineffective by allowing a landlord in circumstances as the present to have the proceedings quashed because a claim was put forward five years hence by a mala fide claimant. 7. Under the Act as originally framed the Special Judge did not possess the power to recall the decrees and to stay proceedings in the liquidation Court. Bent Madho v. Kaniz Zohra. Begum 1937 O.W.N. 473, it was held that the proceedings before the Collector under Chapter v. were not in the nature of ordinary proceedings in Civil cases and that the jurisdiction exercised by him could not be controlled by Civil Courts. It follows that apart from the provisions contained in the Act or the rules framed there under interference with the jurisdiction of the Collector is not permissible. The enactment does not empower the Special Judge to recall the decrees or stop proceedings under Chapter V Rule 15A now lays down that If in a case which has already been decided and forwarded to the Collector for execution, the Special Judge restarts hearing it whether after receiving a written statement under Sub-Section 3 of Section 9, or on an application for restoration or review or on any other ground, he shall immediately issue an order for stay of the execution proceedings and call back the records already sent to the Collector for the purpose. When orders have been passed in (he subsequent proceedings and the case is decided by the Special Judge finally, he shall, if necessary prepare a fresh ranking order u/s 16 incorporating all the debts decreed by him and send it to the Collector along with other records u/s 19. 8. The words "on any other ground" would apparently cover cases arising u/s 11(2) but the hearing of a belated claim under the proviso could scarcely be said to have been restarted by the Special Judge till sufficient cause was found. In the present case the Special Judge "refused to entertain the claim of Khurshed Jehan and we are clear therefore, that he could not either recall the decrees or stay the proceedings in the Court of the Collector under the aforesaid rule. 9. Accordingly we allow the revisions and set aside the order passed by the learned Special Judge. Rani Huzur Ara Begam in application No. 2 of 1944 and Nawab Hasain Ali Khan and Mst. Bishun Dei in application No. 3 of 1944 are entitled to their costs of this Court from Roshan Jehan Begam.