JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - This is an appeal on behalf of a decree-holder, and arises out of an application which she made for vacating the stay of an execution proceeding in pursuance of a notice from a Debt Settlement Board under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act, 1935. The learned Munsif, Second Court, Lakshmipur, before whom the application was made allowed it; but on appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge, Noakhali, restored the stay order. The facts of the case are briefly as follows: in or about the month of March, 1940, one Karimannessa Bibi as mutwalli of a wakf estate made an application to the Debt Settlement Board of Lakshmipur for the settlement of the debts of that estate. At the date the application was made the wakf estate owed certain arrears of rent to the Appellant landlord, but for some reason or other, the debt in respect of such arrears was not included in the application. Later on, in the year 1942, the Appellant instituted a suit for rent against the wakf estate and on the 7th August, 1942, recovered a decree for rent amounting to Rs. 1,923 odd. This represented the Appellant's dues for the years 1345 to 1348 B.S., corresponding roughly to the period from the middle of April, 1938, to the middle of April, 1941. Part of this period, it will be seen, was subsequent to the date of the application to the Debt Settlement Board. On the 21st September, 1942, the Appellant put the decree into execution in the second Court of the Munsif at Lakshmipur. The Defendant mutwalli, Karimannessa Bibi, had died in the meantime, and execution was accordingly taken out against her son, the present contesting Respondent. On the 3rd January, 1943, the new mutwalli made an application to the Debt Settlement Board praying for inclusion of the debt due under the rent decree in the list of debts for the settlement of which his mother had originally applied. The Debt Settlement Board entertained the application, and on the 8th January, 1943, issued a notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act to the learned Munsif before whom the rent execution case was pending. The notice was received by the learned Munsif on the 8th January, 1943, and the execution case was thereupon stayed. The Debt Settlement Board entertained the application, and on the 8th January, 1943, issued a notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act to the learned Munsif before whom the rent execution case was pending. The notice was received by the learned Munsif on the 8th January, 1943, and the execution case was thereupon stayed. The Appellant coming to know of it afterwards applied for vacating the stay, and her application came to be heard on the 1st May, 1943. The learned Munsif, as already stated, allowed the application by his order of that date. He did so mainly on two grounds; in the first place, he was of opinion that the debt under the rent decree did not come within the definition of a debt under sec. 2 (8) of the Act. The definition includes "all liabilities incurred prior to the first day of January, 1940," but the rent decree was not passed till long after that date. The learned Munsif took the view that once the decree was passed, it must be taken to have wiped off the original liability in respect of arrears of rent and that, therefore, the debt for the inclusion of which the judgment-debtor made his application to the Debt Settlement Board on the 3rd January, 1943, could not be regarded as a debt under the Act. Secondly, the learned Munsif held that the "further" application which was made to the Debt Settlement Board on the 3rd January, 1943, was not maintainable under sub-sees. (5) and (d) of sec. 8 of the Act. Sub-sec. (5) showed that a " further " application could be made only in respect of a debt incurred before the date of the first application, and that also for good and sufficient reason; while sub-sec. [6) clearly laid down that the Debt Settlement Board shall not entertain any " further application for the settlement of any debt. which has been incurred by a debtor after the date of the first application. According to the learned Munsif, the debt under the rent decree was a debt incurred by the debtor after the date of the original application and in that view, it was a debt in respect of which the Board had no jurisdiction to entertain an application. 2. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that under sec. According to the learned Munsif, the debt under the rent decree was a debt incurred by the debtor after the date of the original application and in that view, it was a debt in respect of which the Board had no jurisdiction to entertain an application. 2. On appeal the learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that under sec. 20 of the Act it was for the Debt Settlement Board and not for the executing Court to decide whether any liability was a debt or not; in so far as the Debt Settlement Board had directed the issue of a notice under sec. 34. it must be deemed to have impliedly decided that the debt in respect of which the further application was made was a debt within the meaning of the Act. Apart from this, the learned Judge held that as the arrears of rent in respect of which the decree was passed admittedly covered in part a period prior to the 1st January, 1940, the liability did come within the definition in sub-sec. (8) of sec. 2. On the same ground he held that the liability was one incurred, at least in part, prior to the date of the original application. The bar of sub-sec. (5) or sub-sec. (6) of sec. 8 did not accordingly apply. In this view he overruled the learned Munsif. Before the learned Judge an additional point was raised on behalf of the decree-holder founded on sub-sec. (1) of sec. 8. This sub-section as it originally stood was as follows: "Subject to the provisions of sec. 9, a debtor may make application for the settlement of his debts to a Board established for the local area within which he ordinarily resides within five years after the first Board is established under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 3 for that local area." It is admitted that the first Debt Settlement Board to be established for the local area of Lakshmipur, within which the judgment-debtor resided, was established on the 4th February, 1937. It was accordingly contended that after the lapse of five years from" this date it was no longer competent to the judgment-debtor to make any application for settlement of his debts. The "further" application which gave rise to the present proceedings was made on the 3rd January, 1943, and was accordingly challenged as incompetent. In answer, the learned Subordinate Judge pointed out that sub-sec. The "further" application which gave rise to the present proceedings was made on the 3rd January, 1943, and was accordingly challenged as incompetent. In answer, the learned Subordinate Judge pointed out that sub-sec. (1) of sec. 8 was amended later on by Bengal Act VIII of 1942, by sec. 2 whereof the words " seven years '" were substituted for the words "five years." This amendment came into force on the 14th January, 1943. that is to say, several days after the date of the further application, but the learned Judge held that that application was not a fresh application for the settlement of a debt, but merely an application by way of amendment of the original application, which admittedly was in time and was still pending. 3. On the present appeal, each of the ground- which were accepted by the lower Appellate Court has been challenged by the learned Advocate for the Appellant. 4. The first question which arises is whether the validity of a notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act can be challenged by the Civil Court to which the notice is sent. It seems to me that the position which may be now taken to be fairly established on the authorities is this. A notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act operates almost automatically as a stay of the suit or proceeding pending in the Civil Court, and the Civil Court has apparently no say in the matter, but this presupposes that in giving the notice the Debt Settlement Board acts with jurisdiction. But where a notice is impugned on the ground that it is without jurisdiction and ultra vires of the Board, it is not only open to but the duty of, the Civil Court to go into the matter, and if the Civil Court is of opinion that the action of the Board was ultra vires, it would be justified in disregarding the notice. 5. In the present case, as already pointed out, the learned Munsif was of opinion that the notice was without jurisdiction. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine how far the grounds on which the learned Munsif took this view, or the further ground on which the same view was sought to be supported before the lower Appellate Court, were correct. 6. In the present case, as already pointed out, the learned Munsif was of opinion that the notice was without jurisdiction. It becomes necessary, therefore, to examine how far the grounds on which the learned Munsif took this view, or the further ground on which the same view was sought to be supported before the lower Appellate Court, were correct. 6. The fundamental point which arises in the case is what was the precise liability which was the subject-matter of the application of the 3rd January, 1943. Was it the decree in the rent suit, or was it the pre-existing liability on account of arrears of rent for which the decree was passed? An answer to this question will in fact provide a key to the solution of all the other questions which have been raised. On behalf of the Appellant decree-holder, it is urged that the moment the decree was passed, the antecedent debt in respect of which the decree was passed was wiped out, and the only liability that remained was that under the decree. The contention is that the decree created an independent liability distinct from the liability in respect of the rents which were the subject-matter of the suit. It seems to me that there is a distinction between the liability arising under a decree and the pre-existing liability which gives rise to the decree. In other words, after a pecuniary liability has formed the subject-matter of a decree, it must be regarded as having been merged in the decree, and it cannot be regarded as still subsisting so as to be capable of enforcement otherwise than by execution of the decree. In the case of a mortgage decree, this principle is expressly recognised in Or. 34, sub-r. (3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that " on the passing of a final decree under sub-r. (2) all liabilities to which the Defendant is subject in respect of the mortgage or on account of the suit shall be deemed to have been discharged." The same principle has also been recognised in the case of a decree for money passed on a promissory note, by a decision of the Federal Court: Subrahmanyan Cheltiar v. Muttuswami Goundan alias Avanashi Goundan (1940) 45 C.W.N. 1. It follows that the learned Munsif was correct in holding that on the passing of the rent decree on the 7th August, 1942, the debt in respect of arrears of rent for which the decree was passed must be deemed to have been extinguished. The only debt, therefore, that subsisted on the day of the further application which was made by the judgment-debtor, was that under the decree, and this debt was obviously one which was incurred on the date on which the decree was passed. 7. It then, this be the correct position, it at once raised insuperable difficulties in the way of the judgment-debtor. In the first place, the debt in question would not be a debt within the meaning of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act. By the terms of its definition under sec. 2 (8), a debt includes all liabilities incurred prior to the 1st day of January, 1940. The decree being dated the 7th August, 1942, this will be excluded from the definition. Secondly, the debt could not be regarded as having been incurred before the date of the first application, the first application to the Debt Settlement Beard having been made in March, 1940, and the decree having been passed on the 7th August, 1942. Sub-sec. (6) of sec. 8 would, therefore, bar the application which was made on the 3rd January, 1943, for the settlement of this debt. 8. In this view of the matter, the essential condition precedent for bringing into operation the provision of sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act would be wanting, because it could not be said that the debt in respect of which the execution case was pending in the learned Munsif's Court was a debt within the meaning of the Act, or a debt included in an application under sec. 8, which the Debt Settlement Board was competent to entertain. The issue of a notice under sec. 34 of the Act would, therefore, he clearly without jurisdiction and ultra vires of the Board. 9. The further ground on which the notice was impugned before the learned Subordinate Judge, If not before the trial Court would also be not without force. 8, which the Debt Settlement Board was competent to entertain. The issue of a notice under sec. 34 of the Act would, therefore, he clearly without jurisdiction and ultra vires of the Board. 9. The further ground on which the notice was impugned before the learned Subordinate Judge, If not before the trial Court would also be not without force. That ground was to the effect that the notice was issued after the Board had become funds officio for the purpose, five years having already expired from the date on which a Board was established for the first time within the local area of Lakshmipur, namely, the 4th February. 1937. The answer given by the learned Subordinate Judge to this argument does not appear to me to be convincing, It is quite true that the period of five years mentioned in sec. 8 (1) was afterwards altered to seven years by the amending Act of 1942. but this amendment had not come into force either on the date on which the further application for the inclusion of the decretal debt was made by the judgment-debtor, namely, the 3rd January, 1943; nor on the date on which the notice under sec. 34 was issued by the Dent Settlement Board, This learned Subordinate Judge seemed to think that as the Board was still in seisin of the matter on the date on which the amendment came into force, it must be held that the Board was competent to entertain the further application. This assumes that the application was in continuation of the original application; but as I have already held that the debt was one which came into existence for the first time after the date of the original application, this position could not possibly be maintained. The application must be deemed, in this view of the matter, to have been a new application and obviously on the date on which it was made to the Board, the Board was not competent to entertain it. because of the lapse of the time-limit prescribed in sec. 8 (1) of the Act. The Board cannot be said to have regained its lapsed jurisdiction, because of the subsequent amendment extending the time-limit. Such extension could not have retrospective effect. 1 here is nothing in the amending Act to show that it was intended to be retrospective in its operation. 8 (1) of the Act. The Board cannot be said to have regained its lapsed jurisdiction, because of the subsequent amendment extending the time-limit. Such extension could not have retrospective effect. 1 here is nothing in the amending Act to show that it was intended to be retrospective in its operation. On this ground also the issue of the notice under sec. 34 of the Bengal Agricultural Debtors Act must be regarded as having been made without jurisdiction. 10. The result is that the appeal is allowed. The judgment and order of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside and those of the trial Court restored. The stay order will be vacated and execution will proceed. 11. The Appellant is entitled to the costs of this appeal. Hearing-fee is assessed at two gold mohurs. 12. Leave to appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent is refused. Let the records be sent down without delay.