JUDGMENT Bennett, J. - The question raised by this second appeal is a simple but important one. It is whether a person who failed to put forward a claim to property specified in the notice referred to in S. 11, U.P. Encumbered Estates Act can maintain a suit to establish his title to it in the ordinary civil Courts. This question has been answered by both the Courts below in the negative. 2. The plaintiff is the Maharaja Sahib of Dumraon and he brought the suit for possession of a 1/16th share in village Madhopur on the basis of the purchase by him of that share at an auction sale in execution of a decree for arrears of rent in 1934. His application for mutation was dismissed by the revenue authorities, the final order being passed by the Commissioner in 1941. 3. The respondents made their application under S. 4, Encumbered Estates Act in 1935 and included this property in their written statement as their own. It is not disputed that thereafter it was included in the notice published under S. 11 and that no claim to it was made by the Maharaja Sahib. It was eventually included in the property found by the Special Judge to be liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debts of the applicants, and the Special Judge informed the Collector accordingly under S. 19 (2) of the Act. 4. Admittedly there is no authority upon the question stated, the reason for which may be that the decision in the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act has been generally accepted as conclusive. 5. It was pointed out by the Munsif who tried the suit that under sub-s. (4) of S. 11 any order passed by the Special Judge under that section shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil Court of competent jurisdiction; and in first appeal the Civil Judge, relying upon the same provision, held that finality thus attaches to the proceedings. The failure of the appellant to put forward a claim in those proceedings is, he considered, fatal. The Civil Judge also pointed out that it was still open to the appellant to apply to the Special Judge under the proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 11 to have the question of title re-opened. 6. The failure of the appellant to put forward a claim in those proceedings is, he considered, fatal. The Civil Judge also pointed out that it was still open to the appellant to apply to the Special Judge under the proviso to sub-s. (2) of S. 11 to have the question of title re-opened. 6. It may first of all be noted that the provision in S. 11 (2) that a person having any claim to the property mentioned in the notice shall make an application to the Special Judge stating his claim within a certain period is mandatory. The proviso to that sub-section allowing later applications to be made was added by an amending Act of 1939, presumably to meet hard cases, and we think that the enactment of this amendment supports the view that the decision of the Special Judge cannot be questioned otherwise than in the proceedings before him. If it was open to a claimant to agitate his claim in the ordinary civil Courts ignoring the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act, there would have been little need to add the proviso. Moreover, the whole scheme of the Act seems clearly designed to secure finality both as regards the claims of creditors and also as regards claims to the property published as that of the applicant. There is an express provision in S. 13 that claims of creditors not made as required by the Act shall be deemed to have been discharged. Learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the absence of any corresponding provision that the order passed by the Special Judge under S. 11 is conclusive on the point of title and bars the litigation in other Courts, but we do not think that the absence of an express provision warrants the inference that such litigation is maintainable. Though the matter may not be covered expressly by S. 11, Civil P.C. the principle of res judicata is, we think, applicable. Section 11, Encumbered Estates Act, requires all claims to the property to be put forward in the proceedings before the Special Judge and the order passed by him under the section is defined as a decree of a civil Court of competent jurisdiction. Thus when no objection is taken on the published notice, his order with regard to the property claimed by the applicant under S. 11 must have the same effect. 7. Thus when no objection is taken on the published notice, his order with regard to the property claimed by the applicant under S. 11 must have the same effect. 7. We are fortified in this view by a decision of a Bench of the Calcutta High Court in ('07) 34 Cal. 470, Rameshwar Singh v. Secretary of State. That is a converse case, but none the less relevant on that account. In that case land had been acquired under the Land Acquisition Act, but the procedure prescribed by that Act had not been followed and in particular the notice published under S. 9 of the Act had not contained the material facts which would enable the landowner to identify the land intended to be acquired. It was held by the Calcutta High Court that a suit would lie in the civil Court in respect of a claim for damages which could not be foreseen at the time of the acquisition proceedings. It was clearly held that the suit was maintainable only by reason of defects or irregularities in the acquisition proceedings. Reference was made to another decision of the same High Court in ('05) 2 C.L.J. 359, Bhaudi Singh v. Kamadhin Rai that when statutory rights and liabilities have been created, and jurisdiction has been conferred upon a Special Court for the investigation of matters which may possibly be in controversy, such jurisdiction is exclusive and cannot concurrently be exercised by the ordinary Courts. Conceding this principle, the Bench in ('07) 34 Cal. 470, Rameshwar Singh v. Secretary of State observed : It is well settled, however, that even where a specific remedy is provided by a statute, it is necessary, in order to remit the owner to such remedy and exclude his remedy by suit, that the party acquiring the property should have substantially complied with its requirements; and where the proceedings for acquisition are not perfected and completed, they will not debar the remedy by a regular suit. The essence of the matter is that the party has his remedy before the special Court. Where, however, as here, the party has not been able to put forward his claim by reason of defects or irregularities in the proceeding, or where the claim has been put forward but not adjudged, the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be treated as superseded. 8. Where, however, as here, the party has not been able to put forward his claim by reason of defects or irregularities in the proceeding, or where the claim has been put forward but not adjudged, the jurisdiction of the civil Court cannot be treated as superseded. 8. In the present case, there is no suggestion whatever of any defect or irregularity in the proceedings before the Special Judge and, therefore, the appellant cannot claim that the civil Court is invested with jurisdiction on this ground. He can only claim that the ordinary civil Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of the Special Judge in all such cases, and we consider that such contention is refuted both by the scheme of the Encumbered Estates Act and the general principle referred to in this Calcutta case. 9. We were also referred to decisions of this Court in Joti Prasad Upadhiya Vs. Amba Prasad Joty Prasad v. Amba Prasad and ('251 47 All. 513 : 12 Abdul Rahman Vs. Abdul Rahman Abdur Rahman v. Abdur Rahman In the first case the question was whether a civil Court had jurisdiction to try a case challenging the validity of the election of a chairman of a District Board, and it was held that the civil Court has no jurisdiction, there being special provision in the District Boards Act for the determination of the question. It was said (at p. 308) that : It is well settled that where the statute which creates the right also prescribes a particular remedy for the infringement of that right, that remedy, and that remedy alone, can be pursued by the person complaining of the infringement of the right for the redress of the alleged wrong done to him. the earlier case in Abdul Rahman Vs. Abdul Rahman Abdur Rahman v. Abdur Rahman being referred to. 10. These decisions are not so relevant as that in the Calcutta case because it cannot be said that the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act creates a right in S. 11. That section only lays down a procedure for the determination of claims but it may be said that the person aggrieved should be limited to the remedy there prescribed. 10. These decisions are not so relevant as that in the Calcutta case because it cannot be said that the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act creates a right in S. 11. That section only lays down a procedure for the determination of claims but it may be said that the person aggrieved should be limited to the remedy there prescribed. The right of an owner is infringed, where his property is wrongly claimed by an application under the Encumbered Estates Act and the object of the notice published under S. 11 is to enable a person aggrieved by the in elusion of his property in that notice to apply to the Special Judge stating his claim to it, upon which claim being made the Special Judge shall determine whether the property is liable to attachment, sale or mortgage in satisfaction of the debts of the applicant. A special procedure is thus prescribed for the determination of a claim of this kind and we entertain no doubt that a person having any such claim is required by this section to have it determined in the proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act and is precluded from making it elsewhere. 11. A case of the Oudh Chief Court, AIR 1943 410 (Oudh) Imtiaz Ali Khan v. Badruddin, decided by a member of this Bench, was also referred to; but the facts in that case were different, in that the question was whether, when proceedings are pending under the Encumbered Estates Act, it is open to a person to agitate a claim of the nature referred to under S. 11 of that Act in proceedings under S. 145, Criminal P.C. It was held that such proceedings were clearly objectionable, the only forum in which the claim could be advanced being that of the Special Judge seised of the application under the Encumbered Estates Act. 12. For the reasons given we have no doubt that the decision of the Courts below dismissing the suit was correct. It was clearly the intention of the Legislature to secure finality on all questions of title which might be raised in proceedings under the Encumbered Estates Act and any other view would open wide the door to a multitude of suits in the ordinary civil Courts and throw doubt upon the conclusive character of all orders passed by Special Judges under S. 11. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.