JUDGMENT Edgley, J. - In the suit out of which this appeal arises the Plaintiff. Biraja Nath Chowdhury, sued for the preemption of certain property which had been bought by Defendant No. 2, Jitendra Narayan Deb Chowdhury, and Defendant No. 3. Jnanendra Narayan Deb Chowdhury by two kabalas, exhibits C and C1. dated respectively the 3rd of June, 1940. and the 15th of June, 1940. This property had originally belonged to Guru Prosad Chakravorty and on his death it devolved on the three nephews of this gentleman, viz. Ramesh, Jagat and Bimala. The Plaintiff purchased a two-thirds share of the property which belonged to Jagat and to Bimala. but was unable to purchase the remaining third share which belonged to Ramesh. In June, 1940, Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 purchased this share and the Plaintiff's contention was that he had duly exercised his right of pre-emption in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law, but that the Defendants had failed to execute a conveyance in his favour. He therefore instituted a suit against them for the pre-emption of the property on the 26th of December, 1940. A number of pleas were put forward in defence by the contesting Defendants; but in this appeal we are only concerned with the question whether or not the requisite formalities required by the law of pre-emption were observed. Admittedly, the Mahomedan Law of preemption applies to Hindus resident in the district of Sylhet in Assam. The finding of the learned Munsif was to the effect that the requisite formalities had not been observed by the Plaintiff in respect of the alleged purchase which took place on the 10th of June, 1940. He found on the other hand that these formalities had been observed in respect of the first sale, dated the 3rd of June, 1940, and he therefore decreed the Plaintiff's suit in part. 2. When the matter came before the learned Subordinate Judge on appeal the lower Appellate Court found that the requisite formalities for pre-emption had not been observed in respect of either of the a alleged sales and he therefore directed that the Plaintiff's suit should be dismissed with costs. A cross appeal which had been filed by the Plaintiff was also dismissed. 3. We are not concerned with the second sale dated the 15th of June, 1940. A cross appeal which had been filed by the Plaintiff was also dismissed. 3. We are not concerned with the second sale dated the 15th of June, 1940. because the matter as regards that sale is concluded by the findings of fact contained in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court. 4. With regard to the first sale, however, the principal findings are as follows: (1) The formalities in respect of the first demand, namely, talab-i-mowasibat, were correctly performed. This is a finding of fact. (2) As regards the second demand (talab-i-ishhad) the learned Subordinate Judge found as a fact that the requisite formalities had been observed as regards Jitendra Narayan Deb Chowdhury; but he held that with regard to Jnanendra Kara van Deb Chowdhury, Defendant No. 3. these formalities were defective as Jnanendra was absent in Shillong at the time when the second demand was made, and that this demand had been addressed to him by the Plaintiff on the 6th of June, 1940. by means of a letter sent to Shillong by registered post. It was found that the letter had not been attested and that it had not been written, signed or despatched in the presence of witnesses. The learned Subordinate Judge was therefore of the opinion that this letter did not fulfil the ordinary requirements of the law of pre-emption which are stated in Mulla's Mahomedan Law, in respect of the second demand, to be as follows: That the pre-emptor with the least practicable delay after the talab-i-mowasibat had affirmed his intention to pre-empt, after referring expressly to the fact, that the talab-i-mowasibat had been made and had made a formal demand: (a) either in the presence of the buyer, or the seller, or on the premises which are the subject of sale, and (b) in the presence at least of two witnesses. It may be noted that the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge was to the effect that the requisite demand had not been made on the promises which were the subject matter of the sale, and it follows that we must now consider whether or not the sending of the above-mentioned letter to Jnanendra Narayan Deb Chowdhury on the 6th of June, 1940. amounted to a sufficient demand to the seller of the property according to the ordinary principles of the Mahomedan law of preemption to which reference has already been made. 5. amounted to a sufficient demand to the seller of the property according to the ordinary principles of the Mahomedan law of preemption to which reference has already been made. 5. The main argument of the learned Advocate for the Respondents is to the effect that the Mahomedan law of pre-emption which is applicable in the present case requires that certain ceremonies in connection with the talabi-mowasibat and talab-i-ishhad should be strictly observed, and that as far as the talab-i-ishhad is concerned, it is essential that this demand should be made in the presence of witnesses, and that unless this is done the demand is of no effect.. He maintains that if a letter is at all written in connection with the talab-i-ishhad it should be a letter whereby a vakil is appointed, who will act as the agent of the pre-emptor and that such agent will be required to make the demand in the presence of witnesses either on the buyer or the seller or on the premises which are the subject matter of the sale. In support of this argument the learned Advocate places considerable reliance on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Muhammad Khalil v. Muhammad Ibrahim I. L. R. (1916) All. 201. On the facts of that particular case it was held by the learned Judges that it was clear that the Plaintiff was not unable to make the demands himself nor was there anything to show that he was unable to appoint a vakil, and it was therefore held that the second demand (talab-i-ishhad) which had been made by letter, was invalid. It was apparently argued before the learned Judges that under the Mahomedan law the pre-emptor had an option, if he so pleased, to make his second demand by letter and reference was made to Baillie, Macnaghten and Ameer Ali with regard to this point. The learned Judges were of the opinion that the views of these learned commentators were all based upon a text from the Futawa Alamgiri which was quoted in their judgment. The learned Judges were of the opinion that the views of these learned commentators were all based upon a text from the Futawa Alamgiri which was quoted in their judgment. This text, according to the translation given in the judgment, is in the following terms: If a pre-emptor comes to know of the sale while he is on his way to Mecca and makes the talab-i-mowasibat, but is unable to perform the talab-i-ishhad personally, he ought to appoint a vakil to make the claim of pre-emption for him. If he cannot find any one whom he may appoint his vakil, but finds a messenger, he ought to write a letter and in this letter he ought to appoint a vakil. If he fails to do so his right of pre-emption will be lost. But if he can neither find a vakil nor a messenger his right of preemption will not be lost until he finds one. 6. It will be seen from the above quotation from the Futawa Alamgiri that reference is made to certain circumstances in which the pre-emptor may write a letter, and the case which is mentioned apparently deals with a letter in which the pre-emptor finds it convenient to appoint a vakil to act as his agent. This authority does not however, deal with a case in which the pre-emptor may decide not to appoint an agent but merely to write a letter to the buyer or the purchaser of the property to announce his intention to pre-empt nor does it expressly discuss the validity of the latter procedure. There is certainly nothing to prevent a pre-emptor from making the requisite second demand through an agent and, as appears to have been assumed in the case of Ali Muhammad Khan v. Muhammad Said Hussain I. L. R. (1898) 18 All. 309 if such an agent is appointed the ceremonies which should be performed by the pre-emptor would probably have to be performed by the agent. 7. 309 if such an agent is appointed the ceremonies which should be performed by the pre-emptor would probably have to be performed by the agent. 7. In the present case, however, there was no question of appointing an agent or a vakil as the pre-emptor elected to issue a formal letter to Jnanendra Narayan Deb Chowdhury, who was in Shillong, to give the latter notice of Page No. 14 Missing (sic)ing certain passages from the Durrul Mukhtar the learned Judge says: It is also noteworthy that in the same chapter it is stated at two places that the second demand can be made "by means of writing a letter or sending a messenger", 'It is obvious that in the case of a letter there may not be an invocation of the witnesses in the sense of asking them expressly to bear witness. 8. We have also been referred to a Full Bench decision of this Court in the case of Rujjub Ali Chopedar v. Chundi Churn Bhadra I. L. R. (1890) Cal. 513. That was a case in which the second demand had been made by the pre-emptor in the presence of the Vendor without invoking witnesses to attest his immediate demand. It was held that in a case of this sort witnesses should have been invoked. Further, the learned Advocate for the Respondents places some reliance on the case of Jadu Lal Sahu v. Maharani Janki Koer L. R. 39 I. A. 101: (1912) 16 C. W. N. 553. The point for decision in that case was whether or not the Manager of the Court of Wards was competent to observe the formalities which by Mahomedan law are essential preliminaries to a claim for pre-emption; and reference was made to the second formality which ordinarily consists in the repetition of the demand with as little delay as possible in the presence of witnesses either before the vendor or the vendee or on the premises. It is however important to remember that neither in Rujjab Ali's case I. L. R. (1890) 17 Cal. 513 nor in Jadu Lal's case L. R. 39 I. A. 101: (1912) 16 C. W. N. 553 was the question either directly or indirectly under consideration as to what would be the position if the second notice of demand had been made by a letter, as happened in the case with which we are now dealing. 513 nor in Jadu Lal's case L. R. 39 I. A. 101: (1912) 16 C. W. N. 553 was the question either directly or indirectly under consideration as to what would be the position if the second notice of demand had been made by a letter, as happened in the case with which we are now dealing. 9. It seems to us that it would be construing the authorities with undue technicality if we were to hold that the invocation of witnesses is essential in a case in which the second demand is made by letter. We have been unable to find anything in the authorities which would justify us in holding that the procedure which was adopted by the pre-emptor in the present case was irregular or illegal. When such a letter has been written it is of course necessary for the pre-emptor to be in a position to prove that he has made the second demand by letter, but in the present case he has been able to furnish the requisite proof. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the requisite formalities were observed by the pre-emptor in respect of the first sale dated the 3rd of June, 1940. 10. The judgment of the lower Appellate Court must therefore be set aside in so far as it relates to that particular sale and the decision of the learned Munsif will be restored. 11. The appeal is accordingly allowed. Parties will bear their own costs throughout. Blank, J. I agree.