JUDGMENT Raghubar Dayal, J. - Kunj Bihari was convicted by a Magistrate, first class, on two counts u/s 379 I.P.C. for having stolen bricks from the bricks kiln belonging to Mata Prasad and Nazir. He was sentenced to a fine of Rs 25 on each count He went to the Sessions Court and described his application both as a Criminal Appeal and revision. It seems to have been treated as a criminal revision by the Sessions Judge who after hearing the parties, rejected it Kunj Bihari has filed this revision in this Court. 2. This revision was referred to a Bench on account of difference between this Court and the Oudh Chief Court on the question whether, in such circumstances, an appeal lay to the Sessions Judge or a revision lay. The reasons for the views of the two Courts are to be found in the case of Makrand Singh v. Ganga) AIR 1937 Oadh 524 and in Emperor v. Gorakh Prasad 1942 AWR (H.C.) 135: ILR 1942 All 665. The Allahabad view that no appeal lay when a person is sentenced to two different punishments of the same kind for two offences unless the aggregate of the punishments justified an appeal was repeated in the case of Lalji v. Emperor 1943 A W R (H.C.) 322. It is not necessary to go into those reasons again in view of the amendment made in Section 415. The difference in the two views arose on account of the non-amendment of Section 415, Code of Criminal Procedure simultaneously with the amendments of Sections 413 and 414, Code of Criminal Procedure. As a result of the amendment made in Section 415, Criminal Procedure Code, this Section now reads as follows: An appeal may be brought against any sentence referred to in Section 413 or Section 414 by which any punishment therein mentioned is combined with any other punishment but no sentence which would not otherwise be liable to appeal shall be appealable merely on the ground that the person convicted is ordered to find security to keep the peace. 3. It is clear now that an appeal is allowed u/s 415 if any punishment mentioned in either Section 413 or Section 414 is combined with any other punishment. 3. It is clear now that an appeal is allowed u/s 415 if any punishment mentioned in either Section 413 or Section 414 is combined with any other punishment. In other words, in cases which would come u/s 413, Code of Criminal Procedure an appeal would be allowed u/s 415 in which a sentence of fine and a sentence of imprisonment or any sentence other than a sentence of fine are also passed. In cases which come u/s 414, an appeal would be allowed u/s 415 it the sentence of fine is combined with any other sentence. No appeal would be allowed u/s 415 in cases which otherwise come u/s 413 unless the aggregate sentence of imprisonment exceeds one month in the case of a sentence passed by a Court of Session or a sentence of fine exceeding Rs. 50 is passed in case of such fiue being imposed by the Court of Session or the District Magistrate or other Magistrate of the first class. An appeal would be allowed u/s 415 against orders passed in a summary trial if the aggregate sentence of fine exceeds Rs. 200. This was the view about Section 415 prior to the amendment in 1923 and is the view which was taken by this Court in its earlier cases. Any other view would, in some cases, go against the provisions of Section 35 (3), Criminal Procedure Code. If two sentences of imprisonment totalling less than a month are passed by a Court of Session an appeal would not be allowable in view of the provisions of Section 35 (3), Code of Criminal Procedure as it provides that for purposes of appeal consecutive sentences will be deemed to be one sentence. According to the contrary view urged before us an appeal in such cases would be allowable u/s 415, Criminal Procedure Code, if that view be accepted. Such could not possibly be the interpretation of Section 415, Criminal Procedure Code. We, therefore, hold that the order passed on the applicant by the Magistrate, first class, is not appealable as he was sentenced to two separate sentences of line of Rs. 25 each. 4. The learned Counsel for the applicant urged that the conviction of the applicant was not correct on merits. Ordinarily facts are not to be gone into in revision. We do not see any particular reason to depart from this view. 25 each. 4. The learned Counsel for the applicant urged that the conviction of the applicant was not correct on merits. Ordinarily facts are not to be gone into in revision. We do not see any particular reason to depart from this view. We cursorily went through the facts and are of opinion that the allegation of the accused that he had removed the bricks with the permission of Nazir, one of the partners is not substantiated. Nazir was not examind in defence and when examined as a Court witness, did not support this contention. There is nothing on the record to indicate that Nazir and Mata Prasad had fallen out when this complaint was lodged and that they had made up their differences by the time Nazir was examined in Court. We, therefore, reject this application.