JUDGMENT Sinha, J. - This is an appeal under S.410, read with S. 418, Criminal P.C., against an order of the learned Sessions Judge of Benares. The case was tried with the assistance of a jury and the appellant has been sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for nine months under S. 342 and to rigorous imprisonment for three years under S. 211, Penal Code. The sentences have been directed to run concurrently. 2. The appellant was a Platoon Commander in the Special Armed Constabulary and was stationed at Babatpur, in the district of Benares. The case for the prosecution is that, on the afternoon of 15-1-1945, the appellant, Wahid-uz-zafar Khan, along with three other persons, Jumman, Ghayasuddin and Aziz Ahmad went to Mauza Ahirabirpur, at the house of a man named Bansi. The relations between this Bansi and Mahabal and Chet Narain were strained. At their instance he, without any justification, arrested Bansi and took him to his station. On the next morning, i.e., on the morning of 16-1-1945 Jumman, Ghayasuddin and Aziz Ahmad took Bansi to the S.A.C. Commandant at Benares. The Commandant satisfied himself that the arrest of Bansi was a proper arrest and sent him to the Central Police Station, Benares. Jai Narain Singh, the Sub-inspector, who was entrusted with the investigation, found that the case against Bansi was false. 3. The above is, in brief, the story for the prosecution. The appellant, along with Jumman, Ghayas Aziz, Mahabal and Chet Narain, was placed on his trial before the learned Sessions Judge under Ss. 211 and 342, Penal Code. The trial was held, as said above with the aid of a jury. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of not guilty as against the others, but found the appellant guilty. The learned Sessions Judge accepted the verdict and passed the sentence mentioned above. The appellant has come to this Court in appeal. 4. The case has been argued with ability and succinctness by Mr. Lari, the learned counsel for the appellant. The right of appeal given to an accused person, who had the benefit of a trial by jury, is restricted. That right can be found only within the four corners of S. 418, Criminal P.C. It is only a question of law on which this Court can be moved. Lari, the learned counsel for the appellant. The right of appeal given to an accused person, who had the benefit of a trial by jury, is restricted. That right can be found only within the four corners of S. 418, Criminal P.C. It is only a question of law on which this Court can be moved. The learned counsel has, however, substantiated his position by a reference to the relevant portions in the charge of the learned Sessions Judge to the jury. 5. It is not the case of the learned counsel that the charge was tendentious. Nor is it his case that the prosecution having failed, on practically the same evidence against the others, the case against him must also fail. His case is that the learned Sessions Judge fell into an obvious fallacy with regard to S. 211, Penal Code, and did not do his duty at all with regard to S. 342 of that Code. Section 211 says: Whoever.....institutes or causes to be instituted any criminal proceeding against that person, or falsely charges any person with having committed an offence, .... At page 154 of the typed paperbook is to be found the relevant portion of the charge. Says the learned Sessions Judge: There is the evidence that it was Wahiduzzafar who was approached for the release of Bansi and declined to release him. If you believe this evidence, it will be open to you to hold Wahiduzzafar responsible for the arrest and the wrongful confinement of Bansi whether he himself went to Ahirabirpur or not. In that event a case under S. 211, Penal Code, would also be made out against him. For he sent a report to the police at Benares which was not true. (The italics are mine). 6. The learned counsel contends that all that the appellant on his return to his station did was to make a note of what he had done at Ahirabirpur. He had never sent a report to the police at Benares. The learned Crown counsel is unable to place before me anything on the record to support the observation of the learned Sessions Judge that Wahiduzzafar "sent a report to the police at Benares which was not true." If this is so, it is a clear case of misdirection to the jury. The case under S. 211, Penal Code, must, therefore, fail. 7. The case under S. 211, Penal Code, must, therefore, fail. 7. Coming to the other charge of wrongful confinement within the meaning of S. 342, Penal Code, learned Sessions Judge did not explain the law on the subject to the jury. I shall let him speak in his own words : I have already explained section 211 of the Indian Penal Code to you. It is unnecessary for me now to explain the other section, viz. 342 of the Indian Penal Code. The learned Government Pleader has already explained to you the offences with which the accused persons have been charged. 8. There is no doubt in my mind that this involves a failure of duty. Trial by a jury is a wholesome institution, but it, at the same time, casts a very heavy responsibility on the learned Sessions Judge to properly explain the law to the jury : vide Emperor Vs. Mohammad Israil, AIR 1930 All 24 This is necessary in view of the fact that the law attaches special sanctity to its verdict. Once the jury has returned a verdict, the Court has to accept it, except for the reasons indicated in S. 307, Criminal P.C. This duty of explaining the law to enable the members of the jury to return a correct verdict the Judge has to do himself. It cannot be left to be done vicariously. This was the view taken in [Mangan Das v. Emperor] (02) 29 Cal. 379. The learned Sessions Judge in that case too did almost the same which the learned Sessions Judge in the case before me has done. Said he : The law bearing on the case has been placed before you more than once in the addresses delivered by the learned pleaders on either side. I need not go into detail as to the law therefor. Criticising the procedure the learned Judges of the High Court observed as below : It is immaterial how much or how often the Jury may have been addressed by the pleaders on both sides upon the law. The responsibility of laying down the law for the guidance of the jury rested entirely with the Judge, and the verdict arrived at by the jury in the absence of any such direction on the law by which they should be guided cannot be accepted as a valid verdict in the case. 9. The responsibility of laying down the law for the guidance of the jury rested entirely with the Judge, and the verdict arrived at by the jury in the absence of any such direction on the law by which they should be guided cannot be accepted as a valid verdict in the case. 9. It is, therefore, obvious that there was no proper charge to the jury and the trial was vitiated by this error of law. The next question is whether circumstances of the case demand a retrial. I do not think that they do demand a retrial, more particularly when all the other accused have been acquitted on practically the same evidence. 10. I, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused. He shall he set at liberty forthwith unless, required in connection with any other case. It is needless to say that the appellant, who is a young man of 24 leaves the Court without a stain.