JUDGMENT Kidwai, J. - On the 23rd September, 1926, Ram Pher, Defendant No. 1, acting for himself and as a guardian of his younger brother Ram Adhar Defendant No. 2, borrowed a sum of Rs. 350 from Ram Das, who was the original Appellant in this case and executed a simple mortgage deed to secure the money borrowed. On the 23rd September 1939, Ram Das brought the suit out of which this appeal has arisen to enforce his mortgage. The two Defendants filed separate written statements. Both of them alleged that the mortgage was not for legal necessity and that consequently it was not operative since joint ancestral property was mortgaged. It was also pleaded by the Defendant No. 1 that he too was a minor at the time when the mortgage was executed and that in any case he was a youth of whose inexperience the Plaintiff took undue advantage. The Defendant No. 2 pleaded that, in any case, the Plaintiff had been in possession of the mortgaged property from the date of the mortgage and so he was not entitled to interest. In the course of the oral pleadings after some of the issues had been framed the Plaintiff's pleader stated that even if the property was held to be joint ancestral property of the Defendants the suit ought to be decreed against the Defendant No 1 personally. Upon this plea issue No. 8 was framed and this reads as follows: Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to a personal decree against the Defendant as alleged? 2. Issue No. 4 arose out of the plea of Defendant No. 2 that the Plaintiff had been in possession since the date of the mortgage. 3. The trial Court found on issue No. 4 that the Plaintiff had been in possession from the date of the mortgage and on issue No. 8 found that the Plaintiff was entitled to personal decree against the Defendant No. 1. 4. 3. The trial Court found on issue No. 4 that the Plaintiff had been in possession from the date of the mortgage and on issue No. 8 found that the Plaintiff was entitled to personal decree against the Defendant No. 1. 4. The Defendant No. 1 went up in appeal and the lower appellate Court has held that it is not open to the Plaintiff to go behind his own pleadings and to aver his possession from the date of the mortgage and secondly that even if he had been in possession from the date of the mortgage his possession was not that of a mortgage and consequently he was not entitled to the benefit of Section 20(2) of the Indian Limitation Act. 5. The Plaintiff now comes up in second appeal and urges that the decision of the lower appellate Court on the question of limitation is not correct. 6. It is to be noticed that the mortgage on the basis of which this claim was made was not a possessor mortgage. There would, therefore, be no reason for the Plaintiff to enter into possession on the basis of it, but in the plaint it was alleged in paragraph 4 that in June 1937 the parties agreed to allow the Plaintiff to enter into possession of plot No. 562 which was the mortgaged property in lieu of interest Paragraph 5 proceeded to state that the Plaintiff had accordingly entered into possession and had been in possession for the years 1345 and 1346 Fasli and bad also sown the crop in the Fasli year in which the suit was filed. The Defendant No. 1 denied both paragraphs 4 and 5 but he nowhere alleged that the Plaintiff was in possession from any period earlier than 1345 False. As against, him, therefore, the Plaintiff cannot be permitted to take up a position which is inconsistent with his own pleadings and to say now that re has been in possession ever since the mortgage was executed. 7. Even, however, if it is open to the Plaintiff to change his position and if the finding of the trial Court that as a matter of fact, the Plaintiff is in possession since the date of the mortgage is held to be a correct finding, it does not advance the case of the Plaintiff as against the Defendant No. 1 any further. The Article applicable to the case is Article 116 of the 1st Schedule of the Indian Limitation Act which prescribes a period of six years. The mortgage was executed on the 23rd September, 1926, and it provided a period of one year for payment. Thus limitation would run from the 23rd September 1927, and would expire on the 23rd September 1933 The suit was brought in 1939, Unless, therefore, Section 20(2) of the Limitation Act comes to the Plaintiffs assistance, his suit will be barred by time Section 20(2) of the Limitation Act applies only in the case of profits received by a mortgagee in possession. In the present case the Plaintiff has been hold not to have acquired mortgagee rights at all because ancestral land purported to be mortgaged for a debt which is not proved to have been taken for legal necessity. In view of the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Narain Prasad v. Sartnam Singh (1917) 44 I.A. 163 the mortgage is wholly void and the Plaintiff cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been in possession of the land as a mortgagee. -Vide Pichandi v. Karidasami (1884) 7 Mad 539. In this view of the matter too, the receipt of rent by the Plaintiff cannot extend the time and his claims for a personal decree would be barred. 8. It is urged on behalf of the Appellants that the plea of limitation was not taken in the trial Court. It is no doubt true that no specific plea to that effect was raised by the Defendant but the CPC lays down in Order VII, Rule 6 that in a suit filed after the period of limitation has expired the plaint must show the ground upon which exemption from limitation is claimed. In the present case the Plaintiff's counsel when he made a claim for personal decree failed to indicate how be sought to bring his claim within limitation. Since this was not done, it was not necessary for the Defendant to say anything further in the matter. It was for the Plaintiff to show under issue No. 8 that his claim for personal decree was within limitation and in the present case he has failed to do so. Reference may also be made to Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. It was for the Plaintiff to show under issue No. 8 that his claim for personal decree was within limitation and in the present case he has failed to do so. Reference may also be made to Section 3 of the Indian Limitation Act. In agreement with the lower appellate Court, I therefore, hold that, whichever view may be taken of the matter, the claim for a personal decree against Defendant No. 1 is barred by time. 9. I uphold the decree of the lower appellate Court and dismiss this appeal with costs.