JUDGMENT Madeley and Walford, JJ. - This is a reference u/s 66(l) of the Indian Income Tax Act on an application by the Assessee Rani Subhadra Devi Sahiba of Khairagarh Raj, district Kheri, Rani Subhadra Devi has died and Raja Bikram Shah has been brought on the record as her legal representative. 2. The income tax Officer had included certain items of revenue in computing the total income of the Assessee for the year 1941-42 to which the Assessee objected as being revenue derived from land which was used for agricultural purposes and which is Assesseed to land revenue within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the income tax Act and was therefore exempt from assessment to income tax u/s 4(3)(viii): The items in dispute were: (i) Sale of catechu Rs. 5,095. (ii) Kah-charai: dues paid for grazing wild grass Rs. 3,355. (iii) Sale of Narkul Jalkar thin reeds growing on the banks of a river Rs. 1,485. (iv) Sale of forest timber Rs. 6,850. (v) (a) Sale of grass and plus (thatching straw), jhau (a kind of shurb growing on the banks of a river). (b) Income from bhang (rent paid to Assessee by persons holding a license for taking settlement of bhang plants) Rs. 1,755. (vi) Sale bf mango, imli and katbal fruits Rs. 1,419. 3. The income tax Officer came to the conclusion that the receipts in question were taxable as the land from which the income was derived was not used for agricultural purposes, even though it was assessed to land revenue. The decision of the income tax Officer was affirmed by the Appellate Assistant Commissioner, and upon a further appeal to the income tax Appellate Tribunal the decisions of the income tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Commissioner were upheld. 4. Being dissatisfied the Assessee made an application to the income tax Appellate Tribunal to make a reference to this Court u/s 66(1) of the income tax Act. 4. Being dissatisfied the Assessee made an application to the income tax Appellate Tribunal to make a reference to this Court u/s 66(1) of the income tax Act. The question formulated by the Tribunal and referred to this Court is whether in the circumstances of the present case income from the sale of (i) catechu, (ii) Kahcharai, (iii) Narkul Jaikar, (iv) forest timber, (v) (a) grass and plus and (b) bhang, and (vi) fruits of mango, imli and kathal trees (all of which have grown on the land naturally and spontaneously arid without the intervention of any human agency), even if such land is assessed to land revenue, is 'agricultural income' within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the income tax Act and as such exempt from income tax u/s 4(3)(viii) of the Act. 5. The appellate Tribunal in deciding the appeal has relied upon principles laid down in a number of decisions of various High Courts for the proposition that the items in dispute, being of wild and spontaneous growth did not come within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the income tax Act, and were consequently assessable to income tax and we are of the opinion that the conclusions at which the Tribunal has arrived are correct. 6. It is now settled law that forest trees, or the income from gale of forest trees, or fruit from trees which are of spontaneous growth, on land, even it it is assessed to land revenue is not income from land used for agricultural purposes, 7. In Srimad Jagatguru Sringeri Satchidananda Chandasekhara Bharati Swamigal v. C.P. Duraiswami Nairfa (1931) 54 Mad. 900, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that growing trees for fuel is not an agricultural purpose so as to make a person, who holds the land for that purpose, a raiyat within the meaning of the income tax Act. In this case Reilly, J. observed, and which observation has been quoted with approval by a Bench of this Court, to which we shall presently refer, as follows: If we take the strict meaning of 'agriculture' according to its derivation, it means the cultivation of a field, the cultivation of an open space as opposed to horticulture, the cultivation of a comparatively small enclosed space. But the planting of timber or fire wood trees which are to stand on land for a considerable number of years, forming plantations, or woods or f. rests appears tome to be opposed to the idea of agriculture, the cultivation of an open space. It is true that for the purpose of growing trees in a plantation it may be necessary first to prepare the land. Later on it may be necessary to protect and water the plants. Still later it may be necessary to thin out the plantation. But when the land is covered with trees which have to stand on it for a number of years. sometimes as long as a century, during most of which period the land itself is untouched, to describe that as agriculture appears to me inappropriate. To my mind it seems to be different from the cultivation of a field or of open space. 8. The next case referred to by the Appellate Tribunal is The Commissioner of income tax, Madras v. T. Manavedan Tirumaipad Senior Rajah of Nilambur (1931) 54 Mad. 21, wherein a Special Bench held that: The amounts received by the owner of unassessed forest lands, by the sale 0f timber trees thereon, are income liable as such to income tax. 9. In the Province of Bihar v. Maharaj Pratap Udai Natt Sahai Deo of Ratugarh 1941 ITR 313, which was a decision by a Special Bench of the Patna High Court, Harries, C.J., made the following observations: It appears that this head of income was derived from virgin jungles or jungle land not actually cultivated. A few forest guards appear to have employed to protect the property, but it cannot be said that the trees have grown as the result of cultivation. They appear to have grown naturally in the jungles without the intervention of human agency, and in my view the growth of these trees cannot be said to result from the cultivation of the soil. In fact, it was the absence of cultivation that permitted the area to develop into a jungle. 10. Similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party. In H.H. The. In fact, it was the absence of cultivation that permitted the area to develop into a jungle. 10. Similar view was taken by a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a party. In H.H. The. Maharaja of Kaputlhala v. The Commissioner of income tax 1945 O.A. 179 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 179 : 1944 O.W.N. 433, After reviewing the case law exhaustively the Bench of this Court held that Income from the sale of forest trees of spontaneous growth growing on land which is assessed to land revenue, is not agricultural income within the meaning of Section 2(1)(a) of the income tax Act and is not exempt from income tax u/s 4 (2)(viii) of the Act. 11. We may also refer to Special Manager, Court of Wards, Majgawan Estate, Gonaa v. The Commissioner of Income tax 1945 O.A. 62 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 62 : 1944 O.W.N. 451 which was decided on the same principle. 12. In view of the decisions cited above it can no longer be argued that income from sale of trees of spontaneous growth comes within the definition of agricultural income or income from land used for agricultural purposes 13. With regard to the other items in dispute, which are also of spontaneous growth, the principles laid down in the above authorities relating to forest trees of spontaneous growth are applicable with equal force. In Keshava Prasad Singh v. Shri Pragas Ojha (1921). 44 All 19 a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the land used for the purpose of a grove was not land held for agricultural purpose. This decision was approved by this their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Keshava Prasad Singh v. Shri Pragash Ojha. (1924) 46 All 31. If therefore a grove in which mango, imli and katbal fruit trees usually grow, is not land held for agricultural purposes, it follows that income from the fruits of such trees in a grove is not agricultural income fortiori income from the fruits of trees of spontaneous growth cannot be held to be such income as to be exempt from income tax u/s 4(3)(viii) of the income tax Act. 14. 14. The Learned Counsel for the applicant has strenuously contended that the grass growing on land, which is used by the agriculturists for grazing their cattle and which according to him forms part of agriculture, or phus and jhau which are used indirectly for agricultural purposes, the land upon which such grass or phus or jhau grow should be deemed to be land used to agricultural purposes. There is in our opinion a fallacy in this contention. If income from sale of commodities which agriculturists use in order to carry on the trade or business were to be included in the definition of agricultural income a large number of manufacturers and traders will necessarily be exempted from income tax. For example, the manufacturers of implements of husbandry and innumerable other manufacturers and traders, who cater for agriculturists, would claim exemption from income tax on the ground that the commodities, they produce and sell to agriculturists are agricultural income. We have given these examples to show the absurdity to which the question can be reduced, the Learned Counsel has attempted to draw a distinction between sale of grass and the income derived from grazing dues, but we are unable to see any difference between the two. In an unreported case: Rani Tara Kumari Devi, Majhgain Estate, District Kheri v. The Commissioner of income tax, U.P., C.P. and Berar, Luck-now (Civil Reference tender income tax Act No. 5 1943) on a question: Whether income from the sale of forest trees and wild grass of spontaneous growth growing on land, which is assessed to land revenue, naturally and without the intervention 0n human agency, is 'agricultural income' within the meaning of Section 2(1) of the Income tax Act, and as such exempt from income tax u/s 4(3)(viii) of the Act 15. A Bench of this Court, to which one of us was a party, held that the income from sale of such grass did not come within the exemption provided by Section 4(3)(viii) of the income tax Act. As already observed we see no difference between the revenue derived by the sale of grass or by way of grazing dues. 16. Upon consideration of the authorities cited above we are of the opinion that none of the items in dispute in the present case are exempt from income tax and we answer the question referred to us accordingly. 17. 16. Upon consideration of the authorities cited above we are of the opinion that none of the items in dispute in the present case are exempt from income tax and we answer the question referred to us accordingly. 17. The Assesses will pay the costs of this reference. We fix the fee of the Learned Counsel for the Income Tax Department at Rs. 100.