This appeal arises out of a suit filed by the appellant for recovery of possession of about 5.5/6 grounds comprised in Re-survey No. 3155 situated in Kuttiappa Gramani Street, Madavakkam. The appellant’s case is that the suit plot belonged to the plaint temple, that one ground of it was originally leased out in 1904 to Ponnappa Naicken, that Ponnappa sold his leasehold interest to Ranganayaki Ammal, that Ranganayaki Ammal sold it to Munuswami Gramani, that in 1926 Munuswami Gramani sold it to Ponnuswami and that Ponnuswami’s lease was subsequently determined. The defendant was at first a mortgagee from Ponnuswami. Subsequently he obtained a mortgage decree and in execution of that decree purchased whatever rights Ponnuswami had in the property. The appellant further states that after terminating Ponnuswami’s tenancy the trustees took possession of the property and leased it out to third parties and that after the respondent purchased the property in execution of his mortage decree obtained against Ponnuswami, he threatened to interfere with the possession of the appellant’s tenants. This suit is therefore for a declaration that the respondent is not entitled to the suit site. There is also a prayer for possession of the property. The suit was at first decreed by the City Civil Judge but on appeal to this Court in C.C.C.A. No. 37 of 1942 the decree was set aside and the suit was remanded for disposal according to law. This time the City Civil Judge dismissed the suit for possession but granted a decree declaring the title of the appellant. The title of the appellant to the suit was found but the relief for possession was refused on the ground that the necessary three months’ notice provided by section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act (Madras Act III of 1922) was not given by the appellant and hence this appeal. There were also various other questions raised, some of which are discussed in the judgment of the lower Court. The appellant’s case is that the original lease was only of one ground and that the respondent is now in wrongful possession of 5-5/6 grounds. The main defence is that the property belonged absolutely to Ponnuswami and that the plaint allegation that Ponnuswami was a lessee of the land from the temple is not true. The appellant’s case is that the original lease was only of one ground and that the respondent is now in wrongful possession of 5-5/6 grounds. The main defence is that the property belonged absolutely to Ponnuswami and that the plaint allegation that Ponnuswami was a lessee of the land from the temple is not true. The alternative defence is that even if Ponnuswami was a lessee, the respondent was entitled to the benefit of the City Tenants Protection Act. There was a further plea that the title of the appellant was lost by adverse possession. From the documents it appears that in the sale deed by Ponnappa to Ranganayaki Ammal (Exhibit P-1 of 1918) the extent is mentioned as 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet. The same extent is mentioned in the sale deed by Ranganayakai Ammal to Munuswami Gramani (Ex. P-2). This is of the year 1921. In 1926 Munuswami sold the property in his turn to Ponnuswami. This is evidenced by Ex. D-i. In this document the boundaries are given and also the measurements on the four sides. The extent lying within these boundaries is not stated, but it is conceded that it works out at 5-5/6 grounds. The subsequent mortgage deed by Ponnuswami in favour of the defendant (Ex. P-5) also gives the boundaries and measurements on the four sides. On the same day as the mortgage there was a lease back by the defendant to Ponnuswami evidenced by Ex. D-5 and that document follows the description in Ex. P-5 and in Ex. D-1. The sale certificate issued to the defendant when he purchased the property in execution of his mortgage decree also gives the same. (Ex. D-6.) The City Civil Judge, who originally tried the suit, found that the tenancy was only of the extent covered by Exhibits P-1 and P-2, i.e., 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet (vide paragraph 35 of his judgment). In the present judgment the City Civil Judge does not give a definite finding whether the defendant was a tenant of only 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet or of 5-5/6 grounds. The Judge says that the plaint did not seek to make any difference between the 3 grounds and odd covered by Exhibits P-1 and P-2 and the rest of it. The Judge says that the plaint did not seek to make any difference between the 3 grounds and odd covered by Exhibits P-1 and P-2 and the rest of it. He says: “At one stage of the trial I thought that Ponnuswami Gramani should be deemed to be a tenant of 3 grounds and odd mentioned in Exhibits P-1 and P-2, and that in whatever expectation he was occupying the remaining extent of land, the defendant should be deemed to be a trespasser so far as that extra extent is concerned. But I found that the plaintiffs had made no such distinction at all in the plaint. Indeed they ask in the plaint that the entire land mentioned in the plaint schedule covering 5 grounds and odd should be given possession of to them. It is impossible at this stage to differentiate between the portions let to the original tenants and the portions enjoyed by them and to treat the latter portion as standing on a separate footing for purposes of section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act.” This appears to me to be wholly untenable. The plaint stated that only one ground was comprised in the original tenancy. The respondent denied that the land ever belonged to the appellant and in the alternative it was stated that the tenancy was of the entire 5-5/6 grounds. The Court must find what exactly is the subject of the tenancy. If the tenancy was only of 3 grounds and odd, the rest must have been an encroachment and it is the bounden duty of the Court to give effect to the finding arrived at on the evidence. I do not wish to say more than this now. There seems to be ample justification for the finding of the former City Civil Judge on the prior occasion and the view he Was inclined to take, namely, that the lease was only of 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet. This question has to be decided. In the judgment of the lower Court reference is made to the decisions of this Court in Ranganatham Chettiar v. Mariappa Mudali1, which was confirmed on appeal in Ranganatham Chettiar v. Mariappa Mudali2. The learned Judge says that difficulty felt by him in this case was also felt in the case cited above. This question has to be decided. In the judgment of the lower Court reference is made to the decisions of this Court in Ranganatham Chettiar v. Mariappa Mudali1, which was confirmed on appeal in Ranganatham Chettiar v. Mariappa Mudali2. The learned Judge says that difficulty felt by him in this case was also felt in the case cited above. The decision in Ranganatham Chettiar v. Mariappa Mudali1does not seem to have any bearing on the question at issue. In this case if on the documents the lease comprised only 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet it is for the Court to find where that extent is. As Mr. Arunachala Ayyar, learned counsel for the respondent, points out, if the Court finds that in spite of the extent mentioned in Exhibits P-1 and P-2 the entire extent of 5-5/6 grounds were from the very beginning the subject of the tenancy, it would be another matter. But this question has to be found. The next point raised is that the tenancy of Ponnuswami was determined. It is said that Ponnuswami denied the title of the appellant in a prior Small Cause Suit No. 11012 of 1935. It is also pointed out that even in the present suit the respondent denied the title of the appellant. It is undoubted that under section 111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act the tenancy is forfeited by denial of landlord’s title; but the question will be whether the plaintiff gave notice as required by section 111(g), which clearly applies to this case. Reference was made by Mr. Arunachala Iyer to section 114-A of the Act but that does not apply to a case of forfeiture by denial of the landlord’s title. Therefore the only question is whether any notice was given prior to the suit as required by section 111(g). Here again there is a complication introduced by the case put forward that the appellant actually took possession from Ponnuswami and that he, the appellant, let out the property to tenants and that subsequently, when the respondent purchased the property in execution of his mortgage decree disturbance was caused to the appellant’s tenants. If really possession was obtained by the appellant then there was no need to prove that notice in accordance with section 111(g) was ever given. That would only be necessary if possession was not taken from Ponnuswami. If really possession was obtained by the appellant then there was no need to prove that notice in accordance with section 111(g) was ever given. That would only be necessary if possession was not taken from Ponnuswami. That question again has to be found. Yet another question is to be decided whether any action of Ponnuswami in denying the title of the landlord and the landlord’s act of taking possession from Ponnuswami would affect the rights of the defendant who, it appears, had a mortgage from Ponnuswami prior to the act of Ponnuswami denying the title of the landlord. The learned Judge is not right in stating that Exhibit P-15 on which the appellant relied as a notice satisfying the requirements of section 111(g), even if such notice were necessary, could not be relied upon by the appellant. The learned Judge says that the 24th August, 1938, when that letter was sent is not stated to be the date when the cause of action arose. For the present suit the cause of action is given as the date when the respondent took possession, i.e., 10th August, 1939, in pursuance of his purchase in execution of the mortgage decree. The anterior history has been set out and the mere fact that the cause of action, i.e., the incident which immediately led to the suit is given as 10th August, 1939, when the respondent took possession of the property does not mean that the appellant is not entitled to rely upon forfeiture if it really did occur by reason of Ponnuswami’s denial of title. I must here mention that the respondent’s advocate does not admit that the pleas raised by Ponnuswami contained a denial of title such as would work out a forfeiture. It is also stated for the respondent that there are several acts on the part of the appellant subsequent to the alleged forfeiture, if any, caused by Ponnuswami’s act treating Ponnuswami as a tenant which would amount to a waiver. This question again has to be decided. Revised findings on the above questions on the evidence already on record will be submitted before the 15th August, 1945. Seven days for objections. This question again has to be decided. Revised findings on the above questions on the evidence already on record will be submitted before the 15th August, 1945. Seven days for objections. In pursuance of the directions contained in the above order the City Civil Judge, Madras, submitted the following revised finding: * * * * * This appeal coming on for final hearing on Wednesday and Thursday the 5th and 6th days of September, 1945, after the return of the finding of the lower Court upon the issues referred by this Court for trial, the Court delivered the following judgment: Findings have been returned on the various questions set out in my previous order. Sri Gangadeswarar temple represented by the trustees is the plaintiff and the suit is to eject the respondent Madhava Rao Naidu from a plot measuring 5-5/6 grounds comprised in Re-survey No. 3155 situated in Kuttiappa Gramani Street, Madavakkam, Madras. The main defence is that the defendant is a tenant entitled to protection under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act (Madras Act III of 1922) and that the suit is not maintainable as no notice under section 11 of the Act was given by the plaintiff-appellant. The suit was at first decreed by the City Civil Judge, but on appeal the suit was remanded for fresh disposal. The City Civil Judge then dismissed the suit for possession, but granted a decree declaring the title of the appellant. The relief for possession was negatived on the ground that the necessary three months’ notice provided in section 1 r of the Act was not given by the appellant. The appellant did not admit that the entire extent of the land in the possession of the respondent was the subject of the lease. The case was that except one ground of land, the rest was under unlawful occupation of the respondent as a trespasser. There was also a question raised that the tenancy, such as it was, wasforfeited by the disclaimer of the landlord’s title. Five questions were formulated by me and findings called for. The first question is: What is the extent of the land demised? On this point the lower Court has returned a finding that the extent is 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet. The respondent attacks this finding and urges that the lease in fact comprised the entire area. Certain facts are not disputed. The first question is: What is the extent of the land demised? On this point the lower Court has returned a finding that the extent is 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet. The respondent attacks this finding and urges that the lease in fact comprised the entire area. Certain facts are not disputed. The original lease was in favour of one Ponnappa Naicken in the year 1904 and there was no d document. Ponnappa sold his leasehold interest to one Ranganayaki Ammal and she sold her interest to Munuswami Gramani. Munuswami Gramani in turn sold the leasehold interest to Ponnuswami Ponnu-swami created a mortgage over his interest in favour of the respondent and the respondent obtained a decree, brought the property to sale and purchased Ponnuswami’s right. Ponnappa’s sale to Ranganayaki Ammal is evidenced by Exhibit P-1 dated 24th August, 1918. Ranganayaki Ammal s sale to Munuswami is evidenced by Ex. P-2 dated 15th April, 1921 Both these documents mention the extent as 3 grounds 1,350 square feet. In 1926 Munuswami sold the property under Exhibit D-1. It is in this document that in addition to giving the boundaries as given in the previous documents Exs P-1 and P-2, the measurements on the four sides were also given. The exact area is not mentioned, but’if we calculate the area taking the measurements on the four sides, we get an extent of about 1-5/6 grounds. The same boundaries and the measurements on the four sides are repeated in the mortgage deed by Ponnuswami and in the later documents. The respondents learned advocate urges that the boundaries in all the documents being the same, all the area included in the four boundaries passes and that where there is a difference between the extents and the boundaries the latter should prevail. No doubt this is the rule that is ordinarily applied when there is a difference between the area within stated boundaries and the actual area given in the documents. But this is not conclusive and if there are other circumstances to show that all the area within the boundaries was not the subject of the transaction, the above rule gives way. As the lower Court has pointed out, the respondent admitted in the witness-box that Ponnuswami his predecessor-in-title, mortgaged to him more than what he, i.e., Ponnuswami possessed. But this is not conclusive and if there are other circumstances to show that all the area within the boundaries was not the subject of the transaction, the above rule gives way. As the lower Court has pointed out, the respondent admitted in the witness-box that Ponnuswami his predecessor-in-title, mortgaged to him more than what he, i.e., Ponnuswami possessed. Therefore admittedly Ponnuswami did not own all the area situated within the four boundaries mentioned in Exhibit D-1. Nor was Ponnuswami die owner of the entire extent of 5 and 5/6 grounds. Further, the extent mentioned in Exhibits P-1 and P-2, is 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet. The montion of 1,350 square feet shows that in all probability the evidence adduced by the appellant is true, namely, that at the time of the original lease the land was actually measured and given. Otherwise it is difficult to understand the description as “3 grounds and 1,350 square feet.” I see therefore no reason to differ from the finding of the lower Court that the extent leased was only 3 grounds 1,350 square feet. The result of this is that at least as regards the balance, i.e., the difference between 5 and 5/6 grounds and 3 grounds 1,350 square feet the respondent is only a trespasser and the City Tenants Protection Act does not apply. The appellant is entitled to a decree for this extent in any event. The next question is whether there has been a forfeiture of the tenancy This is based upon Ponnuswami’s Repudiation of the landlord’s title. This has been found by the lower Court. It is clear from a perusal of the written pleas filed by Ponnuswami in Small Cause Suit No. 11012 of 1935 on the file of the Presidency Small Cause Court, Madras, that he denied the tenancy and claimed title in himself. Exhibit P-9 is the written pleas and it contains an unequivocal statement that he was not a tenant and that he claimed to be the absolute owner. That was a suit for rent filed by the appellant against Ponnuswami. It is in that suit that Ponnuswami filed the above statement. There is therefore no doubt that Ponnuswami incurred forfeiture. The next question is whether an overt act or a notice as required by section III(g) of the Transfer of Property Act was given and whether it binds the respondent. It is in that suit that Ponnuswami filed the above statement. There is therefore no doubt that Ponnuswami incurred forfeiture. The next question is whether an overt act or a notice as required by section III(g) of the Transfer of Property Act was given and whether it binds the respondent. The respondent purchased the interest of Ponnuswami at a Court sale held in February, 1938. The tenancy being prior to the amendment made under section III(g) is not retrospective in character. Before the Amending Act of 1929, the landholder had only to do some act showing his intention to determine the lease. As amended the law requires the lessor to give notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease. In the present case two documents are relied upon by the appellant to satisfy the requirements of the law. They are Exhibits P-14-a and P-15. Exhibit P-14 is dated 16th September, 1936 and Exhibit P-15 is dated the 24th August, 1938. Exhibit P-15 says that Ponnuswami denied the tenancy and that therefore the lease was terminated. That document certainly satisfied the requirements of even the amended section. Exhibit P-14-a is said by the appellant’s learned advocate to equally satisfy the requirements of the law. Before referring to it, it must be stated that the appellant’s case as put forward in the plaint was that only about 1 ground of land had been leased to Ponnappa Naicker. Admittedly there was no document to evidence the lease. The land was a vacant land and a hut was later on put up only on a very small portion of the land. The portion occupied by the superstructure would not amount even to a fraction of a ground and the area on which the superstructure stands is no guide to determine whether the extent leased was 1 ground or 3 grounds and 1,350 square feet or 5 and 5/6 grounds. It appears that in 1936 some trees were cut down by Ponnappa and removed. Two notices were given on the 16th September, 1936. By Exhibit P-14 the appellant called upon Ponnuswami to pay Rs. 50 being the value of the trees cut and carried away by Ponnuswami. It appears that in 1936 some trees were cut down by Ponnappa and removed. Two notices were given on the 16th September, 1936. By Exhibit P-14 the appellant called upon Ponnuswami to pay Rs. 50 being the value of the trees cut and carried away by Ponnuswami. Exhibit P-14-a is of the same date and that being the important, I set it out in full: " It is represented to me by my clients, the trustees of Sri Gangadeswarar Koil and connected temples, Purasawalkam, Madras, that without their knowledge or permission you are occupying about 2 grounds in extent of the land belonging to the Pathala Ponniamman temple in R. S. No. 3155, that you have put a superstructure thereon, that your such occupation is wrongful and that you are bound to vacate and put my clients in possession of the same. This is to give you notice that unless within three days from your receipt hereof you vacate and deliver vacant possession of the said plot of land my clients will be constrained to institute necessary legal proceedings against you as they may be advised in the premises. If however you are desirous of continuing in occupation of the said land you may apply to my Clients for a lease of the same on such terms and for such period as may be agreed upon between you The repudiation of the tenancy by Ponnuswami was on the 26th September, 1935. The lower Court has found that there was a forfeiture and also the necessary notice. While referring to both Exhibits P-14-a and P-15, the lower Court has not stated whether Exhibit P-14-a satisfies the requirements of the law. That question becomes necessary for the determination of the plea raised under the City Tenants Protection Act. If before the respondent acquired Ponnuswami’s interest in the Court sale of February 1938, Ponnuswami’s right had already been determined legally, he would only be a trespasser or a tenant holding over and it will raise the question whether a transferee from a tenant will be himself a tenant entitled to protection under the Act. That is why the question whether Exhibit P-14-a is enough to bring about a termination of the tenancy becomes very material. That is why the question whether Exhibit P-14-a is enough to bring about a termination of the tenancy becomes very material. It is argued for the appellant that the notice refers to a plot upon which the superstructure was raised and that the notice refers to the possession of Ponnuswami of the plot on which superstructure had been raised as wrongful and that Ponnuswami was called upon to vacate that plot. The appellant’s learned advocate therefore argues that though the extent of the land is stated to be about 2 grounds, it only refers to the land leased in respect of which lease the tenant has repudiated the title. On the other side it is said that this notice refers really to the 2 grounds which is the difference between 3 grounds 1,350 square feet as mentioned in Exhibits P-i and P-2, and the 5 and 5/6 grounds as mentioned in the later document. The respondent’s learned advocate draws my attention to the statements in Exhibit P-14-a that Ponnuswami was in wrongful occupation of about 2 grounds of land, without the knowledge or permission of the appellants. It is said that this description cannot refer to the land which was admittedly the subject of the original tenancy. No doubt there seems to be some difficulty to accept the respondent’s argument. Having regard to Ponnuswami’s denial of title, the appellant was evidently advised to draft the notice in the way in which it was done. It is not necessary that the notice should declare in so many terms that the tenancy was determined owing to a repudiation of title. Even the amended Act requires no more than an intimation to the lessee of the lessor’s intention to determine the lease. I find therefore that Exhibit P-14-a is a valid notice. It is unnecessary to go into the question whether the amending Act of 1929 is retrospective or not or to consider the decision cited by the appellant’s learned advocate in Krishna Prasad Singh v. Adyanath Ghatak1. The next question is whether the forfeiture has been waived. This was raised before me on the former occasion and I called upon the lower Court to give a finding. The lower Court has returned a finding against the waiver set up. No reason is shown for my differing from the finding of the lower Court on this point. The next question is whether the forfeiture has been waived. This was raised before me on the former occasion and I called upon the lower Court to give a finding. The lower Court has returned a finding against the waiver set up. No reason is shown for my differing from the finding of the lower Court on this point. There are no materials on which a waiver can be found. There remains the question whether the respondent is a tenant entitled to protection under section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act. In order to get over the Act, the appellant advanced a case that the land had been actually taken possession of by the appellant and leased to a third party and that therefore the Act was not applicable. If really possession had been taken by the appellant and leased to a third party and the respondent afterwards caused obstruction, it is clear that he cannot rely upon section 11 of the Act. On this question the City Civil Judge has recorded a finding that possession was not taken as pleaded by the appellant. This finding is very strongly attacked by the learned advocate for the appellant. The appellant’s case is that it took possession of the property and leased the same to one Srinivasa Mudali. The lease deed in favour of Srinivasa Mudali is dated 1st October, 1938, and it recites that possession was given to the lessee. The extent leased under the document was 7 grounds and it admittedly includes the suit land. The only question is whether the appellant had already taken possession of the suit lands and whether Srinivasa Mudali was put in possession of the suit land and the other land comprised in the lease to him. The lower Court’s finding that no possession was given to Srinivasa Mudali is based upon Exhibit P-16, notice given to Ponnuswami on the 3rd November, 1938. By Exhibit P-16 the appellant gave intimation to Ponnuswami that the land was leased to Srinivasa Mudali and called upon him to put Srinivasa Mudali in possession. This clearly indicates that possession was not taken before the 3rd November, 1938. By Exhibit P-16 the appellant gave intimation to Ponnuswami that the land was leased to Srinivasa Mudali and called upon him to put Srinivasa Mudali in possession. This clearly indicates that possession was not taken before the 3rd November, 1938. Another fact relied upon by the lower Court is that when the respondent was obstructed in his attempt to take possession of the suit property after purchasing the same in Court auction he filed C. M. P. No. 3897 of 1938 for removal of obstruction against the alleged obstructors and got an order removing obstruction; Srinivasa Mudali is not one of the four objectors who were impleaded in that petition. It is said therefore that if really Srinivasa Mudali was in possession, obstruction would have been offered by him and that the respondent would have impleaded him in the above petition and got an order against Srinivasa Mudali. Srinivasa Mudali filed O. S. No. 3013 of 1939 for an injunction but that was tried along with this suit and dismissed with the remark that he will be entitled to actual possession after the present plaintiff in this suit got possession and that there were no grounds to grant an injunction prayed for by him. As against all this there is the evidence of P.W.1, a trustee of the temple who says that he delivered possession to Srinivasa Mudali. On these materials it is difficult to come to any other conclusion than the one arrived at by the lower Court. It is not possible to say that Srinivasa Mudali was put in possession and that the respondent later on caused obstruction to Srinivasa Mudali. I must proceed on the footing that Srinivasa Mudali was not in possession and that the respondent got possession in pursuance of the Court’s order on the petition already referred to. This being the case the question is whether the respondent is a tenant as defined by the Act. If so the suit for possession is bound to fail for the reason that no notice was given to him under section 11. The expression “tenant” is defined in section 2, sub-section (4) thus: “‘Tenant’ means tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, every other person deriving title from him, and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy.” Thus there are three classes of persons who are tenants under the Act. The expression “tenant” is defined in section 2, sub-section (4) thus: “‘Tenant’ means tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, every other person deriving title from him, and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy.” Thus there are three classes of persons who are tenants under the Act. The first class comprises what may be called the direct tenants, i.e., tenants of land liable to pay rent. This obviously refers to cases where there is privity of contract. Admittedly there is no privity of contract between the appellant and the respondent. The next class refers to persons deriving title from him, i.e., from the tenant. The appellant’s argument is that the expression is ‘person deriving title from him’ i.e., the tenant, and that if the person from whom the respondent derives title was not on the relevant date a tenant, the respondent would not come within this expression. The respondent derives title from Ponnuswami under the Court sale held in February 1938. By that time Ponnuswami had ceased to be a tenant. His tenancy had been forfeited and lawfully terminated. Therefore he does not satisfy the description of a tenant in February, 1938, and therefore the respondent is not a person deriving title from a tenant. This argument is sought to be supported by referring to the next class of tenants included in the definition and that is “and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy.” 1 It is urged that the Legislature has clearly made a difference between persons who are tenants and persons who continue in possession after the determination of the tenancy. It is pointed out that the expression “every other person deriving title from him” comes before the expression “persons who continue in possession after the determination of the tenancy” and that therefore a person deriving title from a person who continues in possession after the determination of the tenancy is not within the definition. The respondent’s advocate argues that even persons who derive title from a tenant holding over is also within the definition. Having regard to the language of sub-section (4), I am of opinion that the appellant’s contention is right. The respondent’s advocate argues that even persons who derive title from a tenant holding over is also within the definition. Having regard to the language of sub-section (4), I am of opinion that the appellant’s contention is right. If the respond ent’s argument is to be accepted, the expression “every other person deriving title from him” should really come after the next class of persons, i.e., persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy. Taking the last class, it refers to persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy. It obviously refers to a person who was a tenant before the termination of the tenancy and who continues to be in possession after the determination of the tenancy. The word “continue” shows that it is the same person who was there on the land as a tenant before termination that is contemplated by the last class. A person who was a tenant and who continued to be in possession after the termination of the tenancy is under the general law not a tenant. He is strictly a trespasser. But by express language the Act includes such persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy under the category of persons who are protected under the Act. But for this last clause, a person who held over after the termination of the tenancy would not be entitled to the benefits of the Act which is intended to protect only tenants. If, therefore, a person who is not a tenant claims the benefits of the Act, there must be express language including him under the category of persons entitled to the benefits of the Act. I am therefore unable to accept the respondent’s argument that a person who derives tide from a person whose tenancy had already been determined is a tenant within section 2, sub-section (4). The expression “every other person, deriving title from him” refers to what precedes it, i.e., to the tenant. The result is, the appeal must be allowed as regards the entire extent and a decree given as prayed for with costs throughout. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by The Chief Justice.-The appellant is the auction purchaser of the right, title and interest of one Ponnuswami in the property in suit, and claims the benefit of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act of 1921. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by The Chief Justice.-The appellant is the auction purchaser of the right, title and interest of one Ponnuswami in the property in suit, and claims the benefit of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act of 1921. Ponnuswami admittedly was a tenant of only a portion of the land in suit. The total area measures 5-5/6 grounds. Both the City Civil Court and Somayya, J., on appeal held that the tenancy only applied to 3 grounds 1,350 square feet, which meant that the appellant was certainly a trespasser so far as the rest of the area was concerned. Ponnuswami denied his landlord’s title and therefore the landlord was entitled to terminate his tenancy, which was done by a notice given to him on 10th September, 1936. He was informed that unless he vacated and delivered vacant possession of the land within three days of the receipt of the notice, proceedings in ejectment would be taken against him. The appellant’s purchase of the right, title and interest of Ponnuswami took place two years later. If Ponnuswami had in law any right in this land it would have passed to the appellant but clearly he had none. The appellant says that he is a tenant within the meaning of the Madras City Tenants Protection Act of 1921 and that the suit was bad because no notice was given to him in accordance with the provisions of section n. Somayya, J., has given reasons for holding that the appellant is not a tenant within the meaning of the Act and we agree with him. The Act defines a tenant as meaning a tenant of land liable to pay rent on it, every other person deriving title from him and includes persons who continue in possession after the termination of the tenancy. The argument of the appellant is that Ponnuswami was in possession after the termination of his tenancy and therefore was entitled to pass on the benefit of the Act to the appellant. It is impossible to accept the argument that a person who claims under a person whose tenancy has been determined is a tenant and is entitled to further notice. When the appellant purported to purchase Ponnuswami’s rights, Ponnuswami was not a tenant and therefore could assign no tenancy right to the appellant. The appeal is dismissed with costs. K.S. -------------- Appeal dismissed.