Judgement Consolidated Appeals (No. 65 of 1944) from three decrees of the High Court (Verma and Yorke JJ.) (November 27, 1941) which had affirmed three decrees of the Court of the Improvement Trust Tribunal, Allahabad, April 27, 1934, whereby, in respect of the compulsory acquisition of certain lands and buildings belonging to the appellant, he was awarded as compensation certain sums of money. The appellant con tended that the sums awarded to him by the tribunal were insufficient, in that they did not include any compensation for the acquisition of the following four pieces of land —(1.) The garden of house No. 8, Mohalla Chak, Allahabad. (2.) Five hundred and four square yards of parti land with enclosure wall, known as No. 32, Mohalla Chah-Chand, Allahabad. (3.) Land with a long shed on one side of it, known as No. 13, Mohalla Mahajani Tola, Allahabad. (4.) Parti land No. 22, Mohalla Mahajani Tola, Allahabad. The appellant further contended that the tribunal, relying on the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of State for India v. Makhan Das (( 1928) I. L. R. 50 A. 470.), took an erroneous view as to the construction of s. 23, sub-s. 3 (a), of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (I of 1894) as amended by the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919 (U. P. Act VIII of 1919). The respondent, on the other hand, contended that if the facts were carefully examined it would be found that the appellant was awarded compensation in respect of each of those four pieces of land, and that in assessing such compensation the tribunal did not apply any wrong principle. The facts appear from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. By s. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act (I. of 1894), as amended by the United Provinces Town Improvement Act (U. P. Act VIII. of 1919) " (1.) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the " Court shall take into consideration — " First the market-value of the land at the date of the first " publication of the notification under s. 36 of the United " Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919. of 1919) " (1.) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the " Court shall take into consideration — " First the market-value of the land at the date of the first " publication of the notification under s. 36 of the United " Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919. * * * * * " (2.) In addition to the market-value of the land as above " provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of " fifteen per centum on such market-value, in consideration of " the compulsory nature of the acquisition ; “Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any land “acquired under the United Provinces Town Improvement " Act, 1919, except — " (b) buildings in the actual occupation of the owner or " occupied free of rent by a relative of the owner, and land " appurtenant thereto, and " (c) gardens not let to tenants but used by the owners as a u place of resort. " (3.) For the purposes of clause first of sub-s. (1.) of this " section — " (a) the market-value of the land shall be the market-value " according to the use to which the land was put at the date " with reference to which the market-value is to be determined " under that clause. (b) if it be shown that before such date the owner of the land " had in good faith taken active steps and incurred expenditure " to secure a more profitable use of the same, further compensation based on his actual loss may be paid to him." 1946. March 26, 27. Rewcastle K.C. and Handoo for the appellant. (b) if it be shown that before such date the owner of the land " had in good faith taken active steps and incurred expenditure " to secure a more profitable use of the same, further compensation based on his actual loss may be paid to him." 1946. March 26, 27. Rewcastle K.C. and Handoo for the appellant. The principal questions for determination in these appeals are concerned with the principles to be applied in assessing compensation on the compulsory purchase of lands and buildings 4n the United Provinces and are as follows (a) In view of the provisions of s. 23, sub-s. 3 (a), of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, as amended by the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919, and the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of State for India v. Makhan Das (( 1928) I. L. R. 50 A. 470.), if the land and/or buildings are not, at the time of their acquisition, producing any revenue, is their owner entitled to any compensation at all therefor ; and, secondly, if he is so entitled, can he demand that he be paid the market-value of the property so acquired, together with any additional percentage for compulsory acquisition ? (b) Where any description of land and/or buildings are compulsorily acquired under the Acts, is their market value to be determined solely on the basis of so many years purchase of the rental or on the basis of the estimated value of the land or buildings or by having regard to the price that a willing buyer would be prepared to pay to a willing seller for the property, or should the valuation tribunal have regard to all these questions in order to assess the compensation to be granted? The amending Act was clearly intended to cut down the full rights which the landowner, whose land has been taken, had under the original Act of 1894. Under the original Act land compulsorily acquired had to be valued not merely by reference to the use to which it was being put at the time at which its value had to be determined, but also by reference to the uses to which it was reasonably capable of being put in the future Vyricherla Narayana Gajapatiraju v. Revenue Divisional Officer Vizagapatam (( 1939) L. R. 66 I. A. 104.). The effect of the amending Act is to cut down the right of the owner to receive compensation by limiting it to compensation based on the actual user of the land at the date of the notice—it is merely a limitation on valuation. The appellant, as owner of properties compulsorily acquired, was entitled to receive compensation on the basis of the market-value of every square yard so acquired, whether or not the properties, or portions thereof, were a source of any income or commercial profit to him at the date of the acquisition. The decision in Secretary of State for India v. Makhan Das (1) to the effect that the market-value of land compulsorily acquired may be nil where, at the date of its acquisition, such land is not being put to any use from which profit is derived, must be considered to be erroneous. A statutory provision such as sub-s. 3 (a) of s. 23 of the Act of 1894, as amended, cannot be interpreted as meaning that land which at the relevant date was not being used in a manner which produced an income to its owner could therefore then have no market-value. It follows from the provisions of proviso (c) to sub-s. 2 of s. 23 that gardens not let, but used by the owner as a place of resort, are to be given a market value for the purposes of calculating compensation. In assessing the compensation due to the appellant the courts below should have had regard to all the matters referred to in head (b) set out above. Tucker K.C. and Wallach for the respondent. This Board has laid down the rule that in cases of this nature they will not interfere in matters of detailed figures, but only if it is clear that some wrong principle of valuation has been applied Narsingh Das v. Secretary of State for India (( 1924) L. R. 52 I. A. 133, 135.) ; Nowroji Rustomji Wadia v. Bombay Government (( 1925) L. R. 52 I. A. 367, 369.). It is submitted, therefore, that the only question in this appeal is whether the tribunal in asertaining the true compensation applied a wrong principle of valuation. It is submitted, therefore, that the only question in this appeal is whether the tribunal in asertaining the true compensation applied a wrong principle of valuation. Although some of the reasoning in Secretary of State for India v. Makhan Das (( 1928) I. L. R. 50, A. 470.) is capable of being questioned, the construction the court put on s. 23 of the Act of 1894 in that case is right, even though it may lead to some conditions where the value of the land is nil. What use land is put to is a question of fact. The court, in valuing land under this section, can adopt a number of methods (a) Rental method— the capital value on a rental basis; (b) the comparative method— comparing similar property of a like nature in the same neigh bourhood and inquiring what sales have taken place ; (c) the contractors method—deciding what it would cost to build a building of that kind now, and make the necessary deduction for depreciation to arrive at the present value ; and (d) the land and building method. [Reference was made to Hart Chand v. Secretary of State for India (( 1939) L..R. 66 I. A. 258.).] There is no evidence that a wrong principle of valuation was adopted in the present case, and it is not one in which the Board should interfere. Rewcastle K.C. replied. May 1. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by MORTON L.J., who made the introductory statement set out above and continued It is necessary for their Lordships to examine in some detail the facts in regard to each of the four pieces of land in dispute. The question of compensation was first considered by the Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter referred to as " the officer "). His award in regard to the first piece of land is in the following terms —" This is an old " pakka building with a decent flower garden attached to it and " also a pakka well. It is assessed to municipal taxes on the “yearly rental of Rs.480. The net profit, after deducting " the taxes, repairs, vacancies, etc., comes to Rs.400. The " current rate of profit on investments in buildings is six per " cent, and at this rate the market value comes to 400 x 50/3 or Rs.6,650. It is assessed to municipal taxes on the “yearly rental of Rs.480. The net profit, after deducting " the taxes, repairs, vacancies, etc., comes to Rs.400. The " current rate of profit on investments in buildings is six per " cent, and at this rate the market value comes to 400 x 50/3 or Rs.6,650. According to the land and buildings method, " its value works out to Rs.9,228. This, of course, does not " take into account the enhanced value of the building and " land on account of the garden. A fair monthly rental that " could be got should be Rs..6o. Deducting the taxes, repairs, " etc., the net profit comes to Rs.6oo per annum, and its " capitalized market value at the rate of six per cent, comes to " Rs.600 x 100/6 or Rs.10,000. The building is not in the actual " occupation of the owner but is lying vacant and the garden is " used by the owner as a place of resort and I would allow " fifteen per cent, for compulsory acquisition, which comes to " Rs.1,500. Therefore I would award Rs.11,500." It was suggested by counsel for the appellant that the officer had awarded nothing in respect of the garden, and he relied on the sentence " This, of course, does not take into account the " enhanced value of the building and land on account of the " garden." Their Lordships cannot accept this suggestion. The sentence just quoted is merely a comment by the officer on the n land and buildings method” and it is plain from the remainder of the award that the officer in fact adopted a method of valuation which did take into account the garden. There can be no doubt that in assessing " a fair monthly rental M the officer was assessing a rental for the house and garden taken together. There can be no doubt that in assessing " a fair monthly rental M the officer was assessing a rental for the house and garden taken together. This is made clear by the fact that, having arrived at his valuation of Rs.10,000, he allows an additional fifteen per cent, for compulsory acquisition because " the garden is used by " the owner as a place of resort." This is a reference to s. 23, sub-s. 2 (c), of the Act of 1894 as amended by the Act of 1919, and it would have been wholly illogical for the officer to add fifteen per cent, if the garden had not been a portion of the property which he had already valued at Rs.10,000. In his award with regard to the second piece of land, the officer observed —" No. 32 is five hundred and four square "yards of parti land with enclosure wall not all round but on a " portion of it. The cost of the wall is estimated to be Rs.204. " The value of the land at Rs.2 per square yard comes to " Rs.1,008." He goes on to explain how he arrives at the value of Rs.2 per square yard, and concludes "I would " award Rs.204 + 1,008 or Rs.1,212 in all for No. 32.” It is thus apparent that compensation was awarded for this piece of land. The award in regard to the third piece of land is in the following terms —" This is mainly open land with a long shed on one " side known as Mahfil. The building is assessed to the " municipal taxes on a monthly rent of Rs.6. Deducting for " repairs, taxes, etc., the net yearly profit comes to Rs.6o " and its capitalized value at the current rate of six per cent. " comes to Rs. 1,000, but this represents, in this case, only the " value of the building, the open land having not been taken " into account obviously. " The area of the land is five hundred and forty-eight square " yards and its value at Rs.2 per square yard comes to " Rs.1,096. According to the land and buildings method, its " value comes to Rs.1,427. " The area of the land is five hundred and forty-eight square " yards and its value at Rs.2 per square yard comes to " Rs.1,096. According to the land and buildings method, its " value comes to Rs.1,427. I award Rs.1,000 plus Rs.1,096 " or Rs.2,096." The award in regard to the fourth piece of land is as follows “This is parti land in continuation of the garden house of " the owner only recently acquired for the same Zero Road " Scheme. It is enclosed within a compound wall and bears “a few ordinary trees. There is a disused pakka well “outside the compound wall. The compound wall and other u small constructions would be worth Rs.900. Well must be “worth not more than Rs.500. The trees will be worth " Rs.50. The area is 2,637 square yards and at the rate of “Rs.2 per square yard its value comes to Rs.5,274. There " have recently been cases in the neighbourhood in which the " land has been valued in private transactions at the rate of “less than Rs.2 per square yard. “The total compensation admissible then comes to Rs.900 " plus Rs.500, plus Rs.50, plus Rs.5,274 or Rs.6,724. It is " said that the compound wall was constructed after the scheme " was notified, but I do not see any act of bad faith on the part " of the owner. I would award Rs.6,724." Again it is apparent that in each of these cases the officer awarded a specific sum in respect of the land. The appellant was not satisfied with the sums awarded by the officer, and applied, under s. 18 of the Act of 1894, as modified by the Act of 1919, for reference of the amount of compensation to the Court of the Improvement Trust Tribunal at Allahabad. Their Lordships find no justification for the suggestion that the tribunal awarded no compensation for these four pieces of land. The only sentence in the judgments of the tribunal which at first sight appears to justify this suggestion occurs in the judgment of the President in regard to the first piece of land. Their Lordships find no justification for the suggestion that the tribunal awarded no compensation for these four pieces of land. The only sentence in the judgments of the tribunal which at first sight appears to justify this suggestion occurs in the judgment of the President in regard to the first piece of land. After referring to Secretary of State for India v. Makhan Das (I. L. R. 50 A. 470.) he observed " The applicant has failed to prove that he was " getting any fruits from the trees standing in the garden, " consequently he cannot get any compensation for the land " that is lying vacant and is being used as a place of resort " and garden/ Taken by itself, this sentence would appear to justify the appellants suggestion, but the remainder of the judgment shows that the President accepted as " correct and 11 reasonable " the rental of Rs.6o per month which had been found by the officer to be the fair monthly rental for the house and garden. Having accepted this rental as fair and reasonable the President continued " The annual rent is Rs.720, it " should be multiplied by i6f, that is 720 x 50/3 Rs.12,000 " The market-value will thus come to Rs.12,000 and " compulsory acquisition comes to Rs. 1,800. Thus the total " will come to Rs.13,800. I therefore allow Rs.2,300 more to u the applicant in addition to the sum already awarded by the " learned land acquisition officer/ It is plain that the President, like the officer, rightly treated the building and garden as one property, and increased the valuation which the officer had placed on that property. The President appears to have overlooked this fact when he made the observation first quoted above. As to the other three pieces of land, the tribunal clearly awarded compensation in respect of each of them. The appellant appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. The President appears to have overlooked this fact when he made the observation first quoted above. As to the other three pieces of land, the tribunal clearly awarded compensation in respect of each of them. The appellant appealed to the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. In their judgment, the learned judges of that court first referred to the first piece of land, and observed " The " method which should be adopted for calculating the market-" value in the case of property which is in the occupation of the " proprietor, and is not being put to the use of earning any " income, on the material date, raises a question which is not " altogether free from difficulty, and we might have been " inclined to consider the suggestion that the matter should " be referred to a larger Bench if the evidence produced by the " appellant in the case before us had not, in our judgment, been " entirely worthless." The court then went on to review the evidence, and continued " The result is that the appellants case fails on the " merits and it is not necessary to consider the question of law " raised by learned counsel. In our judgment the method " adopted by the tribunal for calculating the compensation " to be awarded to the appellant was, in all the circumstances " of these cases, the only satisfactory method that could be " adopted” The court then mentioned the other three pieces of land in question, and continued "Learned counsel for " the appellant has stated that there is no other evidence " on which he can rely for the purposes of these cases and that " there are no fresh points which he proposes to raise. For " the reasons given above we have come to the conclusion that " these appeals are without force." The result is that there is no foundation for the appellants contention that he was awarded no compensation in respect of these four pieces of land. Turning to the appellants second contention, their Lordships are unable to find that any wrong principle was applied by the tribunal in assessing the market-value of these pieces of land. Turning to the appellants second contention, their Lordships are unable to find that any wrong principle was applied by the tribunal in assessing the market-value of these pieces of land. [His Lordship referred to the material sub-sections of s. 23 of the Act of 1894, as amended by the Act of 1919, and continued] Their Lordships are unable to find that either the officer or the tribunal failed to assess the market-value according to the use to which these four pieces of land were put at the relevant date. The value placed on them by the officer appears to have been the market value so assessed, and the officer made his awards before the case of Secretary of State for India v. Makhan Das (I. L. R. 50 A. 470.) had been decided. The tribunal appears to have adopted the same method of valuation, though it would appear that the assessors would have liked to adopt a more generous scale of compensation. Reference was made, however, by the President and assessors of the tribunal, and also by the High Court, to the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of State for India v. Makhan Das (I. L. R. 50 A. 470.), and the judges of the High Court expressed their agreement with the decision of the Full Bench in that case. Their Lordships accordingly think it desirable to say that certain observations in the judgment of Lindsay J. (with which Sulaiman J. and Mukerji J. agreed) in Makhan Das case (i) cannot be supported. Lindsay J. appears to have taken the view that under s. 23 of the Act of 1894, as amended by the Act of 1919, %the market-value of land must be treated as being nil if the owner was not deriving any profit from the land at the relevant date. He continued " It need hardly be pointed out " that such an enactment is fraught with much possible hard-" ship to owners of property which has become subject to the " operation of the Act. Lands of great value may, from a “variety of causes, fall temporarily out of use. Agricultural “land may have to be left fallow for a season or two in order “that it may recover productivity. Lands of great value may, from a “variety of causes, fall temporarily out of use. Agricultural “land may have to be left fallow for a season or two in order “that it may recover productivity. Or the owner of a valuable " site acquired for a building scheme may have to suspend the " execution of his project in order, for example, to contest in " court a claim to a right of way over the land. In either case “the owner is liable to be expropriated without compensation " if a notification issues under the Act while the land is not " being put to actual use. " It is difficult to imagine that cases of this kind were in " contemplation when the Act was passed, but the language of " the Act, as it stands, must, if followed, lead to these results. " It must be left, therefore, to the legislature to declare whether " it was intended to invest the Improvement authorities with " this power of confiscation, or to amend the Act so as to avoid " the results above mentioned " (Ibid. 474.). It would appear that, in the view of the Full Bench in Makhan Das case (I. L. R. 50 A. 470.), neither a plot of land used by its owner as a garden at the relevant date, nor a plot of agricultural land lying fallow at the relevant date, is being put to any " use " within the meaning of s. 23, because the owner is deriving no profit therefrom ; consequently, in the view of the Full Bench, the owner is not entitled to any compensation on its compulsory acquisition. Their Lordships are unable to assent to this view. On the true construction of s. 23 the former plot ought to be valued as a garden and the latter plot ought to be valued as agricultural land. The effect of s. 23, sub-s. 3 (a), of the Act of 1894 as so amended is that the possibility of the garden or agricultural plot being used (e.g.) for building purposes in the future must be disregarded. It is significant that sub-cl. (b) of that sub-section makes provision for the case of the owner having taken active steps and incurred expenditure to secure a more profitable use of the land. It is significant that sub-cl. (b) of that sub-section makes provision for the case of the owner having taken active steps and incurred expenditure to secure a more profitable use of the land. In such a case the owner may be paid " further compensation based on his actual loss." Apart from such a case, only the present use of the land can be considered for the purpose of arriving at the market-value. There may be cases in which the officer, or the tribunal, could properly assess the market-value of the land acquired at nil, but their Lordships do not find it necessary to discuss that matter; each of the four pieces of land in question in this appeal clearly has a market-value. A value was placed on each of these pieces of land by the officer and by the tribunal, and that value appears to have been assessed in accordance with the statutory provisions. Accordingly, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these consolidated appeals should be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the respondent.