JUDGMENT Bind Basni Prasad, J. - This is an appeal from an order passed by the learned Additional Civil Judge of Benares returning a plaint for presentation to the proper Court. His finding is that the suit was not cognizable by the civil Court but by the revenue Court. The material facts are as follows : 2. On 4-2-1922, His Highness the Maharaja of Benares granted a lease of 33.71 acres of agricultural land to the plaintiff's husband, Ganga Dut and Jangi Dasondhi, defendant 3, on an annual rent of Rs. 350. The lessees entered into the possession of the property and were regularly paying the rent to the Maharaja. On 6-11-1930, the plaintiff's husband died and then she along with Jagni continued in possession of the land. Now the plaintiff alleges that being a purdanashin lady she entrusted the management of the property to Shankar Nath, defendant 4, who is related to her. In 1933, the plaintiff alleges that she went to the district of Damoh in the Central Provinces to live with her parents and the defendants were fully aware of her address of that place. Now Iqbal Narain Singh defendant 1, in the present case, was the thekadar of this village from the Maharaja of Benares, and as such had a right to collect rent from the tenants including the plaintiff and Jangi. She alleged that defendants 1, 3 and 4, conspired to deprive the plaintiff of her rights in the disputed land and, with that end in view the thekedar, defendant l, brought Suit No. 287 of 1933 for the arrears of rent against the plaintiff and Jangi and obtained a decree for the same. It is said that this decree was fraudulently obtained inasmuch as the plaintiff's address was wrongly given therein and she was never informed of the proceedings of that suit. The plaintiff goes on to say that defendant 1 put the decree for arrears of rent into execution and got the plaintiff and the defendant 3 ejected from the disputed land. Further to make a show of the bona fides of the decree defendant 1 got Jangi to file an application before the Maharaja of Benares in 1935 for the grant of a fresh lease in favour of himself and the plaintiff. Further to make a show of the bona fides of the decree defendant 1 got Jangi to file an application before the Maharaja of Benares in 1935 for the grant of a fresh lease in favour of himself and the plaintiff. That application was, however, not granted and subsequently defendant 1, who had been from the beginning working up in this direction achieved his purpose by obtaining a patta of the disputed land from the Maharaja of Benares on 14-10-1936. It is alleged that all the proceedings beginning with the institution of the suit for the arrears of rent right upto the grant of the patta in favour of Iqbal Narain Singh, defendant 1, were fraudulent and as such void and ineffectual. The plaintiff states that she came to know of all these proceedings in July, 1938, when she returned to Benares. She made an application to the revenue Court for the review of the ejectment decree but it was dismissed. An application in revision filed by her before the Commissioner was also dismissed. She then brought a suit in forma pauperis in which she claimed the following reliefs : (a) With a declaration that decree No. 287 of 1933 passed by the revenue Court in the suit, Maharaja of Benares v. Mst. Ram Kuar, the ejectment proceedings in execution of it and the grant of the lease to defendant 1, are fraudulent and that defendant 1, has acquired no title under them; defendant 1 may be ejected from the disputed land and possession may be given to the plaintiff. (b) Rs. 300 for the past messe profits and Rs. 100 per annum for future mesne profits be awarded. (c) Costs of the suit may be awarded against defendant 1 or against such of the defendants as may be found liable. 3. By a careful judgment, the learned Additional Civil Judge held that the suit was barred by Ss. 59 and 183, read with S. 242, V.P. Tenancy Act, 1989. In the result he directed that the plaint be returned for proper presentation. The plaintiff prefers this appeal against that order. Now S. 59, U.P. Tenancy Act, provides as follows : 59. (1) Any person claiming to be a tenant or a joint tenant may sue the landholder for a declaration that he is a tenant or for a declaration of his share in such joint tenancy. The plaintiff prefers this appeal against that order. Now S. 59, U.P. Tenancy Act, provides as follows : 59. (1) Any person claiming to be a tenant or a joint tenant may sue the landholder for a declaration that he is a tenant or for a declaration of his share in such joint tenancy. (2) In any suit under this section any person claiming to hold through the landholder, whether as tenant or otherwise, shall be joined as a party. 4. Section 183, U.P. Tenancy Act provides for the remedies of a tenant ejected from, or prevented from obtaining possession of his holding, otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law for the time being in force. Under this section, he can bring a suit for possession of the holding and for compensation for wrongful dispossession. Section 242, Tenancy Act provides that all suits and applications of the nature specified in the Fourth Schedule shall be heard and determined only by a Revenue Court. 5. Now suits under Ss. 59 and 183 appear at serials Nos. 5 and 19 respectively in Group B of the Fourth Schedule annexed to the U.P. Tenancy Act. The whole question, therefore, is whether or not the present suit can be said to be one under the provisions of Ss. 59 and 183. Stripped of all its verbiage, the suit is essentially one for a declaration of the plaintiff's title as a co-tenant of the disputed plot with Jangi and for possession of the same. The allegations contained in the plaint clearly amount to the contention that she was dispossessed of the disputed land "otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the law." The facts of this case are parallel with those of Ram Dihal Dubey Vs. Gajraj Updahya and Others, AIR 1935 All 499 That was also a case in which the plaintiff sued for a declaration that an ejectment order passed against him in favour of the defendant had been fraudulently obtained and was as such ineffectual. Despite the allegation of fraud, it was held that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court, but should have been brought in the revenue Court. It was remarked that an ejectment brought about by fraudulent proceedings was tantamount to an ejectment otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Despite the allegation of fraud, it was held that the suit was not cognizable by the Civil Court, but should have been brought in the revenue Court. It was remarked that an ejectment brought about by fraudulent proceedings was tantamount to an ejectment otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Learned counsel for the appellant questions the correctness of that ruling. He contends that when there is a relief for a declaration that the proceedings in the arrears of rent suit were tainted with fraud the suit is cognizable only by the Civil Court. The essence of the relief claimed by the plaintiff is really a declaration of her tenancy right and restoration of possession to her as such. The obstacle in her way is the proceedings in the arrears of rent suit and the subsequent grant of patta to defendant 1, and she wants to overcome them on the allegation of fraud. In determining the jurisdiction of the civil and the revenue Court, we must see the pith and the substance of the relief and not to its form. The grounds upon which the relief is based are immaterial. The substance of the relief claimed in the present suit really falls within the purview of Ss. 59 and 183, U.P. Tenancy Act. As such the suit was cognizable by the revenue Court only. There is no legal bar to the revenue Court going into the allegations of fraud made by the plaintiff. We agree with the conclusion arrived at by the lower Court. In the result the appeal fails and it is hereby dismissed with costs.