The Chief Justice:-The appellant applied on the Original Side of this Court for an order under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act against the Provincial Textile Commissioner, Madras. The application was dismissed. Hence the appeal. The appellant is a limited liability company which carries on a cotton spinning business in Madura. Under its memorandum of association it has also power to carry on business in weaving, but it has done no wearing itself, although in recent times it has had under contract some of its own yarn woven into cloth on handlooms within its own premises and on privately owned handlooms in the Madura, Ramnad and Tinnevelly districts. On the 20th February, 1946, the respondent issued an order under clause 18-B(1)(b) of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1945, directing the appellant to confine its delivery of yarn to three categories of persons, namely:. (1) Licensed yarn dealers, (2) consumers who had purchased yarn directly from the appellant during the basic period, 1940-42, and (3) persons working handlooms erected in the appellant’s spinning mill at Madura. The handlooms in the mill admittedly belong to the appellant, but they are worked by persons who are paid at piece rates for weaving yarn supplied by the appellant. In spite of the fact that this order in effect prohibited the appellant delivering yarn to owners of handlooms situate outside the mill premises, the appellant continued to deliver yarn to such weavers. The yarn so delivered was not sold to the weavers. It was delivered to them on the condition that the cloth woven from it remained the property of the appellant, the weavers being remunerated for their labour at specified rates. The respondent considered this course to be an infringement of his order of the 20th February, 1946, and seized certain quantities of yarn which the appellant had delivered to outside weavers. This led to the appellant filing the petition for an order against the respondent under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act. The appellant contended that the respondent had no power to prohibit it from delivering yarn to outside weavers on terms of bailment and therefore his order was illegal. The application was heard by Kunhi Raman, J., who rejected it. We agree with the decision of the learned Judge. It is only necessary for us to consider two clauses of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1945. The application was heard by Kunhi Raman, J., who rejected it. We agree with the decision of the learned Judge. It is only necessary for us to consider two clauses of the Cotton Cloth and Yarn Control Order, 1945. The clauses are 18-A and 18-B. They read as follows: " 18-A (1). No manufacturer shall, save in accordance with a general or special permission of the Textile Commissioner or in compliance with a direction given under clause 18-B(a) sell or agree to sell cloth or yarn to any person who (i) is not alicensed dealer under the rules framed in this behalf by the Provincial Government and (ii) did not as a dealer buy any cloth or yarn from him at any time during the years 1940, 1941 and 1942; (b) during any quarter deliver to any dealer, whether in pursuance of a pre-existing contract or otherwise, cloth or yarn in excess of his quota determined under sub-clause (2). (2) For purposes of sub-clause (1)(b), a dealer’s quota of cloth shall bear to the value of the total deliveries of cloth made to all dealers during the quarter by the manufacturer concerned the same proportion as the value of the total deliveries of cloth made to that dealer during the years 1940, 1941 and 1942 bore to the value of the total deliveries made to all dealers during the same years by the same manufacturer, and a dealer’s quota of yarn shall be similarly determined. (3) Every manufacturer shall maintain a register of contracts and deliveries and shall submit returns in such form and at such time as the Textile Commissioner may prescribe. 18-B (1). (3) Every manufacturer shall maintain a register of contracts and deliveries and shall submit returns in such form and at such time as the Textile Commissioner may prescribe. 18-B (1). The Textile Commissioner may, with a view to securing a proper distribution of cloth or yarn or with a a view to securing compliance with this order, direct any manufacturer or dealer, or any class of manufacurers or dealers- (2) to sell to such person or persons such quantities of cloth, or yarn as the Textile Commissioner may specify; (6) not to sell or deliver cloth or yarn of a specified description except to such person or persons and subject to such conditions as the Textile Commissioner may specify; (c) to furnish such returns or other information relating to his or their undertaking, and in such manner, as the Textile Commissioner may specify; and may issue such further instruction as he thinks fit regarding the manner in which the direction is to be carried out; (2) Every manufacturer or dealer shall comply with the directions and instructions given under sub-clause (1). For the appellant it is said that clauses 18-A and 18-B must be read together and that as clause 18-A only refers to contracts for sale of cloth or yarn, clause 18 B(1)(b) must also be deemed to relate only to contracts for sale. As the contracts entered into with the owners of looms outside the mill were not contracts for the sale of yarn, but merely contracts of bailment, there could be, it is contended no infringement of the law. We are unable to accept this argument. Clause 18-B stands quite apart from clause 18-A. Its provisions are self-contained and there is no ambiguity in the wording. What clause 18-B(1)(b) says is that the Textile Commissioner may with a view to securing a proper distribution of cloth or yarn, or with a view to securing compliance with the order, direct a manufacturer or dealer not to sell or deliver cloth or yarn of a specified description except to such person or persons and subject to such conditions as he may specify. The respondent has not travelled beyond this authority. He has given the appellant the right to supply yarn to persons of specified categories; but these categories do not include outside handloom owners. The respondent has not travelled beyond this authority. He has given the appellant the right to supply yarn to persons of specified categories; but these categories do not include outside handloom owners. It is true that the contracts which the appellant entered into with these persons were not contracts for the sale of yarn, but under the arrangements made with them the appellant “delivered” yarn to them. There being delivery of yarn and as the delivery was in contravention of the order of the 20th February, 1946, the respondent had the right to take action. In fact the appellant was guilty of an offence which justified the respondent in seizing the yarn delivered in contravention of his order. There were further arguments raised before Kunhi Raman, J., but it is not necessary for us to discuss them. We have said sufficient to show that an application under section 45 of the Specific Relief Act did not lie. The appeal is dismissed with costs which we fix at Rs. 500. K.C. ------ Appeal dismissed.