JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, C.J. and Kidwat, J. - This execution of decree appeal has been filed against the order of the Civil Judge of Sultanpur dated the 25th July, 1942, holding that there was no decree to be executed and consequently it was impossible to proceed with the execution case. Mr. Naimullah argues that his clients had become proprietors of the property in suit by reason of the operation of Section 4 of the U.P. Regulation of Sales Act, (XXVI 1934) and that there was no question of any execution involved at all but that all that was necessary was the execution of a deed of sale in their favor. It appears that the predecessors of the parties, one Madad Ali, had mortgaged the property in the year 1882 to Chhuttan Rai and had executed a deed of further charge in 1885. Two of his heirs Akbar Ali and Abbas Ali brought a suit for redemption on the 3rd December, 1913, against the representative of the mortgages and obtained a decree for redemption on payment of Rs. 21,000. They paid the decrial amount and obtained possession of the property on the 10th August, 1927. 2. Subsequently some other heirs of Madad Ali, the Respondents in this appeal, brought a suit claiming the recovery of one-fourth share of the redeemed property on payment of a proportionate amount of the mortgage money. On the 19th February, 1930, a preliminary decree was passed. The Plaintiffs in that suit failed to pay the money within the time allowed and consequently the Defendants obtained a final decree for sale on the 24th January, 1933. Thereafter they applied for execution of their decree by sale, and proceedings reached such a stage that the property was about to be sold, but on the 28th April, 1936, the decree-holders applied to the Court conducting the sale asking it to postpone the sale under the provisions of Section 4(b) of the Regulation of Sales Act. The sale was accordingly postponed till the 1st November, 1936. Thereafter on the 3rd July, 1935, the decree-holders applied to the Sale Officer that they wanted the property to be transferred to them in lieu of the decrial amount. On the 6th July, 1936, this application was rejected and the Sale Officer held that he could not cancel his previous order passed with the consent of the decree-holders. Thereafter on the 3rd July, 1935, the decree-holders applied to the Sale Officer that they wanted the property to be transferred to them in lieu of the decrial amount. On the 6th July, 1936, this application was rejected and the Sale Officer held that he could not cancel his previous order passed with the consent of the decree-holders. As a consequent the sale remained stayed. On the 21st October, 1936, the judgment-debtors applied u/s 4 of the U.P. Encumbered Estates Act and their application was forwarded to the Special judge. Proceedings took place before the Special Judge in which the decree holders made a claim for the decrial amount and they obtained a decree on the basis of their former decree. They made no objection to the property shown by the judgment-debtors. The Special Judge sent the case back to the Collector for liquidation proceedings on the 24th October, 1939. It seems that after the decision of the Encumbered Estates Act case the Civil Court recommenced execution proceedings and thereupon one of the judgment-debtors Ikram Husain applied on the 27th February 1942, pointing out that the decrial debt was the subject matter of a decree under the Encumbered Estates Act and therefore no further proceedings should be taken in execution of the original decree. On the 20th April, 1942, the decree-holders gave a lengthy reply in which they claimed that the sale in their favor had become complete by the exercise of an option allowed to them by Section 4(a) of the Regulation of Sales Act and that all that remained to be done was the execution of a qibala in their favor. When the application of the judgment-debtors and the reply of the decree holders came before the Civil Judge, he passed the order that it was agreed that the decree under execution had merged in the decree under the Encumbered Estates Act. 3. In appeal before us the pleas taken in the objection of the decree-holders in the Civil Judge's Court have been reiterated and it is argued that, as soon as the decree-holder exercises the option allowed to him u/s 4(a), he becomes a proprietor of the property and there is nothing further to be done in execution. Consequently it is claimed that the decree holders are entitled as of right to get the sale deed executed. Consequently it is claimed that the decree holders are entitled as of right to get the sale deed executed. It is sad that the decree in respect of which execution was going on had ceased to be operative on the 3rd July, 1936, by reason of the exercise of option by the decree-holders and there could be DO question of merger of that decree in the decree under the Encumbered Estates Act. we do not think that this argument can be accepted. There is nothing whatsoever in Section 4 of the Regulation of Sales Act which lends color to it and Sections 5 and 9 of that Act clearly show that something more remains to be done, namely the execution of the sale deed, even after the option has been exercised. This view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court in Ram Chandra Rai v. Chandni Prasad Dubey 1942 O.A. (Sup) 530 which is clearly applicable. 4. Consequently it cannot be said that at the time when the application under the Encumbered Estates Act was filed by the judgment-debtors the Appellants had become the owners of the property. The position which was adopted in the lower Court seem to us to be perfectly correct. u/s Is of the Encumbered Estates Act. the effect of a decree of the Special Judge under Sub-section (7) of. Section 14 shall be to extinguish the previously existing right, if any, of the claimant, together with all lights, if any, of mortgage or lien by which the same are secured and, where any decree is given by the Special Judge to substitute for those rights a right to recover the amount of the decree in the manner and to the extent hereinafter prescribed. 5. This section clearly means that the previously existing decree ceased to be operative and the only procedure that can be followed for the satisfaction of the debt is that laid down in the liquidation chapters of the Encumbered Estates Act. We are of opinion, therefore, that the order of the Civil Judge is perfectly correct and cannot be interfered with in appeal. 6. We accordingly dismiss this appeal with costs.