JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, J. - This is a decree-holder's appeal which has arisen in following manner: The Appellant Samal Singh filed a suit in May, 1929, for partition of certain properties including plot No. 632 (all)/647 new situate in village Ramapur Chaiya. The subject matter of the suit was referred to the arbitration of three parsons in September, 1929, and the arbitrators filed an award but some how did not allot the plot in question to any of the parties. A preliminary decree was passed in accordance with the award and this was made final on 19th November, 1932. In the two decrees the plot in question was, in contravention of the award, entered as being allotted to the Appellant. In 1935 the Appellant applied for execution of the decree praying for possession of the property decreed including the plot in suit. The Respondents raised no objection to execution and agreed that possession may be delivered to the Appellant. Formal possession was delivered to the Appellant. It appears, however, that he did not get mutation in respect of the plot in suit until 1940. Thereupon the Respondents filed an application on 8th October, 1941, which headed u/s 47, CPC read with Section 144 and Section 151. 2. In this application it was prayed that the plot in suit had not been allotted to the Appellant by the award and the decree that followed wrongly included the aforesaid plot. It was asked that the mistake in the decree be corrected and possession be restored to the Respondents. The learned Civil Judge, Hardoi, before whom, this application came up allowed the application and made an order restoring possession to the Respondents. 3. In appeal it has been contended that the application for execution was time barred under Article 181 of the Indian Limitation Act inasmuch as the right to apply for possession accrued to the Respondents in 1935 when the Appellant had obtained possession of the plot in suit with their consent and not in 1940 when the mutation was obtained. I am of opinion that no question of limitation arises in the case. I am of opinion that no question of limitation arises in the case. The Respondents Counsel on 7th February, 1942, stated that he confined his application to Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, out even if he had not done so, the application could not be treated u/s 47 as it did not relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The substance of the Respondent's complaint was that a mistake had crept into the decree and the Court was invited to rectify that mistake in the ends of justice. The Court which passed the original decree was the Court which passed the order u/s 151 and passed it not as an execution Court but as a Court of first instance who on the mistake being pointed out in the decree was not only entitled but bound to correct it. Admittedly no third party had acquired any right in the plot in Suit and there is no question of the rights of such parties being prejudicially affected. The Appellant had admittedly no title to this plot. It was in the possession of the Respondents. It was not allotted to them under the award and it is only due to the mistake creeping into the decree that the Appellant is trying to take advantage of the mistake. There are no equities in his favour. They all lie on the side of the Respondents who are entitled to be restored to the position they occupied before the decree. It was laid down in Gadadhar Sarkhel Vs. Gopal Chandra Das and Others, AIR 1936 Cal 343 that it is an established principle that where rights of third parties have not intervened it is not only in the power, but it is the duty of the Court, to relieve a party of the injury done to him by it, by reason of its mistakes and defaults and mistakes or defaults of its officers inadvertently commited. Actus curiae neminem gravabit. 4. The Privy Council followed the principle laid down by Cairns, L.C. in Rodger v. The Comptoird' Escompte de Pans L.R. 3 PC 455 at p. 473. One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does not injury to any of the suitors."-See Jai Berlnm v. Kedar Nath Maraxvri A.I.R 1922 PC 269 . 5. One of the first and highest duties of all Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does not injury to any of the suitors."-See Jai Berlnm v. Kedar Nath Maraxvri A.I.R 1922 PC 269 . 5. It has also been contended that the Court after passing the decree became functus officio and had no jurisdiction to correct the mistake and reliance is placed on AIR 1929 121 (Lahore) , That case has however, no bearing. There the decree had been fully satisfied and was consigned to the record. The property had been sold in execution of the decree and possession had been taken by the auction purchaser. The judgment-debtor thereafter applied u/s 47 praying for restitution of property from the possession of the auction purchaser It was rightly held that the executing Court had become functus officio and the application did not relate to execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. 6. It has also been contended that it was not open to the Court to order restitution of possession in the exercise of its inherent powers which could only have been done by a regular suit instituted by the Respondents after payment of proper court-fee. 7. There is ample authority in support of the proposition that if a Court rectifies the mistake in the decree in the exercise of its inherent powers, it has jurisdiction to order restitution of any benefit which may have been received wrongly by the persons who were not entitled to such benefits but for the mistake in the decree. Where a Court has wrongly awarded possession to a party under a wrong decree it has not only got the power but it is also bound to restore possession to the party from whom such possession has been wrongly taken. See (Firm) Ratnaji Chandanmall Vs. Kolli Ramakrishnayya, AIR 1937 Mad 95 which was a case of money wrongly paid under the orders of the Court. 8. The result is that this appeal fails and dismissed with costs.