JUDGMENT Biswas, J. - The Appellant in this case was the Plaintiff in a suit for pre-emption, the right of pre-emption being claimed on the basis of a contract. The suit was decreed by the trial Court in terms of Or. 20, r. 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The decree specified the amount of the purchase-money which was to be paid by the Plaintiff to the Defendant to whom the property had been sold, and fixed the date on or before which the amount was be paid into Court. It was further directed that on payment into Court of such amount together with costs, the Defendant should deliver possession of the property to the Plaintiff, but if the purchase-money and the costs were not so paid, the suit would stand dismissed with costs. The amount of the purchase-money was fixed by the learned Munsif at Rs. 400. An appeal was taken by the Defendant to the District Judge. The Appellate Court affirmed the decree with a modification as regards the amount of the purchase-money, which was fixed at Rs. 675 instead of Rs. 400. The decree as drawn up also followed the terms of Or. 20, r. 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The relevant portion of the decree was in these terms: The price of the property Respondent No. 1 will pay to the Appellant for the land in suit is raised from Rs. 400/- to Rs. 675/- and if Respondent No. 1 pays the whole of this amount in Court by the 17th of September, 194, Defendant No. 1 (Appellant) shall deliver possession of the land in suit to the Plaintiff (Respondent No. 1) whose title to the same shall be deemed to accrue from the date of payment If the money is not paid by the date fixed, the suit will stand dismissed with costs. 2. The decree was passed on the 29th August, 1941, but it was not signed until the 15th September, 1941, that is to say, two days prior to the date fixed for payment. 3. It appears that the Plaintiff who was aware of the terms of the decree before it was actually signed waited till the very last date to make the payment. Not only so, he failed to make the deposit in Court within the normal Court hours. At about 6 or 6-30 p. M.. 3. It appears that the Plaintiff who was aware of the terms of the decree before it was actually signed waited till the very last date to make the payment. Not only so, he failed to make the deposit in Court within the normal Court hours. At about 6 or 6-30 p. M.. on the 17th September, 1941, after the Court had risen, and the presiding officer had left the Court premises, the Plaintiff proceeded to the residence of the learned Munsif and there offered to deposit with him the required amount. Upon that the learned Munsif recorded the following order: This application has been brought to me by Pleader C. B. Lala at my residence at about 6-15 P. M. He tells me that according to the direction of the appellate Court he is to deposit Rs 276/. by to-day in the Court at C. B (Cox's Bazar). I am not sure if the tender at this time of the day will be legal. The Pleader submits that the money may be accepted and the question of legality or propriety of the tender or deposit may be left open The deposit will be accepted entirely at the risk of the applicant. Nazir to accept the deposit of money within half an hour from now i. e, by about 6-45 P. M." 4. Immediately, thereafter, the pleader for the other side came to the learned Munsif and recorded his objections to the acceptance of the deposit. The Munsif pointed out that he had already stated in his order that the legality of the deposit had been left open. 5. The decree-holder thereafter in due course applied for execution of the decree praying for delivery of possession of the property, on the footing that the purchase-money had been duly paid by him into Court as directed by the decree. The Defendant filed objections to the execution under sec. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the main point which be raised was that the deposit of the purchase-money had not been made within due time and that in terms of the decree the suit stood dismissed. There was, therefore, no decree subsisting which was capable of execution. 6. The learned. 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and the main point which be raised was that the deposit of the purchase-money had not been made within due time and that in terms of the decree the suit stood dismissed. There was, therefore, no decree subsisting which was capable of execution. 6. The learned. Munsif before whom the application for execution was made held that though the deposit had been made beyond the ordinary Court hours and the Court could, therefore, refuse the deposit, the fact still remained that the Court allowde the deposit to be made. That being so, he was of opinion that the deposit was to be regarded as having been duly made in compliance with the directions of the decree. In that view, he dismissed the objections to execution. 7. On appeal, the learned District Judge reversed this decision, and hence the present appeal to this Court. 8. The learned District Judge accepted the Defendant's contention that the deposit was not in accordance with the terms of the decree and that, therefore, the decree sought to be executed did not exist. 9. In the present appeal, Mr. Sen has contested the correctness of this view. He recognises that the decree in terms required the purchase-money to be deposited in Court on or before the 17th day of September, 1941, but he says, the deposit did not necessarily cease to be a deposit in Court on that date merely because it was made outside the normal Court hours and at the residence of the presiding officer. Normally, no doubt it should not be open to a litigant to claim that the Court should exercise its functions when it was not sitting at its normal place of business within the normal working hours, but a Court does not cease to be a Court outside its ordinary place of sitting or its ordinary hours of work. If, therefore, outside such place and outside such hours, a Court did. in point of fact, act as a Court, its action was clearly not open to challenge on the ground that it was not an act of the Court. I think there is a good deal of force in Mr. If, therefore, outside such place and outside such hours, a Court did. in point of fact, act as a Court, its action was clearly not open to challenge on the ground that it was not an act of the Court. I think there is a good deal of force in Mr. Sen's contention, and I am not, therefore, inclined to hold that merely because the Munsif accepted the deposit at 6-15 p. M., at his residence, that fact alone would be sufficient to make the deposit bad in law. If the matter rested there, I should have had no hesitation in allowing the appeal, but I am not at all sure that the Munsif actually accepted the deposit. As will appear from the order which he recorded and which I have set out in extenso, it was not an acceptance of the money which was tendered, but a mere direction to the Nazir to hold it in suspense account, so to say, subject to the question of the legality or propriety of the deposit being left open. It cannot be said accordingly that there was an unconditional acceptance of the deposit, or an unconditional deposit cither, as was required by the terms of the decree. The learned Munsif clearly stated in his order that the deposit had been made by the Petitioner at his own risk. That being so, I do not think that there was due compliance with the terms of the decree. The suit accordingly stood dismissed in default of the deposit, and execution could not accordingly proceed. The result is that the appeal is dismissed with costs and the order of the learned District Judge affirmed. Hearing-fee is assessed at one gold mohur.