JUDGMENT Verma, J. - The material facts are these. The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was filed by one Mt. Maryam Begam. A question as to deficiency in court-fee was raised by an Inspector of Stamps. Eventually, on 22-10-1943, a finding was recorded by the Court to the effect that there was a deficiency in court-fee to the extent of Rs. 785 and the plaintiff was ordered to make good this deficiency fey 4-11-1943. On 3-11-1943 the plaintiff applied that she might be permitted to give security to the satisfaction of the Court for payment of the deficiency in court-fee within such time as the Court might allow. This application was allowed on 10-11-1943 and the plaintiff was ordered to furnish security to the satisfaction of the Court by 18-11-1943 undertaking that the deficiency specified in the order passed on 22-10-1943 would be paid by the first date of final hearing which would be fixed on the date on which issues would be framed. The security was duly furnished. On 23-11-1943 issues were framed and 13th and 14th March 1944 were fixed for final hearing. Subsequently it transpired that the plaintiff, Mt. Maryam Begam, had in the meantime died and the present appellant, who is her son, applied to be brought on the record as plaintiff in his mother's place. This application was granted on 31-1-1944. Amendments in the pleadings of the parties followed and an additional issue was framed on 25-2-1944. On the same date, i.e., on 25-2-1944, the Court ordered that the new plaintiff must pay the court-fee, which had been found by the order of 22-10-1943 to be due, by the date fixed for final hearing. The suit came up for hearing on 13-3-1944 which, as already stated was the date fixed for the final hearing of the suit. It then transpired that the deficiency in court-fee had not been made good. The plaintiff's counsel stated that his client was absent and that he had no instructions. The suit came up for hearing on 13-3-1944 which, as already stated was the date fixed for the final hearing of the suit. It then transpired that the deficiency in court-fee had not been made good. The plaintiff's counsel stated that his client was absent and that he had no instructions. The Court thereupon recorded an order in which it made the following observations: "The deficiency of court-fee, as per the finding dated 22-10-1943 and the order dated 25-2-4944 has not been made good Section 6 (3), proviso, therefore applies," and concluded its order in the following words: "Suit dismissed with full costs to the contesting defendants from the plaintiff." On 16-3-1944 an application was filed on behalf of the appellant. This application purported to be under O. 9, R. 9, Civil P.C., and the prayer was that the dismissal of the suit be set aside. The Court below has dismissed that application and this appeal is directed against that order. 2. The contention raised on behalf of the appellant is that the order dismissing the suit passed on 13-3-1944 was, or at any rate must be treated as, an order passed under O. 9, R. 8, Civil P.C., and that, therefore, an appeal lies under O. 43, R. 1 of the Code. The argument on behalf of the respondents, on the other hand, is that that order was not under O. 9, R. 8, that consequently no application under O. 9, R. 9 was maintainable and that, therefore, no appeal lies from the order complained of. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant relies on the fact that the word used in the main paragraph of sub-s. (3), S. 6, Court-fees Act (as amended by the U.P. Provincial Legislature) is "reject" and the word used in the proviso to that sub-section is "dismiss", and argues that this shows that the intention of the Legislature was that, when the Court passes an order of dismissal under the proviso, the order should be taken to be an order of dismissal under O. 9, R. 8, Civil P.C. We are unable, however, to see any justification for this argument. In the first place, if that was the intention of the Legislature, it has certainly not indicated it, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication. In the first place, if that was the intention of the Legislature, it has certainly not indicated it, directly or indirectly, expressly or by implication. In the second place, the function of the Courts is to look at the plain language of the statute and to give it its plain meaning and not to speculate as to what might have been the intention of the Legislature. In the third place, the order of dismissal mentioned in O. 9, R. 8 of the Code is an order which is passed on account of the failure of the plaintiff to appear when the suit is called on for hearing, while the dismissal mentioned in the proviso to S. 6 (3), Court-fees Act is brought about by the failure of the plaintiff to make good a deficiency in court-fee for the payment of which the Court has permitted him to furnish security. We are unable, therefore, to accept the contention that the two dismissals must be treated as identical. 4. It may also be pointed out that the reason--if it is necessary to search for a reason - for the difference in the words used in the main paragraph and the proviso to S. 6 (3), Court-fees Act may be this. The main paragraph deals with a case where the plaintiff, who has been ordered to make good a deficiency in court-fee, has not asked for any latitude, whereas the proviso deals with a case where the plaintiff has asked for and has been allowed a concession in that he has been permitted to furnish security and thus gain time for the payment of the deficiency, and so the Legislature thought fit to use the stronger word in the proviso. Be that as it may, we are unable to see any reason for holding that the order passed on 13-3-1944 was an order under O. 9, R. 8, Civil P.C. That being so, the appellant had no right to apply under O. 9, R. 9. The decision of the Court below was therefore, correct and this appeal is not maintainable. 5. It is true that the plaintiff's counsel stated before the Court below that the plaintiff was absent but that cannot be relied upon in support of the argument that O. 9 of the Code was applicable. The decision of the Court below was therefore, correct and this appeal is not maintainable. 5. It is true that the plaintiff's counsel stated before the Court below that the plaintiff was absent but that cannot be relied upon in support of the argument that O. 9 of the Code was applicable. A plaintiff who is not prepared to make good the deficiency in court-fee, which he has been ordered to pay and for which he has been allowed to furnish security, cannot be allowed to nullify the proviso to S. 6 (3), Court-fees Act by failing to appear. For the reasons given above we dismiss this appeal with costs. Bind Basni Prasad J. 6. I concur with the view expressed by Hon'ble K. Verma J., and I desire to add a few words. There is a sharp distinction between the dismissal of a suit under the proviso to sub-s. (3), S. 6, Court-fees Act and that under O. 9, R. 8, Civil P.C. They contemplate different stages of the proceedings. The proviso to sub-s. (3), S. 6 does not contemplate the appearance or the non-appearance of the plaintiff on the date of the hearing. All that it is concerned with is the non-payment of the court-fee. If the deficiency in the court-fee is paid the suit will proceed, no matter whether the plaintiff is present or not. There can be no dismissal of a suit under the proviso to S. 6 (3), Court-fees Act if the requisite court-fee has been paid On the other hand, under O. 9, R. 8 a dismissal takes place only for non-appearance of the plaintiff ' irrespective of the fact that the court-fee has already been paid. This distinction should be prominently kept in view. 7. Section 6, Court-fees Act, as it stands at present, was enacted by the Provincial Legislature recently and along with it Ss. 6A, 6B and 6G were added. A perusal of these sections will show, they deal with a new subject which was not to be found in the old Court-fees Act. That new subject was the report of the Inspecting officers of the Stamp Department. Formerly such reports when they came before the Courts were accepted or rejected by the Courts and the authorities of the Stamp Department had no legal remedy open to them to question the findings of the Court on the reports. That new subject was the report of the Inspecting officers of the Stamp Department. Formerly such reports when they came before the Courts were accepted or rejected by the Courts and the authorities of the Stamp Department had no legal remedy open to them to question the findings of the Court on the reports. These sections now give a remedy to the authorities of the Stamp Department to question the findings of the Court on the reports and make the provisions stringent so that in the event of their reports being accepted the deficiency in court-fee might be made good. It is for this reason that in sub-s. (3), S. 6, Court-fees Act two provisions have been made. In the main sub-section there is the provision for the rejection of the plaint and in the proviso to that section there is a provision for an order of the dismissal of the suit. It will be seen that these provisions for the rejection of the plaint or the dismissal of the suit follow from the report of an officer mentioned in S. 24A, Court-fees Act and not from the report of the office of the Court. For the latter class of cases provision for rejection of the plaint is made in O. 7, R. 11, Civil P.C.