JUDGMENT Kaul, J. - Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 1945 preferred by Kishan Lal Gupta and Criminal Revision No. 201 of 1945 preferred by the Paramount Insurance Company, Ltd., arise out of the same trial and may conveniently be disposed of by one common order. 2. There was an Insurance Company, known as the Gujrat Life Assurance Company, Ltd., which Subsequently came to be known as the Paramount Insurance Company, Ltd., Baroda. B.P Oudhbal was its secretary in 1944. Kishan Lal Gupta (the Appellant in Appeal No. 350 of 1945) had been working as a special organizer of the Company for some years on a commission basis with his office at Caw pore. On the 19th April, 1944 a complaint was filed by Oudhbal, Secretary of the Paramount Insurance Company Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the Company) alleging that Kishan Lal Gupta along with a number of other persons named in the complaint had entered into a criminal conspiracy and committed a number of fraud upon the Company. According to the statement of Oudhbal Kishan Lal Gupta secured business to the extent of over Rs. 64,000 between the 19th September, 1938 and the 12th February 1943. This included business relating to policies, whereof the total value come up to Rs. 20,000. The 9 persons who took out the policies happened to die during this interval. 48 policies issued through Kishan Lal Gupta "lapsed". It was further alleged that out of every four insurance policies secured by Kishan Lal Gupta three "lapsed" in the next month, the first quarter or the half year. Kishan Lal Gupta used to deduct 60 percent from the first premium on account of his commission and debited the balance due to the Company from him an advance. Suspicions of the Company authorities were aroused and it was discovered that in the nine policies, in respect of which claims were made, the policy holders were "either too old or too sick to be insured" except in the case of Mohiinmal Wazir. Mohammad Wazir, one of the policy holders, was falsely alleged by Kishan Lal Gupta to have died while as a matter of fact he was living, and this fact was known to Kishan Lal Gupta. Mohammad Wazir, one of the policy holders, was falsely alleged by Kishan Lal Gupta to have died while as a matter of fact he was living, and this fact was known to Kishan Lal Gupta. That in order to cheat the Company Kishan Lal Gupta and his associates had used forged documents and were guilty of offences under Sections 416, 417, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Sections 120-B and 109, Indian Penal Code. 3. of the 9 persons named in the complaint as members of the conspiracy to which reference has already bean made three (Markand Lal Gupta, Kedar Nath Gupta and Jagannath Prasad Gupta) could not be served with summonses. The case against Dr. S.G. Gupta was withdrawn by the prosecution Moti Lal Gupta was discharged by the Magistrate for want of evidence. The remaining four accused, Kishan Lal Gupta, his uncle Dabi Charan Gupta, his father-in-law Badri Prasad Gupta, and Rarn Sahai Gupta, uncle of the first wife of Kishan Lal Gupta were committed to Sessions to take their trail for offences under Sections 120-B, 419, 420 and 471, Indian Penal Code They were charged at the trial as follows: Firstly.-That they between the period from August 1938 to December 194J at Lucknow, agreed to do or cause to be done an illeged act to wit obtaining money by cheating from the Gujrat Life Assurance Company Ltd., afterwards known as the Paramount Company Ltd., Raopura Road, Baroda and thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 120-B, Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions. Secondly.-That they in pursuance of the aforesaid criminal conspiracy on or about 5th August 1931 knowingly substituted or caused to be substituted some lady for Mst. Lukai Devi alias Anna Devi, mother of Ram Sahai accused c/o Ram Sahai Salig Ram Gupta, Husainganj, Lucknow, when the real Lukai alias Anna Devi was to be examined medically by Dr. S.C. Gupta of Cawnpore for the purpose of Insurance with the Paramount Insurance Company Ltd., Broda; that they on or about 25th October, 1941 knowingly substituted or caused to be substituted some person for Ishwari Prasad Upadhya of Mitrai Pokhra Nepali Kothi Benares when the real Ishwari Prasad Upadhya was to be medically examined by Dr. S.C. Gupta of Cawnpore for the purpose of Insurance with the Paramount Insurance Company Ltd., Broda; that they on or about 25th October, 1941 knowingly substituted or caused to be substituted some person for Ishwari Prasad Upadhya of Mitrai Pokhra Nepali Kothi Benares when the real Ishwari Prasad Upadhya was to be medically examined by Dr. R.N. Mathur of Cawnpore for the purpose of insurance with the Paramount Insurance Company Ltd., Barodar that they on or about 14-5-45 knowingly substituted or caused to be substituted some lady for Mst. Dilgiri Devi c/o Messrs. Jokhoo Mal Jagannath Prasad Agrahari Ramnagar Benares State, when the real Dilgiri Devi was to be medically examined by Dr. R.N. Mathur of Cawnpore for the purpose of Insurance with the Paramount Insurance Company Ltd., Baroda; that they on or about 21-1-1942 knowingly substituted or caused to be substituted some lady for Mst, Kamla Devi second year Normal Plshach Mochan The Arya Mabila Vidalay Normal High School Beanies, when the said Kamla Devi was to be medically examined by Dr. R.N. Mathur of Cawnpore for the purpose of insurance with the Paramount Insurance Company Ltd. Baroda, and thereby committed an offence u/s 419 Indian Penal Code and within the cogaizmce of the Court of Sessions. 4. Thirdly.-that they during the period from August 1938 to December 1942, in pursuance of the aforesaid criminal conspiracy cheated the Gujrat Life Assurance Company Ltd, afterwards known as the Paramount Insurance Company Ltd., Baroda, and thereby dishonestly induced the said company to make insurance policies in the names of Saktoo Ram c/o Debi Charan Gupta (accused) Messrs. Kallo Mai Satya Narain, Nayaganj, Cawnpore, of Hazai Lal Gupta, Shivpore Benares, of Badri Prasad Gupta (accused) Oil Tank Bargaon, Gonda, of Baldeo Prasad, Shivpore Benares of Lukai Devi alias Anna Devi c/o Ram Sahai (accused) Salig Ram Gupta Hasaingmj Lucknow of Istuvari Prasad Upadhya Nepali Kothi Misri Pokhra Benares of Dilgiri Devi c/o Messrs. Kallo Mai Satya Narain, Nayaganj, Cawnpore, of Hazai Lal Gupta, Shivpore Benares, of Badri Prasad Gupta (accused) Oil Tank Bargaon, Gonda, of Baldeo Prasad, Shivpore Benares of Lukai Devi alias Anna Devi c/o Ram Sahai (accused) Salig Ram Gupta Hasaingmj Lucknow of Istuvari Prasad Upadhya Nepali Kothi Misri Pokhra Benares of Dilgiri Devi c/o Messrs. Jokhoo Mal Jagannath Prasad Agtahan, Ramnagar Benares State, of Kamla Devi second year Normal Pishach Mochan, The Arya Mahila Vidyalay Normal High School Benares, and which policies amount to valuable security and that they further cheated the said Company by dishonestly inducing the said Company to deliver the insurance policies to Saktoo Ram, to Hazari Lal Gupta, to Badri Prasad, to Baldso Prasad Gupta, to Lukai Devi Gupta alias Anna Devi, to Ishwari Prasad, to Dilgiri Devi, to Kamla Devi, and they further dishonestly induced the said Company to deliver to Mst. Kamla Devi w/o Hazari Lal Gupta Shivpore Benares and Mst. Parbati w/o Baldeo Prasad Gupta Shivpore Bennres a sum of Rs. 2.000 in respect of the policy of Hazari Lal Gupta and Rs. 1,000 to Ram Sahai Gupta Husainganj, Lucknow (accused) in respect of the policy of his mother Mst. Lukai Devi alias Anna Devi, and that they thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 420 Indian Penal Code and Fourthly,-that they between the period from August 1928 to December 1942, in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy fraudulently and dishonestly used as genome certain document to wit Exh. 9 Proposal of Hazari Lal Gupta, Exh. 8, Proposal (second) of Hazari Lal Gupta, Exh. 10. Friends' Report of Hazari Lal Gupta, Exh. 12, Agency Report of Hazari Lal, Exh. 24, preliminary claim Form of Baldeo Prasad Gupta, Exh. 20. Health Declaration of Baldeo Prasad Gupta, Exh. 43A, Assignment Policy of Lukai Devi, Exh. 44, Copy of Assignment of Lukai Devi, Exh 39 Receipt of Cheque-Payment, Exh. 42, claim Discharge Form of Lukai Devi, Exh, 199, Cheque on Bank of India, Exh. 158. letter of K.L. Gupta dated 4-11-1941, Exh. 64A, Agency report of Dilgiri Devi, Exh, 64B, Proposal of Dilgiri Devi, Exh. 65 Female Query Form of Dilgiri Devi, Exh 69, Claim Note of Dilgiri Devi, Exh. 72, Proof of Death of Dilgiri Devi. Exh. 59, Agent's report of Ishwari Prasad Upadhya, Exh. 175, Health Declaration of Kamla Devi Gupta Exh 176, Proposal of Kamla Devi Gupta, Exh. 64A, Agency report of Dilgiri Devi, Exh, 64B, Proposal of Dilgiri Devi, Exh. 65 Female Query Form of Dilgiri Devi, Exh 69, Claim Note of Dilgiri Devi, Exh. 72, Proof of Death of Dilgiri Devi. Exh. 59, Agent's report of Ishwari Prasad Upadhya, Exh. 175, Health Declaration of Kamla Devi Gupta Exh 176, Proposal of Kamla Devi Gupta, Exh. 118, Medical Report of Kamla Devi Exh. 157, Setter of K.L. Gupta dated 13-10-1941, Exh. 66, medical report of Dilgni Devi, Exh. 97, Health Declaration of Dilgiri Devi, Exh. 71, Certificate of Identity of Dilgiri Devi, Exh. 73, Certificate of Buriai of Dilgiri Devi, Exh 74, Employer's certificate of Dilgiri Devi, Exti. 161, Agent's Report of Mohammad Wazir. and other documents which they knew or had reason to believe at the time they used them, to be forged documents and that they thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 471 Indian Penal Code and within the cognizance of the Court of Sessions. 5. Charges under Sections 419, 420 and 471 Indian Penal Code, were tried by jury and the charge u/s 120-B with the aid of assessors. The jury, with whom the Judge agreed, by an unanimous verdict held all the accused, except Kishan Lal Gupta, not guilty, and they were accordingly acquitted. They were further unanimously of opinion that Kishan Lal Gupta, was guilty of every one of these three offences. The Judge agreed with this verdict and convicted him. He was held guilty of having committed these offences in relation to the insurance policies of Dilgiri Devi and Mohammad Wazir He was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 18 months u/s 419, Indian Penal Code. and three years' rigorous imprisonment for each of the two other offences under Sections 420 and 471, Indian Penal Code, of which he was held guilty. All the sentences were to run concurrently. All the accused were acquitted of the charge u/s 120-B Indian Penal Code. 6. Appeal No. 350 of 1945 was filed by Kishan Lal Gupta, against his conviction while criminal revision No 201 of 1945 was filed by the Paramount Insurance Company, Ltd., through its Secretary B.P. Oudhbal, praying that the order of acquittal passed in favour of Baclri Prasad, Debi Charan, and Ram Sahai be set aside and that Kishan Lal Gupta be retried in respect of the charges in relation to which he was held to be not gulity. 7. 7. I will take up the appeal first. It was contended by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant that the learned Sessions Judge's charge to the jury was bad on multifarious grounds. He urged that the learned Judge had in disregard of the provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, failed to explain the law to the jury. had omitted to tell them that the accused before them were entitled to the benefit of any reasonable doubt that might be entertained as to their guilt, that be permitted inadmissible evidence to be brought on record which materially prejudiced the Appellant, that he wrongly admitted the evidence of a number of witnesses on record at the trial u/s 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, that he tailed to put to the jury a number of documents which were relied on by Kishan Lal Gupta, that an alleged confession made by Kishan Lal Gupta, which in the Judge's opinion was induced by a promise of some advantage to him was put before the jury, that the charges framed against the Appellant were vague confused to a decree, and related in material prejudice to him. He rather argued that the Sessions judge of Lucknow had no jurisdiction to try the case and the rail was bad for misjoinder of charges. 8. I do not intend to go into a detailed examination of all the evidence that was read out to me at the hearing or all the circumstances to which my attention was invited by the counsel for the Appellant to substantiate his arguments. I may say however, that many of the points raised on behalf of the Appellant are not without substances and that the charge to the jury unfortunately leaves much to be desired. The learned Assistant Government Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the Crown, had to concede this. In fact he supported the application for revision filed by the Secretary of the Paramount Insurance Company, Ltd., for quashing the order of acquittal of the other accused and requested that the re-trial of all of them should be ordered. 9. The learned Assistant Government Advocate, who appeared on behalf of the Crown, had to concede this. In fact he supported the application for revision filed by the Secretary of the Paramount Insurance Company, Ltd., for quashing the order of acquittal of the other accused and requested that the re-trial of all of them should be ordered. 9. I will, however, make a few observations with regard to some of the defects in the charge to the jury which must be deemed to have caused prejudice to the Appellant u/s 297 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a case tried by jury it is the duty of the Court to sum up the evidence for the prosecution and defense and lay down the law by which the Jury are to be guided. There are two points of material importance which are always,-at any rate should always be-borne in mind every jury trial. The Judge should explain to the jurors the constituent elements of the offence or offences with which the prisoner is charged. In this connection it has been held over and over again that it is not sufficient to read out to the jurors the definition from the Indian Penal Code. It should be put before them in a form to enable them to form an intelligent idea as to what conditions must be fulfilled or in other words what facts must be established in relation to the particular case before the Court by the prosecution before the prisoner can be held to be guilty The Judge must further explain to the jury the law relating to criminal trials, an essential principle of which relates to the question of burden of proof. He should tell them in every case that the law presumes every person. charged with an offence to be innocent. It is for the prosecution to establish by legal evidence that he is guilty. He must also explain to them when a charge against an accused person can, according to the principles observed in our Court of law, be said to be established. They should be distinctly told that if they entertained any reasonable doubt: as to the guilt of the prisoner before them, they should as a matter of law hold him not guilty. They should be distinctly told that if they entertained any reasonable doubt: as to the guilt of the prisoner before them, they should as a matter of law hold him not guilty. It was laid down by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in the case of AIR 1933 218 (Privy Council) that it is an essential principle of criminal law that a criminal charge has got to be established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt: and it is essential that the jury should understand this. Unless the Judge makes sure that the jury appreciate their duty in this respect bis omission is as grave an error as active misdirection on the elements of the offence, and a verdict of guilty given by a jury who have not taken this fundamental principle into account is given in a case where the essential forms of justice have been disregarded. In such a case unless it can be predicated that properly directed the jury must have returned the same verdict a substantial miscarriage of justice appears to be established. The omission on the part of the Judge to give direction to the jury as to onus of proof that the accused is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt is material non-direction which vitiates the verdict. 10. The same principle was followed by a Judge of our own Court in Wajid Husain v. King-Emperor 1936 O.W.N. 201. It was laid down that where a Sessions Judge omits to tell the jury in the charge that the benefit of any reasonable doubt that may exist in their minds as to the guilt of any particular accused should be given to that accused, such omission on his part amounts to non-direction that prejudices the case of an accused. It was further laid down that though Section 298(2), Code of Criminal Procedure. authorizes the Judge to express to the jury his opinion on any question of fact in the course of summing up, it is an established rule that the judge should at the same time give the jury to understand that they are not bound by his opinion and should form an independent opinion of their own on questions; of fact. I find that these salutary principles which must be followed in every jury trial were lost sight of by the learned Sessions Judge. I find that these salutary principles which must be followed in every jury trial were lost sight of by the learned Sessions Judge. It is true that while dealing with the case of Kamla Devi's policy the learned Judge has made an observation to the following effect. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof and the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt which has arisen owing to the mystery of Mst. Kamla Devi's identity. 11. But for this stray observation which had special relation to the particular set of facts with which the learned Judge was dealing at the time, the general principle relating to the onus of proof in criminal trials and the effect of the existence of any reasonable do not as to the prisoner's guilt in the minds of the jurors ware not explained to them. Nor did the learned Judge warn the jurors that they were entitled to form their own independent opinion on questions of fact, ana if he expressed any opinion of his own upon such a matter they might take into consideration but were not bound to follow it. In the absence of such an explanation there is every possibility that the jury might accept the opinion of the Judge as something which was binding upon them, and thus fail to exercise their own independent judgment 12. These omissions by themselves are sufficient to render his charge to the jury defective on the ground of non-direction and misdirection. 13. Coming to the frame to the charge I find that the last portion of the charge reads thus. Fourthly-that they between the period from August 19638 to December 1942. in pursuance of the said criminal conspiracy fraudulently and dishonestly used as genuine certain documents to wit (reference is here made to a number of documents) Exh. 161 Agent's report of Mohammad Wazir, and other documents which they knew or had rea3on to believe, at the time they used them, to be lodged documents and that they thereby committed an offence punishable u/s 471, Indian Penal Code, the cognizance of the Court of Sessions 14. The use of the expression "and other documents" without specifying them in a criminal charge is improper. In the absence of such specification the accused can have no idea of the case he had to meet and to which particular documents the reference is made. The use of the expression "and other documents" without specifying them in a criminal charge is improper. In the absence of such specification the accused can have no idea of the case he had to meet and to which particular documents the reference is made. That in the present case prejudice has been caused to the accused by this omission will be seen from the facts I will mention presently. 15. It was a part of the prosecution case that a policy was issued by the paramount Insurance Company Ltd., on an Agent's report, Exh. 152, (This was marked Exh. 101 in the Magistrate's Court and the same number is referred to in the charge) for Rs. 1000. Shortly after this policy was issued, on the basis of a letter alleged to have been received from the policy holder's brother, Khushi Mohammad, (Exh. 159) Kishan Lal Gupta asked the Company to settle his claim. Exh. 169 is the letter which Kishan Lal Gupta is alleged to have received from Khushi Mohammad. It stated that Mohammad Wazir "had been killed in the communal right (riot) of Cawnpore on 28th April, 1941." In Exh. 154, which is Kishan Lal Gupta's letter to the Company, we find the following: We have today taken received back the policy of Md. Wazir along with the premium receipt which had been issued and his brother is ready to return back his claim application on getting Rs. at least 80 -If you accept otherwise he will demand against his policy. We made him understand that in getting claim you have to invest much money and trouble, but it is quite uncertain that you will get claim. But please if you want to decide this claim in such little sum then send the draft as you required and also allow us to pay him confidentially Rs. 80, which not too much. We shall pay this amount from the realised premium from here otherwise not. We do not want to put you loss as could as we can. You know that Muslim are always in favor of giving help to their nation. Please do not lose such golden chance. 16. About the same time that this letter was received the Company received a request direct from Md. Wazir asking for advance of a loan on the security of his policy. You know that Muslim are always in favor of giving help to their nation. Please do not lose such golden chance. 16. About the same time that this letter was received the Company received a request direct from Md. Wazir asking for advance of a loan on the security of his policy. On inquiry they found that Khushi Mohammad had written no letter, that Mohammad Wazir was alive and that Kishan Lal Gupta wanted to cheat the Company of some money in connection with this policy. Khushi Mohammad was examined as a witness and he denied that he had sent any such letter as Exh. 169. Mohammad Wazir was also examined at the trial as a witness to prove that he was alive. What purported to be Khushi Mohammad's letter was not mentioned in the charge framed against the accused nor does it appear to have been put to Kishan Lal Gupta but we find that reference to this document was made in the Sessions Judge's charge to jury. The Appellant's grievance that he has been prejudiced on account of this procedure and the vague character of the charge framed against him cannot, in the circumstances set out above, be said to be without substance. 17. The complaint that the evidence of Mr. Dodd, Exh. 212, of Bindeshri Prasad Exh. 215, of A. N. Mukerji Exh. 213, of Dr. Agarwal Exh. 216, of Abdul Latif Exh. 217 and of some other witnesses was improperly admitted u/s 33 of the Indian Evidence Act. Without going into details in relation to all these witnesses I may observe generally that there is not sufficient material on the record to show that the grounds on which their evidence could be brought on record u/s 33 were satisfactorily established. For instance in Bindesnri Prasad's case it appears that a summons was issued to him, the summons was not received back after service and an order was passed by the learned Judge that his evidence recorded in the Committing Magistrate's Court be read as evidence at the trial because there would be delay in making further attempts to call him as a witness. This was contended by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant. The learned Assistant Government Advocate could not invite my attention to any other material on the record which would go to show that this was not so. This was contended by the Learned Counsel for the Appellant. The learned Assistant Government Advocate could not invite my attention to any other material on the record which would go to show that this was not so. The evidence of certain other witnesses named above is also open to Similar criticism. 18. The learned Judge ought to have put to the jury letters Exhs. A-16, A-17, A-18 and A-28 which, according to Kishan Lal Gupta, were written by Dr. Mathur and relied upon by the accused. 19. Though the Learned Counsel for the Appellant did not give up the points relating to want of jurisdiction in the Lucknow Court to try the case and as to the misjoinder of charges raised by his grounds of appeal, these were only faintly pressed. I am, having considered the reply of the learned Assistant Government Advocate on these questions, satisfied that these objections are not well founded. 20. In view of what has already been said, I consider it unnecessary to go into other points which were raised. 1 am satisfied on an examination of the record and on consideration of the arguments advanced that the learned Sessions Judge's charge to the jury is bad for non-direction and misdirection. The Appellant's conviction is set aside. I direct that Kishan Lal Gupta should be retried for offences under Sections 419, 420 and 471, Indian Penal Code, or any other offences which he may appear) to be guilty of on the facts whereon the three charges mentioned above were framed. 21. The connected revision application No. 201 of 1945 failed on behalf of the Paramount Insurance Company, Ltd. seeks to challenge the propriety of the acquittal of the accused other than Kishan Lal Gupta, under all the charges and of Kishan Lal Gupta under the charge framed u/s 12.0-B, Indian Penal Code It was complained that the learned Sessions Judge's charge to the jury was defective on account of non-direction as well as misdirection. It was further argued that because the learned Sessions Judge's order of acquittal in respect of the offence u/s 120-B, Indian Penal Code, which was tried with the aid of Assessors was based on the verdict of the jurors which is itself vitiated 0:1 account of serious misdirections and non-directions and hence the order of acquittal is bad in law and ought to be set aside. 22. 22. It is well in this connection to remember the observations of Henderson J. in Roshan Lall Khetri v. S.Z. Ahmad (1913) 40 Cal. W.N. 931, and the provisions of Section 418 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Under that section an appeal may lie on a matter of fact as well as on a matter of law, except where the trial was by jury, in which case the appeal shall lie on a matter of law only. In the case to which reference has just been made Handerson J. observed as follows: It would be a most dangerous thing to say that whenever a Magistrate happens to be so unfortunate as to make a mistake in law, the accused person should be put in peril again for it may well be that although the Magistrate has decided a law point wrongly in favor of the accused, he may also have decided the facts wrongly in favor of the prosecution. Clearly an acquittal is not to be set aside merely because bad reasons are given for it. Before we can be induced to take such a course, we must be satisfied that the acquittal wrong altogether, apart from the reasons given by the trial Magistrate. 23. It was observed by Nanavutty J. in Mangla Bakhsh, Shaikh v. Rias Ahmad 1936 O.W.N. 381 that the High Court does not readily reverse an order of acquittal made in favor of any party unless it appears to it that there has been a very grave miscarriage of justice and the aggrieved party had no other remedy but to move the High Court in revision to set aside a perverse order of acquittal. That special sanctity attaches to an order of acquittal passed in a criminal trial is now well settled. It was laid down in Faujdar Thakur v. Rasi Chawdhury (1915) 42 Cal. 612 that though the High Court has jurisdiction u/s 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside an order of acquittal, it has now become a settled practice that it will not ordinarily interfere in revision in such cases at the instance of a private prosecutor. 24. 612 that though the High Court has jurisdiction u/s 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to set aside an order of acquittal, it has now become a settled practice that it will not ordinarily interfere in revision in such cases at the instance of a private prosecutor. 24. May be that in our own Court equally strong and decisive language has not been used with regard to interference with acquittals in criminal cases in exercise of powers u/s 439, Code of Criminal Procedure, but it was observed by Raza J. in Rama Murti, Professor K. v. Jai Indra. Bahadur Singh Thakur (1933) 10 O.W.N. 345 that though the High Court has jurisdiction u/s 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to entertain an application in revision of an order of acquittal when the Crown has preferred no appeal, it would not move in such a case unless there is some glaring defect either in the procedure or in the view of the evidence taken by the Court below. 25. In the case before us all the facts were before the jury. They unanimously returned a verdict of not guilty against all the accused except Kishan Lal Gupta, No doubt the contention of the Learned Counsel for the Petitioner that the Sessions Judge's charge to the jury was defective in certain respects is not altogether unjustified, but that by itself is no sufficient ground for interference against an order of acquittal and a direction for retrial. Having regard to all the circumstances I am of opinion that this is not a fit case in which this Court should exercise its discretion in favor of interference with an order of acquittal passed on an unanimous verdict of not guilty pronounced by the jury, specially as the Government has not cared to avail itself of the right to appeal given to it under the law. 26. Not do I see any good reason for interference with the order of acquittal as regards the charge u/s 120-B, Indian Penal Code which was tried with the aid of Assessors. The learned Sessions Judge has in agreement with the unanimous opinion of the five Assessors who assisted at the trial, recorded a finding in the following words: The evidence does not appear to be sufficiently strong to prove definitely the existence of a conspiracy. The learned Sessions Judge has in agreement with the unanimous opinion of the five Assessors who assisted at the trial, recorded a finding in the following words: The evidence does not appear to be sufficiently strong to prove definitely the existence of a conspiracy. The charge is not proved against the accused or any of them. The accused Debi Charan, Badri Prasad and Ram Sahai are in my opinion entitled to the benefit of doubt. I therefore acquit them. Kishan Lal Gupta being left alone, the charge of conspiracy cannot be sustained against him. I acquit him also. 27. The learned Judge has, as appears from his judgment, taken into consideration all the material evidence dealing with the question of conspiracy. This is not a fit case in which an order of acquittal passed in these circumstances should be set aside at the instance of a private party moving this Court by an application in revision. The application is therefore rejected. 28. In appeal retrial ordered. Revision.