JUDGMENT Mansur Alam, J. - This is a defendants appeal arising out of an application for restitution under S. 444, C.P.C. It appears that the respondents to this appeal filed a suit in the Court of the Munsif for joint possession which was dismissed on 2-4-1932. On appeal the lower appellate Court reversed the decision of the Munsif and decreed the suit on 14-12-1933. While a second appeal was pending in the High Court, the plaintiff respondents in execution of their decree obtained possession on 3.5-1934. The second appeal was heard by a learned Single Judge of this Court who on 20-10-1936 reversed the decision of the lower appellate Court and restored that of the first Court dismissing the suit. Against the decision of the learned Single Judge an appeal under Letters Patent was filed and on 28-10-1938, the Letters Patent Bench affirmed the decision of the learned Single Judge dismissing the suit. 2. The present application out of which this second appeal arises was filed on 2-6-1941 for restitution under S. 144. The application was contested on the ground that it was barred by time but the learned Munsif repelled the plea and allowed the application for restitution, holding that time began to run from the date of the decree of the Letters Patent Bench and, therefore the right to apply under S. 144 accrued only after the decision was affirmed by the Letters Patent Bench. On appeal the lower appellate Court took a contrary view and held that the affirmance of the decree by the Letters Patent Bench did not give a fresh start to the period of limitation and the application was barred by time. The defendants have now come up in second appeal to his Court. 3. It seems to me that the questions raised in this appeal are concluded by the majority decision in a Full Bench case of this Court in Parmeshar Singh and Others Vs. Sitladin Dube and Another in which two learned Judges took the view that where the appellate decree merely affirms the decision appealed from, it would not give a fresh start of limitation and that time would begin to run from the date of the first decree. Latterly a similar point arose in another case, Ujagar Singh Vs. Sitladin Dube and Another in which two learned Judges took the view that where the appellate decree merely affirms the decision appealed from, it would not give a fresh start of limitation and that time would begin to run from the date of the first decree. Latterly a similar point arose in another case, Ujagar Singh Vs. Likha Singh and Another, AIR 1941 All 28 in which another learned Judge of this Court has taken the same view as was taken by the majority of Judges of the Full Bench. With both these views I respectfully agree. In this view of the matter, there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs.