JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This second appeal, arises out of a suit for pre-emption based on the ground that a custom of preemption according to the rules of Muhammadan law prevails in the locality in which the property sold is situate. The Plaintiff for the purposes of this appeal may be said to have claimed a right to pre-empt upon the ground that he had a right of way over the property sold and a right to discharge water upon or through such property. The Plaintiff's house adjoins the house of the vendors. In order to defeat the right of pre-emption the vendor left a strip of his house adjoining the Plaintiff's house unsold and sold a part of his house which was separated from the Plaintiff's house by this strip. 2. In so far as the right of way is concerned, it appears that the Plaintiff was the usufructuary mortgagee of the house sold and while he was in possession in his capacity as a mortgagee he opend a door from his own house into the house which is in dispute. The learned Judge has found that there was no right of way through this house. There was nothing to show as a fact that the opening of the door into the premises of which a part has been sold was acquiesced in by the vendor and 1 have no doubt that it cannot possibly be said that there was any right of way through that part of the house which has been sold. 3. As to the other right of discharging water, it is prefectly clear that the allegation is that the water was discharged into that part of the house which was not sold. It seems to me that that is sufficient answer to the Plaintiff's suit which has been dismissed by the learned Judge of the lower appellate Court. Even if we accept the proposition that the Plaintiff has a right to discharge water from the roof of his house into the unsold portion, that does not seem to me to give him any right of easement over the unsold portion. Once the water has left his premises and gone on to the premises of another his right is satisfied. Once the water has left his premises and gone on to the premises of another his right is satisfied. It is no concern of bis what happens to the water after that, i. e. whether it passes through the property which has now been sold or is retained on the unsold portion or is disposed of in soon other way, provided he himself does not suffer by the water returning to his property or doing him any damage. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has based his argument really open the point that there is no fixed period of prescription under the Muhammadan law for the acquiring of an easement. In the view that I take this question seems to me somewhat irrelevant, but I may, with the greatest deference to the learned Judge who decided the case of Baldeo v. Bairi Nath (1909) 31 All 519, express my doubt whether the question of easement depends upon the rules of Mahammadn law. The Muhammadan Law of pre-emption is that a person who has a right of way over or a right to discharge water upon certain property has a right to pre-empt that property, but the right to pre-empt depends upon the right of way or the right to discharge water and in India the existence 3of that right depends on the Indian Easements Act. It is obvious that the Muhammadan lawyers allowed a person to exercise the right of pre-emption because he had a right of way or a right to discharge water and not because he had been in the habit of passing over somebody else's property or discharging water upon it. He would obviously have no preferential right to pre-emption if he could not enforce the right to go over the property or discharge water upon it However that may be, it seems to me that there can be no doubt that a right of easement under the Muhammadan law caanot in any case come into existence on mere isolated user. There must be some reasonable period of prescription and in so far as the right of way is concerned the learned Judge has decided I think, rightly that no right of way of that kind has been established. 5. There must be some reasonable period of prescription and in so far as the right of way is concerned the learned Judge has decided I think, rightly that no right of way of that kind has been established. 5. On the other question of the right of discharging water, I do not think it was even properly alleged that there was any right over the property which has been transferred by the vendor and which the Plaintiff seeks to pre-empt. 6. The result is that the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal is refused.