JUDGMENT Malik, J. - I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. The Plaintiff is the landlord and he filed a suit for arrears of rent from the Defendants who are his tenants for the period 1344 (Rabi) to 1346 Fasli. The claim was at the rate of Rs. 177 5-0 a year. The Plaintiff's allegations, were that by a registered agreement dated the 12th September, 1929, the Defendants had agreed to pay rent at that rate. 2. The Defendants challenged the validity of this agreement on the ground that u/s 50 of the Agra Tenancy Act (111 of 1926), which is now Section 119 of the, U.P Tenancy Act, 1939, the agreement, was void. u/s 50, Sub-Section 2 of the Act of 1926 the rent of a tenant of the class enumerated in the first part of the section could not be enhanced by more than one fourth of his existing rent. It is argued that the agreement being in contravention of this section was void. The recorded rent payable before this agreement was Rs. 78-12-0 and it could not therefore, be increased by more than Rs. 19 11-0. 3. It was contended on behalf of the Plaintiff that this was not an agreement for enhancement of rent, but under this agreement occupancy rights had been conferred on the Defendants on certain terms and the agreement was, therefore, enforceable. The document was considered by the lower appellate Court which held that there was nothing in the document to show that any occupancy rights had been conferred. The document has not been translated nor has the finding of the lower appellate Court on this point been challenged before me. The position, therefore, is that the finding of the lower appellate Court that this was an agreement by which rent was enhanced remains unchallenged. 4. The only point that has been argued is that the lower appellate Court was not right in decreeing the Plaintiff's suit for rent at Rs. 78-12-0 only. According to learned Counsel, the agreement should have been held valid to the extent of one-fourth of Rs. 78-12-0 and it may have been held to be invalid for any amount in excess of that figure, i.e., in excess of Rs. 19-11-0. 5. 78-12-0 only. According to learned Counsel, the agreement should have been held valid to the extent of one-fourth of Rs. 78-12-0 and it may have been held to be invalid for any amount in excess of that figure, i.e., in excess of Rs. 19-11-0. 5. Section 50 of the Agra Tenancy Act 1926, lays down that the rent of such tenant shall not be enhanced by more than one-fourth of his existing rent.... 6. Under Sections 23 and 24 of the Indian Contract Act the consideration or object of an agreement is unlawful if it is forbidden by law or is of such a nature that, if permitted, it would defect the provisions of any law, and if any part of a single consideration is unlawful the agreement is void. Learned Counsel for the Respondents has urged that the agreement being void, this Court cannot decree the Plaintiffs suit for anything more than Rs. 78-12-0 and it can not make a fresh contract for the parties. On the language of Section 50 of the Agra Tenancy Act I was inclined to hold that the contract would be valid to the extent of one-fourth and void as regards the balance. Learned Counsel has however, cited very high authorities for the view that the contract is void as a whole and the suit cannot be decreed for anything more than Rs. 78/12. He has relied on a judgment of Maclean C. J. and Banerjee J. in the case of Kristodhone Ghose v. Brojo Bogindo Roy (1907) 24 Cal. 895. In that case a similar argument was advanced and their Lordships observed that the Appellant had contended that the contract was severable and that the good part could be severed from the bad, and a decree could be given for the good part, that is for so much of the enhanced rent as did not exceed the two annas in the rupee. Dealing with this argument their Lordships said that they were not able to accept that view as, if this contention was a lowed, the landlord could enter into an agreement for an enhanced rent far beyond the statutory limit, run the risk of the raiyat subsequently disputing it, and if he did, then ask the Court to give him an enhancement only within the statutory limit. Their Lordships further went on to quote the cases of Pickering v. II fracombe Railway Company L.R. 3 CP 235 and Baker v. Hedgecock L. R. 39 ChD 520 (sic), and also the opinion of Mr. Justice Chitty that the Court cannot create or carve out a new covenan for the sake of validating an instrument which would otherwise be void 7. I must, therefore, accept that view and dismiss the appeal. 8. The result is that I dismiss this appeal with costs. 9. Leave to file an appeal under the Letters Patent is granted.