ORDER Allsop, Ag. C.J. 1. I have before me a number of references by the Sessions Judge of Shahjahanpur. They are Nos. 1229 to 1252 of 1945 inclusive. They are cases of men who have been convicted of contraventions of cl. 14, Cotton Cloth and Yam (Control) Order, 1943, and who have been sentenced to various fines not exceeding Rs. 200. Some of the persons convicted were found in possession of unmarked cloth. In their cases the learned Judge has suggested that the conviction should be set aside because there is no evidence on the record that the cloth was manufactured before 31-7-1943. This was not a point that was raised in the applications in revision made to the learned Judge nor was the point raised in the trial Court. I have been through the records of the various cases. The accused either pleaded guilty or admitted that they knew that the cloth had to be sold before 3112-1944. It was never suggested by any of them that the cloth was manufactured after 31-7-1943. The Inspector who recovered the cloth was examined as a witness. In one case he said that all cloth manufactured after 31-7-1943, was not issued from the mills unless it was marked according to the rules with what is known as a Tex Mark. In other cases he merely said that the cloth had to be sold before 31-12-1944. There was at least prima facie evidence that the cloth could not have been manufactured after 31-7-1943, and no attempt was made to rebut this evidence even by way of an allegation. There is certainly no reason to interfere in revision upon the ground that there was no positive evidence in each case that the cloth was manufactured before 31-7-1943. On the general evidence the assumption could be made and nobody ever suggested that the cloth was manufactured after 31-7-1943. 2. In the other cases the learned Judge has suggested that the fines should be reduced to Rs. 5 each. He seems to have been under the impression that the persons found in possession of the cloth had been harshly treated because their shops were raided on 1-1-1945. His idea was that the persons concerned could not have got rid of the cloth which they had not happened to sell the day before. 5 each. He seems to have been under the impression that the persons found in possession of the cloth had been harshly treated because their shops were raided on 1-1-1945. His idea was that the persons concerned could not have got rid of the cloth which they had not happened to sell the day before. My attention has been drawn to the decision of the Nagpur High Court in AIR 1945 249 (Nagpur) In so far as the learned Judges have held that persons charged with a contravention of cl. 14 of the Order should not be convicted for being in possession of cloth against the provisions of the order if they had a lawful excuse for such possession. I agree with them, but in these cases no attempt was made to prove by any evidence that the persons concerned could not have got rid of the cloth if they wanted to do so. There were mere allegations in most of the cases that that was the fact, but no witnesses were called. On the other hand, in so far as the learned Judges of the Nagpur High Court have held that cl. 15 of the Order to all intents and purposes repealed Cl. 14, I cannot, with the greatest respect, agree with them. I cannot believe that the order intended to say in cl. 14 that a person should not be in possession of cloth of a certain kind and then in cl. 15 that he might legally be in possession of it. It seems to me that these clauses read together clearly mean that no person is to be in possession of any kind of cloth unless the Textile Commissioner allows such person to be in possession of cloth of some kind on certain conditions. I do not think that it can be inferred if no conditions are imposed by the Textile Commissioner that a person can be in possession of cloth unconditionally in contravention of the provisions of cl. 14 I think if the Textile Commissioner imposes conditions, then anybody who complies with the conditions can be in possession of cloth but if no conditions are imposed, then nobody can be in possession of cloth at all. If Cl. 15 was intended to mean that any person could be in possession of cloth but that the Textile Commissioner could impose conditions, then cl. If Cl. 15 was intended to mean that any person could be in possession of cloth but that the Textile Commissioner could impose conditions, then cl. 14 would be completely superfluous. 3. The learned Judge has remarked that the pieces of cloth which were found in the shops of the various men concerned in these cases were of such a kind that there was no great demand for them and he has, therefore, assumed without going into the details in any particular case that the accused really could not dispose of them. This seems to me to be a wide assumption. They were not bound to keep these things till 31-12-1944. If they thought that there was no great demand for cloth of this kind they could have reduced the prices or held an auction or in the last resort have given the things away. That would have been of no great hardship if the things in fact could not be sold. A great deal of the learned Judge's order is directed to a criticism of the order. It is not in my judgment the business of a Court to question the policy of the law. Its business is to enforce the law such as it is. In these cases these men were required not to be in possession of cloth and they were found to be in possession of it. Therefore they were guilty of a contravention of the clause. A good deal of emphasis was laid on the fact that the order did not give any direction for the disposal of the cloth which had not been sold. That is not a matter for the Court. It was enjoined upon the persons accused not to be in possession of cloth and it was their business to discover how they were to dispose of the cloth. The learned Judge seems to have had a good deal of sympathy with the persons accused, but he has perhaps overlooked the fact that these provisions are made for the benefit of the people of the country and undue sympathy with those who contravene the provisions of an order of this nature may lead to considerable inconvenience to the people at large. In my judgment there is no sufficient reason to interfere with the sentences of fine. In my judgment there is no sufficient reason to interfere with the sentences of fine. The learned Magistrate has graded the sentences quite reasonably in consideration of the status of the accused and the nature of the cloth recovered. Rules of this kind are easy to evade and the Courts should enforce the rules with a certain strictness in order to prevent the hoarding of cloth and the sale of it in black markets. I think it would be a pity if cloth dealers were under the impression that any contravention of the rules by them would be treated with leniency. 4. I may mention that it was suggested that the publication of the Order in the Government Gazette was not a proper publication within the provisions of R. 119 of the rules made under the Defence of India Act, but that question does not arise in these cases because none of the accused persons suggested for a moment that he was not aware of the existence of the order. Most of them admitted that they knew that cloth had to be sold before 31-12-1944. I reject the references.