JUDGMENT Sharpf, J. - This appeal is by Defendant No. 1 and arises out of a suit brought by the Plaintiff for a declaration that his interest was not affected by the sale for arrears of rent of the holding in which he purchased a share for some of the original tenants, Defendants Nos. 3-11. The Plaintiff was not made a party in the rent suit, despite his having given notice to the landlord, Defendant No. 2, of his purchase, and consequently he claimed that his interest was not affected by the sale at which the Defendant No. 1 was the purchaser. The defense was that the tenancy in dispute was an under raiyati, which was not transferable without the consent of the landlord, that no such consent had been obtained and therefore he was not bound to recognise the transfer, but was entitled to sue the original tenants; and that the Plaintiff was bound by the decree and the subsequent sale in execution. The material facts are not disputed. One Becharam Das, held a jama of Rs. 47 under a registered potta dated 7th October, 1882 executed by the predecessor of Defendant No. 2 in favour of Becharam, the ancestor and predecessor of Defendants Nos. 3-11. The lease in question purported to confer a mourashi mokarari right and a transferable interest in the holding. It has been held by both the Courts below that the Defendant No. 2 was a raiyat and the Defendants Nos. 3-11 from whom the Plaintiff has purchased a share were under raiyats, that the lease purported to confer a permanent and transferable interest, and consequently though no specific consent was taken from the landlord in respect of the transfer to the Plaintiff, the consent of the landlord must be presumed to have been given in view of the terms of the lease granted by his predecessor-in-interest. Both Courts have held, therefore, that the landlord who, it was found, had received notices of the transfer, was bound to implead the Plaintiff in the rent suit, and as this was not done, his interest was not affected by the decree and sale held in execution thereof. They have, therefore, declared the Plaintiff's title to and his right of possession in the disputed holding, and allowed his prayer for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant No. 1 from taking possession of the Plaintiff's share. 2. They have, therefore, declared the Plaintiff's title to and his right of possession in the disputed holding, and allowed his prayer for a permanent injunction restraining the Defendant No. 1 from taking possession of the Plaintiff's share. 2. Three points have been urged by Mr. Mukherji for the Appellant. The first is that the lease Ex. 1 on which the Plaintiff relies was not referred to in the plaint as forming the basis of the Plaintiff's title and was not filed until a late stage of the proceedings and so the Defendant was unable to produce evidence in rebuttal. It does not appear that any objection on this ground was taken previously, and in actual fact the materials available from the record do not support it. The patta was admitted in evidence without any objection, and it appears that it was filed in Court on 23rd August, 1941. The hearing of the suit did not commence until 13th July, 1942. It does not appear to have been at any time disputed that the patta was a genuine document or that it was granted by the Defendant's predecessor-in-interest to the predecessors-in-interest of Defendants Nos. 3-11 from whom the Plaintiff purchased a share. The contention that the Defendant was taken by surprise or that he was deprived of an opportunity to adduce evidence to rebut the patta appears to me, therefore, to be without substance. 3. The second point is that the lower Appellate Court was wrong in his view that the amendment of the Bengal Tenancy Act cannot be treated as having taken away the right of transferability that had already accrued to the under-raiyati long before this amendment. 4. It is not exactly clear what the learned District Judge intended by this observation. It is well settled that prior to the introduction of sec. 48F by the amendments of 1928, an under-raiyati interest was nontransferable unless by custom; presumably, therefore, he was referring to the facts of the present case, and was merely expressing the view that the introduction of sec. 48F in 1928 which expressly prohibited the transfer of the holding of an under-raiyati without consent of the landlord would not operate to nullify any express right of transfer already granted by the landlord, as between the landlord and his under-raiyat. 5. The main contention of Mr. Mukherjee is, however, that by reason of the provisions of sub-sec. 48F in 1928 which expressly prohibited the transfer of the holding of an under-raiyati without consent of the landlord would not operate to nullify any express right of transfer already granted by the landlord, as between the landlord and his under-raiyat. 5. The main contention of Mr. Mukherjee is, however, that by reason of the provisions of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, which was repealed by the Bengal Tenancy Act, 1928, the patta Ex. 1, which was granted in 1882 ceased to have any effect from the year 1894, i.e., nine years after the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and consequently that from the year 1895 the predecessors of the Plaintiff must be treated merely as under-raiyats holding otherwise than under a written lease. Consequently, even if any right of transfer had been granted by the lease, it had ceased to have any validity or existence, and could not be accepted as establishing any consent of the landlord for the purpose of sec. 48F which had come into existence at the time of the Plaintiff's purchase in the year 1935. In any event, he has contended, the consent contemplated by sec. 48F is a consent contemporaneous with the transfer, and a general power of transfer conferred in the year 1882 cannot be construed as equivalent to such consent. 6. In reply to these contentions, Mr. Das has maintained, on the authority of the decision in Chandra Kanta Nath v. Amjad Ali Haji I. L. R. (1920) cal. 788. that apart from sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act, the Appellant who is the successor-in-interest of Defendant No. 2 is stopped from denying that the Plaintiff, the successor-in-interest of Becharam, has a transferable interest in the holding in dispute. And even if sec. 85 is applicable in the present case, he contended that the lessee after 1894 continued in possession on the basis of the original lease, and the Defendant No. 1 or his predecessors could not ignore the terms of that lease though it might be possible for them to eject the Plaintiff, who has succeeded to the under-raiyati interest, by the usual procedure applicable to an under-raiyat holding otherwise than under a written lease. 7. Mr. Das also maintained on the authority of Munshi Serajul Huq v. Abjal Mia (1910) 46 C. W. N. 339. that sec. 7. Mr. Das also maintained on the authority of Munshi Serajul Huq v. Abjal Mia (1910) 46 C. W. N. 339. that sec. 48F of the Bengal Tenancy Act has no application to the case of an under-raiyat holding under a lease granted prior to the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act, 1928, and that the rights created by such a lease could not be nullified by that section. No consent of the landlord was, therefore, at all necessary and even if it was necessary, the provision of the lease conferring a right of transfer was equivalent to the consent contemplated by that section, and no special or fresh consent was necessary. In support of this last proposition, he relied on Bidhu Mukhi Chowdhurani v..Asmatullah (1916) 21 C. W. N. 829. 8. The question of the applicability of sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy "Act or of the disability which it may create was not agitated in the lower Courts, but both Courts have held the Defendant No. 2, the successor-in-interest of the grantor of the patta to Plaintiff's predecessor, to have the status of a mourashi mokarari raiyat, and the present case will, in my opinion, come within the second class considered in the decision in Chandra Kanta Nath v. Amjad Ali Haji I. L. R. (1920) 48 cal. 783 referred to above, and the grantee may invoke the doctrine of estoppels and plead that the grantor cannot be permitted to plead the falsity of the recitals in the document so as to enable him to derogate from his own grant. The present question was not of course directly before the Court in the decision just quoted, in which the main consideration was whether the grantor could be permitted to set up for himself a status lower than which he purported to possess when the lease was granted, but the discussion therein makes it appear very doubtful whether the provision of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 85 will be at all attracted where the lease is granted by a mourashi mokarari raiyat; in any event the principle of the decision appears to be that the grantor cannot be permitted as against the grantee to avoid the provisions of his own grant. 9. This principle appears to have been recognised in a series of decisions, Madan Chandra Kapali v. Jaki Karikar (1902) 6 C. W. N. 377. 9. This principle appears to have been recognised in a series of decisions, Madan Chandra Kapali v. Jaki Karikar (1902) 6 C. W. N. 377. Bipin Behari Hati v. Amrita Lal Bhattacharji (1908) 9 C. L. J. 76. and Arab Ali v. Rachimuddi (1911) 13 C. L. J. 656., which relate directly to the interpretation and effect of sub-sec. (3) of sec. 85 of the Bengal Tenancy Act and in which it has been held that the provisions of that subsection apply only as between the landlord and the sub-tenant, and not between the tenant and the sub-tenant. In the last-mentioned decision, it has been held that the tenancy of an under-raiyat who has been allowed to hold over after the termination of nine years from the commencement of the Bengal Tenancy Act and to continue in occupation as a tenant, is to be terminated in accordance with the provisions of law and till such steps have been taken, he cannot be forcibly ejected from the land. Even assuming, therefore, that sub-sec. (3) of sec. 85 will be attracted and that the lease in question ceased to be valid nine years after the introduction of the Bengal Tenancy Act, I agree with Mr. Das argument that although the landlord might in such a case have ejected the under-raiyati by the usual procedure, so long as he permitted him to retain the tenancy, his possession was referable to the terms of the lease, and the grantor was bound to recognise the right of transfer which it created. 10. The next question is whether sec. 48F is attracted in the case of an under-raiyati lease created prior to the Bengal Tenancy Amendment Act. The decision, Serajul Huq Mia v. Abjol Mia (1940) 46 C W. N. 339. cited by Mr. Das does not appear to have any direct application to the present case, for that was an instance of the granting of a sublease by an under-raiyat, and it was held that sec. 48F did not apply in such a case because as the law stood before that (1928) an under-raiyati holding was neither heritable nor transferable but there was an exception in the case of a sub-lease, as a power to sublet was implied in the definition of an under-raiyat given in sec. 4 of the Act. 11. This is certainly no authority for holding that sec. 4 of the Act. 11. This is certainly no authority for holding that sec. 48F will not be attracted in the case of a lease to an under-raiyat, and there seems no good reason why it should not apply even when the lease was granted prior to 1928. It seems, therefore, that the consent of the landlord will be in such a case a condition precedent to the validity of the transfer. 12. There remains the question whether the provision as to transferability in the lease granted by the predecessor of the Defendant No. 2 to the predecessors of the Plaintiff will amount to " the consent of the landlord" as contemplated in sec. 48F. The decision, Bidhu Mukhi Chowdhurani v. Asmatullah (1916) 21 C. W. N. 829. is not directly applicable. That was a. case relating to the question whether a general provision in a darpatni lease expressly authorising the darpatnidar to grant a sepatni would be sufficient to make the sepatni a protected interest under cl. (g) of sec. 160 of the Bengal Tenancy Act even though no express permission was given in writing at the time when the sepatni was created. The answer given was in the affirmative, and in disposing of the question Mookerjee, J., observed: As the matter is not thus concluded by authority, sec. 160 (g) requires to be construed, and I feel no doubt that we should not accept the interpretation put forward on behalf of the Appellant, namely, that the express permission must be contained in a written instrument, other than the lease whereby the tenancy was created, which is specially executed when the encumbrance is created. If that had been the intention of the legislature, cl. (g) would have been differently framed. There is, I think, no foundation for the contention that an express written permission must be obtained from the landlord on the occasion when the particular encumbrance is created; there is in principle no difference between a permission to create an interest of a particular description given in the lease itself and a permission subsequently given by a separate document. 13. 13. These observations, it seems to me, are equally applicable in the present matter, and the principle underlying them appears to be the same, namely, that when a right is conferred generally without restriction, there is no need to obtain special permission" on every occasion on which that right is exercised. There is no dispute in the present case that a general right of transfer was conferred on the grantee by the landlord, and that being so, the lower Courts were, I think, correct in holding that the " consent of the landlord within the meaning of sec. 48F of the Bengal Tenancy Act to the transfer in question should be inferred. There is nothing in sec. 48F to indicate that the consent which is contemplated must be contemporaneous with the transfer. It is true, of course, as pointed out by Mr. Mukherjee, that the wording of cl. (g) of sec. 160 is different from that of sec. 48F, and the reference to permission being or having been granted to " the tenant for the time being " itself suggests that a prior consent will suffice, but still I see no good reason why a general right of transfer conferred without restriction should not amount to the " consent of the landlord " at a much later period, even though the particular transfer could not have been contemplated when the general consent was given. In my opinion, therefore, the matter has beep rightly decided by the lower Courts and this appeal is dismissed with costs.