JUDGMENT Misra and Kidwai, JJ. - This appeal arises out of a suit brought by the Respondents for Rs. 5,250 as damages for malicious prosecution against one Mr. Maqbool Ahmad Siddiqi, who was headmaster of the Government High School at Barabanki. The suit was decreed in to and Mr. Siddiqi preferred an appeal to this Court but he died during the pendency of the appeal which is being continued by his legal representatives. 2. The undisputed facts of the case are that Mr. Siddiqi had purchased a second hand motor car from Messrs. Bajoria Halwasiya (of which firm the Respondents are partners) on the 26th October, 1938 one Mohammad Ali acting as intermediary between the parties. The case was delivered at Barabarki at the house of Siddiqi at night on the 28th October, 1938. He got it examined the next day and did not find it to his liking. He accordingly returned it to the firm on the 1st November 1938 and wrote a letter (Ex. 4) asking them to take the car back and to supply a better one. The firm treated the transaction as closed and refused to reopen it. After correspondence lasting for about a month, when it bad become absolutely certain that the Respondents' firm would not take the car back, Mr. Maqbool Ahmad Siddiqi lodged a report at police station Bara Banki on the 4th December 1938, alleging that he had been cheated by the Respondents, one Din Mohammad, their chauffeur and Mohammad Ali. (This report is not on the record.) 3. The police thereupon commenced an investigation and sub-inspector Verma came to Lucknow to the Respondents' shop and made certain enquiries there. He took copies of correspondence which had passed between the parties and of other papers and recorded the statements of the Respondents, of Din Mohammad and of another employee of the firm. The car which had given rise to all the trouble was also taken charge of by the police and the Respondents had to execute bonds for their appearance before the police or the Court should their presence be required. (Exs. 11 and 12). 4. Thereafter the Respondents applied to the Superintendent of Police, Barabanki setting out their version of the case and stating that the dispute was, if anything, of a civil nature. They, therefore, asked the Superintendent of Police to drop the investigation. (Ex. (Exs. 11 and 12). 4. Thereafter the Respondents applied to the Superintendent of Police, Barabanki setting out their version of the case and stating that the dispute was, if anything, of a civil nature. They, therefore, asked the Superintendent of Police to drop the investigation. (Ex. 14) on the 21st December 1938 the Superintendent of police noted that, after having gone through the police diaries he was of the opinion that the firm had not cheated the complaint but that if anything the case was of a civil nature. He accordingly ordered that the investigation be closed and that the headmaster be informed that he should file a suit in Court if he so desires. (Ex. A-16). 5. Investigation by the police was dropped and the headmaster was informed though we have no evidence on the record to show exactly what he was told. 6. The headmaster (the Defendant in this case) was not satisfied with this and on the 3rd of January, 1939 he filed a complaint in the Court of M. Mushtaq Hussain Sahib, Sub-Divisional Officer, Nawabganj, and Magistrate, first class, Barabanki in which he charged the Respondents and Din Mohd. with an offence under Sections 420/109 of the Indian Penal Code. (Ex. 20). There were four hearings in the case (vide Ex. A-18 to Ex. A-21). Each of the Respondents presented himself at one hearing and thereafter got his personal attendance excused. 7. On the 20th of February 1939 the Respondents applied to this Court to quash proceedings u/s 439 and 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and proceedings were quashed by the then Chief Judge on the 30th March 1939, it being held that the complainant disclosed no case of cheating against the Respondents of their chauffeur. Proceedings were however, allowed to be continued against Mohd. Ali. (Ex. 22). On the 2nd September 1939 proceedings were also dropped against Mohd. Ali by Mr. Siddiqi who accepted the apology tendered the accused. (Exs. A-2 and A-3). 8. The present suit was brought by the Respondents on the 28th of March 1940. They claimed damages on the ground that the report to the police and the complaint against them were entirely false to the knowledge of Mr. Maqbool Ahmad and that criminal proceedings were started by the Defendant with malicious motives and in order to compel them to comply with the Defendants' illegal wishes and demands. They claimed damages on the ground that the report to the police and the complaint against them were entirely false to the knowledge of Mr. Maqbool Ahmad and that criminal proceedings were started by the Defendant with malicious motives and in order to compel them to comply with the Defendants' illegal wishes and demands. (see Paragraph 10 of the plaint). 9. The damages were divided into two portions viz: Rs. 1. Actual damages (i.e. costs incurred in the criminal proceedings) 778 2. "General damages for reputation, mental worry and pain" 4,472 Total Rs. 5,250 10. The Defendant filed a lengthy written statement in which he set out the circumstances which had led him to initiate criminal proceedings and he pleaded reasonable and probable cause, absence of malice and bona fides. A replication was filed and further oral pleadings were recorded. On these pleadings the trial Court framed the following three issues: 1. Did the Defendant make the complaint maliciously and without reasonable and probable causes? 2. Is the suit maintainable? 3. To what damages, if any, are the Plaintiffs entitled? 11. The trial Court held: (1) That the suit is maintainable. (2) That no conspiracy between the Respondents and Mohammad Ali to cheat the Defendant is proved. (3) That the Defendant did not have reasonable and probable cause to institute criminal proceedings against the Defendant. (4) That the prosecution was actuated by a desire to bring pressure to bear on the Respondents to take back the car and that this amounted to malice. (5) That Rs. 778 is the actual amount which was spent by the Respondents in the criminal proceedings and that the circumstances were such that they were also entitled to Rs. 4,472 as general damages. 12. The Defendant appealed and the points urged in the appeal are: (1) That it is not shown that the Defendant did not have reasonable and probable cause for launching the complaint. (2) That malice is not proved. (3) That even the finding that the object of the prosecution was to bring pressure to bear on the Respondent does not amount to malice, and (4) That the amount of damages awarded is excessive. 13. The facts which require to be proved in order to entitle a person to damages for malicious prosecution are well known and have been correctly set out in the judgment of the trial Court. 13. The facts which require to be proved in order to entitle a person to damages for malicious prosecution are well known and have been correctly set out in the judgment of the trial Court. The onus of proof has also been correctly laid upon the Plaintiffs-Respondents. It will, however, be advantageous to consider what are the factors which a Court has to bear in mind in deciding whether the onus has been discharged and also to consider what amounts to malice for the purposes of an action for malicious prosecution. 14. In Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume XXII, pages 13 and 14 paragraph 15 it is laid down: The malice which a Plaintiffs in an action for damages for malicious prosecution or other abuse of legal proceedings has to prove is not malice in its legal sense, that is, such as may be assumed from a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse, but malice in fact malus animus indicating that the Defendant was actuated either by spite or ill will against the Plaintiff, or by indirect or improper motives. 13. Again in paragraph 19 at page 17 of the same volume we find: Reasonable cause has been said to be such as would operate on the mind of a discreet man and probable cause such as would operate on the mind of a reasonable man. It must also be such as would operate on the mind of the Defendant otherwise there is no reasonable cause for him. It follows that at least when the accused was in fact innocent belief in his guilt is essential to the existence of reasonable and probable cause, and that such belief must at the date of the prosecution be based on ground which or some of which are reasonable and arrived at after due inquiry. 14. On the question of the burden of proof and the evidence necessary to prove malice it is laid down at pages 18 to 22 in paragraphs 26 to 28 as follows: 26. The burden of proof in an action for damages for malicious prosecution lies in the first instance on the Plaintiff. It is not sufficient for him to prove that he was innocent of the crime for which he was prosecuted by the Defendant and that the prosecution terminated in his favour. The burden of proof in an action for damages for malicious prosecution lies in the first instance on the Plaintiff. It is not sufficient for him to prove that he was innocent of the crime for which he was prosecuted by the Defendant and that the prosecution terminated in his favour. He must also show that the Defendant acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. 27. If want of reasonable care on the part of the Defendant is relied upon, that, as an element in the absence of reasonable and probable cause, must be proved by the Plaintiff; and so if facts existed which if known to the Defendant, would have constituted reasonable and probable cause the burden of shoving that they were not known to him would lie on the Plaintiff. But the burden of proof is not stationary. When the Plaintiff has given such evidence as, if not answered, will entitle him to a verdict, the burden of proof is shifted to the Defendant. If the Plaintiff sues in respect of some only of Several charges on which he was prosecuted and gives evidence that as to the charges in respect of which the action is brought the Defendant acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause, the Defendant will not be allowed to prove that as to other charges contained in the same indictment or other indictments there was reasonable and probable cause. 28. Malice may be implied from the want of reasonable and probable cause if the jury agree With the Judge that the facts establish this. But if 15. In Mitchell v. Jenkins 110 E R 908 it was laid down that the absence of reasonable and probable cause and malice are independent and must be proved separately though malice may, in the circumstances of the case be inferred from the absence of reasonable and probable cause. Parke J. said (at page 910 of the Report) The term 'malice' in this form of action is not be considered in the sence of spite or hatred against an individual, but of malus animus and as denoting that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. 16. Parke J. said (at page 910 of the Report) The term 'malice' in this form of action is not be considered in the sence of spite or hatred against an individual, but of malus animus and as denoting that the party is actuated by improper and indirect motives. 16. The matter was fully discussed in the case of Hicks v. Faulkner 8 Q 8 D.107 Hawkins J., states at page 171-2 of the report: Now I should define reasonable and probable cause to be an honest belief in the guilt of the accused based upon a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds of the existence of a state of circumstances which assuming them to be true would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the accuser to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime imputed. There must be; first, an honest belief of the accuser in the guilt of the accused; secondly, such belief must be based on an honest conviction of the existence of the circumstances which led the accuser to that conclusion; thirdly, such secondly-mentioned belief must be based upon reasonable grounds; by this I mean such grounds as would lead any fairly cautious man in the Defendant's situation so to believe; fourthly, the circumstances so believed and relied on by the accuser must be such as amount to reasonable ground for belief in the guilt of the accused. 17. Again at pages 173 to 174 he says: The question of reasonable and probable cause depends in all cases, not upon the actual existence but upon the reasonable bona fide belief in the existence of such a state of things as would amount to a justification of the course pursued in making the accusation complained of no matter whether this belief arises out of the recollection and memory of the accuser or out of information furnished to him by another. It is not essential in any case that facts should be established proper and fit and admissible as evidence to be submitted to the jury upon an issue as to the actual guilt of the accused. The distinction between facts as to establish actual guilt and those required to establish a bona fide belief in guilt should never be lost sight of in considering such cases as that I am now discussing. The distinction between facts as to establish actual guilt and those required to establish a bona fide belief in guilt should never be lost sight of in considering such cases as that I am now discussing. Many facts admissible to prove the latter, would be wholly inadmissible to prove the former. It cannot of course be laid down as an abstract proposition that an accuser is justified in acting either upon the credited statement of an informant or upon his own memory. The question must always arise according to circumstances whether it was reasonable to trust either the one or the other. A person who acts upon the information of another trusts the veracity the memory and the accuracy of that other in each of which he may be completely deceived. His informant's veracity may be questionable his memory fallacious and his accuracy unreliable. Yet it does not follow that it was unreasonable to believe in his information if he never had cause to doubt him. In like manner a man may be deceived by his own memory, yet it does, follow that it was unreasonabl'e to trust it if he never before knew it to be defective. 18. On the question of malice the learned Judge says at pages 174 to 175: It is true as a general proposition that want of probable cause is evidence of malice; but this general proposition is not to be misunderstood. In an action of this description the question of malice is a independent one of fact purely-and altogether for the consideration of the jury and not at all for the Judge. The malice necessary to be established is not even malice in law such as may be assumed from the intentional doing of a wrongful act (see Bromage v. Prossor, 4 B and C 255 per Bayley J.) but malice in fact-malus animus-indicating that the party was actuated either by spite or ill-will towards an individual, or by in direct or improper motives, though these may be wholly unconnected with any uncharitably feeling towards anybody, In order to arrive at a conclusion on the question the jury are to lake into consideration all the circumstances of the case and to form their own opinion upon them uninfluenced by any opinion of the Judge unless that opinion accords with their own view. If among the circumstances it appears to the jury that there was no reasonable ground for the prosecution, they my-though by no means bound to do so-well think that it must have been dictated by some sinster motive on the part of the person who instituted it. Absence of reasonable cause to be evidence of malice must be absence of such cause in the opinion of the jury themselves... 19. In the case of Braja Sunder Deb v. Bamdeb Das 81944 O A (P C) 11: AWR (P C) 11, (1944 O.A. (P.C. Section) page 11) their Lordships of the Judicial Committee say (at pages 13 and 14 of the report) In order to succeed in an action for malicious prosecution the Plaintiff must in the first instance prove two things; (i) that Defendant was malicious and (ii) that he acted without reasonable and probable cause. Malice has been said to mean any wrong or indirect motive, but a prosecution is not malicious merely because it is inspired by anger. However wrong-headed a prosecutor may be if he honestly thinks that the accused has been guilty of a criminal offence he cannot be the initiator of a malicious prosecution. But malice alone is not enough: there must also be shown to be absence of reasonable and probable cause. If in the present case the Respondents honestly believed a criminal offence to have been committed and had reasonable cause for so doing they are not liable in this action and even though they were malicious they still would not be liable if they had reasonable and probable cause for believing in the Appellants,' guilt. 20. In Surendra Nath Shahu v. Bidhu Bhushan Panja ILR 1944 (1) Cal 588 at 592, a single Judge of the Calcutta High Court relying on Abrath v. North Estern Railway Company 11 QBD 440, 456, held: The proposition that in actions for malicious prosecution the onus of establishing absence of reasonable and probable cause to justify the Defendant in launching the prosecution lies, in the first instance on the Plaintiff is well settled The onus is not, however, a stationary burden When the Plaintiff has given evidence which, if not answered would entitled him to succeed, the burden of proof is shitted to the Defendant. 21. 21. In Fateh Chand v. Kunj Behari Lal (1940) 15 Luck 404 it was laid down by a learned single Judge of this Court (at page 409): In my opinion the presence or absence of reasonable and probable cause is a question relating to the state of the mind of the accuser and has to be inferred from the facts of each particular case. 22. Again, at page 411, he says: It is true that in many cases the finding that the complainant's case was false may lead to a presumption that the complainant had no reasonable and probable cause for bringing the complaint leaving him in an action of malicious prosecution to rebut that presumption, but in certain other cases such as the present one such presumption may not arise at all merely upon the finding that the case was a false one. 23. In Dr. Bhawani Shanker Vs. B. Raghubar Dayal, AIR 1937 All 417 . Niamatullah, J. held that the Plaintiff must further establish that there was no reasonable or probable cause for the Defendant to prosecute him (the Plaintiff). If the facts alleged by the Defendant in the criminal case are such as, from their nature, were necessarily true or false to his knowledge, the Plaintiff must establish that the Defendant's story was false; and if he proves that the Defendant's story was false, he should be deemed to have proved that there was no reasonable and probable cause for the Defendant to prosecute the Plaintiff. But cases are easily conceivable in which the Defendant's allegations were not true or false to his knowledge, for example, where the Defendant prosecuted the Plaintiff on information and belief. In such cases the issue is not so simple as that in the class of cases above referred to and the Plaintiff has to establish that the circumstances were such that a reasonable and prudent man would not have acted on the supposition that the Plaintiff was guilty of the offence with which he was charged. In all cases the Plaintiff should also prove malice in the legal sense, i.e., indirect and improper motive. In certain cases malice may be inferred from the absence of reasonable and probable cause. 24. Reference may also be made to the case of Mangal v. Maiku 1937 O W N 226 in while Thomas, J. (later. In all cases the Plaintiff should also prove malice in the legal sense, i.e., indirect and improper motive. In certain cases malice may be inferred from the absence of reasonable and probable cause. 24. Reference may also be made to the case of Mangal v. Maiku 1937 O W N 226 in while Thomas, J. (later. Sir George Thomas C.J.) hold (at page 238) that the Plaintiff in an action for malicious prosecution cannot succeed unless he can show either guilty know ledge or same wicked or indirect motive in the Defendant...the state of the mind of the Defendant at the time when he did the act is very important. 25. He then proceeds to say The burden of proving want of reasonable and probable cause is the Plaintiff and the existence of malice should be independently proved and cannot be inferred merely from the absence of probable and reasonable cause. 26. We consider, as a result of a survey of these authorities, that on the question of malice and reasonable and probable cause, the fallowing propositions are established: 1. In an action for malicious prosecution "malice" is not merely the doing of a wrongful act intentionally but it must be established that the Defendant was actuated by malus animus, that is to say by spite or ill will or any indirect or improper motive. 2. If, however, the Defendant had reason able and probable cause for launching the criminal prosecution no amount of malice will make him liable for damages. Similarly if the prosecutor honestly believed that the accused was guilty of a criminal offence he is not liable for malicious prosecution no matter how wrongheaded he might have been. 3. Reasonable and probable cause must be such as would operate on the mind of a discreet and reasonable man. Consequently due care and caution and adequate enquiry must have been made by Defendant before he launched the prosecution. 4. "Malice" and "want of reasonable and probable cause" both have reference to the state of the Defendant's mind at the date of the initiation of criminal proceedings and the onus rests upon the Plaintiff to prove them. 5. Malice and want of reasonable and probable cause must be proved independently of each other but in the circumstances of any particular case each may be inferred from the other. 6. 5. Malice and want of reasonable and probable cause must be proved independently of each other but in the circumstances of any particular case each may be inferred from the other. 6. Want of reasonable and probable cause cannot be inferred merely from the fact that the Plaintiff is innocent of the crime imputed to him. 7. The initial burden of proving absence of reasonable and probable cause and the existence of malice rests upon the Plaintiff. 8. The burden may shift during the trial. 9. The amount and nature of evidence required to discharge the initial burden depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. If a man acts on his own knowledge then the fact that the complaint was a false one will raise a presumption that there was absence of reasonable and probable cause and that malice existed, unless it is shown that his memory was defective or that there was some valid ground for a misapprehension. 27. We shall now proceed to consider the evidence adduced in this case to substantiate the allegations of the Plaintiffs in the light of the arguments of the Learned Counsel for the parties. We have been through the entire evidence oral and documentary, with the assistance of the parties counsel and we have come to the conclusion that the findings of the trial Court must be maintained except to a certain extent in the matter of the amount of damages. 28. The correspondence which passed between the parties after the purchase of the car and before the report was made to the police has all been produced in the case. It consists of letters, Exs. 2, 4 to 7, A - 12, 9 and 10. They show that at no stage of the case did the Defendant make any reference to having been cheated except in his last letter, Ex. A -12 in which he says that he had been a victim of confidence trick. They also show that he fully recognised the facts that he could not hope for a batter secondhand car for the price which he had paid (vide Ex. 4) and that a commission had been allowed to the middleman (Ex. A-12). He was duly warned by the Plaintiffs in their letter (Ex. They also show that he fully recognised the facts that he could not hope for a batter secondhand car for the price which he had paid (vide Ex. 4) and that a commission had been allowed to the middleman (Ex. A-12). He was duly warned by the Plaintiffs in their letter (Ex. 9) that whatever action he took would be at his own risk and responsibility and he had been told from the very commencement of correspondence that there was no question of the car being taken back because the transaction had been closed. The firm was prepared to oblige him to this extent that, when a better car was available, they would take back the car sold to him in part payment of the price. Further in their last letter, i.e., Ex. 9, they made it clear that Mohammad Ali who had placed the order of the car was not their representative but that he had made himself out to be an agent for the the Defendant. We find from the car delivery order (Ex. 3) that Mohammad Ali signed on behalf of tbe customer, namely, the Defendant. Similarly in the auto purchase order, Ex. 36 the order was placed with the firm and Mohammad Ali signed on behalf of the Defendant. Both these documents were within the knowledge of the Defendant and a copy of the auto purchase order was actually in his possession and had he perused them he would have found that Mohammad Ali, far from acting on behalf of the firm, acted throughout on his behalf. We also find from the evidence of the Defendant as D.W. 2 that Mohammad Ali had made another attempt to procure a car for him somewhere in Hardoi. Thus the Defendant was well aware, or should have been well aware, if he had taken even the ordinary prosecution of considering the documents in his possession, that Mohammad Ali was not acting for the Plaintiffs He had, therefore, no reason to attribute to the Plaintiffs all that Mohammad Ali told him. 29. One of the grounds on which the charge of cheating was based was that it was not disclosed to the Defendant that the real price was not Rs. 700 but Rs. 835. We cannot say that Rs. 835 is not the real price. 29. One of the grounds on which the charge of cheating was based was that it was not disclosed to the Defendant that the real price was not Rs. 700 but Rs. 835. We cannot say that Rs. 835 is not the real price. It is a well-known fact that commissions are paid by companies to those who procure business for them and Ex-A-12 shows that even before the report was made the Defendant was well aware that "the usual commission" had been paid to the middleman. The auto purchase order mention a sum of Rs. 835 as the price agreed upon. The order bears the signature of Mohammad Ali on behalf of the Defendant and the Company accepted this. The complaint that the car purchase order should have disclosed the amount of commission is, in our opinion not well founded because the payment of commission is a transaction between the Company and the person who secures business for it and has nothing to do with the purchaser. In fact the whole of the correspondence discloses that there was no objection to the payment of the commission, nor was it said that the car was not worth the price which had been paid for it, but what was said in it was that the car was not liked by the Defendant and that some drivers had said that it was not a good one. 30. The second ground upon which it was sought to argue that the Defendant had reasonable and probable cause for believing the Plaintiffs guilty was that he had been assured by Mohammad Ali and Din Mohammad that the car would be taken back if returned within a week. Whatever assurance Mohammed Ali may have given was a matter between him and the Defendant and the Plaintiffs cannot be bound by it since, as we have already said, Mohd. Ali was not acting for the Plaintiffs at all. Din Mohammad came into the witness box and definitely contradicted the statement attributed to him. In fact there was no occasion for him to give the assurance that the car would be taken back because he was simply a driver charged with the delivery of the car and had nothing to do with the terms and conditions of the contract of sale. The auto purchase order (Ex. 36) clearly shows that there was no such term embodied in it. The auto purchase order (Ex. 36) clearly shows that there was no such term embodied in it. It shows that the payment of the balance of the price was to be made within two days and delivery of the vehicle was to be accepted within that time. Further there was an additional term applicable only to use motor vehicles which set out that there was no warrantly or condition as to the mechanical condition of the car. Ex. 36 is on the usual printed form and it is quite possible as the Defendant says in the witness box that he did not read it. It was, however, in his possession and available to him and we cannot say that he acted with due care and caution in making a report to the police without having read the terms and conditions upon which he had purchased the car. Then we come to the stage after the report had been made and we find that the Superintendent of Police definitely-ordered the dropping of the investigation on the ground that if anything, the matter was of a civil nature (vide Ex. A-16). The Defendant was informed of the order. Yet he ventured to proceed by way of a complaint instead of going to a Civil Court. The complaint is very lengthy document which contains allegations against Mohammad Ali and Din Mohammad, but the only complaint which it has against the Respondents is contained in paragraph 11, which reads as follows: 11 That on the 29th October 1938, when the complainant showed the car, he came to know that all the four accused persons had conspired together and had willfully defrauded the Defendant. Their subsequent acts done by them off and on were all fraudulent and all the four accused persons were a party to it and this was all meant to exact money from the Defendant by misrepresenting facts. 31. We cannot find anything in the whole of this document which would lead us to infer that there was any real ground for the Defendant to suppose that the Respondents had really a hand in false representations said to have been made to him. It is admitted by the Defendant that be never even met the Respondents, nor did he ever himself go to their shop. It is admitted by the Defendant that be never even met the Respondents, nor did he ever himself go to their shop. His knowledge as to their attitude could only be based upon the letters which he received from them and those letters all along brought to his notice the fact that the contract was completed as soon as the car was delivered. The evidence produced shows that the real cause of complaint which the Defendant had against the Plaintiffs was the refusal of the latter to take back the car. This they were not bound to do and their refusal cannot amount to cheating nor can it have induced the belief in the mind of any reasonable man in the light of the correspondence which passed between the parties that there was any cheating We may note that the criminal proceedings were quashed by an order of this Court (Ex. 22), which shows that it was held that even on the facts alleged by the complainant no criminal case was made out against the Plaintiffs. This judgment is not binding upon us in the present case but we agree with the reasoning upon which it proceeds and have ourselves come to the same conclusion. 32. It was argued that even if it was proved that the real object of the Defendant in making the report and in launching the prosecution was to get the Plaintiffs to take the car back that did not amount to malice. The authorities which we have cited clearly show that that was an improper and indirect motive and would come within the definition of malice. It is further said that before he launched the prosecution, the Defendant took the opinion of two of the leading criminal lawyers of Barabanki. Neither of these gentlemen has been produced in the witness box to depose as to the advice which they gave to the Defendant. We find that the complaint itself (Ex. 20) was cot signed by any lawyer but by the Defendant himself alone. 33. We see no reason, therefore, to differ from the opinion of the learned Civil Judge that the Plaintiffs have substantiated their case that the Defendant had no reasonable and probable cause and was actuated by malice. 34. We come now to the question of damages. 20) was cot signed by any lawyer but by the Defendant himself alone. 33. We see no reason, therefore, to differ from the opinion of the learned Civil Judge that the Plaintiffs have substantiated their case that the Defendant had no reasonable and probable cause and was actuated by malice. 34. We come now to the question of damages. In considering this question we advert to the decision in Rai Jung Bahadur v. Rat Gudor Sahoy (1897) 1 Cal. W. N. 537, in which it is said at page 542: Ordinarily speaking' damages in this form of action are given on two bases, first on the ground of a solarium for injury to the feelings of the party prosecuted ; Secondly as a reimbursement for legitimate expenses incurred by him in his defence. 35. The trial Court has awarded the full amount of damages claimed by the Plaintiffs and since this is a matter of discretion we would not ordinarily have interfered. We find however, that the Court has not considered the matter in all its aspects. It is not doubt true as the trial Court says, that business men like the Plaintiffs are bound to suffer loss of reputation when such actions are brought against them in Criminal Courts but it must also be remembered that their reputation was fully vindicated by the quashing of proceeding by this Court before they were really started. Further the Plaintiffs themselves were partly reasonable for the prolongation of the proceedings, because as Ex. A-18 shows the Plaintiffs were well aware that proceedings had commenced but they avoided attendance in Court and eventually they turned upon one by one. Neither of them had to appear for more than one bearing after which they were exempted from attendance in Court. Then we find that in the present case the Plaintiffs have tried to exaggerate the indignity to which they were subjected by adding that the sub inspector who came to investigate searched their promises and arrested them. Their own witness P.W. 7 who is the office superintendent of the firm does not say that there was any search but he says that some police officer subsequently held "some enquiry'' in the office of the firm. Their own witness P.W. 7 who is the office superintendent of the firm does not say that there was any search but he says that some police officer subsequently held "some enquiry'' in the office of the firm. As to arrest although one of the Plaintiffs and P.W. 7 had deposed to it in this case, we do not find any mention of it in the application made by the Plaintiffs to the Superintendent of Police (Ex. 14) nor do we find any mention of it in the plaint of this suit. We cannot therefore, accept the allegations that either there was a search or that the Plaintiffs were placed under arrest. In this view of the matter we do not think that the full amount claimed by the Plaintiffs as 'general damages' should have been allowed to them. We think that the Plaintiffs are entitled to the Rs. 778 as a reimbursement for legitimate expenses which they incurred in criminal proceedings and to a further sum of Rs. 3,000 for general damages for the loss of reputation and mental worry. 36. The decree of the lower Court is modified and the appeal is partly allowed to this extent that we reduce the sum decreed to the total of Rs. 3,778. Parties will receive and pay costs in both the Courts in proportion to their success and failure. We should like to note that the original Defendant is dead. The decree will, therefore, be limited to the assets of the deceased in the bands of his legal representatives, who have been brought on the record as his heirs.