JUDGMENT Waliullah, J. - This is a Plaintiff's application in revision u/s 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act. It is directed against an order setting aside an ex parte decree and restoring the suit on certain conditions mentioned in the order of restoration. 2. The relevant facts may be briefly stated. An ex parte decree for a certain sum of money was passed on the 27th of July 1944. On the 2nd of August 1944 an application for setting aside the ex parte decree and restoration of the suit was filed by the Defendant and it was supported by an affidavit. On the same day he filed another application praying that he might be permitted to furnish personal security in lien of cash deposit. It appears that the Court granted the application for giving a personal bund as security in lieu of cash deposit and on the 10th of August 1944 the bend as filed. In due course notice was issued to the Plaintiff and after consi-dering the objections filed on behalf of the Plaintiff the Court on the 2nd of November 1944 set aside the ex parte decree and restored the suit on certain conditions. The leaned Judge expressed the opinion that there was nothing on the record to show that the security was insufficient but the security bend was not properly worded. In view of this, the learned Judge felt that the Defendant applicant should be called upon to deposit the decretal amount in cash and this was made as one of the condition for restoration. On the 25th of November 1945 an application was made by the plantiff complaining that the order of the Court dated the 2nd of November 1944 had been carried out. In consequence of this, the Plaintiff submitted that the application for sending aside the exparte decree and restoring the suit must be dismissed After hearing learned Counsel for the parties, the learned Judge, on the 23rd of December 1944, passed an order to the effect that the conditions attached to to his order restcting the suit passed on the 2nd of November 1944 had been duly complied with and in terms of the order the suit must be considened to be restored. The Plaintiff has now come up in revision to this Court challenging the order of restoration. The Plaintiff has now come up in revision to this Court challenging the order of restoration. Techinically this application in revision is defective inasmuch as in terms it seeks the setting aside of the last order passed by the learned Judge on the 2nd of December 1944 and does not specifically refer to the order of restoration which was passed on the 2nd of November 1944 but the ground taken in the application largely deal with the original order passed on the 2nd of November 1944. I have accordingly heard learned Counsel for the parties with regard to the merits of the original order dated the 2nd of November 1944 as well. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff-applicant has strenuously contended that the mandatory provisions of Section 17 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act not having been complied with, the Conrt below had no jurisdiction to set aside the ex parte decree. He has further contended that the affidavit tiled in support of the application for restoration of the suit was defective and was consequently not a piece of legal evidence on which the Court below could have acted as it did. In view of the sequence of events detailed above, it is quite clear that the application for restoration was filed on the 2nd of August 1944 and the personal bond as security in compliance with the proviso to Section 17(1) of the Small Cause Courts Act was filed on the 10th of August 1944. All this took place clearly within thirty days of the passing of the ex parte decree on the 27th of July 1944. Thereafter notice was issued to the Plaintiff and after hearing learned Counsel for both the parties the Court on the 2nd of November, 1944, as mentioned above passed the order of restoration subject to certain condition No doubt one of the conditions attached to the order of restoration was that the Defendant-applicant was directed to deposit the decretal amount in cash instead of the personal bond which be bad been allowed to file on the 10th of August 1944. This, according to the learned Judge himself, was done simply because the security bond was not properly worded inasmuch as the surety bad put in a condition that be would be liable only if money was not realised from the applicant (Defendant). This, according to the learned Judge himself, was done simply because the security bond was not properly worded inasmuch as the surety bad put in a condition that be would be liable only if money was not realised from the applicant (Defendant). The learned Judge bad in an earlier part of bis order clearly indicated his view about the sufficiency of the security because he bad said: There is nothing on the record to show that the security is insufficient. 3. In effect, therefore, the substitution of a cash deposit in place of the personal bond originally allowed by the Court to be filed was not, according to the learned Judge himself, on account of any insufficiency in the security filed but purely on account of a formal defect in the language used in the security bond. No compliance with the conditions affixed to the order of restoration of the 2nd of November 1944 could possibly be effected within the thirty days of limitation counted from the 17th of July 1944. It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the provisions of the proviso to Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act are mandatory. Again, it has been held in many cases both by this Court as well as other High Courts, that the security contemplated by the proviso may be furnished even after the application has been made provided it is forthcoming within the period of thirty days as provided by Articles 164 of the Limitation Act. Further it his been held that even the giving of directions by the Court with regard to the nature of the security in lien of cash deposit may also be postponed to any time within the thirty days of the period of limitation prescribed. Reference may be made here to a Full Bench decision of this Court in Ram Bharose v. Ganga Singh 1931 A L J 1049. It has been pointed out by the learned Judges in that case that the language of the proviso is very unhappy and is incapable of literal application. The main question before the Full Bench related to the proper interpretation of the proviso to Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. It has been pointed out by the learned Judges in that case that the language of the proviso is very unhappy and is incapable of literal application. The main question before the Full Bench related to the proper interpretation of the proviso to Section 17 of the Small Cause Courts Act. The conclusions reached by the learned Judges, after a survey of the relevant case law and the examination of the language of Section 17 along with the proviso, may be briefly summed up thus:- 4. The applicant must present his application for setting aside the decree together with the security demanded before the expiration of the thirty days of limitation as provided by Article 164 of the Limitation Act. If the security filed be in pursuance of a direction by the Court and the Court accepts the security without question and directs a notice to issue before limitation has expired, it, by necessary implication, gives a direction that the security furnished is sufficient to its mind. As observed by Mukerji J. at page 1053: A party cannot suffer by the act of a Court and, therefore, we must accept the position that the Court has given the direction, according to law to the furnishing of the security actually furnished, where the Court instead off(sic) rejecting the application of the Defendant directs that a notice should issue. 5. Again at page 1057 Boys J. observed: If filed within the thirty days and accepted by the Court expressly or impliedly by the issue of notice the application is a good application, though it will be open to the decree-holder to challenge the nature and sufficiency of the security and to the Court under O 9, R. 13 to make such further conditions as it thinks fit. 6. At page 1059 Sulaiman A.C.J. observed: In the present case although the security was deposited without obtaining any previous direction, the Court ordered notice to issue before the period expired It must accordingly be deemed to have by implication given the necessary direction Of course, the question whether the security is sufficient and satisfactory need not be finally determined daring the period of thirty days. Indeed the Plaintiff decree-holder may come in afterwards and challege its sufficiency. Indeed the Plaintiff decree-holder may come in afterwards and challege its sufficiency. The mere fact that it is found afterwards that the security was sufficient (insufficient), would not make the deposit of the security within the time in any way defective. 7. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the application for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed within the period of thirty days. The Court allowed the application for filing personal security on the 8th of August 1944--clearly within the period of limitation. The personal bond as security was filed by the applicant on the 10th of August 1944; this again was clearly within the period of limitation. Notice to the decree-holder opposite party was issued on the 15th of August 1944. This again was clearly before the limitation of thirty days had expired. In view of the principles laid down by the Full Bench, it seems to me that in this case the requirement of the proviso to Section 17 of the Act must be held to be fulfilled in reference to the application itself. As mentioned already, it was certainly open to the decree-holder to challenge the nature and sufficiency of the security and to the Court under Order 9. R. 13 Code of CPC to lay down such further conditions as it thought fit. Viewed in this light, the order of the Court below dated the 2nd of November 1944 may be considered to be the order of the Court passed under Order 9 Rule 13 Code of CPC and the conditions attached to this order to the effect that the decretal amount be deposited in cash and that Rs. 15 be paid by the applicant as damages to the opposite party by the 25th of November 1944 may be treated as conditions imposed by the Court under those provisions. That the Court had very wide discretion with regard to the imposing of such terms as a condition to the order of restoration as it thought fit before setting aside the ex parte order is clear from the provisions of Order 9 Rule 13 Code of CPC Reference might be made in this connection to the case of Shyam lal Sahai v. Ram Narain Lal Seth AIR 1920 Pat. 660., where two learned Judges of the Patna High Court had to consider the question as to the terms which the Court had power to impose under Order 9 Rule 13 Code of CPC as a condition for restoring the case for re-hearing. It was observed at page 661 by Dawson Miller C.J. (with whom Das J. agreed): It seems to me that the terms which the Court has power to impose as condition for restoring the case for rehearing are of a threefold nature. The Court may, first of all, impose conditions as to the payment of costs: it may, secondly impose conditions as to payment into Court and, in my opinion, this Cover the payment into Court of the decretal amount or some portion thereof or payment into Court of costs; and thirdly, it may impose other conditions as it may think fit.... 8. The application filed by the Plaintiff opposite party on the 25th of November 1944 to the effect that as the conditions imposed by the order dated the 2nd of November 1944 had cot been complied with the application for restoration must be deemed to stand dismissed, or should be dismissed and the final order passed by the Court on the 23rd of December 1944 declaring that the earlier order bad been duly complied with and therefore the suit stood restored are fully consistent with the view of the matter I have taken above. It follows, therefore, that there is no question of a want of jurisdiction of the Court below in passing the crder of restoration that it has done. To my mind, in this case there is no question of an extension of limitation for compliance with any of the requirements of the proviso to Section 17 of the Provincal Small Cause Courts Act. The result, therefore, is that I dismiss this application with costs.