JUDGMENT Allsop, J. - This appeal arises out of a suit in which the plaintiffs sought to obtain possession of certain property of which the original owner was one Nand Kishore, who died in the year 1850. This man left him surviving a widow, Mt. Bhawan Kuer, who adopted a boy called Ram Saran Das as a son in the year 1877. Ram Saran Das executed a will on 6-12-1877. He died about the yew 1898 leaving him surviving two widows one of whom was Mt. Kalawati. In 1918 Mt. Kalawati was said to have adopted a son Dharam Prakash, relying upon a power to adopt given her by the will. In 1924 a suit was instituted by Mt. Kalawati in order to obtain a declaration that there had been no adoption and, if there had been an adoption, it was invalid. The trial Court passed a decree in Mt. Kalawati's favour and this was ultimately upheld by their Lordships of the Privy Council in 1933. Mt. Kalawati died in 1935, having in the meanwhile transferred the property in suit to some of the defendants. The plaintiffs instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal on the allegations that they were the nearest reversionary of Ram Saran Das and that Mt. Kalawati had no power to alienate the property. The learned Civil Judge has passed a decree in their favour. 2. One of the allegations which was made in the trial Court by the defendants was that the plaintiffs were not the nearest reversionary of Ram Saran Das. Thelearned Civil Judge decided this issue against the defendants; one of the grounds of this appeal is that this decision was wrong, but learned counsel for the appellants has not been able to adduce any arguments in support of this contention. There was ample evidence to support the finding of the learned Civil Judge and we have not been shown any reason why we should come to the conclusion that he was in error upon this point. 3. The other question which arose in the Court below and which has arisen in this appeal is whether Mt. Kalawati had any power to alienate the property. The answer to this question depends upon the interpretation of the will executed by Ram Saran Das. 4. Clause 1 of the will is in the following terms: After my death, my second wife, Mt. Kalawati had any power to alienate the property. The answer to this question depends upon the interpretation of the will executed by Ram Saran Das. 4. Clause 1 of the will is in the following terms: After my death, my second wife, Mt. Kalawati shall be the absolute owner in possession of the entire immovable property specified at the foot of this will and of the entire movable property and household furniture, jewellery and clothes, hard cash and debts etc., all that I have or which belongs to me. In other words, Mt. Kalawati shall have absolute proprietary right and power with respect to the entire property together with the right to sell, mortgage, make a gift of and transfer it otherwise, as an absolute male owner has. 5. Clauses 2 and 3 dealt with the right of the testator's mother and first wife to receive certain allowances in lieu of maintenance and their right to reside in a certain house. 6. Clause 4 was in the following terms: I authorize Mt. Kalawati to adopt when she wishes, after my death, any boy whom she likes. After making an adoption, neither Mt. Kalawati nor the adopted son shall have any power to make a transfer of my property during the lifetime of Musammat Kalawati. Mt. Kalawati shall act as the guardian of the adopted son till he comes of age as during his minority shall have power to carry on the management of the property. Alter the attainment of majority by the adopted son, he and Mt. Kalawati shall have power to carry on the management and to enjoy the income of the property, either jointly or in equal shares. [I have made some grammatical corrections in our translation of the will hut the substance is as stated by the translator.] 7. Clause 5 authorised Mt. Kalawati to adopt a second or a third son in the event of the death of the first adopted son. 8. These parts of the will were drafted by the testator in his own handwriting and signed by him on 6-12-1896. He made an addition, also in his own handwriting on 10-12-1896 on which date he signed the will and his signature was attested by three witnesses, namely, T.N. Ghosh, a retired Assistant Surgeon, Raghubir Saran, a Pleader, and Daya Nath who appears to have been a Munsif. He made an addition, also in his own handwriting on 10-12-1896 on which date he signed the will and his signature was attested by three witnesses, namely, T.N. Ghosh, a retired Assistant Surgeon, Raghubir Saran, a Pleader, and Daya Nath who appears to have been a Munsif. This addition is in the following terms: Further it is stipulated that if Mt. Kalawati should wish to adopt a son, she shall not adopt any one of the relations of her family or of that of Mt. Basanti (the second widow) or Bhawan Kuer. If my brother, Jiwan, should give his son into adoption, she should adopt him, otherwise she should adopt some other boy, and she shall not have power to make a gift. In case of necessity Mt. Kalawati shall have power to sell or mortgage a portion of the property. The question is whether the executor of this will intended to create an absolute estate of inheritance in favour of Mt. Kalawati and afterwards attempted to restrict her power of alienation or whether he intended to create in her favour a Hindu widow's estate. The learned Civil Judge has held that he intended to create a Hindu widow's estate when he made the addition to the will on 10th December. It is contended by learned counsel for the defendants-appellants that he intended to create an absolute estate in favour of Mt. Kalawati subject to defeasance on the adoption by her of a son and that the restrictions on the power of alienation were intended to operate only when and if the adoption took place. 9. There is always a difficulty in interpreting with drawn up by these who are not experts and this difficulty is enhanced in India where there is so little difference between the creation of a Hindu widow's estate and an attempt to create an absolute estate with restrictions upon the power of alienation. If the first clause in the will stood by itself there could be no doubt whatsoever that Mt. Kalawati was granted an absolute estate of inheritance and the provisions of the fourth clause might be interpreted as provisions for the disfeasance of the estate in the event of adoption, but the will must be read as a whole and the later provisions must be given preference if they are inconsistent with the earlier ones. Kalawati was granted an absolute estate of inheritance and the provisions of the fourth clause might be interpreted as provisions for the disfeasance of the estate in the event of adoption, but the will must be read as a whole and the later provisions must be given preference if they are inconsistent with the earlier ones. It seems to me that Ram Saran Das had changed his mind by 10th December when he inserted the last clause in the will. By the fourth clause he had given Mt. Kalawati an absolute discretion in the matter of adoption, but in the last clause he restricted her powers. He obviously wished her to adopt the son of his brother, Jiwan, that is, his natural brother, if Jiwan would allow her to do so. He certainly intended she should not adopt any of her own relations or the relations of Mt. Basanti or Bhawan Kuer. Her adoption of Dharam Prakash was held to be invalid on the ground that this man was a relation of her own and that she had no authority to adopt him. By this last clause the testator also took away Mt. Kalawati's power of alienation. He said specifically that she would have no power to make a gift and I think that this was a necessary corollary to his injunction that she should not adopt relations of her own, because if she bad a power of gift, she could defeat the intentions of the testator by making a gift to one of those relations without making any adoption or before she had made an adoption. The final clause that she should have power to sell or mortgage in case of necessity is a power which is the ordinary concomitant of a Hindu widow's estate. The question of inheritance to the property did not seriously arise because Mt. Kalawati had no daughter or grand-daughter and her straphang, even if she had an absolute estate, would pass by inheritance to the heirs of her late husband, Ram Saran Das, just as they would pass to his reversionary if she had a Hindu widow's estate. The question of inheritance to the property did not seriously arise because Mt. Kalawati had no daughter or grand-daughter and her straphang, even if she had an absolute estate, would pass by inheritance to the heirs of her late husband, Ram Saran Das, just as they would pass to his reversionary if she had a Hindu widow's estate. Learned counsel for the appellants has urged very strongly that the first clause is quite clear and that the last clause which was inserted on 10th December was meant not to modify that clause but merely to modify the provisions of the fourth clause which related to adoption and its results. I think however, that we must interpret the will as a whole and it seems quite clear that the executor before he executed the will had decided that Mt. Kalawati should not alienate the property except as a Hindu widow might, that is, for necessity. His strongest wish seeing to have been that she should adopt a son to him. This is to be deduced from the fact that he gave her power to adopt not one boy but three boys in succession if necessity arose. 9A. Before he finally executed the will he seems to have realised that this wish of his to have an adopted son might easily be defeated if Mt. Kalawati had the full power of alienation which was allowed to her by the first clause of the will. Learned counsel for the appellants would interpret the will to mean that Mt. Kalawati was to have an absolute estate with full power of alienation if she made no adoption, but I do not think that this interpretation is consistent with the last clause inserted on 10th December. If an adoption was made under the fourth clause that would in itself defeat the absolute estate and there would be no question of Mt. Kalawati's making any alienations thereafter. I think that the provision that she should make no gift must apply to the period before an adoption took place and, as I have already explained, I think the reason is that the executor by giving Mt. Kalawati the power to make a gift might well have defeated his intention that her relations or those of the other women should not benefit from his property. Kalawati the power to make a gift might well have defeated his intention that her relations or those of the other women should not benefit from his property. It seems not improbable that he had on the date of the execution of the will the advice of a pleader and a Munsif who had some knowledge of law and that they suggested that the clause then inserted would more clearly express his intentions. It is, of course, not necessary that a witness should know the contents of a will but in this country I think it is a common practice for witnesses not only to attest the signature of the executants of a document but also, in some measure to express approbation or confirmation of its terms. Even if that were not so, it is at least obvious that there were two persons, learned in the law, who were available for consultation and it is not at all improbable that the testator consulted them. It is not unlikely that they suggested to him that there should be some provision for alienation, if it was really necessary in the interest of the estate. I think the provision for alienation in case of necessity is one indication that it was the testator's intention to create a Hindu widow's estate. Learned counsel has suggested that term 'necessity' was used instead of the term 'legal necessity' and that this indicates that the estate was not intended to be a Hindu widow's estate, but I do not think there can be any such thing as an illegal necessity. A particular action may be necessary or unnecessary. An alienation for necessity according to law is an alienation which must or should be made. If it need not be made, then there is no necessity at all. I think that the testator meant to give Mt. Kalawati the power of alienation which is ordinarily given to the holder of a Hindu widow's estate, that he did not mean her to have any other power of alienation and that he contemplated the adoption of a son by her to him. If he was anxious, as he seems to have been, that a son should be adopted, that adoption might take place at any time while Mt. Kalawati was alive and he would not have wished her in the meanwhile to alienate the estate. If he was anxious, as he seems to have been, that a son should be adopted, that adoption might take place at any time while Mt. Kalawati was alive and he would not have wished her in the meanwhile to alienate the estate. There was therefore no object after he had restricted her powers of adoption and alienation in his giving her an absolute estate. As I have already said, it made no difference in the matter of inheritance whether she had an absolute estate or a limited estate. I agree with the learned Civil Judge that the last clause in the will justifies the conclusion that the testator when he executed the will really intended that Mt. Kalawati should have a Hindu widow's estate till such time as she adopted a son. 10. I certainly see no reason for coming to the conclusion that the learned Civil Judge was wrong and I would, therefore, dismiss the appeal with costs. Sinha J. 11. I agree with my learned brother in the order proposed. In view of the importance of the question I desire to add few words. 12. It is true that the expression used in the deed is "malik" and, on 6-12-1896, the lady is given the right "to sell, mortgage, make a gift of and transfer it otherwise, as an absolute male owner has." But this is not a case where, on the same day, i.e. on 6-12-1896, something was" added which cuts across the earlier recitals. The law is clear that, if two clauses come in conflict with each other, the later shall prevail. But the position here is, if possible, clearer. 13. It cannot be denied that it was open to the testator to change his mind and draw up another will on a later date. This evidently he did, but, instead of executing a fresh deed, he executed a sort of a codicil and, if the latter evidences an intention which militates against the one previously expressed, the later in time must prevail. 14. A large number of authorities have been cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. Particular reliance has been placed upon AIR 1931 179 (Privy Council) Sarajubala Debi v. Jyotirmoyee Debi, AIR 1935 187 (Privy Council) Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kaur, and Sashi Kantha Acharjee and Others Vs. 14. A large number of authorities have been cited by the learned counsel for the appellants. Particular reliance has been placed upon AIR 1931 179 (Privy Council) Sarajubala Debi v. Jyotirmoyee Debi, AIR 1935 187 (Privy Council) Rameshwar Bakhsh Singh v. Balraj Kaur, and Sashi Kantha Acharjee and Others Vs. Promode Chandra Roy and Others, AIR 1932 Cal 600 Basanta Kumar Basu v. Ramshankar Ray. 15. As my learned brother points out, the cardinal question is the intention of the testator. It is not possible to have two deeds couched in identical language or two cases exactly parallel. There is no doubt that, if the word "malik" alone is used, an absolute estate is intended, but, where there are other words used, the whole of the will has to be read and construed. 16. There is yet another circumstance which must also be kept in view. It is a will executed by a Hindu in favour of his wife. It was held so far back as the year 1874 by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in ('74- 75) 2 I.A. 7 : 14 Beng. L.R. 226 : 3 Sar 405 (P.C.), Mahomad Shumsool v. Shevak Ram that: it is not improper to take into consideration what are known to be the ordinary notions and wishes of Hindus with respect to the devolution of property and it may be assumed that Hindu knows that, as a general rule, at all events, women do not take absolute estate of inheritance which they are enabled to alienate. This principle was explained and followed by a Bench of this Court in Mt. Sheoraji Vs. Ram Sawari Devi and Others, AIR 1935 All 43 Mt. Sheoraji v. Ram Sawari Debi. 17. On 6-12-1896, Ram Saran Das had provided for an absolute estate in favour of his wife. He had equally emphatically provided for an adoption. Indeed, he laid unusual stress on it and provided for successive adoptions in the event of the failure of one or more such adoptions. It will not be wrong to hold that on this day he was anxious to pass an absolute estate to his wife and also to ensure his line by means of an adoption. The only limitation upon the wife's estate was that created by an adoption. It will not be wrong to hold that on this day he was anxious to pass an absolute estate to his wife and also to ensure his line by means of an adoption. The only limitation upon the wife's estate was that created by an adoption. Once an adoption is made, it either refers back to the date of the death of the adoptive father or takes effect at least from date of adoption. As held by Sir George Lowndes in AIR 1933 155 (Privy Council) Amarendra Man Singh v. Sanatan Singh at p. 713: .......the adopted son is......clothed with all the attributes of a son, and is from the date of his adoption regarded as having been born in his adoptive family, and from that date the estate ceases to belong to the widow but vests in the son and the will ceases to speak or operate vide ('80) 5 Bom. 48 : 7 I.A. 181 : 4 Sar. 73 (P.C.), Lakshman Dadanaik v. Ramchandra and explained in Lalta Prasad Vs. Sri Mahadeoji Birajman Temple and Others, AIR 1920 All 116 Lalta Prasad v. Sri Mahadeoji Birejman Temple but till that date the widow retains her proprietary interest in the estate. Indeed, if she has made a disposition, authorised by the testator, prior to adoption, the adoption will not affect the validity of that alienation : vide Durgi Vs. Kanhaiya Lal Durgi v. Kanhaiya Lal and AIR 1927 139 (Privy Council) Krishna Murthi v. Krishna Murthi. 18. We can, therefore, assume that, on 6-12-1896, the dominant intention was that an absolute estate should be conferred upon Mt. Kalawati, subject only to the result of the adoption. But it appears that he changed his mind either on further consideration or as a result of the influence of his friends. The deed is attested by a lawyer, Raghubir Saran, and a Munsif, Daya Nath, and it may be that these two largely influenced his mind. By the 10th he changed his mind. He was anxious for an adoption, but he was equally anxious that the field should be restricted. Mt. Kalawati was not to take a boy in adoption from the families of Mt. Basanti or Bhawan Kuar or even her own. The first choice was to be made from the family of his brother. Jiwan, and in the event of his refusal she could take other boys in adoption. Mt. Kalawati was not to take a boy in adoption from the families of Mt. Basanti or Bhawan Kuar or even her own. The first choice was to be made from the family of his brother. Jiwan, and in the event of his refusal she could take other boys in adoption. It must have occurred to him that he should also restrict her right of alienation. He must have thought that it was no use directing an adoption and leaving the boy adopted to her tender mercy or that the object of restricting the field should be defeated by the lady by making a gift in favour of a child of the prohibited family, even if he was not taken in adoption. It is remarkable that this codicil or the post script is in the hands of Ram Saran Das himself. 19. It is, therefore, obvious that the codicil which must control the will, represents the true; intention of the testator, which was to cut down the right given on the 6th and to convert it into what is legally known as a Hindu widow's estate. The view which I have taken is in accord with that taken in Riaz-Ud-Din and Others Vs. Mst. Phula Devi, AIR 1936 All 50 Mt. Chhatarpati v. Mt. Kalap Dei, a case to which my brother was a party. I have ventured to refer to it as the language used in the deed is practically the same as the one used in the case before us. Say the learned Judges: (a) The term "malik" is not a term of art. Its real significance should be considered in the light of the setting in which it occurs. If there is nothing in the context to indicate a contrary intention, the word "malik" certainly denotes full ownership; bat it is consistent with a limited estate if it is controlled by other clauses in the will. (b) A will should be construed as a whole, and a particular clause in which the words "permanent owner" occur should not be taken as standing by itself and record a finding that an absolute estate has been conferred upon the legatee and then pass on to other clauses which indicate the contrary and reject them on the ground that they are repugnant to the earlier clause or that they merely express pious wishes of the testator. (c) In considering a will too great stress should not he laid on any particular word and due allowance should be made', in construing the will for the circumstances in which it was drawn up and executed. 20. The will and the codicil, read as a whole, clearly indicate the intention of the testator that while, on 6th December, he intended to confer an absolute estate upon his favorite wife only to be affected by the legal result of the adoption on which he was equally insistent; he changed his mind by 10th December and wanted to cut down that estate by seeing that the widow does not defeat his intention by transferring the property to a boy belonging to one of the prohibited families or by practically nullifying the effect of a valid adoption by unwarranted alienations. I am, therefore of opinion that the view taken by the Court below is right and that the appeal should be dismissed. 21. The appeal is dismissed with costs.