Research › Browse › Judgment

Calcutta High Court · body

1946 DIGILAW 210 (CAL)

Wahed Bux Sardar v. Hanif Sardar

1946-07-17

body1946
JUDGMENT Edgley, J. - This is an appeal against the decision of Mr. Sehabuddin Ahmed, Subordinate Judge of Alipore, dated the 29th of November, 1941, in which he reversed a decision of the trial Court in a suit which had been instituted by the Plaintiffs for the declaration of their title and for recovery of possession as sub-lessees in respect of certain land which formed part of a wakf estate. The Appellants are two of the descendants of the original founder of the wakf which was created in 1909 by Kanai Mandal. 2. The case for the Plaintiffs was to the effect that the third mutwalli, Ahamed Baksh Sardar, had granted a lease on the 18th of April, 1939, to Defendant No. 1 and pro forma Defendants Nos. 16 and 17 and the latter had granted a sub-lease to the Plaintiffs in respect of their share of the demised property on the 19th December, 1939. The Plaintiffs sought to obtain joint possession with Defendant No. 1, but they were resisted by the other Defendants with the result that they were compelled to institute the suit out of which this appeal arises. 3. The case for the Defendants was that Ahamed Baksh Sardar had acted beyond his powers under the wakf deed in granting a lease on the 18th of April, 1939, in favour of the Plaintiffs' landlords and that consequently the Plaintiffs had no title in respect of the land in suit. The trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the lease dated the 18th of April, 1939, was in excess of the mutwalli's powers under the Mahomedan law. The Plaintiffs then appealed and the learned Subordinate Judge reversed the judgment of the first Court apparently on the ground that the lease was granted for the preservation of the wakf property. 4. It is contended by the learned Advocate for the Appellants in this case that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to a decree by reason of the fact that the lease granted to their landlords was in contravention of the terms of the wakfnama. The material portions of the wakfnama have been placed before us. From this document it appears to have been the intention of the founder of the wakf that the land which was the subject-matter of this deed should ordinarily remain khas. The material portions of the wakfnama have been placed before us. From this document it appears to have been the intention of the founder of the wakf that the land which was the subject-matter of this deed should ordinarily remain khas. Certain kinds of leases are expressly forbidden, namely, kayemi, mourashi and mokarari leases, but in the subsequent portion of the document it is stated that for the sake of the preservation and protection of the wakf property the mutwalli will be entitled to let out any part thereof in thicca, bhagra, meyadi or bemeyadi leases. 5. The case for the Plaintiffs is that they are covered by the latter portion of the wakfnama to which preference is made above, and that the lease in favour of their landlords dated the 18th of April, 1939, was granted by the mutwalli for the sake of the preservation and protection of the wakf property. 6. This being the case the onus lay on the Plaintiffs to show that the granting of the lease was in fact necessary for the preservation and protection of the wakf property, but in our opinion they have failed to discharge this onus. According to the terms of the lease itself there is nothing to indicate that either the preservation or the protection of the wakf property was at stake at the time when the lease was granted, and further it may be mentioned that according to the recitals the lease purports to be a chirasthai mokarari lease which is expressly forbidden under the terms of the wakfnama; and on this point we are not in agreement with the learned Subordinate Judge in so far as he assumes for the purposes of his judgment that a chirasthai mokarari lease is the same as a bemeyadi lease. The main ground on which the learned Subordinate Judge relies in support of his conclusion to the effect that the lease was for the preservation of the wakf property, is the fact that the wakf Commissioner accorded his approval to the lease nearly two years after it had been granted. We have examined this document [Exhibit 5 (b)] and we find that after the hearing of the suit had commenced the Plaintiffs asked for time to produce a document in support of their contention that the Commissioner of wakfs had sanctioned the lease on which they relied. We have examined this document [Exhibit 5 (b)] and we find that after the hearing of the suit had commenced the Plaintiffs asked for time to produce a document in support of their contention that the Commissioner of wakfs had sanctioned the lease on which they relied. An adjournment was accordingly granted and the so-called sanction of the Commissioner of wakfs dated the 17th of January, 1941, was subsequently produced for the purpose of the hearing of this case. In our view this document is worthless as evidence in support of the Plaintiffs' contention. It contains no indication at all that the Commissioner of wakfs made any enquiries into the matter and in any case it would be worthless as a certificate under sec. 53 (3) of the Bengal Wakf Act--which is a document which must be obtained from the Commissioner within six months from the date of the transfer and must be to the effect that in the opinion of the Commissioner the transfer was proper and necessary. The certificate [Exhibit 5 (b)] does not show that the Commissioner of wakfs considered the lease to be proper and necessary, but it merely contains a statement to the effect that he approved the lease. 7. The learned Advocate for the Respondents admits that his case must fail unless it comes within the purview of sec. 53 (2) of the Bengal Wakf Act, which refers to a case in which a transfer is made under an express power conferred by the wakf deed. It is clear that under the terms of the wakf deed no such express power has been conferred and it follows that the Plaintiffs are entitled to no relief. This appeal must accordingly be allowed with costs throughout. The decision of the learned Subordinate Judge is set aside, and the judgment and decree of the trial Court are restored. Blank, J. I agree.