ORDER Mootham, J. - This is an application under s. 115 Civil P.C., for the revision of an order of the Civil Judge of Farrukhabad dated 10-2-1945. The circumstances giving rise to this application are as follows. In the year 1944, Lalla Singh filed a suit in the Court of the Civil Judge of Farrukhabad, and on 10th July of that year the Court gave leave to the defendants, the applicants before me, to deliver certain interrogatories to the plaintiff and directed the latter to file his answers thereto by 26th July. On that date, no answers having been filed and the plaintiff not appearing, the Court on the application of the defendants dismissed the suit, purporting to act under O. 11, R. 21, Civil P.C. 2. On 25-8-1944, the plaintiff applied to the learned Judge for the restoration of the suit on the ground that on the date on which answers to the interrogatories should have been filed both he and his guardian (the plaintiff being a minor) were seriously ill. The learned Judge was satisfied that, for the reasons given by the plaintiff, answers to the interrogatories could not be filed by the date fixed; and he was further of opinion that his order dismissing the suit was one which in any case he should not have made as he had overlooked the fact that as no order had been made under O. 11, R. 11, directing the plaintiff to answer the interrogatories, he had no power under R. 21 of that Order to dismiss the suit if the interrogatories were not answered. In these circumstances he was of opinion that the proper course was for him to exercise his inherent powers under s. 151 of the Code, and accordingly he, on 10-2-1945, allowed the application and directed the restoration of the suit. 3. This order is now attacked on two grounds. In these circumstances he was of opinion that the proper course was for him to exercise his inherent powers under s. 151 of the Code, and accordingly he, on 10-2-1945, allowed the application and directed the restoration of the suit. 3. This order is now attacked on two grounds. It is said, first, that the order of the learned Judge of 26th July dismissing the suit was a valid order and, if it were not, the Court had no inherent power under s. 151 to set it aside as the order was one which was appeasable under, O. 43 R. 1 (f); secondly, it is said that the order of the Court dated 10-2-1945 is a nullity inasmuch as it was made on an invalid applicationthe application being invalid because it was filed not by the plaintiff's guardian but by the plaintiff himself, who was admittedly a minor. 4. It is, in my opinion, clear that the order of the learned Civil Judge of 10-7-1944, dismissing the plaintiff's suit, was wrong in law. In Ramapat Saran and Another Vs. Habib Ullah Khan and Another, AIR 1926 All 553 Ramapat Saran v. Habib Ullah Khan it was pointed out that An order under that rule (that is to say O. 11, R. 21) can be passed only, when there is a previous order under R. 11, requiring a party to answer interrogatories. There are two stages in which the application proceeds. The first is indicated in R. 1. Under that Rule a party simply delivers certain interrogatories to be answered by the other party. The other party may or may not comply with the request. When the party to be questioned fails to answer the interrogatories, the party interrogating has a right to come before the Court and to obtain an order under R. 11 for an answer. It is then that the Court decides whether the party "interrogated must answer or not .... It is when the Court has ordered certain interrogatories to be answered and there is a failure that the question arises whether the failure should be punished and the order enforced by the provision of R. 21. 5. It is then that the Court decides whether the party "interrogated must answer or not .... It is when the Court has ordered certain interrogatories to be answered and there is a failure that the question arises whether the failure should be punished and the order enforced by the provision of R. 21. 5. It is clear that in this case no order was made by the Court under o. 11, R. 11, but it is said that the Court's original order of the 10th July, allowing interrogatories to be delivered and directing the plaintiff to answer them by the 26th July, amounted to an order within the meaning of R. 11. In my opinion this was not so, for on that date the Court did no more than make an order under R. 1, and there can be no out the granting of leave under that rule does not amount to an order to answer interrogatories under R. 11 : ('91) 18 Cal. 420, Prem Sukh Chunder v. Indro Nath Banerjee. It is, therefore, to my mind clear that the learned Civil Judge had no power on 25th July to dismiss the suit : but it is, in my judgment, equally clear that, having dismissed the suit, he had no authority under S. 151 of the Code subsequently to direct its restoration, for it is well established that where a party has neglected to avail himself of a remedy provided by the Civil Procedure Code, it is not open to him to invite the Court by virtue of its inherent Jurisdiction to disturb a decree or order which he has failed to challenge in a statutory manner : Nageshar Prasad Vs. Gudri Lal Narain Das and Another Court has jurisdiction to pass an order under s. 151, whenever it is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of a process of Court, but it cannot be said that the exercise of this power is necessary to meet the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of a process of the Court where there is a specific remedy provided by the Code applicable to the circumstances of the case. Order 43, R. 1, gives a party a right to appeal from an order passed under O. 11, R. 21 and in my opinion, therefore, the learned Civil Judge in passing his order of 26th July 1944 acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction. 6. With regard to the question whether on 10-2-1945, the Court had before it a valid application it is clear that although O. 32, R. 5 (1), says that every application to the Court on behalf of a minor shall be made by his next friend or by his guardian for the suit, sub-rule (2) of that order provides that a Court may discharge an order which has been made on an application filed in contravention of the provisions of sub-rule (1). In my opinion the Court in such cases has a discretion in the matter and it is not bound to set aside such an order if it is satisfied that the order was for the benefit of the minor. This was, the view taken in ('39) 26 AIR 1939 Sind 332 : 185 I.C. 155, Lalumal Dholumal v. Harumal Lalsingh with which I respectfully agree. 7. The position is, therefore, that the learned Civil Judge acted illegally in dismissing the plaintiff's suit on 26th July and that he acted illegally in directing the restoration of the suit on 10-2-1945. I have no doubt that in passing his order of 10-2-1945, the learned Civil Judge firmly believed that he was taking the best step available to remedy the position created by his earlier erroneous order of 26th July, and that in so doing he was acting for the benefit of the minor plaintiff. In so far as the effect of the one illegal order has been to set aside another illegal order and thus to restore the parties to their original position, I should not be disposed in the exercise of my discretionary powers under S. 115 of the Code to set aside the second only of such illegal orders if this course can be avoided. It has however been urged upon me that, in view of the fact that the learned. It has however been urged upon me that, in view of the fact that the learned. Civil Judge in passing his order of 26th July acted without jurisdiction or, as I consider, acted illegally in the exercise of his jurisdiction, I have no choice in the matter but must direct that the second of his orders must be set aside. I have been referred to the cases in Asutosh Ghosh and Another Vs. Indu Bhusan Ghose, AIR 1927 Cal 158 The first of these cases was a civil revision in which Gaming and Page JJ. considered the extent of the inherent powers of a Judge under S. 151, Civil P.C., and feeing of opinion that in the circumstances of the case the Judge of the lower Court had improperly exercised his powers under that section they set his order aside. The learned Judges in this case do not, however, appear to have considered whether the order they made was one the making of which was subject to their discretion nor does it seem that they were invited to do so. In ('03) 26 Mad. 176. Ramasamy Chettiar v. R.G. Orr the application for revision arose out of a suit for damages for breach of a covenant in an agreement which had been wrongly filed in a Court which had no jurisdiction to entertain it. Sir Arnold White C.J. held that the Court of first instance exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it by law, and although he did so with obvious reluctance, he considered that he was bound to interfere. 8. On the other hand, Costello J. in Mt. Kuti Baru Bibi Vs. Jitendra Nath Roy and Others, AIR 1931 Cal 425 declined to set aside an order of an appellate Court, made without jurisdiction, when the effect of so doing would have been to restore an order improperly made by the trial Court and in Rameswar Mahton Vs. Lala Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1925 Patna 36 a Bench of the Patna High Court refused to set aside an order made by a Court, although such order was made without jurisdiction. In that case, an order had been made dismissing a suit on a preliminary point. Lala Dwarka Prasad, AIR 1925 Patna 36 a Bench of the Patna High Court refused to set aside an order made by a Court, although such order was made without jurisdiction. In that case, an order had been made dismissing a suit on a preliminary point. It was open to the plaintiff to apply for review of that order under O. 47, R. 1, but instead of doing so he asked the trial Court for an order restoring the suit to be made in exercise of its inherent powers. The Bench held that in the circumstances the lower Court had no power to act under S. 151 of the Code, but as the plaintiff would undoubtedly have succeeded had he pursued the remedy allowed by law, namely review, it was not a fit case for interference. 9. The exercise by the High Court of the powers vested in it by S. 115, Civil P.C., is by the terms of the section itself, discretionary, and accordingly I do not think that the law imposes any obligation on me to exercise those powers in this case. There is no reason to doubt that had the opposite party appealed under O. 43, R. 1, against the order dismissing his suit he would have obtained an order for its restoration; and, in my opinion, this is a fit case in which my discretion should be exercised in favour of the opposite party. The application is accordingly rejected, with costs.