JUDGMENT Wali Ullah, J. - This is a defendant's appeal. It arises out of a suit for redemption of a usufructuary mortgage of a house executed on 1st December 1941, by Mt. Hajjan Hafizan, defendant 2, in favour of defendant l. It was for a sum of Rs. 6000. Subsequently, on 26th October 1942, the mortgagor sold the equity of redemption to the plaintiff Ganga Din. It appears that on 28th October 1942, the plaintiff applied to the Court for redemption under S. 83, T.P. Act, and thereafter actually deposited in Court Rs. 6000 on 1st November 1942. These proceedings, however, proved ineffectual inasmuch as the mortgagee did not accept the deposit and the application was dismissed on 30th January 1943. Thereafter the plaintiff instituted the present suit for redemption on March 1943, and he also claimed mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 60 per mensem. 2. The suit was contested on these grounds: (1) that the suit was premature, (2) that the defendant was entitled to costs of the repairs of the house to the extent of Rs. 186 and (3) that the defendant was entitled to be reimbursed in regard to the house tax and water tax paid by him in respect of the mortgaged house. Lastly (4) it was contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to mesne profits. 3. The learned civil Judge overruled the contention of the defendant that the suit was premature. He also found that the defendant had spent Rs. 184 in effecting the repairs of the house in question and this amount together with the stipulated interest at 9 per cent, per annum came to Rs. 186. On the issue relating to the amount claimed by the defendant under the head of house tax and water tax he was of opinion that the defendant could not be properly allowed anything up to 30th January 1943, when, according to the learned Judge, a legal tender was made by the plaintiff for payment of the entire sum due under the mortgage. But as he held the plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits from 30th January 1943, he allowed a deduction on account of taxes paid by the defendant for the period subsequent to 30th January 1943. This, according to him, came to Rs. 13-2-0 up to the date of the suit. But as he held the plaintiff was entitled to mesne profits from 30th January 1943, he allowed a deduction on account of taxes paid by the defendant for the period subsequent to 30th January 1943. This, according to him, came to Rs. 13-2-0 up to the date of the suit. In the result, therefore, the learned civil Judge decreed the claim for redemption on payment of Rs. 186 within a week of the date of the decision. He also decreed the claim for past mesne profits for Rs. 52-8-0 less Rs. 13-2-0 on account of taxes, i.e., Rs. 39-6-0. The claim for pendente lite and future mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 45 per mensem was also decreed. 4. Learned counsel for the defendant-appellant has strongly contended that there was no valid deposit or valid tender made by the plaintiff and consequently there was no cessation of interest running under the mortgage. He has contended in effect that the amount deposited under S. 83, T.P. Act, was less than the amount found due to the defendant-appellant. It was consequently not a valid deposit as required by law. It was, therefore, ineffective so far as the question of the cessation of interest is concerned. Next it has been contended that there was no valid tender either, inasmuch as the plaintiff never actually produced the amount for payment to the defendant-appellant. In view of the' finding recorded by the learned civil Judge that the defendant-appellant was entitled to Rs. 186 in addition to the principal sum of Rs. 6000 it is obvious that the deposit in Court of a sum of RS. 6000 only was not a proper deposit within the meaning of S. 83, T.P. Act. It would, therefore, not have the effect of stopping the running of interest thenceforward. 5. The question, however, whether there was a valid tender under S. 84 by the plaintiff stands on a very different footing. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. In the course of arguments learned counsel have referred us to a number of rulings. The learned Civil Judge has relied on two rulings of this Court: Muhammad Mushtaq Ali Khan and Others Vs. Banke Lal and Others, AIR 1920 All 204 and [Chetan Das v. Gobind Saran] ('14) 1 AIR 1914 All. 53 : 36 All. 139 : 22 I.C. 659. The learned Civil Judge has relied on two rulings of this Court: Muhammad Mushtaq Ali Khan and Others Vs. Banke Lal and Others, AIR 1920 All 204 and [Chetan Das v. Gobind Saran] ('14) 1 AIR 1914 All. 53 : 36 All. 139 : 22 I.C. 659. He has also referred to the case of V.R. Venkatarama Aiyar Vs. T. Gopalakrishna Pillai and Another, AIR 1929 Mad 230 In addition to these cases, in the course of arguments in this Court, reference has also been made to the case in Venkatarayanim Garu v. Venkata Subadrayamma Jagapathi, ('23) 10 AIR 1923 P.C. 26 : 46 Mad. 108 : 50 I.A. 41 : 71 I.C. 1035 (P.C.). We have examined these cases with care. In Muhammad Mushtaq Ali Khan and Others Vs. Banke Lal and Others, AIR 1920 All 204 a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court had to deal with a case where the mortgagors had sent a notice to the mortgagees offering to pay the mortgage money and asking for redemption but the money was not actually produced or tendered to the mortgagees. It was held in that case that there was no legal tender. On the facts of that case it was held : In the present case it is not stated that the money was actually produced or tendered to the defendants and redemption asked. Nor is it shown that the defendants waived their right of receiving the money and agreed to accept the notice in lieu thereof. In ('14) 1 AIR 1914 All. 53 : 36 All. 139 : 22 I.C. 659, which was followed in Muhammad Mushtaq Ali Khan and Others Vs. Banke Lal and Others, AIR 1920 All 204 it was held by two learned Judges of this Court that an offer by letter of the amount due on a mortgage is not a good tender within the meaning of S. 84, T.P. Act. It is necessary that the money should be actually produced unless it can be shown that the person entitled to receive the money has waived this condition. Similarly, in A. I. R. 1929 Mad. It is necessary that the money should be actually produced unless it can be shown that the person entitled to receive the money has waived this condition. Similarly, in A. I. R. 1929 Mad. 230,3 two learned Judges of the Madras High Court observed as follows: Where a party refuses to entertain the idea of payment from the tenderer at all and puts it out of his power to offer payment in a manner acceptable to the creditor, the offer of performance by a person able to carry out the promise in its entirety is a valid tender in spite of the form of it being itself not legal tender. Here the tender was by means of a cheque which the creditor declined to accept. He, however, did not merely object to the form of the tender, i.e., tender by cheque, but he refused point blank to accept payment altogether. Reference may also be made to the case of [Jotilal v. Fateh Bahadur], Joti Lal Sah Vs. Fateh Bahadur Shah and Others, AIR 1929 Patna 397 In that case a tender of the entire amount was made by the mortgagor and a request was made that the mortgagee should accept what was just on accounts being taken but the mortgagee not merely disputed the accounts but refused to make any account and instituted a suit. It was held that there was a valid tender and the mortgagee's conduct was such as not to entitle him to any interest accruing after the date of tender. In the recent case in AIR 1923 p. O. 26 it was held by their Lordships of the Privy Council that: If a mortgagee unequivocally refuses a proposed payment of the amount due, the mortgagor is not bound to make a formal tender of it, and the mortgagee cannot recover interest accruing subsequently, even if he proves that the mortgagor had not the money or the control of it. 6. Their Lordships of the Privy Council quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Wigram in [Hunter v. Daniel], ( (1845) 4 Hare 420 : 14 L.J. Ch. 6. Their Lordships of the Privy Council quoted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Vice-Chancellor Wigram in [Hunter v. Daniel], ( (1845) 4 Hare 420 : 14 L.J. Ch. 194 at p. 428: The practice of the Courts is not to require a party to make a formal tender where from the facts stated in the bill or from the evidence it appears the tender would have been a mere form and that the party to whom it was made would have refused to accept the money. It would appear that even in England where the rule in regard to tender was more rigid than in Indian law the old rule that the money should be actually produced and shown to the creditor, for though the creditor may at first refuse, yet the sight of the money may tempt him to take it, has now become obsolete. If the debtor is ready to produce the money and offers to pay it, and the creditor dispenses with production at the time, that is sufficient. 7. In the light of the authorities referred to above, we have to see what happened in the present case which, according to the plaintiff, amounted to a legal tender. While the application under S. 83 was pending, it appears that the plaintiff offered to pay the amount to the defendant-mortgagee in respect of cost of repairs and interest thereon. The mortgagee, however, refused to accept the money and to redeem the mortgage substantially on the ground that the mortgage was not redeemable before the expiry of three years. This is clear from two documents on the record : Paper No. 67-C which records a statement made by the Vakil for the mortgagor on 30-1-1943, and paper No. 68-C which contains a statement made by the Vakil of the mortgagee-defendant appellant on the same date. It is obvious, therefore, that the mortgagee must be deemed to have waived the condition of the actual production of the money when he insisted that he would not accept it and went further and denied the plaintiff's right to redeem the mortgage before the expiry of three years. It is obvious, therefore, that the mortgagee must be deemed to have waived the condition of the actual production of the money when he insisted that he would not accept it and went further and denied the plaintiff's right to redeem the mortgage before the expiry of three years. The finding of the learned Civil Judge, therefore, that there was a legal tender on 30-1-1943 and as the mortgagee refused to accept it he is not entitled to get any interest for the period subsequent to that date is quite correct. 8. In the result, therefore, we are of opinion that there is no force in the contentions of the learned counsel and the appeal is accordingly dismissed with costs.