JUDGMENT K.C. Chunder, J. - These are five appeals and a cross-objection, which have been heard together, against the same judgment of the Subordinate Judge, third-Court, Dacca. Two are First Appeals Nos. 246 and 247 of 1939, with a cross-objection in No. 246, and the other three are Second Appeals Nos. 1691 and 1267 of 1940 and 175 of 1941. As regards the three second appeals, all of them were decided by the same judgment of the Additional District Judge of Dacca, appeals having been taken to that Court as the valuations in the suits were less than Rs. 5,000. 2. Nawabzada K. Atikulla of Dacca inherited vast properties but managed to get himself involved in debts within a very short time and in 1910 the Court of Wards took charge of his estate. This did not check the Nawabzada in his progress in spendthriftness and as the allowance proved very small and his indebtedness chronic, a proposal was made in 1934 for the Court of Wards and his heirs to take over his debts and make arrangements for payment thereof. On 4th April 1935, a deed of settlement was executed by the Nawabzada, who is defendant 1, in favour of defendants 2 to 9, who have been called his legal heirs, by which it was obviously meant that they were the persons who would have succeeded him had be died at the time, as a living person has no heir. The settlement was made with the approval of the Board of Revenue as the estate was then in the hands of the Court of Wards This deed of settlement is printed from p. 29 of the Paper Book in First Appeal No. 246 of 1939. 3. In all the appeals, the common question is the construction and the legal effect of this document as far as the creditors are concerned. There is no other point in the three second appeals and the cross-objection in F.A. No. 246 has not been pressed before us by Dr. Sen Gupta. The other points which arise in connection with the two first appeals will be dealt with in proper place. 4. There is no other point in the three second appeals and the cross-objection in F.A. No. 246 has not been pressed before us by Dr. Sen Gupta. The other points which arise in connection with the two first appeals will be dealt with in proper place. 4. In First Appeal No. 246 of 1939, Suit No. 1 of 1939 in the Subordinate Judge's Court, the suit was on what had been called a hundi (really a promissory note) said to have been executed on 2nd February 1939, by the Nawabzada in favour of Mubarak Hossain the plaintiff. The principal was Rs. 3,750; interest was at the rate of 12 per cent. per annum and the total claim was Rs. 6,700, as Rs. 2,950 was claimed for arrears of interest due. 5. First Appeal No. 247 of 1939 arises out of Suit No. 9 of 1938 on the basis of a promissory note, dated 13th January 1934, in favour of Abdul Hamid, the plaintiff, for Rs. 5,000. The arrears of interest were Rs. 3,500 and the rate of interest 18 per cent. per annum and the total claim was Rs. 8500. 6. As regards the second appeals S.A. No. 1691 of 1940 arises out of Suit No. 7 of 1938 and Money Appeal No. 44 of 1939 of the Additional District Judge's Court of Dacca. It is based on a promissory note dated 7th May 1934, for a principal of Rs. 2000 in favour of the plaintiff Abdul Motin with interest at the rate of 24 per cent. per annum; the arrears of interest claimed amounted to Rs. 1600 and the total claim was thus land at Rs. 3600. 7. Second Appeal No. 1267 of 1940 arises out of suit No. 10 of 1938 and the appeal taken to the Court of the Additional District Judge was Money Appeal No. 45 of 1939. It was based on a hundi, dated 3rd November 1933. Though it is called a hundi, it appears to be a promissory note. It was executed in favour of one Sadananda Basak, the plaintiff; the principal was Rs. 2500, interest was at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum and the total arrears of interest was Rs. 1800 and the claim was for Rs. 4300. 8. Though it is called a hundi, it appears to be a promissory note. It was executed in favour of one Sadananda Basak, the plaintiff; the principal was Rs. 2500, interest was at the rate of 18 per cent. per annum and the total arrears of interest was Rs. 1800 and the claim was for Rs. 4300. 8. Second Appeal No. 175 of 1941 arises out of Suit No. 11 of 1938 against which there was Money Appeal No. 46 of 1939 in the Additional District Judge's Court. It is also said to be based on a hundi (really a promissory note) dated 6th January 1934, executed in favour of Mobarak Hossain the plaintiff. The plaintiff in this suit is also the plaintiff-respondent in the previously mentioned First Appeal No. 246 of 1939 before us. The principal was Rs. 2300; the rate of interest 24 per cent. per annum and the total arrears of interest Rs. 2100 and the amount claimed in the suit was Rs. 4400 Applications have been filed in this Court for action under the Bengal Money-lenders Act (Bengal Act X (10) of 1940), and we shall deal with them later. All these loans were incurred without the knowledge and consent of the Court of Wards though the Nawabzada was a disqualified proprietor and a ward of the Court of Wards. 9. The principal question in the present cases, as I have said, relates to the construction of the registered deed of settlement executed by Nawabzada K. Atikulla of the first part, the Court of Wards represented by W.H. Nelson, Esq., I.C.S., the Commissioner of the Dacca division of the second part, and the Nawabzada's children and his wife, referred to as "the purchasers" in the document, of the third part. On the deed being executed, the Court of Wards not only continued in charge of the estate of the Nawabzada of the first part, but also assumed charge of the estate of the donees of the third part and this was on 22nd November 1935. The suits have been brought against the donees, or purchasers as they have been called, the Nawabzada as represented by the manager of the Court of Wards and the Nawabzada personally. 10. The document, which is Ex. The suits have been brought against the donees, or purchasers as they have been called, the Nawabzada as represented by the manager of the Court of Wards and the Nawabzada personally. 10. The document, which is Ex. 2 in the First Appeal No. 246 of 1939, states that the ward (i.e., the Nawabzada) being at times unable to maintain his dignified family position with the maintenance allowance granted under S. 22. Court of Wards Act, has had to incur unauthorised debts without the knowledge and consent of the Court of Wards and if no suitable arrangement be now made for the liquidation of the said unauthorised debts inevitable rum will overtake him. Then the deed goes on to recite the consideration and for the purpose of construction in the present cases Cl. (a) is the really important clause. That clause runs thus: That the purchasers hereof would pay all existing legally payable debts and liabilities of the settlor as per statement appended hereto. 11. After reciting other considerations with which we are not very much concerned at the present stage, by the operative part in cl. (1), the Nawabzada settled, granted, conveyed and confirmed absolutely unto and to the use of the purchasers hereof in proportion to their respective legal shares under the Mahomedan law and Shara all his estate, right, title and interest which he owned and would have exercised had this document not been executed to and in his aforesaid 2 annas 16 gandas undivided share in Sch. "A" properties and any other existing properties, if any, inadvertently omitted therein. We are not very much concerned with the other clauses in the operative portion except cl. (4) and it runs thus: That it is hereby further agreed and declared that the purchasers shall pay off the legally recoverable debts and liabilities of the said settlor as shown in schedule hereto annexed with future interest thereon out of the proceeds of the property hereby settled. 12. Dr. Sen Gupta, for the respondents in the first appeals and for the appellants in the second appeals, has urged before us that for the purposes of construction it is legitimate to look to the surrounding circumstances. In other words, he has asked us to put ourselves in the arm-chair of the settlor. 12. Dr. Sen Gupta, for the respondents in the first appeals and for the appellants in the second appeals, has urged before us that for the purposes of construction it is legitimate to look to the surrounding circumstances. In other words, he has asked us to put ourselves in the arm-chair of the settlor. According to him, the surrounding circumstances show that Nawabzada was urging the Court of Wards to arrange for payment of all his unauthorised debts. In this connection, he has referred to the antecedent correspondence between the Nawabzada and the Court of Wards. He has further pointed out that for the purpose of the deed he has given a list of his creditors which is embodied in the schedule. It may be made clear here that none of the creditors in any of the suits now before us on appeal are included in the schedule to the deed. According to Dr. Sen Gupta, the deed was executed on the belief that the schedule was not exhaustive but illustrative and this is indicated in the preamble or recital itself and Dr. Sen Gupta urges that the intention of the donor or settlor was that the purchasers were to pay all his debts, He emphasises the word "all" in the consideration clause and further urges that the real intention can be given effect to by treating the words "as shown in the schedule hereto annexed" in the operative clause and "as per statement appended hereto" in the consideration clause as a false description. The list or schedule, according to him, is not exhaustive but illustrative. It is a case of false description. According to him, this construction would be also in consonance with the rule against misconduct. He has further urged that clause (4) of the operative portion should be understood to be the same as clause (a) of the consideration. According to him, there is a latent ambiguity in the word "all" in clause (a) of the consideration. Hence external evidence is admissible. He has asked us to look into the correspondence and also the oral evidence of the Nawabzada. 13. The learned Subordinate Judge began the construction of the document from a consideration of the antecedent correspondence, without considering whether he was entitled to do so. Hence external evidence is admissible. He has asked us to look into the correspondence and also the oral evidence of the Nawabzada. 13. The learned Subordinate Judge began the construction of the document from a consideration of the antecedent correspondence, without considering whether he was entitled to do so. I can do no better than quote the words of Viscount Dunedin in the case of AIR 1929 34 (Privy Council) : The learned trial judge examined with great care the correspondence which took place between the parties before the deed of 1847 was granted, and he came to his opinion on the true meaning of the deed, as he puts himself, after a careful consideration of the deed in the light of the correspondence. We may say here that exactly the same thing has been said and done by the learned Subordinate Judge. Their Lordships must say at once that this way of approaching the true construction of the deed is quite illegitimate. Nothing is better settled than that when parties have entered into a formal contract, that contract must be construed according to its own terms and not to be explained or interpreted by the antecedent communings which led up to it. This is especially true of a conveyance. There even, if there has been a formal antecedent contract, that contract cannot be looked at to control the terms of the conveyance; much less can mere communings, which could only show what parties meant to do but cannot show what they did. It would be otiose to set forth at length the authorities. and then their Lordships cite several English decisions, including the case of Lee v. Alexander, (1888) 8 A.C. 853, 868, about which their Lordships say that, though it is a Scotch case where the law is the same. Lord Selborne in that case stated the proposition as a general one. 14. Lord Esher, M.R. in the case of Ex Parte Dawes; In re Moon (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 275 at p. 286 : (55 L.T. 114), laid down three rules which have been elaborated by further addition of another rule by Beal in his Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation, Beal's Cardinal Rules on Legal Interpretation, 3rd Ed. 184. 14. Lord Esher, M.R. in the case of Ex Parte Dawes; In re Moon (1886) 17 Q.B.D. 275 at p. 286 : (55 L.T. 114), laid down three rules which have been elaborated by further addition of another rule by Beal in his Cardinal Rules of Legal Interpretation, Beal's Cardinal Rules on Legal Interpretation, 3rd Ed. 184. These four rules as given by Beal are these: (1.) When the operative part of a deed is clear it cannot be controlled by the recitals or other parts of the deed. (2.) When the operative part of a deed is ambiguous, or goes beyond the recitals, it may be controlled by the recitals and other parts of the deed. (3.) When the words of the operative part of a deed are general, they may be controlled by the recitals or other parts of the deed. (4.) If both the recitals and the operative part are clear, but they are inconsistent with each other, the operative part is preferred. 15. These rules have the sanction of great authorities spreading over a long time. In the case of Bailey v. Lloyd, (1829) 5 Russ 330 : (7 L.J. Ch. 98) Leach, M.R. states: "...where the operative part of the deed uses language which admits of no doubt, it cannot be controlled by the recital." Romilly, M.R. in the case of Young v. Smith, (1865) L.R. 1 Eq. 180 at p. 183 : 35 Beav. 87 at 90, said: It is of the greatest consequence to keep distinct the different parts of deeds, and to give to recitals and to the operative part their proper effects. I have always held, that where the recitals and the operative part of a deed are at variance, the operative part must be officious, and the recitals inofficious. I do not say inoperative, for the recitals may be useful in explaining ambiguities. Jessel, M.R. in the case of Dawes v. Tredwell, (1881) 18 Ch. D. 354 at p. 358 : (45 L.T. 118) thus summarised the rule: "The rule is, that a recital does not control the operative part of a deed, where the operative part is clear." 16. As regards Dr. Jessel, M.R. in the case of Dawes v. Tredwell, (1881) 18 Ch. D. 354 at p. 358 : (45 L.T. 118) thus summarised the rule: "The rule is, that a recital does not control the operative part of a deed, where the operative part is clear." 16. As regards Dr. Sen Gupta's contention of suggestion of a contrary intention in the recitals than that afforded in the operative part, I can do no better than state what has been summarised as the law in Halsbury's Laws of England, Edn, 2, Vol. 10, p. 283, Art. 352: In the construction of an instrument the recitals are subordinate to the operative part and consequently, where the operative part is clear, this is treated as expressing the intention of the parties, and it prevails over any suggestion of a contrary intention afforded by the recitals;... Authorities are collected, and they are numerous, in the same page of Halsbury in note (f). In the present case, as we have pointed out, in the operative part cl. (4) runs thus: ...that the purchasers shall pay off the legally recoverable debts and liabilities of the said settlor as shown in schedule hereto annexed... 17. Mr. Mookerji has pointed out to us that the word "as shown etc." is an elliptical phrase which determines the extent of liability. In the present case, there can be no doubt that the operative part is clear and whatever might have been the intention of the settlor, by cl. (4) he has made the purchasers or donees liable to pay only the scheduled debts. The operative part being clear, and free from all ambiguity we cannot go behind it and import other intentions either from the recitals or from any antecedent correspondence, or from the oral evidence, I have already mentioned, that none of the creditors in any of the suits are scheduled creditors. Therefore, in my opinion, on this construction of the deed of settlement, the plaintiffs in none of the suits are entitled to any decree against defendants 2 to 9 as represented by the Manager of the Court of Wards, defendant 10, nor are they entitled to a decree against any estate of the Nawabzada in the hands of the Court of Wards, as the debts were incurred without the consent and authority of the Court of Wards. In my opinion "all...liabilities" in cl. In my opinion "all...liabilities" in cl. (a) of the consideration are limited by "as per statement appended hereto." No non-listed or non-scheduled creditor is entitled under the deed. It is not necessary for me, in this view of the document, to decide the other points, but I briefly record our findings with short reasons on the points raised. 18. It has been urged by Mr. Mookerji that as the creditors were strangers to the consideration, they are not entitled, in view of the decision in the case of Tweedle v. Atkinson, (1861) 1 B. & S. 393 : 124 R.R. 610 and other decisions following it to enforce their claim against defendants 2 to 9 represented by the Manager of the Court of Wards defendant 10. In a very elaborate and illuminating judgment of this High Court in the case of Adhar Chandra Mondal Vs. Dolgobinda Das and Others, AIR 1936 Cal 663 D.N. Mitter, J. examined all the authorities English and foreign on this subject and I respectfully agree with his conclusion that a stranger to a contract between two other persons reserving a benefit to him cannot take the benefit thereof and sue thereon, unless from the terms of the contract it is clear that a trust for the stranger was created. In the present case cl. (4) has definitely stated that the purchasers shall pay off the legally recoverable debts and liabilities of the settlor as shown in schedule thereto annexed with future interest thereon out of the proceeds of the property thereby settled. Where by a conveyance right of property has been given for the benefit of another, a trust or obligation in the nature of a trust arises. Sections 34 and 6, Trusts Act may be looked into in this connection. Under the circumstances, the creditors named in the schedule are entitled as beneficiaries of cestui que trust to enforce the obligation in the nature of a trust made for their benefit. I have decided that the deed of settlement is only restricted to scheduled creditors. Had it been otherwise, that is, if the schedule had been merely illustrative and not exhaustive, then all the creditors would have been entitled to enforce the same. In the present case only the scheduled creditors are so entitled. 19. Mr. Mookerji has raised the question of limitation. Had it been otherwise, that is, if the schedule had been merely illustrative and not exhaustive, then all the creditors would have been entitled to enforce the same. In the present case only the scheduled creditors are so entitled. 19. Mr. Mookerji has raised the question of limitation. The Nawabzada remained or continued to remain a ward of the Court even after the settlement. Defendants 2 to 9 were made wards of Court, as I have already mentioned. Section 10(cc), Court of Wards Act (Bengal Act IX [9] of 1879) is quite clear. It says that in calculating the period of limitation applicable to a suit against a ward, a period of four years shall be added to the period of limitation allowed by law. Therefore, as far as the claim against the Nawabzada as a ward of Court and against defendants 2 to 9 as such wards are concerned, clearly there is no limitation in view of S. 10(cc), Court of Wards Act. 20. Mr. Mookerji has urged, and I am of opinion that his contention is right, that where a suit comprises several claims or reliefs, then the period of limitation may be separate in case of the different claims or reliefs. In the present case, he has urged that as there is a claim against the Nawabzade personally and not as a ward of the Court, the extension of the period of limitation by four years under S. 10(cc) will not be applicable to that claim. Dr. Sen Gupta has very rightly conceded this point, as in his opinion the matter is of academic importance; the Nawabzada is dead and he left no assets out of which any decree passed personally against him could be realised. 21. Mr. Mookerji has raised the question of what was the amount of consideration in appeal No. 247. The document shows that Rs. 5,000 was the amount of the principal. The Nawabzada's version is that he was paid only Rs. 1,500 and the document was not executed as stated in the document itself, namely, on 13th January 1934, but in February 1936. The Subordinate Judge has not accepted this story. There is such an amount of confusion in the Nawabzada's evidence and his memory is so unreliable that it is not possible to rely on his oral evidence. 1,500 and the document was not executed as stated in the document itself, namely, on 13th January 1934, but in February 1936. The Subordinate Judge has not accepted this story. There is such an amount of confusion in the Nawabzada's evidence and his memory is so unreliable that it is not possible to rely on his oral evidence. It appears that though the Nawabzada's version is that the document was executed in February 1936, it is clear that a claim had been put forward on behalf of the plaintiff before the Court of Wards on 31st January 1936. I am therefore, unable to accept the Nawabzada's version and I hold agreeing with the Court below that the amount of principal in that loan was Rs. 5,000. 22. Mr. Mookerji has raised the question of repayment of the loan of Rs. 3,750 in the first appeal No. 246. The Nawabzada's version is that there were two hundis outstanding in 1932, both of 7th December 1931, one for Rs. 5,000 and another for Rs. 2,500. He had made some payment amounting to Rs. 2,200 and in February 1932 he actually borrowed Rs. 3,750, the amount now in suit. As regards the amount of principal and the actual payment of that amount there is no contest. The amount due, according to this story now given on behalf of the Nawabzada, was Rs. 9,050 as principals of the different loans. Some interests were due and these were subsequently consolidated and substituted by other promissory notes one for Rs. 4,600 on 30th December 1932; another for Rs. 5,000 on 21st September 1933, and a third one for Rs. 450 on 21st September 1933. The total due was Rs. 9,950 and obviously the balance of Rs. 900 was for arrears of interest due. The version further is that interest of about Rs. 1,600 became due for 1933, and therefore a consolidated promissory note was finally executed for Rs. 11,600. It is said that this loan of Rs. 11,600 is shown in the schedule to the deed as due to Ishaq Bepari and the Court of Wards subsequently paid it off. The Court of Wards actually paid Rs. 17,000 and odd, included in which is an amount of Rs. 12,000 for payment of two hundis of 7th December 1931 of Rs. 5000 and Rs. 2,500 and a promissory note of 13th December 1932 for Rs. The Court of Wards actually paid Rs. 17,000 and odd, included in which is an amount of Rs. 12,000 for payment of two hundis of 7th December 1931 of Rs. 5000 and Rs. 2,500 and a promissory note of 13th December 1932 for Rs. 4,500 as the entry in the claims register shows. In the schedule of creditors, a loan of Rs. 11,600 is shown in the name of Ishaq Bepari, as the Nawabzada's version was that all the loans including this loan of Rs. 3 750 was by Ishaq Bepari in the benami of his son Mobarak Hossain the plaintiff in the suit. I have already pointed out that in the entry in the claims register three other distinct hundis are mentioned and not the amount of Rs. 3,750 taken as a loan in February 1932. Mr. Mookerji has urged before us that no enquiry was made at the time of the payment from the Nawabzada and for this purpose he has referred to the order sheet in the file. The order sheet shows no entry of any enquiry from the Nawabzada, but we have the evidence of the defence witness, the Accountant, that he personally enquired into the matter and that he even consulted the Nawabzada. When the Court of Wards, after enquiry, paid off three other debts, it is not possible to say that the Court of Wards by their payment was also paying off the loan of Rs. 3,750. On this point it is very difficult to rely on the memory of the Nawabzada, whose evidence as to the different promissory notes and different transactions is of a very much contused character. Under the circumstances, I agree with the learned subordinate Judge that the amount of Rs. 3,750 was not repaid. 23. In view of my decision, all the second appeals are dismissed with costs. The two first appeals succeed and the suits in the Subordinate Judge's Court, No. 1 of 1939, and No. 9 of 1938, are dismissed with costs in both the Courts. In view of my decision, no order is passed on the applications under the Bengal Money lenders Act. Had the decision been otherwise interest due would have been calculated under S. 30 of the Act and instalments granted and for that purpose it would have been necessary to remand the cases to the Court below to determine the same. In view of my decision, no order is passed on the applications under the Bengal Money lenders Act. Had the decision been otherwise interest due would have been calculated under S. 30 of the Act and instalments granted and for that purpose it would have been necessary to remand the cases to the Court below to determine the same. The cross-objection is dismissed without costs. R.C. Mitter, J. 24. I agree.