Lord Justice Morton.-These consolidated appeals are from three decrees of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad dated the 27th November, 1941, affirming three decrees of the Court of the Improvement Trust Tribunal, Allahabad, dated the 27th April, 1934, whereby, in respect of the compulsory acquisition of certain lands and buildings belonging to the appellant, he was awarded as compensation certain sums of money. The appellant contends that the sums awarded to him by the Tribunal were insufficient, in that they did not include any compensation for the acquisition of the following four pieces of land: (1) The garden of House No. 8, Mohalla Chak, Allahabad. (2) 504 square yards of Parti land with enclosure wall known as No. 32, Mohalla Chah-Chand, Allahabad. (3) Land with a long shed on one side of it known as No. 13, Mohalla Mahajani Tola, Allahabad. (4) Parti land No. 22, Mohalla Mahajani Tola, Allahabad. The appellant further contends that the Tribunal relying upon the Full Bench decision of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of State v. Makhan Das1, took an erroneous view as to the construction of section 23(3)(a) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Act No. I of 1894) as amended by the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919 (U. P. Act No. VIII of 1919). The respondent on the other hand, contends that if the facts are carefully examined it will be found that the appellant was awarded compensation in respect of each of these four pieces of land, and that in assessing such compensation the Tribunal did not apply any wrong principle. 1. (1928) I.L.R. 50 All. 470 (F.B.). It is, therefore, necessary for their Lordships to examine in some detail the facts in regard to each of these four pieces of land. [After discussing the facts their Lordships proceeded]: The result is that there is no foundation for the appellant’s contention that he was awarded no compensation in respect of these four pieces of land. Turning to the appellant’s second contention, their Lordships are unable to find that any wrong principle was applied by the Tribunal in assessing the market-value of these pieces of land. Turning to the appellant’s second contention, their Lordships are unable to find that any wrong principle was applied by the Tribunal in assessing the market-value of these pieces of land. The material sub-sections of section 23 of the Act of 1894, as amended by the Act of 1919, are as follows: “(1) In determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under this Act, the Court shall take into consideration: First the market-value of the” land at the date of the first publication of the notification under section 36 of the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919. * * * * * * * * (2) In addition to the market-value of the land as above provided, the Court shall in every case award a sum of fifteen per centum on such market-value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition: Provided that this sub-section shall not apply to any land acquired under the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 1919, except: * * * * * * * * (b) buildings in the actual occupation of the owner or occupied free of rent by a relative of the owner, and land appurtenant thereto, and (c) gardens not let to tenants but used by the owners as a place of resort. (3) For the purposes of clause first of sub-section (1) of this section: (a) the market-value of the land shall be the market-value according to the use to which the land was put at the date with reference to which the market-value is to be determined under that clause. (b) If it be shown that before such date the owner of the land had in good faith taken active steps and incurred expenditure to secure a more profitable use of the same, further compensation based on his actual loss may be paid to him.“ Their Lordships are unable to find that either the Officer or the Tribunal failed to assess the market-value according to the use to which these four pieces of land were put at the relevant date. The value placed upon them by the Officer appears to have been the market-value so assessed, and the Officer made his awards before the case of Secretary of State v. Makhan Das 1 , had been decided. The value placed upon them by the Officer appears to have been the market-value so assessed, and the Officer made his awards before the case of Secretary of State v. Makhan Das 1 , had been decided. The Tribunal appears to have adopted the same method of valuation, though it would appear that the Assessors would have liked to adopt a more generous scale of compensation. Reference was made, however, by the President and Assessors of the Tribunal, and also by the High Court, to the decision of the Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Secretary of State v. Makhan Das1, and the Judges of the High Court expressed their agreement with the decision of the Full Bench in that case. Their Lordships accordingly think it desirable to say that certain observations in the judgment of Lindsay, J. (with which Sulaiman, J. and Mukerji, J., agreed) in Makhan Das’ case1 cannot be supported. Lindsay, J., appears to have taken the view that under section 23 of the Act of 1894, as amended by the Act of 1919,. the market-value of land must be treated as being nil if the owner was not deriving any profit from the land at the relevant date. He continued: ” It need hardly be pointed out that such an enactment is fraught with much possible hardship to owners of property which has become subject to the operations of the Act. Lands of great value may, from variety of causes, fall temporarily out of use. Agricultural land may have to be left fallow for a season or two in order that it may recover productivity. Or the owner of a valuable site acquired for a building scheme may have to suspend the execution of his project in order, for example, to contest in Court a claim to a right of way over the land. In either case the owner is liable to be expropriated without compensation if a notification issues under the Act while the land is not being put to actual use. It is difficult to imagine that cases of this kind were in contemplation when the Act was passed. but the language of the Act, as it stands, must, if followed, lead to these results. It is difficult to imagine that cases of this kind were in contemplation when the Act was passed. but the language of the Act, as it stands, must, if followed, lead to these results. It must be left, therefore, to the Legislature to declare whether it was intended to invest the Improvement authorities with this power of confiscation, or to amend the Act so as to avoid the results above-mentioned." It would appear that, in the view of the Full Bench in Makhan Das’ case1 neither a plot of land used by its owner as a garden at the relevant date, nor a plot of agricultural land lying fallow at the relevant date, is being put to any "use" within the meaning of section 23, because the owner is deriving no profit therefrom; consequently, in the view of the Full Bench, the owner is not entitled to any compensation on its compulsory acquisition. Their Lordships are unable to assent to this view. On the true construction of section 23 the former plot ought to be valued as a garden and the latter plot ought to be valued as agricultural land. The effect of section 23(3)(a) of the Act of 1894 as so amended is that the possibility of the garden or agricultural plot being used (e.g.) for building purposes in the future must be disregarded. It is significant that sub-clause (b) of that sub-section makes provision for the case of the owner having taken active steps and incurred expenditure to secure a more profitable use of the land. In such a case the owner may be paid "further compensation based on his actual loss". Apart from such a case, only the present use of the land can be considered for the purpose of arriving at the market-value. There may be cases in which the Officer, or the Tribunal, could properly assess the market-value of the land acquired at nil, but their Lordships do not find it necessary to discuss that matter; each of the four pieces of land in question in this appeal clearly has a market-value. A value was placed on each of these pieces of land by the Officer and by the Tribunal and that value appears to have been assessed in accordance with the statutory provisions. Accordingly, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these consolidated appeals should be dismissed. A value was placed on each of these pieces of land by the Officer and by the Tribunal and that value appears to have been assessed in accordance with the statutory provisions. Accordingly, their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that these consolidated appeals should be dismissed. The appellant must pay the costs of the respondent. Solicitors for the Appellant: T. L. Wilson & Co Solicitors for the Respondent: The Solicitor, India Office. H.J.U./V.S. ----- Appeal dismissed.