JUDGMENT Allsop, Ag. C.J. 1. This is a second appeal against a decree of the Civil Judge of Jhansi. The suit which has given rise to the appeal was instituted in the Court of an Assistant Collector of the first class in Jhansi by the appellant, Seth Baghubar Dayal, in order to obtain the ejectment of Panna Lal and others from certain agricultural plots upon the ground that the plaintiff was the lambardar of the Mahal in which the plots lay and that the defendants were trespassers. Panna Lal claimed to be in possession as a cosharer in the mahal. The other defendants alleged that Panna Lal was alone in possession and that they were not in possession at all. The learned Assistant Collector framed an issue upon the question of Panna Lal's proprietary title and sent it to the civil Court for decision. The decision was that Panna Lal was a cosharer in the mahal. The learned Assistant Collector seems in error to have thought that the finding was against Panna Lal and he passed a decree for ejectment. Panna Lal appealed to the Civil Judge who set aside the decree of the learned Assistant Collector and dismissed the suit. 2. The second appeal has been referred by two learned Judges of this Court to this Full Bench because of a difference of opinion upon a question of law between this Court and the Board of Revenue. The case of this Court in which the opinion was expressed was Sultan Ahmad Khan Vs. Jalaluddin and Another, AIR 1940 All 370 The question which arose in that case was whether a lambardar could sue a cosharer for ejectment in a revenue Court under the provisions of S. 44, Agra Tenancy Act, 1926. The decision of this Court was that he could not do so. The decision turned upon terms of S. 44 of the Act which in so far as they are relevant, are that a person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land without She consent of the landholder shall be liable to ejectment. The landholder as defined in that Act was the person to whom rent was payable. The decision turned upon terms of S. 44 of the Act which in so far as they are relevant, are that a person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land without She consent of the landholder shall be liable to ejectment. The landholder as defined in that Act was the person to whom rent was payable. This Court held that all the cosharers including the lambardar were landholders because the rent was ultimately payable to all of them in proportion to their shares in the mahal although the lambardar might, in some circumstances, have the right in the first instance to collect it. I do not think that it is necessary for us now to go into the question whether that decision was right, although I think that it was, The law is now contained in S. 180, United Provinces. Tenancy Act, 1939, which is not exactly in the same terms as S. 44 of the Act of 1926. The present' section is as follows: (1) A person taking or retaining possession of a plot or plots of land other wise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant shall be liable to ejectment under this section on the suit of the person so entitled, or when the joint consent of more than one person is required on the suit of any one or more of such persons, and also to pay damages, which may extend to four times the annual rental value calculated in accordance with the sanctioned rates applicable to hereditary tenants. (2) If no suit is brought under this section or a decree obtained under this section is not executed the persons in possession shall on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for such suit or for the execution of such decree, as the case may be, become a hereditary tenant of such plot or plots. 3. In my judgment this section is intended to apply to persons one of whom is on claims to be a landholder and the other of whom claims to be in possession as a tenant. I would draw attention to the words 'admit him as a tenant' in the first sub-section and to the whole of the second sub-section. 3. In my judgment this section is intended to apply to persons one of whom is on claims to be a landholder and the other of whom claims to be in possession as a tenant. I would draw attention to the words 'admit him as a tenant' in the first sub-section and to the whole of the second sub-section. We have been referred to the decision of the Board of Revenue in the case of [Tej Singh v. Khem Chand] (41) 1941 R.D. 110. It has always been held that cosharers in a mahal are in the same position as tenants-in-common in English law, that is, each cosharer has a share in every part of the mahal and each cosharer is entitled to use any part just as much as any other cosharer provided that he does not permanently exclude the other cosharers. If a cosharer takes permanent possession of a part of the land in such a way as to prevent other cosharers from making use of it, the remedy for the other cosharers is to obtain a decree against him for joint possession or for the removal of any constructions which he may have made which lead to their exclusion or to obtain a decree for partition. It is obvious that persons who agree to share any property or acquiesce in the sharing of it must have such relations with each other that they can amicably arrange for the use or enjoyment of that property by them all in a reasonable manner. If such relations do not exist the only course for them is to separate and partition the property. There is nothing in my judgment in the U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which disturbs the ordinary law about the relations of cosharers or tenants-in-common. In the absence of any definite statutory provision, I cannot hold that one of the cosharers, as a lambardar, is entitled to exclude all or other cosharers from the use of land by taking possession of it himself; nor would I hold in the absence of any such definite provision that the right of cosharers to use and enjoy land which is their common property should be the subject of decision in a Revenue Court. If we were to take the contrary view the logical result would be that all suits for possession against trespassers over land in Revenue mahals would lie under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, and that the jurisdiction of the civil Courts would be excluded. I may point out that a mahal is not an abstraction but an area of land and it would consequently follow that all suits against trespassers over land in a mahal except possibly over the village site would lie in the revenue Court, that is, that all suits about proprietary title in mahals or estates consisting of several mahals would be instituted, in the first instance, in the Revenue Court, although the actual question of proprietary title might be referred as an issue to the civil Court. It has never been understood that a dispute between two persons claiming proprietary title in a revenue mahal should be instituted in Revenue Courts. There is no logical distinction between isolated plots and the whole area of land in a mahal. Our attention has been directed to the provisions of S. 245, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, which defines the powers of lambardars and in particular to that part of the section which says that the lambardar is entitled to do all acts incidental to the proper management of the estate with a view to the common benefit. I do not think that this right of management extends to the ejectment by the lambardar of other cosharers from their khudkasht. We have considered the decision of the learned Members of Board of Revenue in the (sic) [Tej Singh v. Khem Chand. (41) 1941 R.D. 110 ] With reference to it I must say, in the first instance, that a proprietor who appoints an agent does not thereby lose his proprietary title. Consequently, although the lambardar may be the agent of the cosharers for certain purposes, he does not thereby become the sole proprietor go as to deprive them of their proprietary rights. I also do not see why the result of our decision should be that a lambardar is not entitled to collect rents in accordance with the statute in Certain circumstances. He would be entitled to collect the rents as the statutory agent of the other cosharerg. The cosharers might, by agreement, appoint same agent or attorney to collect rents on their behalf. He would be entitled to collect the rents as the statutory agent of the other cosharerg. The cosharers might, by agreement, appoint same agent or attorney to collect rents on their behalf. That would not mean that the agent or attorney would become the land holder or that he would acquire proprietary rights against the cosharers. In my judgment, where a question arises between cosharers, including among them the lambardar, about the manner in which the cosharers should use or enjoy the land, that is a question which would properly be decided by a suit in a civil Court and, in the last resort, if no satisfactory arrangement could otherwise be secured, by a suit for partition. 4. No question of jurisdiction has been raised in the case before us, but I certainly think that a lambardar is not entitled to eject one of the cosharers by means of a suit under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939. I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal. Verma, J. I concur. Wali Ullah, J. I agree. Sinha, J. I agree. Malik, J. 5. The facts have been fully set out in the judgment of the Hon'ble A.C.J. The point for decision in this case is whether a lambardar can bring a suit under S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, for ejectment of a cosharer who has taken possession of land which had been in the possession of certain tenants from which they had been ejected. In the case in Sultan Ahmad Khan Vs. Jalaluddin and Another, AIR 1940 All 370 a Full Bench of this Court had held that such a suit did not lie under S. 44, Agra Tanancy Act of 1926. Under that section a landholder could file a suit for ejectment of a person who had taken possession of the holding without the consent of the landholder. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that the above case is no longer good law us the language of S. 180, U.P. Tenancy Act, 1939, has been altered and now a suit for ejectment can be filed against a person who his taken possession of land otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force and "without the consent of the person entitled to admit him as tenant" at the instance of the person so entitled. Keliance is also placed on S. 245 of the Act which sets out the powers of the lambardar. The lambardar, in accordance with the provisions of that section is not only entitled to collect rents and other dues but is also entitled to settle and eject tenants. But it mast be remembered that he does all this on behalf of the entire body of cosharers. He is constituted an agent on their behalf and the cosharers do not cease to be cosharers and as such co-owners of the property merely because there is a lambardar. The U.P. Tenancy Act, as the other Tenancy Acts preceding it, was primarily intended to regulate the relations between landlords and tenants or persons wrongfully claiming to be tenants. The rights as between landlords inter, se are governed by certain stray provisions here and there, but there are no complete set of provisions governing relationship. A cosharer may no doubt, if he enters into a contract with the entire body of cosharers or with the lambardar as representing them, become a tenant of the body, though he as a cosharer is also a member of that body; but the tenancy in such a case (sic) only arise by contract. As regards any plot of land in the village, every cosharer (sic) got equal rights according to the extent or his share. If a cosharer peacefully takes possession of some land which is vacant, he does not thereby become either a tenant or a trespasser. If such land is cultivated by him, it may become his khudkasht as defined by S. 3, sub-s. (9) of the Act. Section 180 of the Act was intended to regulate the relations between landlords and tenants or persons wrongfully claiming to be tenants, but where a person is in possession of the holding as a proprietor or as a cosharer, no question of his ejectment under S. 180 as a trespasser can arise. 6. For the reasons given by me above and for the reasons given in the judgment of the Hon'ble Ag. C.J. with which I agree, I would dismiss the appeal with costs. The appeal is dismissed with costs.