JUDGMENT Yorke, J. - I have heard Mr. Kazmi in support of this reference and Mr. Darbari against it. The Session Judge of Saharanpur recommends that the commitment for trial of Rasul Ahmad on charges under Sections 467 and 193 I. P. C. be quashed. 2. As regards the commitment for trial on the charge u/s 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it is not disputed that the learned Civil Judge, who, acting u/s 470-B of the Code of Criminal Procedure, made the complaint, was not competent so to do because it has baen held that an appeal from an order u/s 476 either making a complaint or refusing to make a complaint may not be transferred by the District Judge to the Court of the Civil Judge but must be disposed of by the District Judge himself, such a proceeding being of a quasi criminal nature. 3. As regards the complaint u/s 467, the position is slightly different. The complaint against Rasul Ahmad was that he was the scribe of a document which was a forged document and which was used in a civil proceeding by Mohammad Ayub. Mohhamnmad Ayub's claim founded on this document was rejected and an application was made by the Defendant, Akbar Ali, for the prosecution of both, Mohammad Ayub and Rasul Ahmad, in respect of this document. The application was rejected by the Munsif and an appeal was lodged in the Court of the District Judge who erroneously transferred it for disposal to the first Civil Judge. The first Civil Judge proceeded to make a complaint against Kasul Ahmad under both sections that is 193 and 467 of the Indian Penal Code. The complaint u/s 193 was evidently a bad complaint for the reason that the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal and to make the complaint. But in the case of the charge u/s 467, inasmuch as Rasul Ahmad was not a party to the proceeding in the Court but was only alleged to have scribed and thus to have forged the document, no complaint by a Court against him was required by the provisions of Section 195 (1) (b) or (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and a complaint could be made against him under the provisions of Section 190 (1) (a) of the Code. The learned Sessions Judge is of opinion that it was necessary for the taking of cognizance of the offence u/s 467 I, P. C. against the accused that there should have been a complaint or a police report before the magistrate. The word 'private" of course does not find a place in Section 19 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. HO went on to make remark that "the come plaint filed by the first Civil Judge cannot-bi treated as a complaint by a private individual. The act of the Court must be taken to be in exercise of the powers vested in it and must be performed strictly according to law. It any act of the Court is invalid as an act of a Court, it cannot be deemed to be a private act of the presiding officer. This appears to follow from the principle behind the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. The King Emperor 1936 A W R 620: A L J 895. The only portion of the head note and indeed of the decision which is said to be applicable is that in which it is said that- The rule that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way, the thing must be done in that way or not at all and other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden, applies to Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. The contention of Mr. Kazmi is that the first Civil Judge sitting as a Court and not as Mr. X, Civil Judge, and that the only complaints which he could make in the circumstances were complaints such as would fall within the scope of Section 195 (1) (b) or (c). He further contends that the Civil Judge in the circumstances in which he was actually sitting had no jurisdiction to make any sort of complaint. Mr Darbari, on the other hand, contends that it does not matter how the Civil Judge come to be acquainted with the facts, nor does it matter by what process or in what form chose to make the complaint to the magistrate about the offences which seemed to him to arise from the facts which come to his knowledge. He has referred to a reported case of my brother Allsop, J., Ch. Tara Singh Vs. He has referred to a reported case of my brother Allsop, J., Ch. Tara Singh Vs. Emperor, AIR 1938 All 449 . The head note in that case runs as follows: There is nothing in Section 190 which prevents a sub divisional magistrate from taking cognizance of an offence that happens to be reported to him by a Civil Judge or an officer who presides in a Court of justice. The Civil Judge being a complainant, it is not necessary that he should be examined before the magistrate takes conizance of the offence. However, evin if he should be examined and is not examined, that would amount only to an irregularity which would not vitiate the whole trial. 5. In that case the offence was brought to the notice of the sub-divisional magistrate by a Civil Judge who had issued an order of attachment in contravention of which a Defendant had removed certain crops. It does not seem to me that there is any real distinction in principle between such a complaint and a complaint such as we have in the present case made by a Judge who in the course of the performance of his duties, even in a case in which according to law he had no jurisdiction though under a mistaken view of the law he was supposed to have jurisdiction, comes to know of certain facts which lead him to the conclusion that an offence has been committed. In such circumstances, the Civil Judge, so far as I am able to see, was in no way debarred from making a complaint of the facts which constituted such offence and if he made a complaint, it was the duty of the sub-divisional magistrate to entertain that complaint. The mere fact that he purported to make the complaint in the capacity of a Court would not, I think, debar the magistrate from taking cognizance of the offence alleged. In these circumstances, so far as relates to the charge u/s 467, I reject the reference and direct the learned Sessions Judge to proceed to dispose of the sessions trial according to law.