JUDGMENT Gentle, J. - The Appellant was the Plaintiff in the suit out of which this appeal arises. He is a freemason and was a member of the Empress of India Conclave of the masonic craft and was its Supreme Ruler in the year 1940-1941. At a regular meeting of the Conclave held on the 28th May, 1942, a resolution was passed expelling the Appellant from membership. The three Respondents, who were the Defendants in the suit, were respectively the Supreme Ruler, the Secretary and a member of the Conclave at the time of the resolution for expulsion, and they were sued as representing all the members. The Appellant claimed declarations that (A) the expelling resolution is null and void and (b) he is still a member of the Conclave and for an injunction restraining the Respondents and other officers and members of the Conclave from preventing him participating in its management and exercising his rights and privileges as a member. A claim for damages, assessed at a sum of Rs. 10,000 was abandoned at the trial. Mr. Justice Sen dismissed the suit and this is the Plaintiff's appeal against the dismissal. 2. The Appellant alleges that the resolution is invalid as the rules of the Conclave were not observed in that he was not given proper notice of the complaint or charges made against him. Further, that no discussion upon the complaint was permitted and no due enquiry took place at the meeting whereat the resolution was passed and he was not afforded a proper opportunity to meet the charges, it is also alleged that the procedure was contrary to natural justice. There is a further allegation that the resolution was not passed as Rule 61 requires, by a two-third majority inasmuch as the number of the members who voted in favour of the resolution for expulsion was less than two-thirds of the members present at the meeting. 3. The trouble arose out of bad feeling and animosity between the Appellant and Mr. E. J. Samuel, a fellow member of the Conclave, and both of them were also members of a Masonic Royal Arch Chapter which is another masonic order. 3. The trouble arose out of bad feeling and animosity between the Appellant and Mr. E. J. Samuel, a fellow member of the Conclave, and both of them were also members of a Masonic Royal Arch Chapter which is another masonic order. Each made complaints against the other to the Conclave and the Appellant prosecuted Samuel for defamation with respect to a letter written to a high masonic officer regarding masonic affairs and also for theft of some documents relating to the masonry. Samuel ultimately was acquitted of both charges. The principal matter of complaint against the Appellant was that he instituted criminal proceedings against a fellow mason, more particularly, since the subject-matter of the criminal charges related to masonic affairs and, it was alleged against the Appellant, that such conduct was unmasonic. 4. The matters relating to both the Appellant and Samuel were considered by the Permanent Committee of the Conclave-a committee formed of certain of its members-at a meeting held on the 4th February, 1942, at which it was resolved that both the Appellant and Samuel should be asked to resign their membership. This decision was communicated to the Appellant and to Samuel by letters, sent to each of them, dated the 14th February, 1941. The Appellant denied receiving the letter addressed to him and a copy of it was not disclosed in the Respondents' affidavit of documents and, indeed, was not forthcoming until after the trial had commenced. Mr. Justice Sen in his judgment, said he had not the slightest hesitation in disbelieving the Appellant with respect to the letter. 5. Neither the Appellant nor Samuel resigned from membership of the Conclave and at its regular meeting held on the 26th March, 1942, it was resolved that action should be taken against both of them under Rule 61 and the Secretary was instructed to take the necessary action. Both the Appellant and Samuel received notices of the convening of this meeting, but neither of them attended. 6. Both the Appellant and Samuel received notices of the convening of this meeting, but neither of them attended. 6. Rule 61 reads as follows: Every Conclave has the power to exclude any of its members for sufficient cause, provided mat such member shall have been served with due notice in writing of the complaint made against him and of the time and place appointed for its consideration, seven clear days before, so that he may attend and be heard; such notice shall be considered served if sent by registered post to his last known address. This power of exclusion can only be exercised by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. The name of every member so excluded from a Conclave, with a statement of the cause of his exclusion shall be forthwith sent to the Grand Recorder. 7. On the 9th May, 1942, the second Respondent as the Secretary of the Conclave, wrote to the Appellant. The letter is as follows: Wor. Bro. M. S. Ezra, Dear Sir and Wor. Bro. On the 14th February, 1942, 1 forwarded to you the unanimous decision of the Permanent Committee of the Conclave, requesting you to tender your resignation from the Conclave. You have failed to accede. The matter was taken up in open Conclave at its last Regular Meeting, and I am now directed to give you notice that the question why you should not be excluded for un-masonic conduct will be considered at the next Regular Meeting to be held on the 28th May, 1942, at 7 p.m. Any defence you care to submit in writing-will receive the consideration of the Conclave but please take notice that in the event of your not appearing in person the charge against you will be proceeded with in your absence. Yours sincerely and fraternally, (Sd.) N. K. Basu. Empress of India Conclave No. 16. 8. A letter, couched in similar terms, was sent to Mr. Samuel who replied on the 22nd May, 1942. expressing his unqualified regret for any lapse and gave his solemn assurance that there would be no recurrence of anything to cause offence or misunderstanding and he prayed for consideration on account of his being an old mason who had rendered ungrudging services to the craft. 9. The Appellant replied to the Secretary's letter on the 21st May, 1942. expressing his unqualified regret for any lapse and gave his solemn assurance that there would be no recurrence of anything to cause offence or misunderstanding and he prayed for consideration on account of his being an old mason who had rendered ungrudging services to the craft. 9. The Appellant replied to the Secretary's letter on the 21st May, 1942. In his letter he denied receipt of the Secretary's letter of the 14th February and asked for a copy of the proceedings of the meeting of the Permanent Committee (held on the 4th February) in connection with his complaint against Samuel " whom you have been openly encouraging and supporting for the past five months." The letter continues that the Appellant was not aware up to that time of any complaint against him by any member of the Conclave and could not understand on what authority it was characterised as unmasonic. The Secretary, as an experienced man in worldly affairs and a sound lawyer, must know that no member of any civilized institution could be excluded from it without a prima facie case being made out against him and without specific charges furnished him for his defence before he could be adjudicated guilty. The recognised practice had not been adopted by the Conclave and the Appellant concluded that paragraph 2 of the Secretary's letter under reply was a subterfuge for bringing pressure to bear on him to withdraw the criminal proceedings instituted against one of the Conclave members. The letter further continues, the Appellant repeated that as no notice of any complaint had been served upon him and no specific charges whatever framed against him as required by law (Rule 61) of the constitutions, the request calling upon him to submit his defence in writing was illogical and meaningless. As the immediate past Supreme Ruler of the Conclave he called upon the Secretary to withdraw immediately the letter under reply and to express his unqualified apology for the unwarrantable tone expressed in it and for his unconstitutional conduct in violating law 61. Finally, the letter concludes, that should the Conclave proceed to take action against the Appellant in the manner suggested without any charge against him in contravention of law 61, the Secretary and those taking part in the proceedings would do so at their individual risk and responsibility. 10. No reply was sent by the Secretary to the Appellant's letter. Finally, the letter concludes, that should the Conclave proceed to take action against the Appellant in the manner suggested without any charge against him in contravention of law 61, the Secretary and those taking part in the proceedings would do so at their individual risk and responsibility. 10. No reply was sent by the Secretary to the Appellant's letter. 11. The Conclave meeting was held on the 28th May, the Appellant and Samuel both being present. At one place in his evidence, the Appellant said, prior to the 28th May he did not know that there was a charge against him of bringing criminal proceedings against Samuel and also this charge was not placed before the meeting. Later he admitted that, prior to his letter of the 21st May. he had been privately informed by a member that this " might " be one of the charges, but he persisted in his denial that the matter was not discussed at the meeting and said it was not referred to, and not a word about it was mentioned. 12. At the meeting the Secretary read the minutes of the Conclave's meeting held on 26th March, the notice convening that meeting and a bundle of somewhat lengthy correspondence which had taken place including Samuel's and the Appellant's respective complaints against each other made to the Conclave and also the Appellant's letter addressed to the Secretary dated the 21st May. 1942. Save for the statement in the Appellant's 21st May letter, that the action taken against him was a subterfuge to force him to withdraw Samuel's prosecution, there is no mention in any of those documents of the criminal proceedings. 13. In his evidence, the first Respondent said there were two charges of unmasonic conduct preferred against the Appellant at the meeting. (1) taking a masonic matter against a brother mason to the Criminal Courts and (2) after being informed of the decision of the Permanent Committee the Appellant wrote a nasty letter (that of 21st May) to the Secretary and was unduly rude. (1) taking a masonic matter against a brother mason to the Criminal Courts and (2) after being informed of the decision of the Permanent Committee the Appellant wrote a nasty letter (that of 21st May) to the Secretary and was unduly rude. In the course of his evidence the second Respondent said that when the 21st May letter was read to the members " Ezra's chance on the ballot was dished," and, he added, that the Appellant gushed for something about the criminal proceedings not being within the competence of the Conclave to judge and therefore he (the second Respondent) presumed that the criminal proceedings were mentioned at the meeting. There can be no doubt that two charges were made of unmasonic conduct at the meeting and those two charges were the criminal proceedings and the letter of the 21st May; 1 say not doubt, because, in addition to the evidence of the first Respondent it was specifically put in cross-examination to the Appellant and to one of his witnesses, a Mr. Abraham, that those two charges were in fact preferred at the Conclave meeting on the 28th May. 14. The first Respondent said that the Appellant was informed of these two charges at the meeting; he spoke with regard to them, his remarks mainly being an attack upon the second Respondent, alleging that he was trying to drive the Appellant from the Conclave, and that his conduct was not unmasonic by going to the Criminal Court; in doing so, he was not breaking the masonic constitution and it was not a letter which should be considered by the Conclave. Several members took part in the discussion, which lasted about an hour, with regard to the proposed resolution to expel the Appellant. 15. The minutes of the meeting record the reading of all papers regarding the exclusion of the Appellant and Samuel and that explanations were submitted by them; discussion look place for an hour, in which many members took part, and that five voted for and 22 against Samuel's exclusion and 19 in favour of and nine against the Appellant's exclusion. 16. Mr. Wajid Ali, a Presidency Magistrate and a member of the Conclave, was called on behalf of the Appellant. 16. Mr. Wajid Ali, a Presidency Magistrate and a member of the Conclave, was called on behalf of the Appellant. He said there were several complaints against the Appellant, including the institution of criminal proceedings against members of the brotherhood, but he, the witness, did not think this was discussed. Several members took part in the discussion and he said, the minutes accurately record what took place at the meeting. Mr. Wajid Ali added that the Appellant said that he had not been given an opportunity to explain his conduct. The witness appears to have thought, and to have suggested at the meeting, that the matter might be adjourned in order to afford an opportunity to the Appellant to ask for forgiveness. 17. Mr. C. E. Clarke, another member of the Conclave, who was called for the Appellant, said that at the meeting there was no question for any criminal proceedings being brought up or mentioned. 18. Mr. E. E. J. Ebraham, another member called for the Appellant, said that after the meeting the first Respondent said that the Appellant should not have brought the criminal proceedings against Samuel. This witness added that most of the members stated that they did not know the grounds of the expulsion, because they were not read out at the meeting. When, later, he was asked by the Court to give the names of those members, the witness replied that he could not definitely remember who they were. 19. The learned trial Judge saw, heard and studied the witnesses who gave evidence before him-an advantage which is denied to an Appellate Court. His findings were expressed and his conclusions arrived at upon the evidence which he heard and upon the opinions which he formed in regard to the witnesses. Mr. Justice Sen disbelieved the Appellant and said he placed no reliance upon Ebraham's evidence. He found that the Appellant was apprised of the charges against him, was given an opportunity to defend himself and there was ample discussion at the meeting. During the course of the trial it was suggested by the Appellant that the second Respondent had been responsible for faking some of the correspondence and falsifying the minute book. This was rejected by the learned Judge. No reason has been shown for interference with Sen, J.'s findings of fact. 20. With regard to Rule 61, Mr. During the course of the trial it was suggested by the Appellant that the second Respondent had been responsible for faking some of the correspondence and falsifying the minute book. This was rejected by the learned Judge. No reason has been shown for interference with Sen, J.'s findings of fact. 20. With regard to Rule 61, Mr. Justice Sen pointed out that it does not expressly state that particulars of the complaint should be mentioned in the letter or notice and he held that the Rule had been observed and had not been violated. He said it might be argued that there had been violation of natural justice if it could be shown that the person complained against was not aware of the particulars of the charges and was not given a reasonable opportunity of meeting them; but in the particular facts of this case he was of opinion that there had been no violation of natural justice, the fact that the Appellant had instituted two criminal proceedings against Samuel was very well known to him, that it was a matter of discussion amongst the members of the Conclave was clear from the evidence, and the Plaintiff's case that he had no notion what was the charge against him was an idle and a dishonest pretence. 21. As pointed out above, the letter or notice of the 9th May does not specify any particulars, details, or grounds of the alleged unmasonic conduct charged against the Appellant; but there is merely the bare statement that the question was to be considered why he should not be excluded from the Conclave for that conduct. It is convenient in the first instance to consider this notice more particularly with regard, in the first instance, to the charge of institution of criminal proceedings against a brother mason and in doing this, reference to the authorities is required. Leeson v. General Council of Medical Education and Registration L. R. 43 Ch. D. 356 (1889) was a case concerning the Medical Act, 1858, sec. 29 of which gave disciplinary powers to a statutory body, called the General Medical Council, over registered medical practitioners and empowering the Council to strike a practitioner off the register, if, inter alia after due enquiry the Council adjudged him to have been guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect. 29 of which gave disciplinary powers to a statutory body, called the General Medical Council, over registered medical practitioners and empowering the Council to strike a practitioner off the register, if, inter alia after due enquiry the Council adjudged him to have been guilty of infamous conduct in a professional respect. There was no definition in the Act of what might constitute "infamous conduct" and the precise meaning and scope of those words were left to the Council which had to decide whether it had been established to its satisfaction. In the course of his judgment Lord Justice Bowen at page 383 observed that the language of the statute. certainly imports that the substantial elements of natural justice must be found to have been present at the enquiry. There must be due enquiry. The accused person must have notice of what he is accused. He must have an opportunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at after he has had a full opportunity of being heard. With respect to the charge made, the charge of which he has notice, it is a charge of infamous conduct in some professional respect, and the particulars which should be brought to his attention in order to enable him to meet that charge ought to be particulars of conduct which, if established, is capable of being viewed by honest persons as conduct which is infamous. 22. Those observations were quoted with approval by Lord Wright at pp. 643 and 644 in General Medical Council v. Spackman L. R. [1943] A. C. 627. In Ambalal Sarabhai Vs. Phiroz H. Antia, AIR 1939 Bom 35 . a member of a club was expelled under a rule, Rule 39, which provided that the General Committee for sufficient reasons could exclude any member whose presence in the club they might consider to be detrimental to its interest without assigning any particular reason for their doing so. Mr. Justice Wassoodew, at page 39 of the report, observed: It is argued that r. 39, if properly interpreted, does not require a charge to be framed....If there is a lacuna in the rule, such as is contended for, that rule must be supplemented by rules of natural justice and upon authority the omission to do so would not debar the member from complaining against the act of expulsion in a Court of law. 23. 23. Later, the learned Judge referred to the head note of Dawkins v. Antrobus, [1881] 17 Ch. D. 615 which reads thus: The Court will not interfere against the decision of the members of a club professing to act under their rules, unless it can be shown either that the rules are contrary to natural justice, or that what has been done is contrary to the rules. 24. Thereafter Mr. Justice Wassoodew observed: The elementary principles of natural justice require, as an ordinary person understands them, that the person arraigned must know precisely what the charge against him is.... The charge may not be formulated in legal language, but still it cannot be left to surmise or speculation as to why the resolution was proposed. 25. Reference was also made by Mr. Justice Wasssoodew to MacLean v. The Workers' Union [1929] 1 Ch. 602 and the observation therein of Mr. Justice Maugham, at p. 625 where he says: The phrase 'the principles of natural justice' can only mean, in this connection, the principles of fair play so deeply rooted in the minds of modern Englishmen that a provision for an enquiry necessarily imports that the accused should be given his chance of defence and explanation. 26. Elsewhere at page 624, Mr. Justice Maugham observed: It is impossible to doubt that, if the rules postulate an enquiry, the accused must be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. and at page 623: It is certain.... that a domestic tribunal is bound to act strictly according to its rule and is under an obligation to act honestly and in good faith. 27. And later on, at the same page: In the case I have before me (and I may add in such a case as a power of expulsion in a member's club) it seems to me reasonably clear that the matter can only depend on contract, express or implied. 28. Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, for the Respondents, particularly relied upon the last quotation and he argued that since r. 61 does not require particulars or details of a complaint to be given to a member, which will be the subject of an enquiry by a meeting of the Conclave, no particulars were required in the letter of the 9th May, which fully complies with all the requirements of that Rule. 29. 29. In the present case the Appellant did not attend any meeting of the Conclave or of the Permanent Committee after November, 1941. On the 14th February, 1942, he was informed by the Secretary's letter of that date (as found by Mr. Justice Sen) that at a meeting of the Committee held on the 4th February a resolution had been passed that in the interests of the Conclave he and Samuel should resign their membership and requesting compliance with the resolution as early as possible. The letter does not give the reason or grounds for the resolution. The next happening, so far as the Appellant is concerned, was the receipt by him of a notice dated the 15th March, 1942, convening a meeting of the Conclave on the 26th March at which, amongst other business, Item 5 was to consider the proceedings of the Permanent Committee meeting held on the 4th February. The Appellant did not attend the Conclave meeting on the 26th March whereat it was resolved that action should be taken against him under Rule 61 and the Secretary was directed to take necessary action. Thereupon the Secretary wrote to the Appellant the letter or notice of the 9th May. That letter, as previously mentioned, does not give any particulars or grounds, but it merely says consideration of his exclusion would be considered for unmasonic conduct, and no mention is made of the criminal proceedings. The letter itself, it seems to me, would appear to suggest that non-compliance with the resolution to resign was the alleged unmasonic conduct; after referring to the resolution calling upon the Appellant to resign, the letter states that "the matter" was taken up at the last meeting of the Conclave; "the matter" would appear to be the failure to resign. The Appellant's letter of the 21st May, written in reply to the Secretary's notice of the 9th May, is couched in strong language; the view is expressed that the proposed course was a subterfuge to make the Appellant withdraw the criminal proceedings which he had instituted, but admittedly the letter asked for details or particulars of the alleged unmasonic conduct. It was argued that, by making reference in the letter to the criminal proceedings, the Appellant was perfectly aware that those proceedings were alleged to be the unmasonic conduct which was to be the subject of consideration. It was argued that, by making reference in the letter to the criminal proceedings, the Appellant was perfectly aware that those proceedings were alleged to be the unmasonic conduct which was to be the subject of consideration. That is not as I read the letter. What the Appellant wrote was, that the course which the Conclave was proposing to adopt, namely, to exclude him for unmasonic conduct pursuant to Rule 61, was in order to force him to withdraw those proceedings. There was no reply sent by the Secretary to the Appellant's letter and he was never informed that the institution of the criminal proceedings constituted the unmasonic conduct for which his expulsion was to be the subject of consideration. The Appellant, as I see it, was left entirely in the dark as to the exact and precise charge which he had to meet. 30. In Leeson's L. R. (1889) 43 Ch. D. 356 and Spackman's cases, L. R. [1943] A. C. 627, a statute enabled action to be taken when " infamous conduct" is established, but nevertheless particulars, for example, acts and behaviour, amounting to such conduct, have to be brought to the attention of a person charged with infamous conduct. The words in the quotation from those two cases I have previously set out, which require emphasis, are the following: The charge of which he has notice... and the particulars which should be brought to his attention in order to enable him to meet that charge ought to be particulars of conduct which, if established, is capable of being viewed by honest persons as conduct which is infamous. 31. Ambalal Sarabhai's case A. I. R. [1839] Bom. 25 points out that the person arraigned must know precisely what is the charge against him and it cannot be left to his surmise or speculation. The power to expel by the machinery provided in it, which is given by Rule 61, cannot have greater effect and consequences than the power to strike a medical man off the register under a statutory provision with respect to guilt of infamous conduct. The principle, in my view, must be the same in both instances. The power to expel by the machinery provided in it, which is given by Rule 61, cannot have greater effect and consequences than the power to strike a medical man off the register under a statutory provision with respect to guilt of infamous conduct. The principle, in my view, must be the same in both instances. When a charge under a statutory provision requires particulars to be given to the person charged with infamous conduct, there must also be the same necessity for a person to be given like information under Rule 61 with regard to unmasonic conduct. The notice to the Appellant did not give any particulars or any indication that the institution of the criminal proceedings against Samuel was the conduct alleged to be unmasonic for which expulsion was to be considered and such information does not appear in any other or earlier letter or notice which was sent to him. As pointed out previously, the letter of the 9th May would seem to imply that the infamous conduct was his failure to resign from the Conclave after the Permanent Committee had resolved that he should be asked to do so. It may be the Appellant was informed by a member of the Conclave that the criminal proceedings might be the subject of the enquiry by the Conclave but that would do no more than lead the Appellant to surmise or speculate what was alleged against him. 32. With respect I am unable to agree with the learned Judge's view that the Appellant himself must have known that he had instituted those proceedings and also his action was the subject of discussion amongst the Conclave members so that, as I read the judgment, it would follow specific mention of the proceedings in the notice was not required. When a person is charged with an offence in a Criminal Court it is not sufficient merely to state the nature of the offence, for instance, theft; sufficient detail must also be given to enable the accused to be apprised what the exact charge is which he has to meet. A member of a club or of a masonic body or of any other institution is, in my view, entitled to be given no less information than an accused person must be afforded in a criminal prosecution. A member of a club or of a masonic body or of any other institution is, in my view, entitled to be given no less information than an accused person must be afforded in a criminal prosecution. The instance that the Appellant might have been able to surmise or to speculate that the criminal proceedings were the subject of the charge of unmasonic conduct was insufficient. The rule requires notice to be given seven days before the meeting at which the unmasonic conduct was to be considered and such notice, upon the authorities to which I have referred, must include particulars of the acts or behaviour alleged to constitute such conduct. Since those particulars were not given, in my view, there was not proper compliance with the rule and also there was not observance of the ordinary principles of what is called natural justice. The accused, if I may be allowed to call him so for convenience, was not informed before he went to the tribunal, which, in effect, had to try him, of the charge or charges which he had to meet. 33. It is convenient at this juncture to deal with a contention of Mr. N. C. Chatterjee, learned Counsel for the Respondents, that if there was any irregularity with regard to the notice of the 9th May such irregularity was waived by the Appellant who acquiesced in that irregularity and also with the proceedings at the meeting; there was acquiescence by attending the meeting where he was apprised of the charges; he did not ask for a postponement or an adjournment; he participated in the business; he tried to obtain a decision in his favour upon the merits; and having failed in that respect, it was argued, the Appellant cannot now be heard to complain of any defect in the notice. In support of this argument George Bell Vs. The Royal Western India Turf Club, Ltd., (1945) 47 BOMLR 916 was cited. The question of waiver and acquiescence was not, as I see it. raised in argument before the learned trial Judge and it certainly is not pleaded in the written statement. Acquiescence is a form of estoppel and such a plea, with necessary particulars of the facts alleged to give rise to it. should be pleaded. For authority on this there is Bullen and Leake on Pleadings, 9th Edn., p. 661. raised in argument before the learned trial Judge and it certainly is not pleaded in the written statement. Acquiescence is a form of estoppel and such a plea, with necessary particulars of the facts alleged to give rise to it. should be pleaded. For authority on this there is Bullen and Leake on Pleadings, 9th Edn., p. 661. Waiver is also a matter for special pleading-see Ghose's Principles and Practice of Pleading, p. 426. 34. The absence of any plea in the above respect is sufficient to deal with the argument but I think it desirable to express a view with regard to its substance. In Labouchere v. Earl of Wharncliffe (1879)18 Ch. D. 346 , the rules of a club required fourteen days' notice to be given of a meeting of the club; a notice, one day less than the required number of days, was given of a meeting whereat it was to be proposed that the Plaintiff and one other member (who subsequently resigned) should be expelled; the Plaintiff attended the meeting, participated in the discussion upon the proposed resolution for his expulsion, which resolution was carried; it was held that the meeting was not properly called and that the Plaintiff was not bound to tell the meeting that it was irregularly and improperly called and he had not waived the irregularity. Jessel, M. R., observed at pages 353 and 354 as follows: A man might say, ' I have a good defence upon the merits. I contend that I ought not to be expelled. Therefore, I am not going to run away by availing myself of a technical objection.' He was entitled to say, ' though the meeting is irregularly called, 1 have such a good case on the merits that I should like to take your opinion.' But he was not bound to tell the meeting that it was irregularly or improperly called. As to the question of waiver, Mr. Labouchere could not waive liability; he was liable for his subscription until he had resigned or been expelled, and if he had not resigned or been expelled, the club could have sued him for his subscription on the ground that he had not been properly expelled. In my opinion, then, this objection is valid, and the meeting, having been irregularly called, had no power to expel Mr. Labouehere. 35. In my opinion, then, this objection is valid, and the meeting, having been irregularly called, had no power to expel Mr. Labouehere. 35. In my view irregularity in a notice regarding the requirement that it should give particulars of the charge is no different to an irregularity as to the length of the notice. Rule 61 requires notice of the complaint to be given seven clear days before it is to be considered, and when particulars of the complaint are not included, it is a bad notice. An irregularity in that respect is no different, in its effect, to an irregularity as to the length of the notice. Further, in the present case, the notice of the 9th May informed the Appellant that, if he did not appear, the charge would be proceeded with in his absence. In those circumstances he acted perfectly properly by attending the meeting, indeed I would venture to say he was forced to do so. His presence at the meeting created no waiver with regard to the defective notice and no acquiescence with the defective notice or with the proceedings. With respect, I prefer to follow Labouchere's case (1879) 18 Ch. D. 346 in preference to George Bell Vs. The Royal Western India Turf Club, Ltd., (1945) 47 BOMLR 916 . 36. I now come to a different matter; the Second charge relating to the Appellant's letter of the 21st May. There were the charges made against the Appellant of unmasonic conduct, the criminal prosecution and the letter of the 21st May. As already pointed out, the first Respondent, who was the Supreme Ruler of the Con-clave and who presided over the meeting, said at more than one place in his evidence, those two charges were preferred; whilst the second Respondent, in earlier part of his evidence, suggested that there was only one charge, later, he admitted there were several charges. 37. The resolution of expulsion was passed with respect to both these charges. The second charge, the letter of the 21st May, could not have been and was not the subject of the notice of the 9th May. I say it could not have been, inasmuch as the Appellant's letter of the 21st May was written after the notice of the 9th May was sent to and received by him. The second charge, the letter of the 21st May, could not have been and was not the subject of the notice of the 9th May. I say it could not have been, inasmuch as the Appellant's letter of the 21st May was written after the notice of the 9th May was sent to and received by him. Expulsion under r. 61 cannot take place unless 7 days' notice of the complaint is given to a member and it must follow that the Conclave could not consider a charge of unmasonic conduct with respect to the letter, in the absence of a notice of any sort being given to the Appellant with regard to it. It may have been that the criminal proceedings was the main charge but, according to the second respect, the Appellant's letter of the 21st May " dished " him in the ballot for expulsion after it had been read to the members. The second charge was one of the two charges with respect to which the resolution of expulsion was passed; no notice of that charge was ever given and in that circumstance, it was incompetent for the members of the Conclave to take it into consideration or to adjudicate upon it. In that respect r. 61 clearly was not observed. The observation by Jessel, M. R., in Fisher v. Keane (1878) 40 Ch. D. 353 at 862 of the report is very much in point. There the Master of the Rolls said: .... in my opinion a committee, acting under such a rule as this, are bound to act, as Lord Hatherley said, according to the ordinary principles of justice, and are not to convict a man of a grave offence which shall warrant his expulsion from the club, without fair, adequate and sufficient notice, and an opportunity of meeting the accusations brought against him. 38. There was complete non-observance of the requirements, mentioned in the quotation, that there should be given fair, adequate and sufficient notice of the charge relating to the letter. In this respect the resolution, in my view, is entirely invalid and totally inoperative. 39. A point was taken that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. It was argued that it cannot adjudicate upon expulsion, simpliciter, of a member from a club or some similar institution or organisation. In this respect the resolution, in my view, is entirely invalid and totally inoperative. 39. A point was taken that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the present suit. It was argued that it cannot adjudicate upon expulsion, simpliciter, of a member from a club or some similar institution or organisation. Reliance for this contention was placed upon Baird v. Wells (1890) 44.Ch. D. 661. That was a case of the expulsion of a member from a proprietory club, that is to say, a club in which the members are not the owners, but some individual or entity owns the club together with all its property, furniture, lease of the premises and all its assets, and a member has merely a right to use the premises and to have at his disposal the amenities of the club. Clearly the member, in that case, had no right of property, in or of the club of which he was a member, since the whole of the assets, as I will call them, belonged to some person who was the proprietor. In the course of his judgment Mr. Justice Stirling quoted from Rigby v. Connol (1880) 14 Ch. D. 482, a case of expulsion of a member from a Trade Union in which the principle is the same as with a club or, as in this case, a Conclave. The quotation, cited by Mr. Justice Stirling, was the observation of Jessel, M. R., at pages 487 where he said: I have no doubt whatever that the foundation of the jurisdiction is the right of property vested in the member of the society, and of which he is unjustly deprived by such unlawful expulsion. There is no such jurisdiction that I am aware of reposed, in this country at least, in any of the Queen's Courts to decide upon the rights of persons to associate together when the association possesses no property.... I cannot imagine that any Court of Justice could interfere with such an association if some of the members declined to associate with some of the others. That is to say, the Courts, as such, have never dreamt of enforcing agreements strictly personal in their nature.... in such cases no Court of Justice can interfere so long as there is no property the right to which is taken away from the person complaining.... That is to say, the Courts, as such, have never dreamt of enforcing agreements strictly personal in their nature.... in such cases no Court of Justice can interfere so long as there is no property the right to which is taken away from the person complaining.... If that is the foundation of the jurisdiction, the Plaintiff, if he can succeed at all. must succeed on the ground that some right of property, to which he is entitled, has been taken away from him. 40. According to the evidence, in the present case, in the event of the Conclave being dissolved, its funds would not be divisible among the members but would pass to the Grand Conclave. The Appellant said he claimed an interest in the Conclave's Benevolent Fund. The second Respondent said there is no such fund but, when required, grants are made out of the general fund. Mr. Justice Sen, in his judgment, said that the Appellant had shown, by being expelled from the club, he lost all right to the Benevolent Fund of which indigent members of the Lodge might have advantage. Evidently the learned Judge accepted the Appellant's evidence regarding that fund. Admittedly, according to the second Respondent's evidence, the Conclave owns property, for instance, its regalia, which undoubtedly belongs to the Conclave and therefore to its members, although it might pass on dissolution of the Conclave to the Grand Conclave; but until that event occurs, that property belongs to the Conclave of which the Appellant was a member; and he has a right with respect to that property as also a right with respect to the Benevolent Fund-both of which, in my view, are property. It is sufficient, to enable him to come to this Court and for this Court to have jurisdiction to entertain his suit in which he disputes the correctness of his expulsion from the Conclave, to show there has been deprivation of his right to that property. With respect I agree with the learned trial Judge's finding that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 41. One other argument was put forward by Mr. Niren De, during the course of his able argument on behalf of the Appellant, that the resolution is invalid because it was not passed by the required majority of two-thirds. With respect I agree with the learned trial Judge's finding that this Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 41. One other argument was put forward by Mr. Niren De, during the course of his able argument on behalf of the Appellant, that the resolution is invalid because it was not passed by the required majority of two-thirds. What the rule provides, in this respect, is the following: This power of exclusion can only be exercised by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. 42. Mr. De contended that the rule requires that the majority of two-thirds shall be that of two-thirds of the members present at the meeting; if there are some abstentions, and whilst there may be a two-thirds majority in regard to the votes cast by members who voted, unless the two-thirds majority is of two-thirds of the members present, the resolution to exclude has not been properly passed so as to be effective. Reliance for this argument was placed upon two decisions of the Courts in England, In re: The Rale-Payers of Eysham Parish 18 L. G. Rep. (1849) Comonon Law, Q. B. 210 and Labouehere's case 13 Ch. D. 346 (1879), previously quoted. In 11 Eysham's case 18 L. G. Rep. (1849) Comonon Law, Q. B. 210 a statute provided for the adoption of an act by rate-payers if so determined by a majority consisting of two-thirds of the votes of the rate-payers present at a meeting held for the purpose. In that case the decision was that the words " two-thirds of the votes of the ratepayers present" meant the voting power present or two-thirds of the persons present who were qualified to vote; consequently two-thirds majority of the actual votes cast was not sufficient, when it was less than two-thirds of the rate-payers present. In Labouchere's case 13 Ch. D. 346 (1879) the rule for expulsion required a resolution to be passed by two-thirds of the members present. The wording in both those cases, of the statute and of the rule, are different to what it is in the present case. The wording in rule 61, in my view, does not mean two-thirds of the members of the members attending the meeting; if it did. then the last two words of the sentence. " and voting," are entirely unnecessary and have to be ignored. The wording in rule 61, in my view, does not mean two-thirds of the members of the members attending the meeting; if it did. then the last two words of the sentence. " and voting," are entirely unnecessary and have to be ignored. The wording of the rule is "by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting." In my opinion the words "and voting,' coupled with the other words, mean of the members present, those who vote, and a resolution is properly passed by a majority of two-thirds of the actual votes cast. I cannot see there is any other meaning to the rule than that which I have ventured to give. 43. One further matter remains to be considered and this, again, was not raised before the learned trial Judge. Rule 182 of the Constitution of the Ancient Fraternity provides as follows: If the Grand Master be satisfied that any brother has been illegally or without sufficient cause excluded, he may order him to be re-instated, and may suspend any Lodge which fails to comply with that order. 44. Mr. Chatterji referred to this rule and contended that the Appellant had a right of appeal to the Grand Master against his exclusion and if the Grand Master upheld his appeal his re-instatement would have to follow; it was further argued that, unless and until the Appellant availed himself of the benefit of the rule, he has no right to come to this Court to seek redress here and thus the present suit is premature. This is not, in my view, raised by any plea in the written statement. Paragraph 6 of the pleading alleges that the Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit. There is an issue-Issue No. 1- which is to this effect:-" Is the suit maintainable having regard to (a) the provisions ' of a particular part of the constitution ' and (b) rules 182... "? That issue was directed to the plea in paragraph 6 of the written statement that the Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain the suit. 1 cannot accept that the question of the suit being premature was the subject of pleading and the fact that it was not argued before the trial Judge is corroborative of that view. "? That issue was directed to the plea in paragraph 6 of the written statement that the Court has no jurisdiction at all to entertain the suit. 1 cannot accept that the question of the suit being premature was the subject of pleading and the fact that it was not argued before the trial Judge is corroborative of that view. Since there is no plea that the suit is premature it must follow that this argument inevitably must fail. 45. For the reasons which I have given, and this case has caused me, personally, great concern and anxiety, I have come to the conclusion that the Appellant was not properly, correctly and legally expelled and the resolution of the expulsion was beyond the powers of the Conclave. It must follow, therefore, that the dismissal of his suit must be set aside. There will be a decree for the two declarations and for the injunction sought in the plaint and, the Appellant, in my view, is entitled to his costs here and in the Court below. Certified for two Counsel. 46. The security of Rs. 2,751-4-0 for costs of the appeal, furnished by the Appellant, under the order of this Court dated the 4th December, 1944, with the Respondent's attorney will be forthwith refunded to the Appellant's attorney by the Respondent's attorney. 47. I desire to add that I am satisfied the first and second Respondents and all the members of the Conclave throughout acted perfectly bond fide and there is a complete absence of bad faith on their part. All suggestions to the contrary are entirely groundless. Ormond, J. 48. This is an appeal in a suit brought by the Appellant claiming a declaration that a resolution, held at a meeting of the Conclave of a Lodge to which he as a mason belongs, expelling him from the Lodge, is null and void, a declaration that he is still a member of the Lodge and an injunction. The suit was brought against the three Defendants in a representative capacity on behalf of themselves and all other members of the Conclave. The three individuals joined as Defendants were: Mohendra Nath Banerjee, the Supreme Ruler of the Conclave, Narendra Kumar Basu, the Secretary thereof, and one Sris Chandra Guha, one of the members. One written statement was filed on behalf of the Defendants. The three individuals joined as Defendants were: Mohendra Nath Banerjee, the Supreme Ruler of the Conclave, Narendra Kumar Basu, the Secretary thereof, and one Sris Chandra Guha, one of the members. One written statement was filed on behalf of the Defendants. Mohendra Nath Banerjee and Narendra Kumar Basu, and another written statement was filed on behalf of Sris Chandra Guha. The third Defendant Guha did not appear by Counsel in the suit, and curiously enough he was not called to give evidence on either side. It will be seen that his written statement supports in the main the case of the Plaintiff. In paragraph 7 he states: The matter of exclusion of the Plaintiff was put to the vote and this Defendant voted against such exclusion. In paragraph 8 he states: He believes that in excluding the Plaintiff the said rule (that is, Rule 61) was not duly complied with by other members and the officers concerned. And in paragraph 9 he states: The procedure adopted to expel the Plaintiff did not appear to him to be just or proper. He voted against such expulsion. In paragraph 11 he takes the plea that he is not responsible for and was not a party to the exclusion of the Plaintiff. Beyond mentioning this, I am not here otherwise concerned with that aspect of the matter. 49. The other two Respondents have appeared by the same Counsel representing them both, and the appeal has been heard as an appeal in a suit against the members of the Lodge. 50. At the outset of argument for the Respondents, it was contended by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the Court is not entitled in any event, even if the claim of the Plaintiff were made out, to grant any relief in this suit in view of the circumstances of this particular case. This argument was based on the principles laid down in Rigby v. Connol 14 Ch. D. 482 (1880), where Jessel, M. R., observed at pages 487 and 488 as follows: I have no doubt whatever that the foundation of the jurisdiction is the right of property vested in the member of the society, and of which he is unjustly deprived by such unlawful expulsion. D. 482 (1880), where Jessel, M. R., observed at pages 487 and 488 as follows: I have no doubt whatever that the foundation of the jurisdiction is the right of property vested in the member of the society, and of which he is unjustly deprived by such unlawful expulsion. There is no such jurisdiction that I am aware of reposed, in this country at least, in any of the Queen's Courts to decide upon the rights of persons to associate together when the association possesses no property. Persons, and many persons, do associate together without any property in common at all. A dozen people may agree to meet and play whist at each other's houses for a certain period, and if eleven of them refuse to associate with the twelfth any longer, I am not aware that there is any jurisdiction in any Court of Justice in this country to interfere. Or a dozen or a hundred scientific men may agree with each other in the same way to meet alternately at each other's houses, or at any place where there is a possibility of their meeting each other; but if the association has no property, and takes no subscriptions from its members, I cannot imagine that any Court of Justice could interfere with such an association if some of the members declined to associate with some of the others. That is to say, the Courts, as such, have never dreamt of enforcing agreements strictly personal in their nature, whether they are agreements of hiring and service, being the common relation of master and servant, or whether they are agreements for the purpose of pleasure, or for the purpose of scientific pursuits, or for the purpose of charity or philanthropy-in such cases no Court of Justice can interfere so long as there is no property the right to which is taken away from the person complaining. If that is the foundation of the jurisdiction, the Plaintiff, if he can succeed at all, must succeed on the ground that some right of property to which he is entitled has been taken away from him. That this is the foundation of the interference of the Courts as regards clubs, I think, is quite clear. 51. Observations to a similar effect were made in Baird v. Wells 44 Ch. D. 661 (1890), where at page 675. That this is the foundation of the interference of the Courts as regards clubs, I think, is quite clear. 51. Observations to a similar effect were made in Baird v. Wells 44 Ch. D. 661 (1890), where at page 675. the passage above was quoted with approval and relied on by Mr. Justice Stirling. This principle is now, it would seem, well settled with the result that, where a proprietary club, as frequently happens, is owned by a company, a member would not have a right to recourse to the Courts for wrongful expulsion in the ordinary way. It was contended by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee that the present case is similar to those cases. For this he places reliance on the Plaintiff's own evidence where he stated that if the Conclave ceases to exist he would not be given a share of its property, but its property would be handed over to the Grand Lodge. As I see the position, however, the mere fact that by rule such property would be handed over to the Grand Lodge in the event of the Conclave ceasing to exist, does not mean that a member of the Conclave has no rights of property in the property of the Lodge while it does exist. It was stated in evidence, and is undisputed, that the Lodge owns certain regalia, while it may be that that regalia is worn only by certain officers appointed by the Conclave, it must, on the materials before us, it seems to me, be taken to be the property of the members of the Lodge while the Lodge is in existence. There is another matter also in relation to the rights of the Appellant in respect of a benevolent fund, which is administered from the general funds of the Lodge. The learned Judge of the Court of first instance appears to have come to a finding of fact that such benevolent fund exists. It would appear that he has on this point accepted and believed the evidence of the Appellant. We are hardly in a position to dispute such finding of fact. The prospective right of the Appellant to be given benefits of the benevolent fund in certain contingencies, even though only a contingent right, would, I think, be enough in itself to support the power of this Court to give relief in this suit. We are hardly in a position to dispute such finding of fact. The prospective right of the Appellant to be given benefits of the benevolent fund in certain contingencies, even though only a contingent right, would, I think, be enough in itself to support the power of this Court to give relief in this suit. Apart from this the matter of the property of the members in the regalia and other movables of the Lodge in itself is, in my view, sufficient. 52. Another point raised in argument on behalf of the Respondents by Mr. N. C. Chatterjee was that this suit is premature in view of Rule 182 of the rules in the constitution printed at page 186 of the paper book. That rule is as follows: If the Grand Master be satisfied that any Brother has been illegally or without sufficient cause excluded, he may order him to be re-instated, and may suspend any Lodge which fails to comply with that order. 53. While this gives a power of reinstatement to the Grand Master, it does not appear to give a clear right of appeal to an expelled member although he might well expect as a matter of courtesy to have any application for re-instatement made by him to the Grand Master heard. The point that the suit was premature is nowhere taken in the written statement. There is, however, an issue (Issue No. 1) which was raised in the Court of first instance in the following terms: Is the suit maintainable having regard to (among other matters) Rule 182? This point was not argued as it would appear from the judgment in the Court below. The written statement contains merely a general plea: "These Defendants contend that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this suit." The specific point that the suit was premature does not, therefore, appear to have been raised until at a late stage in the argument before us. The terms of Rule 182 do not, in my view, appear to be sufficient to shut out the jurisdiction of this Court. 54. Now as to the power of expulsion in an association such as a club or the Conclave in this suit to expel a member the matter generally is put in this way in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. 54. Now as to the power of expulsion in an association such as a club or the Conclave in this suit to expel a member the matter generally is put in this way in Halsbury's Laws of England, 2nd Edn., Vol. 4, Art. 907: There is no implied power to expel a member from an unincorporated members' club, whatever may be the ground for expulsion, nor can the rules of such a club be altered, without the consent of every member, so as to create a power of expulsion, unless such rules provide for their own alteration. 55. It follows from this that the powers of the Conclave in its meeting to expel a member are derived solely from, and are limited to, the powers given to it under Rule 61 at page 183 of the paper book. That rule is worded as follows: Every Conclave has the power to exclude any of its members for sufficient cause, provided that such member shall have been served with due notice in writing of the complaint made against him and of the time and place appointed for its consideration, seven clear days before, so that he may attend and be heard; such notice shall be considered served if sent by registered post to his last known address. This power of exclusion can only be exercised by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting. The name of every member so excluded from a Conclave, with a statement of the cause of his exclusion, shall be forthwith sent to the Grand Recorder. 56. I would also observe that it is settled and clearly the position is that this Court has no jurisdiction or power to sit in any sense as a Court of Appeal on any decision come to by the members in the exercise of Rule 61, that is to say, if the members at a duly constituted meeting held bond fide and in accordance with the rules of natural justice, should decide rightly or wrongly that there was sufficient cause against a particular member to expel him and did expel him; it would not be for this Court at all to interfere. It is, however, essential that the members, firstly, should act in strict compliance of Rule 61, secondly, that the enquiry should be made and a decision arrived at bond fide, and thirdly, unless the rule specifically provides on a particular matter something to the contrary, the general principles of natural justice must also be followed. The rules such as Rule 61 are merely an embodiment of the contract between the members-one with another. It is open to the members of any association, such as this Conclave, to make any rule they like as to the expulsion of a member. This power clearly depends on the "contract made between the members. It has been pointed out that there is nothing to prevent the members making a particular express contract on a particular point which, if they do not agree about it, would be regulated differently by the rules of natural justice. Observations were made to this effect by Mr. Justice Maugham in Mac Lean's case [1029] 1 Ch. 602 which was a Trade Union's case. At page 623, he observed: In the case I have before me (and I may add in such a case as a power of expulsion in a members' club) it seems to me reasonably clear that the matter can only depend on contract, express or implied. If, for instance, there was a clearly expressed rule stating that a member might be expelled by a defined body without calling upon the member in question to explain his conduct, I see no reason for supposing that the Courts would interfere with such a rule on the ground of public policy. 57. On the other hand where the rule provided in any particular respect that some condition must be fulfilled then that condition must be strictly complied with since the power of expulsion is itself dependent on the terms of the rule. Furthermore, as it has been put, if there is a mere lacuna in the rule without any express provision which would shut out one of the ordinary principles of natural justice then the rule must be operative subject to the general principles of natural justice. As to the principles of natural justice governing such a case these have been laid down in Lee son's case L. R. (1889) 43 Ch. D. 366. As to the principles of natural justice governing such a case these have been laid down in Lee son's case L. R. (1889) 43 Ch. D. 366. In that case at page 383 dealing with the mode in which the statute governing expulsion from the General Medical Council should be enforced. Lord Justice Bowen observed: The jurisdiction is defined by the statute. There must be an allegation before the General Medical Council of infamous conduct in some professional respect and adjudication must be arrived at after due inquiry. The statute says nothing more, but in saying so much it certainly imports that the substantial elements of natural justice must be found to have been followed at the inquiry. There must be due inquiry. The accused person must have notice of what he is accused. He must have an opportunity of being heard, and the decision must be honestly arrived at after he has had a full opportunity of being heard with respect to the charge made, the charge of which he has notice, it is a charge of infamous conduct in some professional respect and the particulars which should be brought to his attention in order to enable him to meet that charge ought to be particulars of conduct which, if established, is capable of being viewed by honest persons as conduct which is infamous. That is all. 58. Similar observations were recently made in Spackman's case L. R. [1943] A. C. 627 where this passage which I have quoted from Lord Justice Bowen's judgment in Lccson's case L. R. (1889) 43 Ch. D. 366 was cited and relied on at page 643. The decision in Fisher v. Keane [1878] 11 Ch. D. 353 bears on the same aspect of the matter. At page 357, Jessel, M. R., observed: In the first place I have to consider what the true construction of the rule in question is; and in the second place I have to consider whether the method adopted by the committee of putting that rule in force was such as. according to the rules of conducting judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, ought to be adopted. 59. These principles have also been followed in India for which I may refer to Ambalal Sarabhai Vs. according to the rules of conducting judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, ought to be adopted. 59. These principles have also been followed in India for which I may refer to Ambalal Sarabhai Vs. Phiroz H. Antia, AIR 1939 Bom 35 , where the legal position is, if I may say so with respect, very clearly enunciated by Wassoodew, J. 60. I should emphasise here that in the present case there is no question on the facts of the case, in my view, of any want of bond fides on the part of the Respondents in their application of rule 61 or in any of the proceedings leading up to or concerned with the expulsion of the Appellant. The Appellant himself made certain suggestions in his evidence which might be open to the interpretation that a certain letter had been concocted. He has been disbelieved as to this by the learned Judge and I should readily accept the finding of fact on this point of the learned Judge. I would take this opportunity of emphatically stating that no imputation should be made as a result of this case on any of the Defendants or on any members of the Lodge. They have acted throughout in a completely bond fide manner, honourably as men of honour, in what they considered to be the best interests of the Fraternity or their craft. The only question for me to decide is whether they have made a mistake or not. 61. The question for decision is simply then, whether there was a breach of the terms of rule 61 or a breach of the principles of natural justice or, as it may probably more conveniently be considered, whether there has been a breach of rule 61 carrying with it, as imported in it, those principles of natural justice which apply to this case. In coming to the conclusion which I do, I really accept the learned Judge's findings in the Court below, such as are findings of fact based in any degree on the credibility of any of the witnesses. This means, in particular, that I accept the learned Judge's finding, firstly, that the Appellant received notice of the adjourned meeting to be held on the 4th February and secondly, that the Appellant received the notice of the 14th February. I should now turn to the facts. 62. This means, in particular, that I accept the learned Judge's finding, firstly, that the Appellant received notice of the adjourned meeting to be held on the 4th February and secondly, that the Appellant received the notice of the 14th February. I should now turn to the facts. 62. I need not go for the moment into matters earlier than those concerning the meeting of the 1st February. On the 24th January a notice of a meeting to be held on the 1st February was sent out. That notice enclosed a complaint made by the Appellant. On the 1st February a meeting was fixed but not held, it was adjourned until the 4th February. There was considerable controversy as to whether the Appellant had or had not had notice of the adjournment. The learned Judge has clearly found that he did have notice. A meeting was then held on the 4th February. The Appellant did not attend that meeting. Where he was or how near he got to it is for our purposes immaterial. Apparently he went to a point outside where the meeting was held or he went at the wrong hour, too early or too late, but in any event he did not attend. There was then a letter of the 14th February sent by the second Respondent, the Secretary, to the Appellant giving him notice of a resolution arrived at on the 4th February to this effect that: " in the opinion of the committee it would be to the interest of the Conclave if both Worshipful Brother Ezra and Worshipful Brother Samuel were to resign from the Conclave. I have been desired to request you to comply with it as early as possible." The learned Judge has found clearly that this letter was received by the Appellant. On the 9th May the Secretary again wrote to the Appellant: the letter, which has been set out by my learned brother, informing him " You have failed to accede." That is to the request to tender his resignation. The matter was taken up in open Conclave at its last regular meeting: " I am now directed to give you notice that the question why you should not be excluded for unmasonic conduct will be considered at the next regular meeting to be held on the 28th May. The matter was taken up in open Conclave at its last regular meeting: " I am now directed to give you notice that the question why you should not be excluded for unmasonic conduct will be considered at the next regular meeting to be held on the 28th May. Any defence you care to submit in writing will receive the consideration of the Conclave but please take notice that in the event of your not appearing in person the charge against you will be proceeded with in your absence." On the 21st May the Appellant replied to that letter. On the 28th May the meeting was held. It is somewhat important for a point which emerges later, for me to state what materials were before the meeting on that day. I will not take time in going into details into the contents of these documents, which can be seen from the paper book. But I wish to state what they were. The first document was a letter of the 11th September from a certain Mr. Samuel to the Secretary, being the letter which he desired to have read out before an election that was then shortly going to take place. It contains no reference to any criminal proceedings taken by the Appellant against Mr. Samuel (p. 213). The second document is the letter of the 4th February, 1941, from Mr. Samuel to the first Respondent Mr. Banerji also relating to a certain election of a high officer, and this also contains no reference to any criminal proceedings (p. 214). The third document is at page 160 being a letter of the 27th November, 1941, from the Appellant to the Supreme Ruler, that is, Mr. Banerji. It deals with various matters but contains no direct reference to any criminal proceedings. The fourth document is one at page 163-a letter of the 19th January, 1942, from the Appellant to the Supreme Ruler being a reminder. The fifth is a letter at page 165 dated the 28th January, 1942, from Mr. Samuel to the Secretary-which again deals at large with these matters concerning elections and contains no direct reference, to any criminal proceedings. The sixth paper read out at the meeting was the minutes of the meeting of the 4th February. This also contains no direct reference to any criminal proceedings. Samuel to the Secretary-which again deals at large with these matters concerning elections and contains no direct reference, to any criminal proceedings. The sixth paper read out at the meeting was the minutes of the meeting of the 4th February. This also contains no direct reference to any criminal proceedings. The last portion is: It was unanimously decided: 'That in the opinion of the Committee it would be to the interest of the Conclave if both Wor. Bro. Ezra and Wor. Bro. Samuel were to resign from the Conclave.' (Page 176). 63. The next paper (the seventh) is the letter of the 9th May to which I have already referred addressed by the Secretary, the second Respondent, to the Appellant to which my learned brother has also referred already. It will be seen that this also contains no reference specifically to any criminal proceedings, (page 169). The next (the eighth) is the letter of the 21st May from the Appellant himself to the second Respondent, the Secretary in reply to the letter of 9th May. The only reference contained in this letter to the criminal proceedings is in the following words; in the third paragraph after dealing with other matters: As this recognised practice has not been adopted by the Conclave I must conclude that para. 2 of your letter under reply is a subterfuge for bringing pressure to bear on me to withdraw the criminal proceedings instituted against one of the Conclave members, arising out of another constitution which are now sub judice in the law Court. 64. Before going further it is to be noted that nowhere in this letter is there any statement by the Appellant treating the position to be that the charge to be made against him, when the question of his expulsion would be considered, was that he had instituted criminal proceedings and not withdrawn them. On the contrary the suggestion in the passage to which I have just referred and the whole of the paragraph in which it is contained, is that the charge or charges are something different and that whatever they are, they are guided by a motive which is to bring pressure upon him to withdraw criminal proceedings. He is with considerable emphasis in this very letter asking for particulars of the specific charges being made against him (page 170). He is with considerable emphasis in this very letter asking for particulars of the specific charges being made against him (page 170). There was also read out at the meeting the letter of the 22nd May at page 172 of the paper book from Mr. Samuel to the Secretary. That is merely a letter concerned with Mr. Samuel's own position and offering an apology and an explanation why he had not resigned as requested. It contains no reference to the criminal proceedings. The last paper that was read out (the tenth of the series) was the minutes of the meeting of the 26th March at page 189. Those minutes contain no reference to matters material to the present case. A perusal of these papers will show that they are lengthy documents with all manner of contentions and allegations in them, but that with the single exception of the passage I have quoted in the Appellant's own Utter of the 21st May there is no direct reference at all to any criminal proceedings lodged by him against Mr. Samuel. 65. The question then is what were the charges made against the Appellant. For convenience I would distinguish between, firstly, charges in the sense of charges as notified to the Appellant telling him what case he would have to meet or answer, and secondly, charges in the sense of the matters in fact taken into consideration against him by the body expelling him and the reasons on which they actually did decide to expel him. On the first aspect of the matter the Appellant had received the notice of the 14th February- He had received nothing else which could be called a charge up to any date more than seven days before the meeting. In so far as he had had even by the date of the meeting itself any notice from his accusers or from the Lodge of the complaint, whether in writing or orally, this went no further than the letters to which I have in detail referred. It is clear, therefore, that up to the time of the voting of his expulsion the only charge of which he had had notification which he would have to meet was one for "unmasonic conduct" as stated in the letter of the 9th May in general terms. It is clear, therefore, that up to the time of the voting of his expulsion the only charge of which he had had notification which he would have to meet was one for "unmasonic conduct" as stated in the letter of the 9th May in general terms. He had not, in the sense I am now considering the matter, received any notice cither of any specific charge of having instituted criminal proceedings and of unmasonic conduct in that he had done so, or of having written an impertinent or otherwise objectionable letter of the 21st May and of unmasonic conduct in that he had written and sent that letter. I may rote that in arriving at this view of the tacts I am not differing in any respect from the facts found by the learned Judge in the Court of first instance for he has not dealt specifically with this point since he took the view that it was enough that the Appellant had knowledge of the charges from whatever source apart from any notice received by him from the officers of the Lodge in the sense of a charge in which I am now considering. 66. Passing to the other question, what were the matters for which he was in fact expelled, the written statement is clear on the point, in paragraph 7 where it says: At the said meeting (of the 28th May) the Plaintiff was informed of the charges against him and was requested to adjust and settle his differences but the Plaintiff refused to adjust or settle and behaved in a most disgraceful, truculent and insubordinate manner. It was on account of such behaviour and by reason of his letter of the 21st May, 1942. and his unmasonic behaviour that the meeting resolved to expel him. 67. "Such behaviour" clearly refers to the plea of disgraceful, truculent and insubordinate behaviour at the meeting itself. The " unmasonic behaviour" may presumably be read with reference to the statements in paragraph 5 of the written statement which detail the charge against the -Appellant as being that he had instituted criminal proceedings. 68. The evidence of the first Respondent, Mr. "Such behaviour" clearly refers to the plea of disgraceful, truculent and insubordinate behaviour at the meeting itself. The " unmasonic behaviour" may presumably be read with reference to the statements in paragraph 5 of the written statement which detail the charge against the -Appellant as being that he had instituted criminal proceedings. 68. The evidence of the first Respondent, Mr. Mahendra Nath Banerjee also clearly bears this out both on the point that no notice of any specific charges were ever given to the Appellant beyond the charge in general terms of unmasonic conduct and also on the point that he was in fact expelled on the various matters referred to in paragraph 7 of the written statement. In question 40 he was asked: Was any charge formulated at that meeting? His answer was: Reading all those papers were the full formulation of the charges. In question 41 he was asked: Apart from reading all the letters were any charges formulated? His answer was: I put to the meeting verbally the gist of all those letters once more for the benefit of the brethren-that was the formulation-nothing was read out from any other written paper. 69. And then he speaks in passages immediately following to the effect that the first charge was " going to the Criminal Courts against another member" and the second charge was in respect of the letter of the 21st May. Further at question 220 he (Mr. Banerjee) agrees that the Appellant even at the meeting was asking for specific charges framed against him. 220 Q.-Did Mr. Ezra ask from you about these specific charges at the meeting, answer yes or no? A.-I had the letters read and he asked again and I told him again. 221 Q.-So did he ask you about the specific charges, answer yes or no? A.-He did. 222 Q.-If he was aware of the specific charges before why should he ask you? A.-That is what I told him. You know it has been read out, why do you ask the same question again? 70. I have already shown that what was read out was limited to the particular papers I have referred to. 71. The second Respondent in evidence hearing on this part of the case said: 49. Q.-Tell his Lordship whether Mr. Ezra and Mr. Samuel were made aware of the charges against them?" A.-I think they were. 70. I have already shown that what was read out was limited to the particular papers I have referred to. 71. The second Respondent in evidence hearing on this part of the case said: 49. Q.-Tell his Lordship whether Mr. Ezra and Mr. Samuel were made aware of the charges against them?" A.-I think they were. Firstly, look at this letter of the 21st of May-what does he say in para. 3 (reads). 50 Q.-Were they (meaning Mr. Ezra and Mr. Samuel) apprised of the charges against them? A.-They were apprised and so far as I, remember Samuel gave a defence by word of mouth once. So far as Ezra was concerned he spoke at least twice or thrice during the whole of the discussion and then he had to be stopped by the Supreme Ruler. He knew exactly what took place. 232 Q.-At the meeting of the 28th of May you did not yourself tell Mr. Ezra that he has gone to the Criminal Court also? A.-At the meeting I read out the entire correspondence and papers and I had no occasion to formulate a charge against Ezra, At that meeting I was acting as the Secretary. I read the whole correspondence and placed before the Conclave what I thought about the conduct of these two gentlemen. 72. It is clear, therefore, that the reasons on which the persons exercising their right of expulsion of the Appellant came to their decision to expel him were, firstly, his behaviour in a disgraceful, truculent and insubordinate manner at the meeting itself of the 28th May, secondly, his letter of the 21st May. 1942. thirdly, his unmasonic behaviour in general. What I have so far been considering is a pure question of fact, that is to say, what were the charges. I would only remark, if as appeared from the evidence the Respondents themselves do not know to-day. or did not know at the date of the hearing, clearly what the charges were, could the Appellant know them on the 28th February or seven days before the 28th February when he was under the rule to have notice? Furthermore, could the members voting at that meeting of the 28th February know them sufficiently to come to a decision on them? 73. Furthermore, could the members voting at that meeting of the 28th February know them sufficiently to come to a decision on them? 73. Those being the facts, the Appellant contends that his expulsion is bad in law, firstly, for having been in breach of Rule 61 and secondly, in breach of the principles of natural justice. I have already referred to certain authorities bearing on the principles of natural justice. As to a case where more than one charge against the accused was made, where he had an opportunity of defending himself against one charge but no opportunity of defending himself against the second charge, which was also taken into consideration by the body expelling him, reference should also be made to Gompcrtz's case (1886) I. L. 9 Mad 319. It is true that in that case Gompertz did not at all appear before the committee who were the body which expelled him. He had had notice that the matter of publication of a pamphlet by him was to be considered by the committee, but he had no notice that the writing of certain letters would also be considered by them. In principle, if it is correct as it is, in my view, to hold in this case that the Appellant was entitled to notice of specific charges, even if the contention of the Respondents were accepted, that notice of the charge in general terms of unmasonic conduct, (though this, in my view, is not enough) somehow covered or included a charge based on the institution of criminal proceedings yet if he was in fact expelled at the meeting, as was evidently so in this case, for other charges, of which he certainly had had no notice, such as the writing of his letter of the 21st May and his conduct at the meeting itself, then his expulsion would, in my view, be equally as bad in law as the expulsion was held to be in Gompertz's case (1886) I. L. 9 Mad 319. 74. For a clear enunciation of the general principles of law affecting the exercise of a right of expulsion, reference should also be made to the Beegateak Club case (Labouchere's case), (1879) 13 Ch. D. 346 to which my learned brother has already referred; in which the observations forcefully expressed are, I think, particularly applicable also to the present case. 75. For a clear enunciation of the general principles of law affecting the exercise of a right of expulsion, reference should also be made to the Beegateak Club case (Labouchere's case), (1879) 13 Ch. D. 346 to which my learned brother has already referred; in which the observations forcefully expressed are, I think, particularly applicable also to the present case. 75. The particular points on which the Appellant relies in the present case for establishing that his expulsion is bad in law may be treated as four : Firstly, that in breach of the rule there was not a requisite two-thirds majority; secondly, that seven clear days' notice had not been given to him as was required when the rule stated that the notice in writing of the complaint should be given to him -"seven clear days before"; thirdly, that apart from the question of time for the notice no due notice in writing of the complaint was given to him. Those matters arise directly in respect of the rule. Then there is a fourth matter, which arises, not directly in terms of the rule, but under the principles of natural justice in regard to the operation of the rule, which he puts in this way : that there was no due enquiry. I will deal with these matters separately. 76. Regarding the question of two-thirds majority, the wording of the Rule is this: "This power of exclusion can only be exercised by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members present and voting." For the Respondents it is contended that the wording of the rule is itself perfectly clear, and that, in counting whether the requisite majority has been achieved, two-thirds has to be taken of those of the members present who actually voted either for or against the motion; that is to say, that the words "present and voting" both equally qualify the word "members" and that the word "voting" means actually voting either for or against. The result of this, of course, is that if there were 100 members present of whom 70 refrained from voting and 30 voted, the votes of 20 members would be sufficient to exercise the power of expulsion. The result of this, of course, is that if there were 100 members present of whom 70 refrained from voting and 30 voted, the votes of 20 members would be sufficient to exercise the power of expulsion. Similarly, that if there were 100 members and for some reason only 3 members voted-97 members abstaining-the vote of 2 members would be sufficient to effect a legal expulsion; and indeed if there were 100 members present and one member only voted that single member's vote would be sufficient to effect a legal expulsion. In answer to any suggestion that this is at least a curious result Mr. N. C. Chatterjee urged only that it was in likely to occur, since members would normally be expected to vote. As a matter of interest I find that in Parliamentary practice in the matter of voting, up till I think 1906, all members who were in the Chamber of the House at the time when the House proceeded to a division were bound to go into one or other lobby, that is to say, they were bound to exercise their votes either for the ayes or for the noes. Their only escape from this obligation was to betake themselves to the area round the Speaker's Chair, where they might be treated as no longer in the House. In fact it would appear from May's Parliamentary Practice, 13th Edn. at page 361, that there was an occasion when members, who declined to leave the House to go into the division lobby but persisted in remaining in their seats, were removed by the Sergeant-at-Arms. That position was. however, changed in 1906. In any event it is not here suggested that any member at any meeting of the Conclave would not be entitled to exercise his right of remaining neutral if he wishes. The first question then simply is whether a member present when the motion is put, but remaining neutral, is to be included in the phrase "and voting" or not. It is suggested that if the words "and voting" are construed as covering a member who is present but remains neutral, then the words might just as well not be in the sentence at all, since the whole matter would be equally covered if the expression stopped at the phrase "two-thirds of the members present". It is suggested that if the words "and voting" are construed as covering a member who is present but remains neutral, then the words might just as well not be in the sentence at all, since the whole matter would be equally covered if the expression stopped at the phrase "two-thirds of the members present". I have for myself felt considerable difficulty about the proper construction of this sentence in Rule 61-the result to which I have referred of a single member voting out of a hundred and being intended to authorise an expulsion would not on the face of it appear to be what might have been expected to be the natural meaning of a clause in the circumstances to which it refers. I feel it may well be that the words "and voting" should be construed as including a member who is present at the time when the motion is put, but remains neutral; on the ground that even by remaining neutral he is nevertheless exercising his right to vote, and that the words have been included so as to have the force that only members present at the time itself when the motion is put and not members present otherwise at the meeting as a whole should be included. I agree that this is not the direct meaning of the language if the words "present and voting" are taken as one compound adjectival type of phrase referring to " members," and if the act of voting is to be said to be restricted to the action of members present who actually cast their vote for or against. An alternative construction even if the word "voting" is restricted to voting only for or against the motion, which would avoid the unexpected result of one member out of a hundred being authorised to carry through expulsion, would be if the words "and voting" are read as relating back as a verbal adjective qualifying the word "majority" earlier at the beginning of the sentence. It would then mean that the stipulation for two-thirds had to be two-thirds of the members present and that the power of exclusion could only be exercised by a majority of members positively voting in favour of a motion for expulsion. It would then mean that the stipulation for two-thirds had to be two-thirds of the members present and that the power of exclusion could only be exercised by a majority of members positively voting in favour of a motion for expulsion. A third reading is that the word ''voting" is to have the meaning of covering members present and "qualified to vote" as opposed to members who might conceivably be present, such as honorary members, who are not qualified to vote. On this construction, urged for this clause by Mr. De, we were referred to the case of In re the Rate-Payers of Eynsham Parish 18 L. G. Rep. (1849) Common Law Q. B. 210. There the phrase to be construed was not the same as the phrase in the present case, but was, "a majority consisting of two-thirds of the votes of the rate-payers present at such meeting." The resolution was passed which had in favour of it more than two-thirds of the members who actually voted one way or the other but less than two-thirds of the members present inclusive of those who had remained neutral; and the two learned Judges dealing with the matter were both of the same opinion that when the stipulation referred as there to two-thirds of "the votes", it meant not two-thirds of the votes actually cast in favour or against, but two-thirds of the votes possessed by the members present. Therefore in that case it was held, that what was required was two-thirds of the persons present qualified to vote. Speaking for myself I have considerable doubt about the proper construction of this clause. The corresponding clause in the main constitution of the United Grand Lodge of England is in Rule 181 (at page 186 of the Paper Book) expressed in clear language where it says : Unless two-thirds of the members present vote in favour of it. By rule 89 (page 184) governing the Conclave concerned in this Appeal, its proceedings and the rights and duties of its members shall be regulated as nearly as circumstances will permit by the constitution of the United Grand Lodge of England. The local rule governing the power of expulsion might well be expected to carry the same meaning as that of the parent or governing body. The local rule governing the power of expulsion might well be expected to carry the same meaning as that of the parent or governing body. In this case there were 30 members present and qualified to vote (inclusive of the Appellant), 19 voted for expulsion; 9 voted against it. If any one of the three modes of construction I have mentioned is correct, then there would have been no requisite majority under the rule. I am inclined to the view that "voting" here means "qualified to vote". I do not however desire to decide this Appeal on this ground. 77. Regarding the point of seven days' notice the position comes to this. If there was only one charge, unmasonic conduct in general, then if it is correct to hold, as I shall hold in a moment, that this is not a sufficient charge, and that it is necessary that the Appellant should have had notice of a specific charge against him, then it comes to this, that a charge of umasonic conduct in general terms is no charge at all; and in that case seven days' notice of a useless charge is not a compliance in my view" of the Rule 61 as it should reasonably be read. In dealing with the matter on the pure wording of the Rule 61, If there were no principles of natural justice to be imported into it, it seems to me that the phrase "due notice in writing of the complaint made against him" must entail charges sufficiently particularised to enable the person who is charged to know what case he has to meet. If there were three charges of the matters of which in paragraph 7 of the written statement it is stated the Appellant was expelled, then it is clear that he had not had seven days' notice of his conduct, which took place on that very day at the meeting; nor had he had seven days' notice of the matter of writing the letter of the 21st May. Had the Lodge desired to take up these matters and expel him and take these grounds into consideration as well as any previous ground for his expulsion, the proper course under the rule would, as it seems to me, have been to adjourn the matter and to have given him further specific charges relating to those matters giving him more than seven clear days' notice before the matter was again taken up. 78. Regarding the third point whether the charge of unmasonic conduct in general terms of which he did have more than seven days' notice, was due notice in writing of the complaint within the rule or was sufficient compliance with the rules of natural justice imported into the rule, it was contended by Mr. N. C. Chaterjee that such rule merely referred to notice of "the complaint" and did not say notice of the complaint with particulars. Therefore the rule should be taken as complete in itself and that no principles of natural justice should be added to it. As to this Mr. N. C. Chatterjee relied also on certain observations of Mr. Justice Blagden in the case of George Bell Vs. The Royal Western India Turf Club, Ltd., (1945) 47 BOMLR 916 . At page 94 it will be seen that the learned Judge makes certain observations to the effect that "the mere absence of notice of the charge before the hearing" might not be in itself (in his view) "incompatible with natural justice in a domestic tribunal." 79. These were, however, for the case as decided by him, observations made obiter since he holds a little further on at page 97, that in any event there appeared to he acquiescence in that case in the Tribunal's proceeding to hear the case then and there for better or for worse. The learned Judge also takes care to restrict his comments to cases where the rule itself does not stipulate for any notice; and he observes at page 95: In cases where the rules expressly require some particular form of notice the question is one of construing the rules. 80. In the present case on the well-settled authorities to which I have already referred, it was, in my view, incumbent "on the Lodge to give the Appellant specific notice of the charges which he had to meet. 81. 80. In the present case on the well-settled authorities to which I have already referred, it was, in my view, incumbent "on the Lodge to give the Appellant specific notice of the charges which he had to meet. 81. I come then to the last point raised by the Appellant that there was in fact at the meeting of 28th May, no due enquiry according to the principles of natural justice. This is wrapped up with the question already considered whether the charges against the Appellant were sufficiently particularised. The decision 1 have reached on the previous points is, in itself, enough to dispose of this appeal. Had there been particularised proper notice to the Appellant of what he was being charged with, there are no additional or special circumstances in connection with the conduct of the meeting of the 28th February, which would have led me to hold, that there had not been due enquiry within the principles of natural justice. The evidence of the second Respondent which has been accepted by the learned Judge, and which I readily accept, is that there was a discussion for at least an hour. That is also the finding of the learned Judge. But having regard to all the facts of this case it seems to me correct to hold that there was not a due enquiry according to the principles of natural justice. It seems to me it would be immaterial if the discussion had lasted five hours instead of one; if the members present did not know clearly precisely what the issue was on which they were asked to decide. They were not being asked to decide whether it was their personal wish whether the Appellant should remain a member of the Lodge or not, or whether he ought to have resigned or not, but whether there was sufficient cause for him to be expelled. To decide on this in a reasonably judicial or semi-judicial manner it would be necessary for them to know, what was the particularised matter of which he was being charged. I cannot see how it would be enough for them to come to a proper decision on the proper issue, simply having read out to them the series of papers which were read out and which had no direct bearing on the criminal proceedings, which are now said to have been the main charge. I cannot see how it would be enough for them to come to a proper decision on the proper issue, simply having read out to them the series of papers which were read out and which had no direct bearing on the criminal proceedings, which are now said to have been the main charge. They were never asked to vote on the question, whether they were satisfied he had done any particular things, and then, on that, whether they considered his action sufficient cause to expel him; but were asked to vote for or against his expulsion without having it clearly put before them for what act he was being expelled. It follows in my view that there was in the circumstances of this case no due enquiry such as the Appellant would be entitled to under the principles of natural justice. 82. A point was relied on by Mr. Chatterjee to this effect that knowledge of the Appellant would do instead of notice of a specific charge. The argument appears to be this that the Appellant had himself instituted the criminal proceedings and therefore he had full knowledge of the matter, that he had been told, (as has been stated in evidence and as the learned Judge in the Court of first instance has found), indirectly by other members of the Lodge, that the question of his having instituted criminal proceedings might be considered; and it is suggested that because he had this knowledge, it was unnecessary to particularise any specific charge. This to my mind is the same as to say that because any criminal will always have a better knowledge of his own past life than his accusers, he need never be charged at all. I cannot accept this as a principle of natural justice. As was pointed out by Mr. De, any cause " sufficient" under Rule 61 would by the nature of the association from which he was being expelled, inherently necessitate unmasonic conduct. The position, as I see it, is not dissimilar from the position of an officer being brought before a Court Martial on a charge of "conduct unbefitting an officer and a gentleman " without anything more; or of a doctor being brought before the Medical Council on a charge of "infamous conduct" and nothing more; or, as was suggested by Mr. De, of a member of a professional club being charged with "unprofessional conduct" and nothing more. A charge framed in wide terms such as this, when relating to a particular body of masons, or army officers, or doctors, or members of a particular profession, as the case may be, seems to me to have the weight of no charge at all. It is just as if the Appellant had been given notice from the members of the Lodge to this effect : "We propose to expel you because we propose to expel you," or "we propose to expel you" simpliciter without giving any reason at all. And then furthermore stating, " If you do not wish to be expelled, you must come and explain, for any reasons you may originate from your side and any grounds you may think fit to advance, why you should not be expelled." That, in my view, is not in accordance with natural justice. 83. Apart from any considerations of natural justice it will be seen, however, "in the present case that a short reply to the whole case of the Defendants is that Rule 61 has not been complied with and that the Appellant has, in fact, been expelled because of matters of which he has not had seven days' notice. I need not emphasise my view again that since the power of expulsion to be exercised by the members of any particular club is derived solely from the Rule creating it, it follows that it is essential that the rule is to be strictly complied with. 84. A point was finally raised at the last moment of the hearing as to acquiescence or waiver. The passages in Mr. Justice Blagden's judgment in the George Bell Vs. The Royal Western India Turf Club, Ltd., (1945) 47 BOMLR 916 referred to above, were relied on, and it was suggested that whatever might be the principles of natural justice, or even whatever might be the stipulations in the rule, since the question of notice of the charge against him was a matter solely concerning the Appellant, it would be open to him to acquiesce in the meeting going forward without giving him the proper notice to which he would be entitled without acquiescence. As to this I would only say that Mr. As to this I would only say that Mr. Justice Blagden's judgment, as already pointed out, was restricted to a case where there had been no breach of the rule. In my view, if the members do not proceed within the strict limits of the rule creating the power of expulsion, there is no power of expulsion, whether a member chooses to consent to be expelled or not. Furthermore, on the facts of the present case, when it is clear that the Appellant at all material times and even at the hearing of the meeting itself of the 28th May was emphatically asking for specific charges to be stated, it cannot, I think, be said, on the facts of this case, that there was any acquiescence or waiver. I, therefore, agree, with all respect, with the judgment of my learned brother that this appeal should be allowed and the other orders consequent thereon.