JUDGMENT Mansur Alam, J. - The facts leading up to the filing of the suit out of which this appeal arises are that in 1939 a suit No. 157 of 1939 was filed by defendant 1 against Munshi, his two brothers and his uncle for possession of the property in dispute. That suit was hotly contested right up to the High Court and was decreed by all the Courts. 2. The plaintiffs, who are the sons of Munshi and are minors, brought the present suit with their mother as their nest friend for possession on the allegation that the decree in the earlier suit was the result of fraud and collusion the between father and defendant 1 and, therefore, the father could not be said to have adequately represented the interest of the sons and hence they were not bound by the decree in that suit. The suit was contested and the learned Munsif framed three issues, one of which was about the plea of res judicata wised by the defendant. The learned Munsif took up the case for decision on the question of res judicata first and the counsel for the parties made a statement that they would produce no evidence on that issue. The learned Munsif ultimately gave a finding to the effect that the plaintiffs were adequately represented by their father Munshi in the previous suit and, therefore, their claim was barred by res judicata. Against this decision, the plaintiffs went in appeal to the lower appellate Court which took the view that the learned Munsif should have struck a separate issue about fraud and collusion on the ground of which the decree in suit No. 157 of 1939 was challenged and, this not having been done, it remanded the case to the learned Munsif with direction that he should frame the issue about fraud and then decide the question. The defendant has come in appeal to this Court against the order of remand. It is urged that the plaintiffs themselves having agreed to produce no evidence on the issue about res judicata, they have to thank themselves for the situation that they find themselves in. It seems to us that there is considerable force in this contention. 3. The defendant has come in appeal to this Court against the order of remand. It is urged that the plaintiffs themselves having agreed to produce no evidence on the issue about res judicata, they have to thank themselves for the situation that they find themselves in. It seems to us that there is considerable force in this contention. 3. It is now the settled view both of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in AIR 1927 56 (Privy Council) and also of a Full Bench of this Court in Thakur Din and Another Vs. Sita Ram and Another, AIR 1939 All 399 that a decree obtained against a father or karta of a joint Hindu family must be binding on the sons and the father must be held to have represented not only his own interest but also the interest of the other members of the joint family. In the course of their judgment in the case mentioned above their Lordships of the Judicial Committee made the following observation: In the case of a Hindu family where all have rights, it is impossible to allow each member of the family to litigate the same point over and over again, and each infant to wait till he becomes of age, and then bring an action, or bring an action by his guardian before; and in each of these cases, therefore; the Court looks to: the Expln. 6 of S. 11, Civil P.C. to see whether or not the leading member of the family has been acting either on behalf of minors in their interest, or if they are majors, with the assent of the majors. 4. It, therefore, follows that a decree passed against a father or a manager of a Hindu family-unless it is vitiated by fraud or unless the son establishes that his interests were not properly safeguarded-must be held to be res judicata against the other members of the family. 5. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that there can be no question of res judicata in this case because the plaintiffs were no parties to the earlier suit. We have again the high authority of their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('21) 19 A.L.J. 366 : 8 AIR 1921 P.C. 11 : 48 Cal. 5. It is, however, contended on behalf of the respondent that there can be no question of res judicata in this case because the plaintiffs were no parties to the earlier suit. We have again the high authority of their Lordships of the Privy Council in ('21) 19 A.L.J. 366 : 8 AIR 1921 P.C. 11 : 48 Cal. 499 : 48 I.A. 187 : 60 I.C. 631 (P.C.), G.H. Hook v. Administrator General of Bengal that S. 11. Civil P.C. is not exhaustive of the principle of res judicata. In ('22) 20 A.L.J. 684 : 9 AIR 1922 P.C. 80 : 45 Mad. 320 : 49 I.A. 129 : 67 I.C. 408 (P.C.), Rama Chandra Rao v. Rama Chandra Rao at p. 691, again a Privy Council case, their Lordships are more explicit and observe that the principle which prevents the same case being twice litigated, is of general application and is not limited by specific words of the Code in this respect. This contention, therefore, has no force. 6. Now, it cannot be seriously disputed that before a decision can operate as res judicata, it must not be tainted with fraud or any other legal flaw. When, therefore, the defendant raised the plea of res judicata, he meant to plead that the decree was not a tainted decree and was passed in a suit in which the plaintiffs were properly represented and their interests were adequately safeguarded and the only manner in which they could get rid of the effect of such, a decree was by establishing that the decree was not a good decree because it was either tainted or they were not properly represented in the suit. 7. The parties to this case could not have been in any doubt about this, and it seems to us that the learned Munsif was right in not framing a separate issue about the alleged fraud. That issue was clearly involved in the issue of res judicata and it was for the plaintiffs to have led evidence in proof of their case that the decree in the earlier suit was vitiated by fraud and collusion. They chose not to do so and have to thank themselves for the position they find themselves in. The decree in the earlier suit is, therefore, clearly binding on the plaintiffs. 8. They chose not to do so and have to thank themselves for the position they find themselves in. The decree in the earlier suit is, therefore, clearly binding on the plaintiffs. 8. In this view of the matter, we must allow this appeal, set aside the order of remand passed by the lower appellate Court and restore the decree passed by the learned Munsif. In the circumstances of the case we make no order as to costs.