JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - These are two Rules directed against a single order, dated the 7th September, 1945, passed by the learned Sadar Munsif, Faridpur, in two Execution cases, which were heard analogously. By the order complained of, the learned Munsif directed that a portion of the money deposited by the Opposite Party under sec. 168A (1) (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, be refunded to her. The present Rules were obtained by the decree-holders. The facts of the Execution cases need not be stated in detail. It appears that the Petitioners obtained two rent decrees against certain tenants and brought the respective tenures to sale in execution of those decrees. The sale proceeds were not sufficient to meet the charges mentioned in sec. 168A (1) (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act and accordingly the auction-purchaser was directed to make a deposit of certain further sums. Those sums included an amount on account of the rent which had become payable to the decree-holders, between the date of the institution of the suit and the date of the confirmation of the sale. These sums were duly deposited, but after having made the deposit, the auction-purchaser made two applications before the Court, whereby she submitted that a portion of the rent for the period between the institution of the suit and the confirmation of the sale had become time-barred and consequently she was not liable to pay the same The prayer she made was that these portions of the sums deposited by her, which were Rs. 708-13-3 pies in one case and Rs. 715-7-3 pies in the other, might be refunded. The learned Munsif allowed the applications and directed a refund as prayed for. Subsequently he confirmed the sales. Thereafter the decree-holders obtained the present Rules. The only question to be decided in these Rules is whether the language used in the latter part of sec. 168A (1) (b) of the Bengal Tenancy Act admits of any qualification in respect of such part of the rent accruing after the institution of the suit as may have become time-barred. The learned Munsif has held that the language of the section does admit of such qualification. In our opinion, he is not right. 2. The relevant portion of the sub-clause reads thus: any rent which may have become payable to the decree-bolder between the date of the institution of the. The learned Munsif has held that the language of the section does admit of such qualification. In our opinion, he is not right. 2. The relevant portion of the sub-clause reads thus: any rent which may have become payable to the decree-bolder between the date of the institution of the. suit and the date of the confirmation of the sale. 3. It will be seen at once that the language is " which may have become payable " and not " which is payable," or " which is recoverable." The clause, on a plain reading, will appear to embody an absolute provision to the effect that the rent accruing to the landlord between the limits of time mentioned must in all cases be paid. 4. The learned Munsif has referred to the language of sec. 169 (1) (c) where a similar provision is made in respect of payment out of surplus sale proceeds. The language there is "any rent which may have fallen due to him." The learned Munsif observes that that language is significantly different from the language used in el. (b) of sec. 168A (1). In our Opinion, there is no difference whatever and the language used in sec. 168A (1) (b) is, in all essential respects, a reproduction of the language occurring in sec. 169 (1) (c). 5. With regard to the latter section, namely, sec. 169 (1) (c), there is a decision of this Court in the case of Raja Narendra Lal Khan v. Sarat Chandra Bhattacharjee (1915) 21 C.L.J. 535. There it was held that in a case, coming under sec. 169 (1) (c), the landlord was entitled to receive out of the sale proceeds all the rent which had fallen due to him between the said limits of time, although a portion might have been found to be time-barred if a suit had been brought. The reason given was that since the tenant was in possession of the land, his liability to pay the rent remained; and the bar of limitation, if any, would apply only if a suit had been brought, but could have no application to an application under sec. 169 (1) (c), for which no limitation had been provided anywhere. In our opinion, the principle of that case completely covers the case before us and our decision on the language of sec. 169 (1) (c), for which no limitation had been provided anywhere. In our opinion, the principle of that case completely covers the case before us and our decision on the language of sec. 168A (1) (b) must also be to the same effect. 6. Mr. Mukherjee, appearing for the auction-purchaser contended, in the first place, that cl. (b) of sec. 168A (1) used the word "payable" and nothing could be payable in law, if its recovery had become barred by the law of limitation. This contention is plainly untenable, since the language used in the clause is " any rent which may have become payable," and therefore does not require a subsisting right of recovery under the law of limitation applicable to a suit. 7. Mr. Mukherjee, in the next place, referred to the case of Rai Jogendra Chandra Ghose Bahadur v. Bhawani Charan Law (1945) 49 C.W.N. 552 and contended that in a case where there might be some surplus sale proceeds, the landlord would be entitled to get the whole of the rent mentioned in cl. (b) of sec. 168A (1), even if a part of it had become barred by limitation; but in a case where there was no surplus and the auction-purchaser would have to pay, the decree-holder would be limited only to such portion of the rent as had not yet become barred by limitation. In support of this contention he relied upon the case to winch I have already referred. Mr. Mukherjee's contention was that in the case cited the learned Judges held that the liability imposed by the legislature on the auction-purchaser by sec. 168A (1)'(b) was only the liability imposed on the tenant by sec. 169 (1) (c) and therefore the landlord could recover from the auction-purchaser only what he would be entitled to recover from the tenant in a case where there were no surplus sale proceeds. The whole foundation of this argument is that the liability of the auction-purchaser under sec. 168A (1) (b) is but the liability of the tenant under sec. 169 (1) (c). now transferred to the auction-purchaser. 8. It appears to us that the case cited, instead of supporting Mr. Mukherjee's contention, completely discountenances it. The whole foundation of this argument is that the liability of the auction-purchaser under sec. 168A (1) (b) is but the liability of the tenant under sec. 169 (1) (c). now transferred to the auction-purchaser. 8. It appears to us that the case cited, instead of supporting Mr. Mukherjee's contention, completely discountenances it. In that case, their Lordships referred to an earlier case of Phani Bhusan Mukherjee v. Puma Chandra Bagchi (1943) 48 C.W.N. 210 and observed as follows: According to him (i.e., the learned Judge who had delivered the judgment in the earlier case) it merely shifted the liability from one, namely, the tenant judgment-debtor, to another, namely, the purchaser at the Court sale. In our judgment that is not what cl. (b) in substance enacts. 9. It will thus be seen that, instead of holding that the liability of the auction-purchaser under sec. 168A (1) (b) is but the tenant's liability, now shifted to the auction-purchaser, their Lordships held quite to the contrary. Indeed, in a latter passage in the judgment their Lordships repeated this opinion when they said that the liability of the auction-purchaser was a new liability. In our opinion, Mr. Mukherjee can derive no support for his contention from the case to which he referred. 10. The position in our view is clear. Under the language of sec. 168A (1) (b) the auction-purchaser has to pay to the decree-holder the rent mentioned there, because that is what the section says and further because there could be no question of any bar of limitation, since in such a case, as in a case under sec. 169 (1) (c) there is no suit, but only an application, for which there is no rule of limitation laid down anywhere. The order passed by the learned Munsif was, in our opinion, erroneous and must be set aside. 11. It was brought to our notice by Mr. Mukherjee that the Petitioners had preferred an appeal to the District Judge against the very order which is under revision before us. It is clear that an appeal has been preferred but it is not equally clear whether that appeal is directed against this very order, or some other order. 11. It was brought to our notice by Mr. Mukherjee that the Petitioners had preferred an appeal to the District Judge against the very order which is under revision before us. It is clear that an appeal has been preferred but it is not equally clear whether that appeal is directed against this very order, or some other order. Assuming that the appeal is against this very order, which the Petitioners were not able to deny, it must certainly be said that if the appeal had been preferred before this Court was moved, the Petitioners acted improperly in not bringing that fact to the notice of this Court; and, equally, if the appeal has been filed since, the Petitioners failed in their duty in not instructing their learned Advocate to inform us of that fact to-day. This, however, ought not to influence us in deciding the case on merits. It may be that the advisers of the Petitioners had some doubt as to whether the order was appealable, or whether it was not. If it was appealable, an appeal would lie to the Court below; whereas if it was not appealable, this Court would have to be moved. It may be that it was in those circumstances that the Petitioners had recourse to both the remedies in order to save themselves against the possible bar of limitation. 12. We must observe, however, that there can be no question of the order in the present case being appealable. The application was made by a third party auction-purchaser for a refund of a certain sum of money which she had deposited under the provisions of sec. 168A (1) (b). Such an application has not the remotest connection with the execution, satisfaction or discharge of the decree which was being executed; nor can it be said that the auction-purchaser was in any sense the representative of either of the decree-holder, or the judgment-debtor. In our view, the order moved against is not appealable and in moving this Court in revision, the Petitioners acted rightly. 13. It was also contended that since the Petitioners have not moved against the final order by which the sale was confirmed, they are debarred now from proceeding with the present application. We do not think that there is any substance in this contention. 13. It was also contended that since the Petitioners have not moved against the final order by which the sale was confirmed, they are debarred now from proceeding with the present application. We do not think that there is any substance in this contention. If the Petitioners succeed in their present application, as they have done, the subsequent and consequential order of confirmation will automatically fall to the ground. It was not necessary, in order that this application might be maintained, that the Petitioners should have preferred an appeal against the order of confirmation of sale as well. 14. In the result, the Rules are made absolute; the order complained of is set aside and the Opposite Party is directed to re-deposit the sums which have been ordered to be refunded, if she has withdrawn the same. If the sums be still in Court, the Petitioners will be entitled to withdraw the sums and the sales will in due course be confirmed, but otherwise the sales will be confirmed on the Opposite Party bringing back to Court the sums she has withdrawn. In view of the irregularity in the conduct of the Petitioners to which I have already referred, we would not make any order for costs in their favour, although their applications succeed. Biswas, J. I agree.