Judgement Appeal (No. 83 of 1945), by special leave, from an order of the High Court (September 29, 1944) made by it in purported exercise of the powers conferred on it by s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to issue directions of the nature of habeas corpus. The order directed that the second respondent, Purushottam Yeshwant Deshpande (hereinafter called " the " detenu "), should be set at liberty forthwith on the ground that his detention was illegal. The following facts are taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee On August 21, 1944, the detenu was arrested pursuant to an order given by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, under r. 129. The arrest was made by a police officer, K. C. Diwakar. On August 22, under an order signed by the said K. C. Diwakar, the detenu was committed to the custody of the Superintendent, Central Gaol, Nagpur. The order was expressed to be made under the powers conferred by sub-r. 2 of r. 129. On August 23, a report of the arrest was made to the Provincial Government as required by sub-r. 2. On August 26, the Provincial Government, purporting to act under sub-r. 4 of r. 129, directed that the detenu be detained in police custody for a period expiring on September 4, 1944. On September 2, 1944, the Provincial Government, purporting to act under sub-rr. 2 and 4 of r. 129, directed that the detenu should be detained in police custody for a further period of fifteen days from September 5, 1944. A further order was made by Government on September 19, 1944, for a further extension of the period of detention, but as that order was made after the hearing in the High Court, such order could not affect the position. In the meantime, namely, on August 25, the detenus wife, who was the first respondent, made application to the High Court under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure, complaining that the detention of the detenu was illegal and improper. In the meantime, namely, on August 25, the detenus wife, who was the first respondent, made application to the High Court under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Pro cedure, complaining that the detention of the detenu was illegal and improper. That application was supported by certain affidavits made by Waman Deshpande, a nephew of the detenu, alleging, amongst other things, that the detenu had been interrogated by the police whilst in prison, that he had been questioned only about one Inamdar, a former employee of the detenu, who was alleged to have been concerned in a dacoity committed in the Province of Bombay, and that no questions were ever put to the detenu about any activities which could have brought him within the operation of r. 129 of the Defence of India Rules. No evidence was filed by the police officer who arrested the detenu, or by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police on whose orders the arrest was made, and the only evidence filed on behalf of the Provincial Government dealing with the grounds of suspicion against the detenu was an affidavit sworn by the Chief Secretary of the Provincial Government on September 10, 1944, which said that the report of the arrest of the detenu had been received by the Provincial Government on August 23, and that it revealed reasonable grounds for suspecting that the detenu was actively associated with certain persons engaged in underground activities calculated to pre judice the public safety and efficient prosecution of the war, and that in the opinion of the Provincial Government there were reasons to suspect that they had already acted in a manner which had prejudiced the public safety. That affidavit contained no allegation that the detenu himself had been engaged in any subversive activities, or even that he was aware of such activities on the part of his associates. The application was heard by the High Court of Nagpur (Bose and Sen JJ.) on September 11, and judgment was given on September 29, holding that the detention of the detenu was illegal, and directing that he be set at liberty forthwith. By r. 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 " (1.) Any “police officer .... may arrest without warrant any person “whom he reasonably suspects of having acted .... " (a) .... By r. 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 " (1.) Any “police officer .... may arrest without warrant any person “whom he reasonably suspects of having acted .... " (a) .... in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or to the efficient prosecution of the war. “ (2.) Any officer who makes an arrest in pursuance of sub-" r. (1.) shall forthwith report the fact of such arrest to the " Provincial Government, and, pending the receipt of the orders " of the Provincial Government, may, subject to the provisions M of sub-r. (3.), by order in writing, commit any person so “arrested to such custody as the Provincial Government " may by general or special order specify Provided— " (i.) that no person shall be detained in custody under " this sub-rule for a period exceeding fifteen days without " the order of the Provincial Government; and " (ii.) that no person shall be detained in custody under this " sub-rule for a period exceeding two months. " (4.) On receipt of any report made under the provisions of " sub-r. (2.), the Provincial Government may, in addition to u making such order, subject to the second proviso to sub-r. (2.), " as may appear to be necessary for the temporary custody of "any person arrested under this rule, make, in exercise of any power conferred upon it by any law for the time being in " force, such final order as to his detention, release, residence " or any other matter concerning him as may appear to the "said Government in the circumstances of the case to be " reasonable or necessary.” " Rule 26.—(1.) The Central Government or the Provincial " Government, if it is satisfied with respect to any particular " person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any " manner prejudicial to the defence of British India, the public " safety, the maintenance of public order, His Majestys " relations with foreign powers or Indian States, the maintenance " of peaceful conditions in tribal areas, or the efficient prosecution of the war, it is necessary so to do, may make an " order " (b) directing that he be detained ; " By s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure " (1.) Any “High Court may, whenever it thinks fit, direct .... (6) that " a person illegally or improperly detained in public or private " custody within such limits [namely, the limits of its appellate " criminal jurisdiction] be set at liberty." 1946. March 28, 29. Rewcastle K. C, Khambatta and B. Sen for the respondents, took a preliminary objection to the competency of the appeal, and referred to Mukhlal Singh v. Kishuni Singh (( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 279.) as justifying the right to do so at this stage. It was said in King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (i) that under the general Indian law the situation under the Criminal Procedure Code as to appeals from orders in the nature of habeas corpus is exactly the same as the position in England regarding appeals against orders of discharge in habeas corpus proceedings, that is to say, there is no appeal to anybody where a man has applied for a writ of habeas corpus and been released. In Sibnath Banerji*s case (i), however, it was held that under s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, there was, where that section operated, an appeal from every kind of criminal proceeding, and that the section was not so limited in its language, as to exclude a proceeding in the matter of habeas corpus. From any such criminal proceeding there was expressly given under that section an appeal to the Federal Court, and an appeal having been made in that case—one of habeas corpus— to the Federal Court, there was a consequential appeal from the federal Court to this Board. The reasoning in Sibnath Banerji s case (1) was, however, based on the special terms of s. 205 of the Act of 1935, and has no applicationto the present case, which did not come under that section. Unless there is under that particular section, s. 205, an appeal to the Federal Court and a consequential appeal to this Board, Sibnath Banerjis case (( 1945) L. R. 72 I. A. 241.) lays down that there is no appeal in such proceedings as this to anyone, and that the situation is exactly the same as was decided in the House of Lords in Cox v. Hakes (( 1890) 15 App. Cas. 506.). Cas. 506.). Alternatively, assuming that there is an appeal to the Federal Court in the circumstances of this case, then it is not the practice, where there is a chain of appeals provided for, to come direct to this Board, omitting an intermediate court. One reason for that is that the Board requires the greatest possible assistance from the courts below Bhaya Mohammad Azim Khan v. Saadat AH Khan (( 1939) L. R. 66 I. A. 160.). It is still open to the Board to rescind the special leave to appeal that was given in this case ; it is not necessary that there should be a petition for that purpose Bai Shevantibai v. Janardhan Raghunath Warick (( 1944) L.R. 71 I. A 142.). In the circumstances this appeal is not competent in law. Sir Thomas Strangman K.C. and B, MacKenna for the appellant. It is said for the respondents that Sibnath Banerjis case (1) decided that unless s. 205 of the Government of India Act applies there is no appeal at all against an order made under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It is readily conceded that there is no appeal as of right. The present case was not an appeal within s. 205, so it has to be considered whether, in view of the fact that the Board gave special leave to appeal, this appeal is competent although the Criminal Procedure Code does not provide for an appeal. The appeal is competent. The Privy Council have entertained appeals in habeas corpus matters. The position under the Judicature Act was entirely different from what it is in an appeal to His Majesty in Council in such a case. It is the commonest thing for appeals to come before the Board by special leave where the local statute provides that the decision of the court appealed against shall be final, and that is this case; and the only question is whether there is any distinction between civil and criminal cases. There is plenty of authority to show that there is not; the practice of granting leave and entertaining appeals applies to both criminal and civil cases Nadan v. The King ([ 1926] A. C. 482, 491.) ; Sarda Mahesh Prasad Singh of Barhar v. Badri Lal (( 1936) L. R. 63 I. A. 207.). There is plenty of authority to show that there is not; the practice of granting leave and entertaining appeals applies to both criminal and civil cases Nadan v. The King ([ 1926] A. C. 482, 491.) ; Sarda Mahesh Prasad Singh of Barhar v. Badri Lal (( 1936) L. R. 63 I. A. 207.). The Privy Council have in fact entertained appeals by the Crown where people have been set at liberty in habeas corpus proceedings, and in one case, at least, leave of the Board was previously obtained Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Kwok-A-Sing (( 1873) L. R. 5 P. C. 179.) ; Reg. v. Mount (( 1875) L. R. 6 P. C 283.). It was said in Cox v. Hakes (15 App. Cas. 506.) that “The Judicial Committee " . . . . can advise the exercise of Her Majestys prerogative " with respect to the appeals from her Colonial courts in matters " where undoubtedly no appeal lies in this country " (Ibid. 520.). With regard to the merits of the appeal, the grounds on which the High Court held that the detention of the second respondent was illegal and improper can be summarized as follows (a) that where a person has been arrested and detained under r. 129 the High Court must determine the reasonableness of the suspicions entertained by the police officer who arrested him. (b) That the burden of satisfying the High Court that the police officers suspicions were reasonable rests upon the Crown. (c) That if this burden is not discharged, and the arrest is in consequence held to be defective, the defect cannot be cured by any subsequent orders made by the Provincial Government under sub-rr. 2 and 4 of r. 129 of the Defence of India Rules. (d) That in the present case the police had arrested the detenu in order to investigate a crime, and not with any intention of promoting the efficient prosecution of the war or protecting the public safety. It is submitted that a person detained under r. 129 may be questioned by the police with reference to a crime committed by him or by any other person. The detention does not become thereby illegal. It is submitted that a person detained under r. 129 may be questioned by the police with reference to a crime committed by him or by any other person. The detention does not become thereby illegal. Want of good faith in the exercise of the powers conferred by r. 129 means acting dishonestly or for some purpose other than that for which the power was conferred, and unless want of good faith in this sense be proved, the exercise of these powers cannot be questioned. The provisions of r. 129 are ancillary to those of r. 26, and as the executive must be the judge of the necessity for making a final order under r. 26, so it must be in respect of a temporary order under r. 129. The argument that the High Court must have been intended to have the power of deciding whether the police officers suspicions were reasonable is unsound. Even, however, if the High Court is so empowered, and does decide that they were unreasonable, it does not follow that the High Court must order the release of the detained person in a case where the Provincial Government, after his arrest, has made an order for his continued detention under sub-rr. 2 and 4 of r. 129. The order of detention cannot be set aside except on proof that it was made in bad faith ; it is for the detenu to prove bad faith, and that has not been established. It is not for the court to decide whether the executives suspicions were reasonable, but if it was, then the burden of proving that the suspicions were unreasonable rests on the detenu. The High Court had no power to decide whether the police officers suspicions were reasonable, but if they had, it was for the detenu to prove that they were unreasonable, and he had failed to discharge that burden. The High Court had no power to decide whether the police officers suspicions were reasonable, but if they had, it was for the detenu to prove that they were unreasonable, and he had failed to discharge that burden. The fact that the police had questioned the detenu about Inamdar and his associates, and the fact (if it were a fact) that the police were investigating a crime of dacoity and that the questions put to the detenu were connected with that investigation were no evidence that he had been arrested merely with a view to investigating that crime, or that the Provincial Government had continued the detention merely with the object of affording facilities for that investigation, or that the arrest could not have been made or the detention ordered with a view to promoting the efficient prosecution of the war or protecting the public safety. No reason was shown to the High Court for impeaching either the good faith or the reasonableness of the police officer or of the Provincial Government. In the circumstances the High Court had no power to make any order under s. 491 of the Criminal Procedure Code. B. MacKenna followed. The reasoning which appealed to the House of Lords in Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson ([ 1942] A. C. 206.) is equally applicable to r. 129 ; there it was held that the courts had no authority to inquire into the validity of the Secretary of States order under Reg. 18b. There is no wide difference between the words used in r. 129 and those in Reg. i8b which would enable a distinction to be made on the wording of the rule. Next, with regard to the fact that in this case the Provincial Government did make an order under sub-r. 4 of r. 129, reliance is placed on s. 16, sub-s. 1, of the Government of India Act, 1935, which provides that " No order made in exercise of " any power conferred by or under this Act shall be called in " question in any court." That sub-section applies as much to an order made by the Provincial Government under r. 129 as to an order made under r. 26. It is for the respondents to prove that the appellant exercised the power for some purpose other than that for which it was conferred; if they can do that it is conceded that the appellant does not get the protection of s. 16 of the Act of 1935. On the evidence the respondents have not succeeded in showing that. Counsel for the respondents were not called on. May 7. The judgment of their Lordships was delivered by SIR JOHN BEAUMONT, who stated the facts set out above, and continued In granting special leave to appeal the Board imposed the two following conditions (1.) That the detenu should not in any event be re-arrested in respect of the matters to which the appeal relates, and (2.) that the petitioner should pay the costs as between solicitor and client incurred by the respondents both in opposing the petition and in the appeal. At the outset counsel for the respondents contended that no appeal was competent. That such a contention is open at the hearing of an appeal, notwithstanding that special leaye has been given without reserving express power to challenge the competency of the appeal, was established by two decisions of this Board, Zahid Husain v. Mohammad Ismael (2( 1930) L. R. 57 I. A. 186. and Mukhlal Singh v. Kishuni Singh (L. R. 57 I. A. 279.). In support of his argument that the appeal is incompetent counsel relied mainly on the well-known case of Cox v. Hakes (15 App. Cas. 506.), and a recent decision of this Board, King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (L. R. 72 I. A. 241.). In Cox v. Hakes (15 App. Cas. 506.), the House of Lords decided that in England no appeal lay from an order of discharge made on the return to a writ of habeas corpus. The question turned primarily on the construction of s. 19 of the Judicature Act, 173. In their speeches both Lord Halsbury and Lord Herschell noticed two decisions of the Privy Council, Attorney-General for Hong Kong v. Kwok-A-Sing (L. R. 5 P. C. 179.), and Reg. v. Mount (L. R. 6 P. C. 283.), and pointed out that special considerations applied to appeals from Colonial courts, in which the Privy Council was tendering advice to His Majesty as to the exercise of the prerogative. v. Mount (L. R. 6 P. C. 283.), and pointed out that special considerations applied to appeals from Colonial courts, in which the Privy Council was tendering advice to His Majesty as to the exercise of the prerogative. The case of King-Emperor v. Sibnath Banerji (L. R. 72 I. A. 241.) was one in which an appeal lay from an order of discharge made by a High Court in India under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the Federal Court under s. 205 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and from the Federal Court to the Privy Council under s. 208, and it was held that the rule in Cox v. Hakes (1) had no application to such a case. In the present case, however, no appeal lay to the Federal Court under the Government of India Act, 1935, since no question was involved as to the interpretation of the Act or any Order-in-Council made thereunder, and the question for decision is whether an appeal lies direct to the Privy Council from an order of a High Court discharging a person from custody under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The broad principle which must determine this question is that appeals from decisions of courts in the British Dominions and Dependencies to the King in Council are heard under the royal prerogative, and that the prerogative can only be curtailed by force of an Act of Parliament, that is, by the King in Parliament. There is no Act of Parliament which prohibits, or authorizes the prohibition of, an appeal to His Majesty in Council by a party aggrieved against an order discharging a person from custody under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In their Lordships opinion, therefore, the preliminary objection fails. Dealing with the merits of the matter, their Lordships think that the questions for decision lie within a narrow compass and depend on the construction of r. 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, with which must be read r. 26. In their Lordships opinion, therefore, the preliminary objection fails. Dealing with the merits of the matter, their Lordships think that the questions for decision lie within a narrow compass and depend on the construction of r. 129 of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, with which must be read r. 26. [His Lordship read the rules and continued] The two questions which, in their Lordships view, arise on this appeal are (i.) Where a police officer makes an arrest under r. 129, sub-r. 1, of the Defence of India Rules, is he bound to prove to the satisfaction of a court before whom the arrest is challenged that he had reasonable grounds of suspicion ? (ii.) If he is so bound and fails to discharge the burden laid on him, is an order made by the Provincial Government under r. 129, sub-r. 4, for the temporary custody of a person arrested valid notwithstanding that the arrest was invalid? On the first question it is important to notice the differences between r. 26 and r. 129. Under the former rule an order of detention can be made only by the Central or Provincial Government, though this power may be delegated under the Defence of India Act ; and the Government may make an order of detention if it is satisfied with respect to any particular person that, with a view to preventing him from indulging in the subversive activities specified, it is necessary so to do. It is to be noticed that the Government must be satisfied, mere suspicion is not enough, but there is no qualifying adverb such as " reasonably " or " honestly " attached to the word " satisfied." On the other hand, under r. 129, any police officer can arrest on mere suspicion, but the suspicion must be reasonable, the exact words being " any person whom he reasonably " suspects” As the High Court noticed in their judgment, the House of Lords, in Shearer v. Shields ([ 1914] A. C. 808.), had to construe a provision in the Glasgow Police Act authorizing constables to arrest if they had reasonable grounds of suspicion, and the House held that the burden rested on the constable concerned to show that his suspicion was reasonable and his act therefore justified. Their Lordships think that the same result must follow under r. 129. Their Lordships think that the same result must follow under r. 129. Reliance was placed by the appellant on Liversidge v. Sir John Anderson ([ 1942] A. C. 206.), but as the High Court again noticed, there are two very material distinctions between that case and the present one. In the first place, the authority empowered to arrest under the Defence of the Realm Act is a high officer of state, namely, the Home Secretary, and not a mere police officer ; and in the second place, the House of Lords was impressed with the obvious inconvenience and danger to the public which might ensue if the Home Secretary was bound to disclose confidential information on which he had acted. In India this danger is very largely mitigated by the existence of r. 26, under which the Government can act whenever it is satisfied as to the matters mentioned in the rule. Cases in India under the Defence of India Rules which may involve disclosure of secret and confidential information will arise only in cases lying in the border-land between the police being suspicious, and Government being satisfied, as to a persons subversive activities, and such cases are hardly likely in practice to be either numerous or serious. In their Lordships opinion, therefore, the High Court was right in holding that the burden lay on the police officer to satisfy the court that his suspicions were reasonable, and it is plain that on the evidence he had not discharged that burden. The second question turns on the construction of sub-r. 4 of r. 129, and was strongly pressed by Sir Thomas Strangman on behalf of the appellant. His contention was that the Provincial Government, acting under the power conferred by sub-r. 4, had made orders for the temporary custody of the detenu which were on their face unobjectionable, and that such orders were valid whether or not the detenu had been validly arrested. Counsel felt the difficulty of maintaining that an order for detention would be valid if the arrest had been made in bad faith, which he submitted was not the case which he had to meet, and he suggested that an order for custody would be valid if in the light of circumstances known to the Government the arrest appeared to be proper. But the language of sub-r. 4 affords no warrant for any such" distinction. But the language of sub-r. 4 affords no warrant for any such" distinction. If a valid order for custody can be made, although the arrest was invalid, it can make no difference whether the illegality of the arrest was due to an honest error or to an act of bad faith. Sub-rule 4 is curiously expressed. It provides that on the receipt of a report under sub-r. 2, which, be it noted, need only be as to the fact of arrest, the Provincial Government may, in addition to making such order as may appear necessary for the temporary custody of any person arrested under the rule, make, in exercise of any power conferred on it by any law for the time being in force, such final order as to his detention as may appear to Government to be reasonable or necessary. Reference to any law for the time being in force introduces the powers conferred by r. 26 and, possibly, other provisions of law, though no such provisions were brought to their Lordships attention. The sub-rule is so framed as to suggest that what is really being conferred on Government is power to make a final order, power to make an order for temporary custody being expressed parenthetically. But when the language is looked at carefully it is plain that the sub-rule does not purport to enlarge the powers which Government may possess under any law for the time being in force, and this part of the rule seems designed only to indicate that Government can take advantage of a person being in temporary custody when making a final order under any other law. But a final order for detention can be made under r. 26 on Government being satisfied as in the rule men tioned, and its validity depends in no way on the person against whom the order is made being already under arrest. The only substantive power which is conferred upon the Provincial Government by sub-r. 4 is a power to make such order as may appear necessary for the temporary custody of any person, not, be it noted “arrested” but “arrested under this rule” that is, on reasonable suspicion as to the persons activities. If no arrest was made under the rule, the power to make an order for temporary custody of the detenu never arose. If no arrest was made under the rule, the power to make an order for temporary custody of the detenu never arose. Their Lordships therefore agree with the High Court in thinking that the Provincial Government had no power to make an order for the temporary custody of the detenu, whose arrest under sub-r. 1 was invalid. Mr. MacKenna, for the appellant, further, relied on s. 16, sub-s. 1, of the Defence of India Act, 1939, which provides " no "order made in exercise of any power conferred by or under this " Act shall be called in question in any court." But this argument only raises the same question in a different form. If the orders made by the police or the Provincial Government were invalid they were not made in exercise of a power conferred by the Act. The learned judges of the High Court in their judgment— which is not open to criticism on the ground of undue brevity— discussed various other aspects of the case, and their Lordships must not be taken as being in agreement with all the opinions expressed by the learned judges. On the view which their Lordships have expressed that the Provincial Government have failed to prove that the arrest of the detenu was justified, and that the orders for custody made against him were illegal, the High Court was plainly justified in making the order which it did make under s. 491 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. For these reasons their Lordships will humbly advise His Majesty that this appeal be dismissed. The appellant must pay the respondents costs of this appeal as between solicitor and client.