JUDGMENT Majumdar, J. - The Petitioner is the landlord and the Respondent a monthly tenant, of premises No. 14. Prem Chand Boral Street, Calcutta. It is alleged by the Petitioner that an order was made on the 3rd of April, 1945, under sec. 6 (2) of the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act of 1933 on the Respondent and other inmates of the house, directing them to discontinue the use of the said premises as a disorderly house or brothel or a place of common assignation, within 15 days from the date of the said order. Thereupon on the 5th April, 1945 the Petitioner determined the tenancy by serving on the Respondent a notice to quit. On the 10th April, 1945, an order was made under sec. 6 (2) of the said Act directing the Petitioner as landlord of the premises to discontinue the use of the said house as a disorderly house, brothel or place of assignation. Thereupon on the 11th of May, 1945 the Petitioner instituted the suit in the Presidency Small Causes Court against the Respondent for the recovery of possession of the said premises out of which this application arises. After stating that the Respondent was a monthly tenant, it was stated in paragraph 2 of the plaint, as originally filed, that the said monthly tenancy was duly determined by an ejectment notice dated 5th April, 1945, requesting the Defendant to quit the said premises on the expiry of 30th April, 1945, in compliance with the notice from the Commissioner of Police dated 10th April, 1945, under sec. 6, [sub-sec. (2)], [sub-sec. (3)], (a), (b), (c), (d) of the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act of 1933, as the said premises is being used by the Defendant as disorderly house, etc., and the Defendant was thereby creating a nuisance. 2. The said paragraph (2) was subsequently amended. 6, [sub-sec. (2)], [sub-sec. (3)], (a), (b), (c), (d) of the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act of 1933, as the said premises is being used by the Defendant as disorderly house, etc., and the Defendant was thereby creating a nuisance. 2. The said paragraph (2) was subsequently amended. After amendment it read as follows:--"The said monthly tenancy was determined by an ejectment notice dated 5th April, 1945, requesting the Defendant to quit, vacate and deliver up to the Plaintiff peaceful possession of the said premises No. 14, Prem Chand Boral Street in the town of Calcutta on the expiry of the 30th day of April, 1945, in compliance with the order of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Detective Department, Calcutta, made on 3rd April, 1945, under the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act VI of 1933, in the presence of the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The cause, of action has arisen under sub-sec. (8) of sec. 6 of the said Act." 3. By reason of the amendment, the materials as contained in the plaint upon which recovery of possession of the premises was claimed were that the Respondent was a monthly tenant, the tenancy was determined in pursuance of the order dated 3rd April, 1945, made under the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act. There was no allegation in the plaint as amended that "the tenant has been guilty of conduct which is a nuisance or an annoyance to adjoining or neighbouring occupiers." This fact when established would disentitle the tenant to the protection afforded by Paragraph 9 (1) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order. I have mentioned the portion within inverted commas which is the language of the proviso (b) of Paragraph 9 (1) of the House Rent Control Order, as it is common ground, that if the House Rent Control Order applies, then of the provisos contained in the said Paragraph 9 (1), this proviso only is relevant and material on the facts of this case. 4. On this pleading, the Judge held that though the order made under sec. 6 (2) of the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act gave the landlord the right to determine the tenancy forthwith, the Rent Control Order which applied constituted a good defence. His view was that as the Plaintiff did not bring his claim within Para. 4. On this pleading, the Judge held that though the order made under sec. 6 (2) of the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act gave the landlord the right to determine the tenancy forthwith, the Rent Control Order which applied constituted a good defence. His view was that as the Plaintiff did not bring his claim within Para. 9 (1) (b) of the House Rent Control Order he could not make an order for delivery of possession although the tenancy was determined. In that view he dismissed the suit on the 25th February, 1946, and this order of dismissal is now assailed before me. 5. Mr. Banerjee on behalf of the applicant has contended that the order of the Judge is fit to be set aside for the reason that he was in error in his interpretation of the scope and effect of sec. 6 of the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act and of the House Rent Control Order. The argument about the provisions of House Rent Control Order not applying was not pressed and I think rightly. Mr. Banerjee's argument on the other point, as I understood him, amounts to this :-- (i) The order made under sec. 6 (2) of the Bengal Suppression of the Immoral Traffic Act entitled the Petitioner forthwith to determine the tenancy, which was duly done. (ii) The order so made, because of sub-sec. (4) was final and its legality or propriety could not be questioned in any trial or proceeding in any Court. (iii) Therefore, when that order and the determination of the tenancy following that order were pleaded and proved, the Judge should held that the proviso contained in Para. 9 (1) of the House Rent Control Order was sat and as such he should have passed the decree. 6. In order to test the soundness of Mr. Banerjee's contention, it is necessary to examine closely the provisions of sub-sec. (4) of sec. 6 of the Bengal Suppression of Immoral Traffic Act. The said sub-section provides as follows :-- For the purposes of this section the decision of the Commissioner of Police or Superintendent of Police that a house, room or place is used is manner or for the purposes prescribed in clause, c or d of sub-sec. (1) shall be final and the legality or propriety thereof shall not be questioned in any trial or judicial proceeding in any Court. (1) shall be final and the legality or propriety thereof shall not be questioned in any trial or judicial proceeding in any Court. 7. The words "for the purposes of this section introducing the said sub-sec. (4) are significant The purposes of sec. 6, as I read them, are (a) discontinuance of a house as a brothel or disorderly house, etc., by an order made in exercise of the power conferred upon the Commissioner of Police [sec. 6 (2)]. (b) punishment for contravention of that order [sec. 6 (6)], (c) entry of the house, in respect of which order has been made, in the Register which be maintained [sec. 6 (7)], (d) notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for time being in force, to entitle the owner of the house in respect of which an order has made on the tenant to determine the tenancy. 8. For these purposes therefore the decision the Commissioner of Police that the house is used either as a brothel or disorderly house or a common place of assignation or for purposes of prostitution as described in cls. (a), (b) and (d) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 6 is final. 9. Therefore, in connection with the purposes above mentioned, if any question arises in a Court in any trial or judicial proceeding, that Court is precluded from raising any controversy regarding the finality, legality or propriety of that decision. It follows, therefore, that the jurisdiction of the Court to go behind the said decision is not taken away when the subject for consideration before it relates to matters other than the said purposes. 10. It cannot be said that for any of the purposes mentioned above, the decision of the Commissioner of Police was called in question in this suit which was for recovery of possession of the house. I am of opinion that the Calcutta House Rent Control Order applies and therefore the tenant cannot be deprived of the protection afforded by Paragraph 9 (1) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, unless the Plaintiff succeeds in establishing that he has been guilty of a conduct described in Paragraph 9 (1) (b). I am of opinion that the Calcutta House Rent Control Order applies and therefore the tenant cannot be deprived of the protection afforded by Paragraph 9 (1) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order, unless the Plaintiff succeeds in establishing that he has been guilty of a conduct described in Paragraph 9 (1) (b). By Paragraph 2 (5) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order a tenant has been defined to be a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable on account and includes a person continuing in possession after the determination of a tenancy in his favour. This definition obviously indicates that the protection of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order as mentioned above would extend to persons whose tenancy has been determined by valid notice to quit and as such to the Respondent in this case. 11. In order to pass the decree for ejectment against the Respondent therefore the Court will have to come to a finding in the first instance that the conduct of the tenant is of the description as mentioned in Paragraph 9 (1) (b) of the Calcutta House Rent Control Order so as to disentitle him to the protection afforded. The decision of the Commissioner of Police does not constitute a finding of or relate to any such conduct of the Respondent. It amounts to a finding that the house is used as a brothel or disorderly house and for the purposes of prostitution, etc. 12. That being so, I do not see how that decision could be conclusive and binding or helpful to the trial Court in coming to a conclusion regarding the Respondent's conduct of the description as mentioned in Paragraph 9 (1) (b) about which the trial Court is required to come to a finding and consider various facts and circumstances for that purpose which normally would not arise in an enquiry before the Commissioner of Police in coming to his decision for ordering the discontinuance of the house as a brothel. 13. In this case, as I have already said, there is no allegation that the conduct of the Respondent was of the nature as described in Para. 9 (1) (b) of the Rent Control Order, nor do I find from the records that any evidence was adduced to prove such conduct. 14. 13. In this case, as I have already said, there is no allegation that the conduct of the Respondent was of the nature as described in Para. 9 (1) (b) of the Rent Control Order, nor do I find from the records that any evidence was adduced to prove such conduct. 14. In the circumstances, in my judgment the trial Judge came to a proper decision in dismissing the suit and I do not find any reason to interfere with his order. The Rule is therefore discharged with costs.