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1946 DIGILAW 149 (MAD)

The Official Receiver of Ramnad at Madura v. Lakshmanan Chettiar

1946-04-17

HORWILL, SHAHABUDDIN

body1946
Shahabuddin, J.-This civil miscellaneous second appeal arises out of an interlocutory application filed in the Court of Subordinate Judge of Devakotta by one Valliammai Achi in the insolvency proceedings relating to her husband Muthiah Chettiar. Her case was that a sum of Rs. 14,000 given to her at her wedding was handed over to her father-in-law in accordance with the custom prevalant in her community-the Nattukottai Chetti community-that this amount was invested by her father-in-law in K.M.A.L.A. and other firms for her benefit and after his death her husband withdrew the amount and its interest and invested the same in A.M. firm which he started in Singapore and that the amount at the time of her application had accumulated to Rs. 1,62,362-6-0. This money, she contended, was held by her husband, the insolvent, for her benefit and therefore she should be given a first charge on his entire assets. Before filing this petition she had filed an application as an ordinary creditor of her husband. That application she did not press and it was therefore dismissed. The Official Receiver in opposing the application under appeal did not admit that Valliammai Achi was given Rs. 14,000 at her wedding or that that amount was invested by her father-in-law for her benefit. He contended that even if there was such an investment it did not remain as trust money but that Valliammai Achi lentit to the insolvent to start the A. M. business and that therefore he stood in the position of a debtor and not a trustee. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the case of Valliammai Achi with regard to the deposit made with her father-in-law and the investment by him in other firms but he doubted if he acted as a trustee in doing so. He however held that the insolvent took the amount from his wife as a loan. On the question of the charge he came to the conclusion that even if it were assumed that the insolvent was a trustee in respect of the amount in question there was no evidence connecting the property in respect of which the charge was claimed with the assets of the A. M. firm, and that unless the properties were traced to the assets of that firm, Valliammai Achi was not entitled to the charge claimed by her. He therefore held that Valliammai Achi was entitled to claim the amount as an ordinary creditor. On appeal the learned District Judge took the view that the amount claimed by the petitioner, constituted a trust fund. It was contended before him that in view of this conclusion a charge should be created over the entire assets on the basis that in Nattukottai Chetti families which are trading families the entire assets should be regarded as trade assets. The learned Judge did not accept this contention as A. M. firm was not ancestral business, but he came to the conclusion that the insolvent constructed a bungalow and acquired two sites with the assets of the A. M. firm and therefore gave the present first respondent, one of the sons of Valliammai Achi who had come on record as her legal representative-she having died after the appeal was filed, a charge in respect of these properties. The second respondent, another son of Valliammai Achi was declared an insolvent and his interest vested in the Official Receiver, Ramnad, This appeal has been filed by the Official Receiver, while the first respondent has filed a memorandum of cross-objections centending that he should have been granteda charge over the entire assets of his father. That a sum of Rs. 14,000 was given to Valliammai Achi at her wedding and that this amount was handed over to her father-in-law who invested it from time to time in several firms is not disputed; nor is there any controversy with regard to the actual amount due to her. The finding of the learned District Judge that the amount of Rs. 14,000 at the inception constituted a trust fund is not contested; but it is argued that his conclusion that the amount retained the character of a trust fund even after it was brought into the A. M. firm is not correct. It is contended that the insolvent borrowed the money from Valliamrnai Achi when he started the A. M. firm and was therefore a debtor and not a trustee. Alternatively it is argued that assuming it was a trust fund even after it was taken into the A. M. business at Singapore, Valliamrnai was not entitled to a charge over the properties ever which a charge has been created, as those properties have not been traced to the assets of the A. M. firm. Alternatively it is argued that assuming it was a trust fund even after it was taken into the A. M. business at Singapore, Valliamrnai was not entitled to a charge over the properties ever which a charge has been created, as those properties have not been traced to the assets of the A. M. firm. The learned District Judge has not discussed the evidence in this case as fully as he should have done. It cannot however be said that he has not discussed the evidence at all; but it appears to us on a full consideration of all the material evidence on record that his conclusions cannot be upheld and that both the contentions of the appellant have to prevail. The evidence with regard to the custom in the Nattukottai Chetti community in respect of the amounts given to the bride has been given by the insolvent who was examined as P.W.6. He deposed as follows: “It is given to the head of the bridegroom family, that is the bridegroom’s father who would credit it in the name of the bridegroom who has no right to the money, but only can manage it. The bridegroom’s father has no right to the money, and is bound to account for it to the bride. If the father of the husband dies, then the husband keeps it safe for the wife.” It is not disputed that in accordance with this custom, the amount in question was invested in the name of the insolvent himself before it was transferred to the A. M. firm. But Ex. A shows that the amount when taken into the A.M. firm was credited in the name of Valliamrnai Achi. This is a significant departure from the practice spoken to by the insolvent, and it is contended on behalf of the appellant that this indicates that at that stage the amount was borrowed from Valliammai Achi for starting the A. M. firm and therefore ceased to be a trust fund even if it had till then retained that character. On behalf of the respondent the description of the amount in Ex. A as stridhanam money of Valliammai Achi received from A.L.A. firm is strongly relied upon as indicating that the money was taken into the A. M. firm as a trust fund. On behalf of the respondent the description of the amount in Ex. A as stridhanam money of Valliammai Achi received from A.L.A. firm is strongly relied upon as indicating that the money was taken into the A. M. firm as a trust fund. In our opinion the entry that the amount was the stridhanam of Valliamrnai Achi is only descriptive, and the importance of the account is that it was opened in the A. M. books in the name of Valliamrnai Achi and not in the name of the insolvent. It is stated in the interlocutory application under appeal that the practice in recent years has been to keep the amount in the name of the bride also, but A. M. firm was not started in recent years. In any case this statement regarding the recent custom does not find any support in the evidence. The insolvent who spoke to the custom does not say that in recent years the practice has been to invest the amount in the name of the wife. It is not contended before us that there has been any such recent custom. Admittedly there was no instrument of trust. It is only on custom that the contention that stridhanam amounts invested in the name of the husband constituted a trust fund is based. In these circumstances, a departure from that custom such as is found in Ex.A is a strong indication that the fund changed its character when it came into the hands of the A. M. firm. The insolvent no doubt deposed that he managed the stridhanam money of his wife and that when he took it from the A.L.A. firm into the A. M. firm he did not take the consent of Valliamrnai Achi, indicating thereby that he continued to treat it in the manner in which it was treated prior to his starting the A. M. firm, but in an earlier stage of the insolvency proceedings he had deposed before the Official Receiver that he did not know if the petitioner had any moneys other than those received as her stridhanam and that he never managed her moneys but his son and son-in-law managed them. He also deposed that he had borrowed from his wife and that she lent him money from her stridhaham. He also deposed that he had borrowed from his wife and that she lent him money from her stridhaham. When his attention was drawn to this evidence he denied having made those statements, an explanation which is hardly acceptable. In her petition which she first filed but did not press, Valliammai Achi treated this amount as having been lent to her husband. This is clear from the following statement in her affidavit accompanying that petition: " The stridhanam amounts were credited in the said A. M. firm in my name as for 17th. Arpasi, Sukla. The insolvent owes me in that respect Rs. 46,790-15-6 ringhis and the same at the exchange rate of Rs. 155 came to Rs. 72,526. The same will also be borne from the accounts that have been filed by the insolvent in this Court. The insolvent also undertook to pay interest on the aforementioned amount deposited with him at 12 annas per cent, per mensem for 12 months thavanai". In her evidence in support of her first application she stated that she had deposited her stridhanam amounts with the insolvent. The entry in Ex. A considered with these statements of the insolvent and Valliammai Achi, specially the statement that the insolvent undertook to pay interest at a fixed rate, makes the conclusion irresistible that the amount was taken into the A.M.firm as a loan from Valliammai Achi. It is then argued on behalf of the respondent that according to the custom in this community, the trust created by the deposits made at the time of the marriage enures to the advantage of not only the bride but also of the children to be born of the marriage, that even if it is considered that Valliammai agreed to her husband utilising the amount for starting a business it would amount only to the beneficiary consenting to an investment to be made by the trustee, and that at any rate as far as her children were concerned, the trust continued and therefore the money did not lose the character of a trust fund even when the insolvent borrowed it. In support of this contention reliance is placed on in Re Dixon: Heynes v. Dixon1. In our opinion there is no force in this contention and this decision does not apply to the facts under consideration. In support of this contention reliance is placed on in Re Dixon: Heynes v. Dixon1. In our opinion there is no force in this contention and this decision does not apply to the facts under consideration. In Re Dixon: Heynes v. Dixon1, the amount had been settled on the wife by a marriage settlement in pursuance of which she was entitled only to the income. The trustee lent it to the husband with the consent of the wife. It was held that as the husband took with full notice that the money lent was trust money he was in the position of an express trustee. But the deposit of the stridhanam amount cannot be considered to be a marriage settlement especially when according to the evidence of the insolvent the bride appears to be the sole beneficiary. The insolvent has deposed that the bridegroom’s father has no right to the money and is bound to account for it to the bride. In the petition under appeal it is not alleged that the money handed over to the husband’s family constituted a trust for the benefit of the children. On the other hand, the case set out there is that the amount was handed over to the husband’s family to be invested and improved for the benefit of the bride. Reference is then made to Palaniappa Chettiar v. Nachiappa Chettiar2, Official Assignee of Madra, v. Muthayee Achi3and Muthuraman Chetti v. Periannan Chettiar4, where observation that the stridhanam of the bride invested in the bridgroom’s name constitutes a trust fund for the bride and the children to be born of the marriage have been made; but in these cases, the question as to the rights inter se between the mother and her children did not arise. In the Official Receiver of South Arcot v. Kulandaivelan Chettiar5, relied on by the appellant the question came up for decision and the learned Judges after examining the Bench decision in the Official Assignee of Madras v. Muthayee Achi3, as well as the records of that case observed that that decision could only be taken to have meant that the fund would, in the ordinary course, enure to the advantage of the mother, as well as her children, the beneficiaries taking not jointly but successively. As regards the other two decisions the learned Judges observed, as follows: " In none of them did any question arise as to the rights inter se between the mother and her children. General language used as to the stridhanam fund being intended for the benefit of the bride and the children to be born of the union is not inconsistent with the mother taking as the sole beneficiary and her sons or daughters, as the case may be, succeeding her as her heirs." They took the view that in the Nattukottai Chetty community the children did not have a joint interest with the mother in the stridhanam fund. In this view, with which we respectfully agree, Valliammai Achi at the time at which the money was taken by the insolvent into A. M. firm was solely entitled to it, and as from the circumstances stated above it is clear that she lent the money to the insolvent, it cannot be said that the amount continued in the A.M. firm as a trust fund for the benefit of her children. It is significant that the first application and the one under appeal were filed by Valliammai Achi alone and her son came on record only as her legal representative. We therefore consider that the learned Subordinate Judge rightly regarded the insolvent as a debtor of and not a trustee for Valliammai. Even if it is assumed for argument’s sake that the amount when it was invested in A. M. firm was a trust fund, we fail to see how that would entitle Valliammai to a charge on all the assets of the insolvent. There can be no presumption that when a trustee makes his own monies with the trust fund, he misappropriates the latter. There is no doubt an allegation in the petition under appeal that the insolvent committed breach of trust, but no particulars of the alleged breach of trust are mentioned. Nor has it been proved that the insolvent committed any breach of trust. In the circumstances a charge can be created only over those properties which have been traced to the funds of the A. M. firm. Nor has it been proved that the insolvent committed any breach of trust. In the circumstances a charge can be created only over those properties which have been traced to the funds of the A. M. firm. The learned District Judge concluded that the bungalow and the two sites over which he created a charge were acquired with the money of the A. M. firm because he considered that it was probable that they were so acquired and the insolvent deposed that he acquired them with that money. But his earlier deposition was to the effect that he had acquired these properties with his own money earned by him as an agent of another firm before the A. M. firm was started. The insolvent explained that that statement was incorrect but that explanation is not worthy of acceptance. We have not been referred to any account specifically tracing these properties to the funds of the A. M. firm; nor have the sale deeds under which the sites were acquired by the insolvent been produced. We therefore consider that these properties have not been traced to the funds of the A. M. firm and that the charge created by the learned District Judge cannot be upheld. The order of the District Judge is set aside and that of the Subordinate Judge restored. The appeal is therefore allowed with costs in this Court and the lower appellate Court. The memorandum of cross-objections is dismissed with costs. V.S. ------ Appeal allowed.