JUDGMENT Chakravartti, J. - Among the sections introduced into the Bengal Tenancy Act by the amending Act of 1928 was one numbered 26G which has since undergone considerable expansion. In its original form it provided that an occupancy raiyat might enter into a complete usufructuary mortgage in respect of his holding for a period not exceeding fifteen years and it was further provided in sub-s. (4) that no other form of usufructuary mortgage entered into by an occupancy raiyat in respect of his holding would have any force or effect. By sub-s. (4), registration of documents creating a complete usufructuary mortgage of an occupancy holding for a period exceeding fifteen years or a usufructuary mortgage other than a complete usufructuary mortgage was also forbidden and such documents were declared inadmissible in evidence. "Complete usufructuary" mortgage was defined as a mortgage with possession, under the terms of which both the principal of the loan and the interest thereon were to be extinguished by the profits arising from the land during the period of the mortgage. It will be seen that the section was addressed only to usufructuary mortgages created after its date. 2. In 1938, the section was amended by Act 6 [VI] of that year so as to bring within its ambit usufructuary mortgages created before the Act of 1938. The provision that usufructuary mortgages other than complete usufructuary mortgages would have no force or effect was omitted from sub-s. (4) but reenacted in sub-s.(1) in slightly different language, with the addition of the words, "entered into after the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1928", which had previously been implied. A new sub-section numbered (1a), was added and thereby it was enacted that "every usufructuary mortgage," entered into before the amending Act of 1928 and subsisting on the 1st August 1937, "shall be deemed to have taken effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage for the period mentioned in the instrument or fifteen years, whichever is less." Save for the portion transferred to sub-s. (1) and a proviso added at the end which is not here material, sub-s. (4) stood as it was, dealing with only complete usufructuary mortgages or usufructuary mortgages of other kinds. The next important sub-section added was sub-s. (5) which ran as follows: Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in any other law or in any contract, the consideration (with all interest thereon) for a complete usufructuary mortgage or another form of usufructuary mortgage deemed under sub-s. (1a) to have taken effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage, entered into by an occupancy raiyat in respect of his holding or a portion or share thereof shall be deemed to have been extinguished on the expiry of the period (a) mentioned in the instrument of the mortgage, or (b) of fifteen years, whichever is less, from the date of the registration of the instrument, or where there is no registered instrument, from the date of the mortgagee's entry into possession, and the mortgagor shall thereupon become entitled to possession of the mortgaged holding, and he may, if he is not forthwith given possession, apply to the Court or to a Revenue Officer to be restored thereto. 3. It will be seen at once that as regards complete usufructuary mortgages for a period less than fifteen years, the declaration made in sub-s. (1a) that they shall be deemed to have taken effect for the period mentioned in the instrument, or that made in sub-s. (5) that the consideration shall be deemed to have been extinguished on the expiry of the said period, was meaningless, since such result would follow from the terms of the mortgage itself. But nothing turns on that circumstance. More important is the fact that throughout the sub-section the section spoke only of complete usufructuary mortgages and usufructuary mortgages other than complete usufructuary mortgages. It was only certain usufructuary mortgages which were converted by sub-s. (1a) into complete usufructuary mortgages for fifteen years and similarly was sub-s. (5) limited to "a complete usufructuary mortgage or another form of usufructuary mortgage deemed under sub-s. (1a) to have taken effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage." Accordingly, it was held by this Court in a number of decisions that mortgages, other than usufructuary mortgages, were outside the purview of the section and mortgagors of anomalous mortgages could not claim its benefit or maintain an application under sub.s. (5), although possession of the mortgaged property might have been delivered to the mortgagee. 4. 4. It was presumably to meet the effect of these decisions that the section was further amended by Act 18 [XVIII] of 1940. Sub-s. (1a) which dealt with mortgages, to be deemed to have taken effect as complete usufructuary mortgages for fifteen years or less, if a shorter period was mentioned in the instrument, now provided that such mortgages would be every mortgage (including a mortgage by conditional sale) entered into by an occupancy raiyat in respect of his holding or of a portion or share thereof in which possession of land is delivered to the mortgagee- (a) which was so entered into before the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1928, and was subsisting on or after the 1st August 1937, or (b) which, being other than a usufructuary mortgage having under sub-s. (1) no force or effect, was so entered into after the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1928, and before the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1940, and was subsisting on or after the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy (Amendment) Act, 1940. 5. The sub-section thus came to embrace, as regards mortgages executed before the Act of 1928, all mortgages accompanied by delivery of possession, whether complete usufructuary, or usufructuary but not complete usufructuary, or anomalous, provided they were subsisting on 1st August 1937; and as regards mortgages executed after the Act, 1928, it came to embrace all such mortgages whether complete usufructuary or anomalous provided they were executed before Act of 1940 and subsisting after the commencement of that Act. Usufructuary mortgages, other than complete usufructuary mortgages, executed after the Act of 1928, were not included under he second head, because under sub-s. (1) they were void. The anomaly of a statutory declaration that complete usufructuary mortgages for lease than fifteen years shall be deemed to have taken effect as such, remained. As regards other material amendments, sub-s.(4), it will be remembered, created a bar against registration of documents creating a complete usufructuary mortgage for more than fifteen years or a usufructuary mortgage other than a complete usufructuary mortgage. Anomalous mortgages were not added to the list in the following language: (c) a mortgage of such holding, portion or share (other than a complete usufructuary mortgage or a usufructuary mortgage referred to in clause (a) in which possession of land is delivered to the mortgagee. 6. Anomalous mortgages were not added to the list in the following language: (c) a mortgage of such holding, portion or share (other than a complete usufructuary mortgage or a usufructuary mortgage referred to in clause (a) in which possession of land is delivered to the mortgagee. 6. Sub-s. (5), however, remained unalterd, so far as the material part is concerned and continued to speak of only "a complete usufructuary mortgage or another form of usufructuary mortgage deemed under sub-s. (1a) to have taken effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage." The question which has been referred to a Full Bench in the present case arises out of this circumstance and asks whether a mortgage by conditional sale of an occupancy holding, accompanied by delivery of possession, which is now covered by sub-section (1a) of section 26G, is also covered by sub-s. (5) and whether the mortgagor can have his remedy by an application thereunder. 7. The facts out of which the question has arisen may now be stated. The appellant, who was an under-raiyat without a right of occupancy, executed a Kat Kabala in respect of his holding in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents on 20th May 1920. Possession of the mortgaged property was delivered to the mortgagee who was to enjoy the usufruct, but the property was to be restored to the mortgagor on payment of the principal amount, if the same was paid by the Bengali year 1337 B. S. It is not now disputed that the transaction was not a sale with a condition of repurchase, but a mortgage by conditional sale and that since possession was delivered to the mortgagee, it was an anomalous mortgage. The mortgagor did not pay back the money but neither was the mortgage foreclosed and it is still subsisting. The amending Act, 18 [XVIII] of 1940, came into force on 9th January 1941. On 18th March following, the mortgagor made an application u/s 26G (5), praying for restoration of the property on the ground that the mortgage had been extinguished by operation of law. Apart from the question as to whether the transaction was a mortgage at all, the only objection raised by the mortgagee in the Courts below appears to have been that in the case of under-raiyats, section 26G, in so far as it related to mortgages other than complete usufructuary mortgages, was not applicable. Apart from the question as to whether the transaction was a mortgage at all, the only objection raised by the mortgagee in the Courts below appears to have been that in the case of under-raiyats, section 26G, in so far as it related to mortgages other than complete usufructuary mortgages, was not applicable. In any event, it was contended further, the section could not apply retrospectively on one anomalous mortgage of an under-raiyati-holding executed before the amendment of 1940. 8. The trial Court held that the whole of section 26G applied to under-raiyati holdings and applied retrospectively so far as the terms of the section provided and accordingly it allowed the application. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge differed and held that section 26G would not apply to the present case, both because the section, in its application to under raiyati holdings, was limited to complete usufructuary mortgages and because the amendment of 1940 would not operate retrospectively on mortgages of such holdings executed before its date. In the result, he dismissed the application. Neither Court went into the question as to whether the mortgagor, even assuming the provisions of section 26G applied to the mortgage, was entitled under the terms of sub-s. (5) to proceed by way of an application. Against this decision of the Subordinate Judge the mortgagor moved this Court in revision and obtained a rule, but he also preferred an appeal, apparently because some doubt was felt as to the appropriate form of his remedy. The rule and the appeal were directed to be heard together. 9. The case came to be heard by Mr. Justice Mitter and Mr. Justice Sharpe who dealt with it in the appeal. The learned Judges held that by the operation of the last part of section 49 (1) of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the whole of section 26G was attracted, to mortgages of under-raiyati holdings and accordingly, not merely complete usufructuary mortgages but all kinds of mortgages covered by the section would be governed by its provisions as they might stand at the date the section was invoked by a mortgagor. Since, in the present case, the amending Act of 1940 had come into force before the mortgagor's application was made, the mortgage could only take effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage for fifteen years by virtue of section 26G (1a), as last amended. Since, in the present case, the amending Act of 1940 had come into force before the mortgagor's application was made, the mortgage could only take effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage for fifteen years by virtue of section 26G (1a), as last amended. The learned Judges next proceeded to consider whether the mortgagor was entitled to obtain his remedy by an application under S. 26G (5) and held that he was, despite which the restricted language of the sub-section had not, in this respect, been amended when the scope of sub-section (1a) was enlarged in 1940. But previously, there had been a decision of a Division Bench in 47 C. W. N. 79 Saharaddin Dewan Vs. Altafuddin Ahmed and Others, AIR 1943 Cal 590 where it was held that although sub-s. (1a) applied to mortgages with possession which were not usufructuary mortgages, sub-s. (5) did not, and the remedy of the mortgagor in such cases would be to proceed by way of a suit under the general law. As the learned Judges in the present case were unable to agree in that view, they referred to a Full Bench the following two questions: (1) Whether a mortgagor, who had executed mortgage on his occupancy holding in the form of mortgage by conditional sale before the commencement of Act 4 [IV] of 1928 (B. C.) and which was subsisting on or after 1st August 1937, and had delivered possession to the mortgagee, is entitled to recover possession by an application under sub-s. (5) of Section 26G of the Bengal Tenancy Act. (2) Has that point been correctly decided in 47 C. W. N. 791 Saharaddin Dewan Vs. Altafuddin Ahmed and Others, AIR 1943 Cal 590 ? 10. In accordance with the rules of the Court the whole appeal as also the connected rule was directed to be laid before the Full Bench. Although the first question, as framed, is limited to the case of a mortgage by way of conditional sale, accompanied by delivery of possession, the answer to it must cover all mortgages with possession which are not usufructuary mortgages, either of the type described as a complete usufructuary mortgage or some other type. u/s 26G (5), the position of all such mortgages, whatever it may be, is the same. u/s 26G (5), the position of all such mortgages, whatever it may be, is the same. The ground upon which the learned Judges held that even in the case of such mortgages, the mortgagor could maintain an application under S. 26G (5), was that the sub-section did not merely lay down procedure but also contained a part of the substantive law enacted by the section and if anomalous mortgages were held to lie outside its ambit, two of the essential provisions required to give effect to sub-section (1a) in respect of such mortgages would be wanting. As respects anomalous mortgages, the latter sub-section would therefore be reduced to a nullity. According to the learned Judges, there was, outside sub-s. (4), no provision either in Bengal Tenancy Act or in any other law, under which such mortgages would be extinguished before the expiry of the term mentioned in the instrument and they observed that the starting point for the period of fifteen years to which the term of a mortgage was reduced under the section, could only be found in sub-s. (5). It could not be supposed that the Legislature had amended section 26G so as to bring anomalous mortgages within sub-s. (1a) and then rendered the amendment ineffective by leaving two essential provisions to a sub-section which had no room for such mortgages. The learned Judges observed that section 26G was a piece of 'parental' legislation and the ambiguous provisions occurring in it should be so construed as to advance the remedy. They held accordingly that the words "another form of usufructuary mortgage" in sub-s. (5) should be construed in a manner calculated to further the beneficent object of the sections and the true construction, in their view, would be "a form of mortgage when the mortgagee has been allowed by the mortgagor to enjoy the usufruct of the property." 11. Having regard to the frequency with which sub-s. (5) is resorted to by mortgagors and the undoubted advantages of an application over a suit, the question is certainly one of great practical importance. It is therefore essential that the correct procedure under the Act should be settled. Rules of interpretation of statutes have now reached such a condition that they themselves require to be interpreted. It is therefore essential that the correct procedure under the Act should be settled. Rules of interpretation of statutes have now reached such a condition that they themselves require to be interpreted. As applied in India, their source is, apart from the General Clauses Act, decisions of English Courts, rendered with reference to English statutes, but since the Privy Council itself applies those rules in interpreting Indian enactments, it is not open to anyone to say that they are not appropriate. Yet, two observations may be made. The primary object in interpreting a statute is always to discover the intention of the Legislature and in England the rules of interpretation, developed there, can be relied on to aid the discovery because those whose task it is to put the intention of the Legislature into language fashion their language with those very roles in view. Since framers of statutes couch the enactments in accordance with the same rules as the judicial interpreter applies, application of those rules in the analysis of a statute naturally brings up the intended meaning to the surface. It is at least doubtful whether in the case of framers of Indian statutes of the present times, specially of the Provincial Legislature the same assumption can always be made. 12. Be that as it may, even if English rules of interpretation have to be applied, there is another consideration which must be borne in mind in applying them. As will appear from a reference to any comprehensive treatise on the subject, as to any problem of interpretation, rules in completely opposite senses, sponsored by equally eminent authorities, can be found. Stated together, they appear incongruous; but if a little care is bestowed on examining them, it will appear that the different rules were formulated with reference to statutes of different times and to legislative practice of different kinds and also that they were formulated by Courts of different jurisdiction, acting with different judicial aims. All of them cannot be applicable today. All of them cannot be applicable today. A rule formulated in comparatively ancient times, in view of the extreme conciseness of ancient statutes, cannot properly be applied to the prolix enactments of modern legislatures: on the other hand, rules applied in days "when Acts were framed in harmony with the lax method of interpretation, contemporaneously prevalent", cannot properly be applied today; and again, it is not possible to countenance now the method of construction "according to the equity of the state" which Courts of Chancery at one time adopted in order to extract out of words meanings which no one else would find there. In deciding whether it is legitimate to adopt a particular rule of interpretation, one must have regard to the kind of statute with reference to which it was formulated, the Court which formulated it and the legislative practice of the time. There is otherwise the risk of being misled by conflicting rules. 13. The question in the present case is whether mortgages other than usufructuary mortgages can be held to be within the purview of section 26G (5) of Bengal Tenancy Act, although the words of the sub-section read in their ordinary sense, do not cover them. As dealt with by the referring Judges, the question raises three problems of interpretation. Is it open to a Court to supply what appears to be an omission in a statute? Can an expression, occurring in one part of a statute, be read in an enlarged sense by reference to another part? Is there a special rule regarding remedial statutes that they should be beneficially construed, even though it may entail some strain on the language? 14. On each of these questions, propositions, both in the affirmative and in the negative, can be found in the books. But if cases relating to modern statutes be examined the true rule, applicable today, will appear to be that the words of a statute are always supreme and effect must be given to them when the meaning is plain, whatever the consequences, except in one case. The one exception is the case of repugnance to another part such as makes that part void or frustration of the very part where the words occur, for, the rule of following the plain language must not be carried to the length of producing futility. The one exception is the case of repugnance to another part such as makes that part void or frustration of the very part where the words occur, for, the rule of following the plain language must not be carried to the length of producing futility. In such a case, a casus omissus can be supplied, or words read in an extended sense and, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the plain meaning of the words used in one part of a statute will nullify another part, other parts of the statute can properly be referred to. But mere injustice or inconvenience will not justify departure from the plain meaning, for such matters are for the Legislature, and not the Court, to consider, nor can other parts of a statute be drawn upon to the same extent as in days when statutes were not expressed in a number of separate sections. Where, however, the words are ambiguous or capable of a wider as well as a narrower meaning, that construction is to be adopted which promotes or accords with what appears from the preamble and other parts of the Act to be its object, but this is the rule for all statutes. Further than this, there is no special rule of beneficial construction, for statutes of a remedial character. 15. The Bengal Tenancy Amendment Acts are modern statutes expressed in unusual amplitude of language and making provision for the matters legislated upon with a great deal of particularity. They curtail existing rights in a most drastic manner. In construing S. 26G (5), the learned referring Judges have applied the rule of repugnance and applied it correctly, if we may say so with respect, on their view of the section. But we are unable to agree that the other rule they have applied is also applicable. There is no ambiguity in the words of the sub-section and consequently no valid reason to adjust them to what is supposed to be the relief intended to be given by the Act; and we do not think that any special rule of liberal construction can be applied to a piece of modern legislation although it may be of the parental type. It is certainly a sound principle that in construing a statute, the Court should have some measure of freedom and, concurrently, some feeling of responsibility for the justice of its decision, but the limits of the freedom are as we have indicated. 16. In the present case, if the right of the mortgagor to maintain an application for restoration of the mortgaged property can be found at all, it must be in the expression "another form of usufructuary mortgage deemed under sub-s. (1a) to have taken effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage." The quaintness of the phrase "another form" may be overlooked and it may be assumed that it is the draftsman's English for "any other form". But the question is whether it may also be inferred that the Legislature intended the expression we have quoted to cover all mortgages, whether strictly usufructuary or not, under which the mortgagee was given possession of the property to enjoy its usufruct. 17. In our opinion, such inference is not possible. The history of the amendment of 1940, which we have outlined above, shows that the Legislature was aware of anomalous mortgages with possession as distinguished from usufructuary mortgages and indeed was amending the section in 1940 with the single object of making provision therein for mortgages of the former class. In the section itself, both in sub-s. (1a) and sub-s. (4) such mortgages are mentioned as a distinct class side by side with complete usufructuary mortgages and usufructuary mortgages of other types. If yet the Legislature did not add the new class in sub-s. (5), but left the language there to stand at "complete usufructuary mortgage or another form of usufructuary mortgage", it is impossible to hold that so far as sub-s. (5) was concerned, it intended the expression "usufructuary mortgage" to connote both usufructuary and anomalous mortgages. The principle laid down by Blackburn J. in the old case, (1864) 4 B. & S. 927 R. v. Cleworth (1864) 4 B. & S. 927 : 9 L. T. (N. S.) 682 : 12 W. R. 375 p. 934, would apply with greater force to a modern statute, carefully and elaborately expressed. If it appears that the class or thing which it is sought to bring within the Act, was known to the Legislature at the time when the Act was passed it must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 18. If it appears that the class or thing which it is sought to bring within the Act, was known to the Legislature at the time when the Act was passed it must be held to have been omitted intentionally. 18. Can the omission be taken to be a case of mere oversight? There is, as already pointed out, the extreme doctrine that if on the plain language of a statute there is an omission, even if it may appear to have been caused by an oversight, the consequences are for the Legislature and not the Court to consider. But assuming that in a case of an undoubted oversight, an omission may be supplied, the present, clearly, is not such a case. The section contains a provision in sub-s. (2) where the Legislature undoubtedly intended to provide for all kinds of mortgages with possession and that sub-section shows what language the Legislature adopted when such was its intention. The language in sub-(2) is "a complete usufructuary mortgage or a mortgage referred to in sub-s. (1a)" and it is significant that this phrase was inserted by the amendment of 1940. It was not, however, substituted for the old phrase in sub-s.(5), although that sub-section was amended in certain other respects. Again, it appears from sub-s. (8) that so far as mortgages by conditional sale with possession are concerned the Legislature was particularly conscious of their existence as a separate class and was making certain special provisions with regard to them. In these circumstances, it is impossible to hold that the omission to include in sub-s. (5) the residuary class of mortgages included in sub-ss. (1a), (2) and (4) was due to an oversight. 19. There is yet another circumstance which points to the conclusion that the omission was intentional. Sub-s. (5) was inserted by the amendment of 1938 and was not as regards the material part altered in any way by the amendment of 1940. (1a), (2) and (4) was due to an oversight. 19. There is yet another circumstance which points to the conclusion that the omission was intentional. Sub-s. (5) was inserted by the amendment of 1938 and was not as regards the material part altered in any way by the amendment of 1940. Before the latter amendment, the language of sub-S. (1a) was "every usufructuary mortgage" and the language of sub-s. (5) was as it stands now, viz., "a complete usufructuary mortgage and another form of usufructuary mortgage, etc." With reference to S. 26G as it stood after the amendment of 1938, it was held by this Court in a series of decisions that mortgages with possession which were not usufructuary mortgages, properly so called, did not come within its ambit and the mortgagor was not entitled under sub-s. (5), read with sub-s. (1a), to make an application for restoration of the mortgaged property. It is true that the specific question as to whether an application is maintainable was not considered or decided but that, in our opinion, is immaterial, since there was the basic decision that anomalous mortgages were not within the purview of the sub-section at all. In one of the earliest cases, 44 C. W. N. 465 Panchanan Mandal and Another Vs. Sashi Bhusan Pradhan and Others, AIR 1940 Cal 281 , sub-s. (5) was expressly referred to and quoted in extense. Yet the Legislature, while amending sub-s. (1a), did not make any corresponding amendment of sub-s. (5) and must, therefore, be deemed, according to a well-known rule, to have accepted the construction put by the Court on the latter sub-section and elected to leave it as not providing for anomalous mortgages. There can be no question that before the amendment of 1940, the expression "another form of usufructuary mortgage deemed under sub-s. (1a) to have taken effect as a complete usufructuary mortgage " occurring in sub-s. (5) could not have comprised anomalous mortgages, for, in sub-s. (1a) only usufructuary mortgages were then mentioned. The view that the same expression, left by the Legislature in the same state after notice of the construction put upon it, must now be taken as intended to bear a wider meaning appears to us to be plainly not tenable. 20. The view that the same expression, left by the Legislature in the same state after notice of the construction put upon it, must now be taken as intended to bear a wider meaning appears to us to be plainly not tenable. 20. But are all these considerations overborne by any repugnancy resulting from the words being taken in their ordinary meaning or by reduction of any other part of the section to a nullity? We think not. It is not correct to say that outside sub-s. (5), there is no provision under which a mortgage could be deemed to have been extinguished before the expiry of the period mentioned in the instrument. Sub-s. (1a) itself contains such a provision. That sub-section provides that the mortgages mentioned therein should be deemed to have taken effect as complete usufructuary mortgages for the period mentioned in the instrument or fifteen years, whichever is less, and the definition of complete usufructuary mortgage', as contained in S. 3 (3), is to the effect that it is a mortgage under which both the loan and the interest thereon are extinguished by the profits arising from the land during the period of the mortgage. The effect of the two provisions, read together, is that the mortgages mentioned in sub-s. (1a) will be extinguished on the expiry of fifteen years, although the period mentioned in the instrument may be longer and in order that that incident may attach to the mortgages, application of sub-s. (5) is not necessary. It is true, however, that a starting point for the period of fifteen years is provided for in sub-s. (5) in order to give effect to the provision with regard to them, contained in sub-s. (1a). 21. Usufructuary or other mortgages for a specified term are known to the Transfer of Property Act as well, but absence of a statutory starting point has never caused any difficulty in the computation of the period. It may be pointed out that section 26G itself was without any provision regarding the starting point till 1938 and computation of a period of fifteen years might even then be found necessary in a case, although there was no question then of any application under sub-s. (5). It may be pointed out that section 26G itself was without any provision regarding the starting point till 1938 and computation of a period of fifteen years might even then be found necessary in a case, although there was no question then of any application under sub-s. (5). It is clear therefore that as regards mortgages not covered by sub-s. (5), the period may be computed according to general principles and there is no compelling reason to find room for anomalous mortgages in sub-s. (5) in order to make a computation of the period possible in their case. Indeed, if the language of the section is to be added to or read in an enlarged sense, the starting point mentioned in sub-s. (5) can be held to be implied in sub-s. (1a) as well, with at least as much propriety as it can be held that another form of usufructuary mortgage includes forms of mortgage not usufructuary. 22. There is a last consideration which inclines us to the view that a mortgage of the type mentioned in the first question referred to a Full Bench is not intended to be covered by sub-s. (5). It is a mortgage by conditional sale under which possession of the mortgaged property is also delivered to the mortgagee. With regard to such mortgages the section makes a special provision in sub-ss. (8) to (10). It is not necessary for us to decide finally whether, if sub-s. (5) covers mortgages by conditional sale, that sub-s. and sub-s. (8) can stand together on any possible view, but it is at least significant that for like relief, the mortgagor is directed by sub-s. (8) to bring a suit and not make an application and, further, that a starting point is provided for the period of fifteen years after which the mortgagee also may bring a suit. The right given to the mortgagee is that notwithstanding anything contained elsewhere in the Act-and, therefore, notwithstanding anything contained in sub-s. (1a) under which the mortgage is to be deemed to be extinguished after fifteen years-he may bring a suit, after the expiry of fifteen years from the date of the instrument, for a declaration that hie mortgage has not in fact been extinguished by the profits. The implication clearly is that the fifteen years, in the case of such mortgages, is fifteen years from the date of the instrument. The implication clearly is that the fifteen years, in the case of such mortgages, is fifteen years from the date of the instrument. Sub-s. (8) shows further that although a mortgage by conditional sale, accompanied by delivery of possession, is to be extinguished only after the period of fifteen years under sub-s. (1a), the mortgagor is given a special right to prove even before fifteen years that it has in fact been already extinguished by the profits; and because he is given this special right, the Legislature may well have intended that the remedy of an application, given to other mortgagors, should not be given to him, but he must bring a suit to enforce his right under sub-s. (1a), even as he must do to enforce his right under sub-s. (8). In any event, the sub-section provides a starting point for the computation of the period of fifteen years in the case of mortgages by conditional sale and there is thus no necessity to force such mortgages into sub-s. (5) for the purpose of getting a starting point. 23. It may be said that sub-s. (8) only covers mortgages by conditional sale subsisting at the commencement of the amending Act of 1940 and does not also meet the case of anomalous mortgages which are not mortgages by conditional sale. As regards the first objection, it will be enough to say that since sub-s. (8) does not mention the limits as to the date of the commencement of the mortgage which are mentioned in sub-s. (1a), it covers all mortgages by way of conditional sale in respect of which relief can possibly be required after the amendment of 1940. We must dissent altogether from the view expressed by Henderson, J. in 48 C. W. N. 571 Mohendra Nath Haldar v. Mahendra Nath Sardar ('44) 31 AIR 1944 Cal. 1305 : 48 C.W.N. 571, that the word 'subsisting' in sub-s. (8) means subsisting under the fifteen years' rule. It means, as it obviously does in the other sub-sections, subsisting under the ordinary law, not having been foreclosed or redeemed or in the case of usufructuary mortgages the period not having expired. As regards the second objection, we have already pointed out that the period can be computed as in the case of mortgages governed by the Transfer of Property Act. As regards the second objection, we have already pointed out that the period can be computed as in the case of mortgages governed by the Transfer of Property Act. For the reasons given above, we are of opinion that there are no valid grounds for reading sub-s. (5) in a wider sense than the language in its ordinary connotation bears, but on the other hand there are strong reasons why it should not be so read. The sub-section is perfectly workable as it stands and no repugnancy to any other sub-section results, if the words are read in their natural sense. Nor is any part of the section rendered ineffective. The answer to the first question referred must therefore, be in the negative and that to the second question in the affirmative. 24. These answers are quite sufficient for the disposal of the case, for, on the view we have taken, the application made by the mortgagor u/s 26G (5) must be dismissed, even if be has a right under sub-s. (1a). The Division Bench has held that he has such right, although he is an under-raiyat without a right of occupancy and the mortgage is an anomalous mortgage, executed before the amendment of 1940. As already stated, this finding has been arrived at on the view that by virtue of the last part of section 49 (1), the whole of section 26G applies to under-raiyata in respect of all kinds of mortgages in the same manner as it applies to raiyats with an occupancy right and that the section, as it might stand at the date of the mortgagor's application, would apply. It is on this view that the main question referred to a Full Bench has been framed in terms of an occupancy holding. The respondent challenged this finding of the Division Bench before us, but did not advance any argument. If the effect of S. 49 (1) be to make the whole of section 26G applicable to under-raiyats in respect of all kinds of mortgages, we agree with the Division Bench that amendments made in the section from time to time would automatically apply to them and an application made by an under-raiyat after the amendment of 1940 in respect of an anomalous mortgage would be governed by the section as it then stood, although the mortgage might have been executed before the amendment. 25. 25. But we should not be prepared, without further consideration, to accept the view that the effect of S. 49 (1) is to make S. 26G applicable to under-raiyats even in respect of mortgages other than complete usufructuary mortgages. Prima facie, it appears to us that if s. 49 (1) was intended to have the wide effect attributed to it, it would have been quite sufficient to enact only the last part of the sub-section and enactment or a specific provision regarding complete usufructuary mortgages in the first part was wholly unnecessary. It also appears to us that the words 'so far as may be', occurring in the section, cannot be disregarded; nor can the true meaning of the section be ascertained without considering S. 48G (2) (i), as amended in 1938. However, as there was no argument before us on this question, we do not think it would be proper for us to decide it. We would only direct that it will remain open. 26. It is true that even by giving this direction, we are interfering with the finding of the Division Bench on a question not referred to us. But the power of a Full Bench to deal with questions decided by the referring Judges but not referred, seems clear, in cases where the whole appeal or revision case is referred. Were it otherwise, the Full Bench, after answering the question referred, would be bound to decide the case in accordance with the other findings of the referring Judges which they might or might not consider right and where they considered them to be wrong, they would be bound to give a decision which they themselves thought erroneous. Such a position is not statable. An illustration of exercise by the Full Bench of the power of interfering with findings on questions not referred will be found in 28 C. L. J. 304 Purna Chandra v. Chandray Moni Dasi ('17) 4 AIR 1917 Cal. 520 : 33 I.C. 49 : 23 C. L. J. 304 (F. B.). In the result the questions referred to a Full Bench are answered as indicated above. The appeal is dismissed and the rule discharged, but each party will bear its own costs throughout. Biswas, J. 27. I agree. Blank, J. 28. I agree.