JUDGMENT Ghulam Hasan, C.J. and Kidwai, J. - These two appeals are directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court and relate to the interpretation of two wills of one Jagaonath Prasad. The wills are dated the 21st December 1908 and the 12th June, 1914 and their copies are. Exs. 1 and 2 in the record of appeal No. 2 of 1945 and Exs. A-5 and A-6 in the record of appeal No. 3 of 1945. The facts have been fully stated in the judgment of the learned single Judge and it is not necessary for us to repeat them, but the following pedigree will elucidate the position which the parties occupy: 2. By his wills Jagannath Prasad conferred certain benefits upon his widow, Mst. Bhagwani, his widowed daughter-in-law, Mst. Radha, his grand-daughter, Mst. Ram Piari, and upon Ram Piari's father-in-law, Sheo Dayal. 3. The question involved in the cases out of which the present appeals have arisen related to (1) the nature of the estate conferred upon Mst. Radha by her father-in-law's wills (since the other two female legatees predeceased her), and (2) whether her interest in the property was of such a nature as to make it liable to be taken in execution of a decree against her. Both the trial Court and the first appellate Court held that Mst. Kadha acquired an absolute estate under the wills Jagannath Prasad and that consequently the properties in her possession could be sold in execution of the decrees against her. 4. The Plaintiff in one suit and the objectors in the other case were not satisfied with these decisions and came up in appeal to this Court. Their appeals were heard and decided by Kaul, J. The two questions raised before him were (1) what is the nature of the estate conferred upon Mst. Radha and (2) whether it is possible under the Indian law to confer a life estate with a power of alienation superadded He held that Mst. Radha acquired a life estate with full powers of alienation during her lifetime and that there is nothing in the law as administered in India which in any way militates against such an estate being created. 5. Radha acquired a life estate with full powers of alienation during her lifetime and that there is nothing in the law as administered in India which in any way militates against such an estate being created. 5. The Appellants, thereupon, applied u/s 12(2) of the Oudh Courts Act for leave to appeal and leave was granted to them by our learned brother in a very short order which reads as follows: The question raised by the applicants' counsel is whether under the Indian Law it is permissible for a testator to confer upon the legatee life estate coupled with a power of alienation in certain circumstances. His contention is that our law does not permit tins. I have taken the opposite view. I consider it a nt case for an appeal u/s 12(2) of the Oudh Courts Act. The application is allowed. The permission sought for is accorded. 6. Before us three points have been urged, namely, the two points urged before Kaul, J., and the further point that even accepting the interpretation placed on the will by Kaul, J., execution cannot proceed against the property since Mst. Radha is now dead and her rights have ceased. 7. We have been taken through both the wills by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants who invites us to hold that only a life estate was conferred upon Mst. Radha and that the true significance of the words "Ta Hayat" just preceding the words granting a right of alienation is that all alienations made by Mst. Radha must come to an end on her death and that the heirs of the testator then enter into possession as if no alienation had been made. He addressed various arguments, all of which had been urged before our learned brother for holding that only a life estate had been conferred upon Mst. Radha by her father-in-law's will. 8. On the next question namely that a life estate coupled with a power of alienation is unknown to law and cannot be permitted his argument was that the power of alienation is an incident of the ownership and does not exist independently of the estate itself. He went on to contend that this being so, a life estate with a power of making such an alienation as would continue to be operative after the termination of the legatees lifetime would be a contradiction in terms. He went on to contend that this being so, a life estate with a power of making such an alienation as would continue to be operative after the termination of the legatees lifetime would be a contradiction in terms. He wishes to distinguish between the grant of a right of alienation and the conferment of a power to alienate, lie argues that it nay well be that a life estate is conferred and to it is added the power of disposing of the property and it may also happen that both the life estate and the power are granted to the same person. He proceeds that this would not bet the same thing as a life estate coupled with a right of alienation because in the form case the power could not be exercised by anybody but the donee of the power himself and consequently there could he not exercise of the power by sale by an order of a Court. 9. On the third point it is said by the Learned Counsel for the Appellants that, even on the construction placed upon the wills by our learned brother, the power of alienation came to an end with the life of Mst. Radha she herself could of course, make no alienation after her death and consequently no one, not even the Court, could make any such alienation for her after her death. 10. On the first question the Respondent's Learned Counsel objects that the question of the construction of a document cannot be the subject of an appeal u/s 12(2) of the Oudh Courts Act and further that permission was, in fact, not granted to appeal with regard to the interpretation placed upon the wills. He referred to the cases reported in Uman Shankar v. Ashraf Husain 1943 O.A. 221 : O.W.N. 404. Brij Bhukhan v. Bhagwan Datt 1943 O.A. 247 : A.W.R. (C.C.) O.W.N. 404 and Mohammad, J afar v. Mst. Barka 1943 O.A. 282 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 159 : O.W.N. 457, for the proposition that a particular interpretation placed upon a. particular document by a learned Judge in second appeal is no ground to grant a certificate that the case is a fit one for a third appeal. Such a point is not even a substantial question of law, much less a point of general importance. 11. Such a point is not even a substantial question of law, much less a point of general importance. 11. No exception has been taken to the principles of interpretation upon which the learned single Judge proceeded and the only contention that has been raised by the Appellants' Learned Counsel is that his interpretation of the words of these particular wills is wrong. We, therefore, think that, with regard to this part of the case, the decisions cited are clearly applicable and that no permission should have been granted upon the first ground we may also note that as a matter of fact this was not one of the grounds upon which permission to appeal was granted. The principle, therefore, laid down in Ewaz Alt v. Firdous Jehan 1914 O.A.159 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 159 : O.W.N. 228. is clearly applicable and the Appellants Learned Counsel cannot agitate this matter in third appeal. At page 234 of the case mentioned the learned judges say: We are of opinion that a certificate that the case is a fit one for appeal on certain questions of law which the learned single Judge considers to be of sufficient importance to go before a Bench does not permit the Appellant to agitate other matters in respect of which the certificate is either silent or expressly refuses leave. The word 'case' occurring in Section 12(2) does not in our opinion operate to enlarge the scope of the appeal to an ambit greater than the one in respect of which certificate is obtained. 12. In that case no doubt leave was refused to appeal with regard to all but three grounds mentioned in the memorandum of appeal. In the present case this is not so but the order is silent as to all grounds but one. The principle enunciated, therefore, is fully applicable. Since, however, the question has been fully argued before us by the Learned Counsel For the Appellants, we feel it necessary to add that we see no reason to differ from the opinion expressed by our learned brother in respect of the interpretation of the two wills. The principle enunciated, therefore, is fully applicable. Since, however, the question has been fully argued before us by the Learned Counsel For the Appellants, we feel it necessary to add that we see no reason to differ from the opinion expressed by our learned brother in respect of the interpretation of the two wills. At the same time we do not feel called upon to state detailed grounds for our opinion because the matter has been considered from every aspect by Kaul, J., and he has, in his elaborate judgment taken note of all the arguments advanced before him which are the same as the arguments put forward before us. Having regard to the scheme of the wills, the object which the testator had in view and the meaning which he attached to various words in the different parts of the will we agree that the testator desired to confer upon his widowed daughter-in-law something more than a life estate and that he desired to bequeath to Sheo Dayal only that portion of his property which may be left over after Mst. Radha had made full use of it in accordance with the provisions of the will. This opinion of ours is further strengthened by the fact that the same provisions of the will deal with the moveable as well as the immoveable property left by Jagaonath Prasad. 13. We come then to deal with the next question, namely, whether there is anything in the law of India which would invalidate the conferment of a life estate in a particular property with the right to alienate the property or any portion of it permanently. The Appellants' Learned Counsel relied upon the law laid down in the case of Tagora v. Tagore 1972-73 I.A. Suppl. Vol. 47. for the proposition that testator cannot confer upon a legatee an estate which is not known to the law. He however, failed to show us any authority in which it might have been held that a life estate coupled with a right of alienation is not known to the law in India. We find that the Hindu Law recognizes life estates with the power of alienation for legal necessity or for other limited purposes in the case of all females taking property by inheritance. We find that the Hindu Law recognizes life estates with the power of alienation for legal necessity or for other limited purposes in the case of all females taking property by inheritance. Indeed in the arguments before us it was conceded that if an estate is conferred upon a person with a power of alienation superadded and it is further provided that whatever portion of the property is not alienated should go, by operation of the same will to some other persons, it would be a perfectly valid disposition. The Learned Counsel for the Appellants himself drew our attention to the cases of Saroda Sundari Dassi v. Kristo Jiban Pal (1901) 5 Cal W.N. 300 and S.M. Hara Kumari Das v. Mohim Chandra Sarkar (1908) 12 C.W.N. 412 as illustrative of this proposition. It is, however argued that, in these wills the testator directs that all (kul) the property shall go to Sheo Dayal and this is not a proper disposition. This is really a matter of construction and we have already pointed out that the learned single Judge of this Court held that, in the context of the wills of Jagannath Prasad, Sheo Dayal was only to get the portion of the property that remains undisposed of. Thus on the consideration placed on the will with which we agree the present case also comes within the principle enunciated in the Calcutta cases to which we have referred. After all when a life estate is created it is really an interest carved out of the absolute ownerships of the property. We can find no principle which compels the creator of such an interest to confine it to a life estate pure and simple and not to give any additional rights. 14. In dealing with this aspect of the matter our learned brother has relied upon the Judgments of Sir Louis Stuart, C.J., and Gokaran Nath Misra, J., in the case of Thikur Jagmohan Singh v. Mst. Sheoraj Kuar (1927) 4 O.W.N. 1125 at pp. 1135 and 1141. Without repeating what he has said we thou d like to add that an argument similar to that which has been advanced before us was advanced in that case and the remarks of Wazir Hasan, J., (later Sir Saiyid Wazir Hasan, C.J.) are very apposite to the present case, He says at pages 1161 and 1162: It is argued by Mr. Niamaluliah that the power of alienation is added by devise to the limited estate conferred on the survivor and in support of the argument reference is made to powers of appointment in English wills and deeds. To my mind the analogy is misleading. Power of appointment, as understood in English law of real property was not, I am convinced, within the mental vision of the testator at all, I presume that he was wholly ignorant of it. According to my judgment the testator speaks of the power of alienation and testamentary disposition not by way of a gift of such power in addition to the gift of a limited estate but simply by way of explanation an amplification of what was implied as an inseparable incident in the status of a malik. There are no words connoting the gift of such a power and we cannot create one. I should not be understood to mean that the testator was under any legal disability to make a devise of a power of appointment if he intended to make one. All I gay is that he had no conception of it and he has not made such a devise. 14. We have, therefore, come to the conclusion that there is nothing in the laws of India which prevents the grant of the right of alienation to a person to whom a life estate is also granted in certain properties. 15. Coming now to the third question it is urged by the Learned Counsel for the Respondent that it is a new point which was not taken in the Courts below and was not taken before the learned single Judge and that it should therefore, not be allowed to be taken in third appeal. He relies upon a case reported in Mir Mohammad Husain v. Mohammad Habib Khan 1941 O.A. 686 : A.W.R. (Rev) 661 : O.W.N. 979 which lays down the proposition that in an appeal u/s 12(2) of the Oudh Courts Act a point not raised before the single Judge cannot be entertained. Reference may also be made to Vidya Sagar Abkar v. Bankey Lal 1943 O.A. 18 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 8 : O.W.N. 39 at p. 41, Matwan-nassa v. Pateahwari Prasad Singh 1943 O.A. 115 : O.W.N. 180 at 181 and Upper India Bank through Mr. Reference may also be made to Vidya Sagar Abkar v. Bankey Lal 1943 O.A. 18 : A.W.R. (C.C.) 8 : O.W.N. 39 at p. 41, Matwan-nassa v. Pateahwari Prasad Singh 1943 O.A. 115 : O.W.N. 180 at 181 and Upper India Bank through Mr. H. Hunter v. Ajodhia Singh 1940 O.A. 181 : O.W.N. 182 at 184 which law down the same, rule. We think that the objection is well-founded and that it is not open to the Appellants, Learned Counsel to argue this point before us. 16. In the present case there is another difficulty. We find from the judgment of our learned brother that objection was taken by the Respondents the title of the Appellants to bring a suit or to raise objections in execution proceedings, and if was held by him that the contention is not without force, but in view of the conclusion arrived at by me that Mst. Radha acquired a life interest in the property in question with full power of alienation over it, it is unnecessary to consider the second point 17. Thus if we were to allow the new point to be taken and even if we decided it in favour of the Appellants, we would be called upon to determine the title of the Appellants themselves, a point which was deliberately left open. This is altogether beyond the scope of the appeal u/s 12(2) of the Oudh Courts Act. We, therefore, cannot permit the third point to be raised in this appeal. 18. The result is that the appeals fail and are dismissed with costs.