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Allahabad High Court · body

1946 DIGILAW 214 (ALL)

Haider Husain v. Fatima

1946-09-05

KIDWAI

body1946
JUDGMENT Kidwai, J. - This unfortunate litigation has arisen between a daughter and her father with regard to a share in a house situated in muhalla Chaudhri Garhaiya in the city of Lucknow. It appears that on the 31st January 1924, the Defendant-Appellant, Hyder Husain and his mother Amir Khanam, executed two deeds of gift of the property in suit in favor of Mst. Fatima, Plaintiff-Respondent who is the daughter of Hyder Husain, Mst. Fatima was then a mere child. In June 1936 the Plaintiff was married and on the 1st July 1936 before her formal rukhsati took place (although she had visited the houses of her husband) the deeds of gift in suit were executed by the Plaintiff in favor of her father, Hyder Husain and her grandmother, Amir Khanam. Thereafter Amir Khanam died leaving Hyder Husain as her son and sole successor. On the 11th July, 1938, the Plaintiff instituted the present suit in the Court of the Munsif, North Lucknow, to get the deeds of gift set aside on the ground that they had been executed by her without her understanding their true nature under the belief that her father was taking from her powers of attorney in order to enable him to conduct some litigation then pending. It is not necessary to enter into the details of the other pleas taken by her. The defense was that the deeds of gift executed in January 1924 were merely colorable transactions entered into in order to protect the property from creditors and that possession under them had not passed. It was pleaded that the deed in suit which are Exs. A-1 and A-2, were genuine and valid and that no fraud or coercion had been exercised by the Defendant. 2. The trial Court framed issues to cover all these defenses and having come to the conclusion that the deeds of gilt executed in January 1924 were farzi, although formal delivery of possession under them took place and that Exs. A-l and A-2 were genuine and valid transactions entered into by the Plaintiff who was then a major, it dismissed the suit. 3. The Plaintiff went up in appeal and the learned Additional Civil Judge thought it necessary to frame another issue and to remit it for trial to the Munsif's Court. A-l and A-2 were genuine and valid transactions entered into by the Plaintiff who was then a major, it dismissed the suit. 3. The Plaintiff went up in appeal and the learned Additional Civil Judge thought it necessary to frame another issue and to remit it for trial to the Munsif's Court. This issue reads as follows: Were the deeds of gift of 1936 not induced by undue influence and were these executed by Hafiza Khanam after she had and independent advice and with full appreciation of the effects thereof on her interests?" (Hafiza Khanam is an alias for Fatima.). 4. The trial Court found that no undue influence had been exercised and that the Plaintiff was unworthy of credit. It accordingly again upheld the deeds of gift, Exs. A-1 and A-2 and forwarded the finding to the lower appellate Court. The lower appellate Court has considered all the evidence on the record and has discussed the statements of the witnesses produced by the Defendant in support of his case. It did not consider that evidence to be reliable and accordingly it held that the Plaintiff was under the influence of her father and grandmother when she executed these deeds and that the advice given to her was not that of independent persons. It also held that the finding of the learned Munsif that the gifts in dispute were not induced by undue influence could not be sustained and that the Defendant bad had failed to discharge the onus which lay upon him. The lower appellate Court accordingly held that the Defendant had failed to prove that the alleged deeds of gift of 1936 were not induced by undue influence and were executed by Mst. Fatima after she had received independent advice and with full appreciation of the effects thereof on her interests, and decreed the suit. 5. The Defendant has come up in second appeal but I am of opinion that this appeal is concluded by findings of fact. 6. There can be no doubt that in the present case, apart from Mst, Fatima being a pardanashin lady, u/s 111 of the Indian Evidence Act the burden lay upon Hyder Husain, Appellant to prove that the transactions bad been entered into in good faith. As the lower appellate Court has pointed out Mst. Fatima had only just attained majority. 6. There can be no doubt that in the present case, apart from Mst, Fatima being a pardanashin lady, u/s 111 of the Indian Evidence Act the burden lay upon Hyder Husain, Appellant to prove that the transactions bad been entered into in good faith. As the lower appellate Court has pointed out Mst. Fatima had only just attained majority. In litigations that were pending her father had been acting as her guardian ad item, she was still residing with her father and grandmother, and although she had been married the marriage was so recent that it could not. be said that she had passed out of the influence of her father, particularly in view of the fact that the formal ruksati still remained to be performed. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the father stood in a position of active confidence and since the good faith of these transactions was in dispute, it was for him to prove them. The lower appellate Court has approached the matter from the correct angle and has fully considered the evidence adduced by the Defendant to discharge the onus. It is said that the evidence produced was the best evidence that was available to the Appellant and that if the witnesses are related to him, they are equally related to the Respondent who is his daughter. It if not necessary that even the best evidence should be truthful evidence and it is truthful evidence alone that can be accepted. When the lower appellate Court has come to the conclusion that this evidence is not reliable there remains no evidence on the record to discharge the burden which lay upon the Defendant. 7. I, therefore, do not see any reason to interfere with the decision of the lower appellate Court and dismiss this appeal with costs.